Search
Search for projects by name or address
Shape
Badges
About
Shape is a Rollup on Ethereum based on the OP Stack. It is a chain for creators, innovating by giving creators 80% of the Sequencer fee as 'gasback'.
Badges
About
Shape is a Rollup on Ethereum based on the OP Stack. It is a chain for creators, innovating by giving creators 80% of the Sequencer fee as 'gasback'.
Why is the project listed in others?
Consequence: projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds.
Learn more about the recategorisation here.
2025 May 29 — 2026 May 29
The section shows the operating costs that L2s pay to Ethereum.
2025 May 29 — 2026 May 29
This section shows how much data the project publishes to its data-availability (DA) layer over time. The project currently posts data to
Ethereum.
2025 May 29 — 2026 May 29
This section shows how "live" the project's operators are by displaying how frequently they submit transactions of the selected type. It also highlights anomalies - significant deviations from their typical schedule.
Last 30 day anomalies
All liveness anomalies detected for this project in the last 30 days, helping you review recent downtime and availability issues.
No State updates were performed for 1h 24s (from 2026 May 29, 19:55 UTC until 2026 May 29, 20:55 UTC). These typically occur every 1h 12s on average.
No State updates were performed for 1h 24s (from 2026 May 26, 09:38 UTC until 2026 May 26, 10:38 UTC). These typically occur every 1h 12s on average.
Funds can be stolen if
MEV can be extracted if
Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. Only one entity is currently allowed to propose and submit challenges, as only permissioned games are currently allowed.
All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.
There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.
Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.
All data required for proofs is published on chain
All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.
- Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs
- BatchInbox - address
- OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function
EthereumUpdates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by permissioned operators only. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.
Proposers submit state roots as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the create function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.0 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge period has passed and it is not countered.
Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state roots using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 0.00 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the defend or attack functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with full concurrency. Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 3d 12h. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see freeloader claims), if a clock gets inherited with less than 3h, it generally gets extended by 3h with the exception of 6h right before depth 30, and 1d right before the last depth. The maximum clock extension that a top level claim can get is therefore 10d. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers’ stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step prover contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks (Spearbit 5.1.3).
Program Hashes
Name | Hash | Repository | Verification | Used in | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
0x03ca...7d1b |    | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Past upgrades
The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.
2026 May 25, 08:56 UTCHigh severity70changesOP Contracts v5.2 upgrade : PermissionedDisputeGame migrated to a shared implementation via CWIA clones. No permissions change. Executed 2026-05-18 by Alchemy Multisig 1 (chain operator); same upgrade applied to settlus and worldchain . Implementation rotations: - OptimismPortal2 5.1.1 → 5.2.0 — diff - SystemConfig 3.11.0 → 3.13.1 — diff — adds DELAYED WETH SLOT (zero, not active) and isCustomGasToken() getter. - DisputeGameFactory 1.3.0 → 1.4.0 — diff — clone bytecode now embeds gameType + chain-specific args; FromDGF getters expose existing challenger/proposer/weth (new visibility, not new permissions). - AnchorStateRegistry 3.5.0 → 3.7.0 — diff — adds getStartingAnchorRoot . gameImpls[1] now points to shared PermissionedDisputeGameV2 eth:0x58bf355C… (deployed 2025-12-22). Shared MIPS FPVM eth:0x6463dEE3… appears in discovery because the new V2 references it. L1CrossDomainMessenger , L1StandardBridge , L1ERC721Bridge , OptimismMintableERC20Factory , DelayedWETH : upgradeToAndCall re-init only, no rotation.
OP Contracts v5.2 upgrade: PermissionedDisputeGame migrated to a shared implementation via CWIA clones. No permissions change.
Executed 2026-05-18 by Alchemy Multisig 1 (chain operator); same upgrade applied to settlus and worldchain.
Implementation rotations:
- OptimismPortal2
5.1.1→5.2.0— diff - SystemConfig
3.11.0→3.13.1— diff — addsDELAYED_WETH_SLOT(zero, not active) andisCustomGasToken()getter. - DisputeGameFactory
1.3.0→1.4.0— diff — clone bytecode now embeds gameType + chain-specific args;*FromDGFgetters expose existing challenger/proposer/weth (new visibility, not new permissions). - AnchorStateRegistry
3.5.0→3.7.0— diff — addsgetStartingAnchorRoot.
gameImpls[1] now points to shared PermissionedDisputeGameV2 eth:0x58bf355C… (deployed 2025-12-22). Shared MIPS FPVM eth:0x6463dEE3… appears in discovery because the new V2 references it.
L1CrossDomainMessenger, L1StandardBridge, L1ERC721Bridge, OptimismMintableERC20Factory, DelayedWETH: upgradeToAndCall re-init only, no rotation.
| contract L1CrossDomainMessenger (eth:0x2b18602877181C3cB72C687E2A771E123A3788E3) [opstack/L1CrossDomainMessenger] { | |
| +++ description: Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function. | |
| values.$pastUpgrades.7: | |
| + | ["2026-05-18T17:41:47.000Z","0xd622e8f8eaf67a44f09ffa928ad7dec0ff497de810588ea5ae758b5bfeb54140",["eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 7 |
| + | 8 |
| } |
| contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0x2c03e8BF8b16Af89079852BE87f0e9eC674a5952) [opstack/DisputeGameFactory] { | |
| +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x7daf6049672fd2ab7dc8dd3b6287e1d0a40958346c5e2857c4616a73dcac4da6" |
| + | "0x8f21dbc160582c568a2a925ddad1b2bb889a9f72bac2067c6e72d43b662ef538" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x74Fac1D45B98bae058F8F566201c9A81B85C7D50" |
| + | "eth:0xc040F392E52Cb6970CA8E110c280fE24E07C5e2c" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.4: | |
| + | ["2026-05-18T17:41:47.000Z","0xd622e8f8eaf67a44f09ffa928ad7dec0ff497de810588ea5ae758b5bfeb54140",["eth:0xc040F392E52Cb6970CA8E110c280fE24E07C5e2c"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 4 |
| + | 5 |
| values.challengerFromDGF: | |
| - | "UNRESOLVED" |
| + | "eth:0xA4fB12D15Eb85dc9284a7df0AdBC8B696EdbbF1d" |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.gameImpls.1: | |
| - | "eth:0xE7A58c18D90E24fbf679E75678cA2b557dd9de49" |
| + | "eth:0x58bf355C5d4EdFc723eF89d99582ECCfd143266A" |
| values.permissionedGameArgs: | |
| - | "0x" |
| + | "0x033c000916b4a88cfffeceddd6cf0f4be3897a89195941e5a7c3f8209b4dbb6e6463dee3828677f6270d83d45408044fc5edb908c55f722cf6e14907b844a8b8d3cfd0c04cf3ed9b36b4f78990619fdd8f7e9cc7965326336f2bd70600000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001680d8a607f3d2de86add04df00f06794cb339a40dea4fb12d15eb85dc9284a7df0adbc8b696edbbf1d" |
| values.proposerFromDGF: | |
| - | "UNRESOLVED" |
| + | "eth:0x0D8a607F3d2de86adD04Df00f06794cB339A40de" |
| values.version: | |
| - | "1.3.0" |
| + | "1.4.0" |
| values.wethFromDGF: | |
| - | "UNRESOLVED" |
| + | "eth:0x36B4f78990619Fdd8F7E9cc7965326336f2bd706" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x74Fac1D45B98bae058F8F566201c9A81B85C7D50: | |
| - | "DisputeGameFactory" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xc040F392E52Cb6970CA8E110c280fE24E07C5e2c: | |
| + | "DisputeGameFactory" |
| } |
| contract OptimismMintableERC20Factory (eth:0x319322906beAdf69dF5d4607169c63D692B1aDC1) [opstack/OptimismMintableERC20Factory] { | |
| +++ description: A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it's deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain's representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa. | |
| values.$pastUpgrades.4: | |
| + | ["2026-05-18T17:41:47.000Z","0xd622e8f8eaf67a44f09ffa928ad7dec0ff497de810588ea5ae758b5bfeb54140",["eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 4 |
| + | 5 |
| } |
| contract AnchorStateRegistry (eth:0xc55f722cF6e14907B844a8B8D3CFd0C04Cf3Ed9B) [opstack/AnchorStateRegistry_post13] { | |
| +++ description: Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0xf808a203af41f7932eb8e39985e56a7c75c940a260fb17d76d1003a3793281b5" |
| + | "0xfdabc8b9b4db9b7aa78227b26e936abaf24f058502b96e8d9a293d49b1e89b47" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0xeb69cC681E8D4a557b30DFFBAd85aFfD47a2CF2E" |
| + | "eth:0x36398155Cd17cfe804F69b233eDDA800DD4D5aA5" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.1: | |
| + | ["2026-05-18T17:41:47.000Z","0xd622e8f8eaf67a44f09ffa928ad7dec0ff497de810588ea5ae758b5bfeb54140",["eth:0x36398155Cd17cfe804F69b233eDDA800DD4D5aA5"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 1 |
| + | 2 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "3.5.0" |
| + | "3.7.0" |
| values.getStartingAnchorRoot: | |
| + | {"root":"0x137f34d380e6aed311aea30584f0b684ca0cdfeaa6c47b9dd0b78802163204a1","l2SequenceNumber":25499310} |
| implementationNames.eth:0xeb69cC681E8D4a557b30DFFBAd85aFfD47a2CF2E: | |
| - | "AnchorStateRegistry" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x36398155Cd17cfe804F69b233eDDA800DD4D5aA5: | |
| + | "AnchorStateRegistry" |
| } |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0xE7A58c18D90E24fbf679E75678cA2b557dd9de49) [opstack/PermissionedDisputeGame] | |
| +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger. |
| contract L1ERC721Bridge (eth:0xe9d3E49b0636016c5fE9eaA2347948D0bA9f15Af) [opstack/L1ERC721Bridge] { | |
| +++ description: Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain. | |
| values.$pastUpgrades.7: | |
| + | ["2026-05-18T17:41:47.000Z","0xd622e8f8eaf67a44f09ffa928ad7dec0ff497de810588ea5ae758b5bfeb54140",["eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 7 |
| + | 8 |
| } |
| contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0xEB06fFa16011B5628BaB98E29776361c83741dd3) [opstack/OptimismPortal2] { | |
| +++ description: The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x3e7e2cb08ba995795937c9c2e8ea9d0e4d2e2de852f389055073384d5f79c59d" |
| + | "0x7883f2d27d696b1fa6259a97c561d651493c2c1324e9646e04dba10adcfd8a21" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202" |
| + | "eth:0x97cEbbf8959e2A5476fbe9B98A21806Ec234609B" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.7: | |
| + | ["2026-05-18T17:41:47.000Z","0xd622e8f8eaf67a44f09ffa928ad7dec0ff497de810588ea5ae758b5bfeb54140",["eth:0x97cEbbf8959e2A5476fbe9B98A21806Ec234609B"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 7 |
| + | 8 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "5.1.1" |
| + | "5.2.0" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202: | |
| - | "OptimismPortal2" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x97cEbbf8959e2A5476fbe9B98A21806Ec234609B: | |
| + | "OptimismPortal2" |
| } |
| contract SystemConfig (eth:0xfF11e41D5C4F522E423Ff6C064Ff8D55AF8f7355) [opstack/SystemConfig] { | |
| +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0xaa1b3bedab4e63198240e9dea4503f0e615e4d18a545961c9f11b72143279fbc" |
| + | "0x703fe68eeb3d5454a8ef012933846f1ff1433fc2df39c0c94f2a550d8325f085" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x2fA28989fc559836E9d66dFf3010C7F7f41c65ED" |
| + | "eth:0xd392c27B84b1cA776528F2704BC67B82a62132d2" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.9: | |
| + | ["2026-05-18T17:41:47.000Z","0xd622e8f8eaf67a44f09ffa928ad7dec0ff497de810588ea5ae758b5bfeb54140",["eth:0xd392c27B84b1cA776528F2704BC67B82a62132d2"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 9 |
| + | 10 |
| values.getAddresses.delayedWETH: | |
| + | "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" |
| values.version: | |
| - | "3.11.0" |
| + | "3.13.1" |
| values.DELAYED_WETH_SLOT: | |
| + | "0x51547f31a231e1007dca33017faa3da20d959b95087c588a7768bfb922fd58ff" |
| values.delayedWETH: | |
| + | "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" |
| values.isCustomGasToken: | |
| + | false |
| implementationNames.eth:0x2fA28989fc559836E9d66dFf3010C7F7f41c65ED: | |
| - | "SystemConfig" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xd392c27B84b1cA776528F2704BC67B82a62132d2: | |
| + | "SystemConfig" |
| } |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0x58bf355C5d4EdFc723eF89d99582ECCfd143266A) [opstack/PermissionedDisputeGame] | |
| +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger. |
2026 May 15, 13:08 UTC8changesTwo unrelated changes bundled into this discovery diff: Scheduled signer-key rotation on shared OP Stack governance contracts (no threshold or permission changes): - DeputyPauseModule ( 0x76fC2F971FB355D0453cF9F64d3F9E4f640E1754 ): deputy rotated from 0x352f1defB49718e7Ea411687E850aA8d6299F7aC to 0x2fA150379bF32b6d79Eeb4ff9bD280E76049a87c . Executed via superchain-ops eth/052; the DeputyPauseModule spec specifies that this is a regular rotation. - OpFoundationUpgradeSafe: Member rotated. Shape-local sequencer configuration tweak: - SystemConfig ( 0xfF11e41D5C4F522E423Ff6C064Ff8D55AF8f7355 ): minBaseFee raised from 0 to 10000000 (10 Mwei = 0.01 Gwei). Not a governance change.
Two unrelated changes bundled into this discovery diff:
Scheduled signer-key rotation on shared OP Stack governance contracts (no threshold or permission changes):
- DeputyPauseModule (
0x76fC2F971FB355D0453cF9F64d3F9E4f640E1754):deputyrotated from0x352f1defB49718e7Ea411687E850aA8d6299F7aCto0x2fA150379bF32b6d79Eeb4ff9bD280E76049a87c. Executed via superchain-ops eth/052; the DeputyPauseModule spec specifies that this is a regular rotation. - OpFoundationUpgradeSafe: Member rotated.
Shape-local sequencer configuration tweak:
- SystemConfig (
0xfF11e41D5C4F522E423Ff6C064Ff8D55AF8f7355):minBaseFeeraised from0to10000000(10 Mwei = 0.01 Gwei). Not a governance change.
| contract DeputyPauseModule (eth:0x76fC2F971FB355D0453cF9F64d3F9E4f640E1754) [opstack/DeputyPauseModule] { | |
| +++ description: Allows eth:0x2fA150379bF32b6d79Eeb4ff9bD280E76049a87c, called the deputy pauser, to act on behalf of the eth:0x847B5c174615B1B7fDF770882256e2D3E95b9D92 if set as its Safe module. | |
| description: | |
| - | "Allows eth:0x352f1defB49718e7Ea411687E850aA8d6299F7aC, called the deputy pauser, to act on behalf of the eth:0x847B5c174615B1B7fDF770882256e2D3E95b9D92 if set as its Safe module." |
| + | "Allows eth:0x2fA150379bF32b6d79Eeb4ff9bD280E76049a87c, called the deputy pauser, to act on behalf of the eth:0x847B5c174615B1B7fDF770882256e2D3E95b9D92 if set as its Safe module." |
| values.deputy: | |
| - | "eth:0x352f1defB49718e7Ea411687E850aA8d6299F7aC" |
| + | "eth:0x2fA150379bF32b6d79Eeb4ff9bD280E76049a87c" |
| } |
| contract OpFoundationUpgradeSafe (eth:0x847B5c174615B1B7fDF770882256e2D3E95b9D92) [GnosisSafe] { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| values.$members.6: | |
| - | "eth:0xc222ab08333109243B1f4E2a80e3D0A190714AB5" |
| + | "eth:0xa2A58E31C03C59e34ab4d996d811DA0C035BfDea" |
| } |
| contract SystemConfig (eth:0xfF11e41D5C4F522E423Ff6C064Ff8D55AF8f7355) [opstack/SystemConfig] { | |
| +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address. | |
| values.minBaseFee: | |
| - | 0 |
| + | 10000000 |
| } |
2026 May 05, 17:15 UTCHigh severity86changesOP Stack contracts upgrade on shape. Implementation rotations / version bumps: - SystemConfig v3.7.0 → v3.11.0 — adds daFootprintGasScalar and minBaseFee . - OptimismPortal2 → v5.1.1 . - L1CrossDomainMessenger v2.10.0 → v2.11.0 . - DisputeGameFactory v1.2.0 → v1.3.0 ; PermissionedDisputeGame rotated; permissionedGameArgs EXPECT REVERT → 0x . - L1StandardBridge v2.7.0 → v2.8.0 . - L1ERC721Bridge upgraded. - OptimismMintableERC20Factory v1.10.1 → v1.10.2 . - AnchorStateRegistry rotated (v3.5.0 at new address). - DelayedWETH rotated (v1.5.0 at new address). - MIPS rotated: old 0x07BABE08... deleted, new 0x6463dEE3... (v1.9.0) created. - PreimageOracle rotated. Discovery also picked up several Optimism Foundation governance contracts (SaferSafes, DeputyPauseModule, LivenessModule, OpFoundationOperationsSafe, DeputyGuardianModule, Guardian Multisig, etc.) reachable from the new SystemConfig wiring.
OP Stack contracts upgrade on shape.
Implementation rotations / version bumps:
- SystemConfig
v3.7.0 → v3.11.0— addsdaFootprintGasScalarandminBaseFee. - OptimismPortal2 →
v5.1.1. - L1CrossDomainMessenger
v2.10.0 → v2.11.0. - DisputeGameFactory
v1.2.0 → v1.3.0; PermissionedDisputeGame rotated;permissionedGameArgsEXPECT_REVERT→0x. - L1StandardBridge
v2.7.0 → v2.8.0. - L1ERC721Bridge upgraded.
- OptimismMintableERC20Factory
v1.10.1 → v1.10.2. - AnchorStateRegistry rotated (v3.5.0 at new address).
- DelayedWETH rotated (v1.5.0 at new address).
- MIPS rotated: old
0x07BABE08...deleted, new0x6463dEE3...(v1.9.0) created. - PreimageOracle rotated.
Discovery also picked up several Optimism Foundation governance contracts (SaferSafes, DeputyPauseModule, LivenessModule, OpFoundationOperationsSafe, DeputyGuardianModule, Guardian Multisig, etc.) reachable from the new SystemConfig wiring.
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0x0621932Ea17bE6ad17409c0A9A112E166Afc0653) | |
| +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger. |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract MIPS (eth:0x07BABE08EE4D07dBA236530183B24055535A7011) | |
| +++ description: The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute. |
| contract L1CrossDomainMessenger (eth:0x2b18602877181C3cB72C687E2A771E123A3788E3) { | |
| +++ description: Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x12cf78bcfa479caaee8133c0f935dcdcc333cdc116805f6b81bd80f6ba52128c" |
| + | "0xfa9c986019a03bd66efb7584a7064e708f6fb71956643a9d4daa2c0972a29c03" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x22D12E0FAebD62d429514A65EBAe32dd316c12D6" |
| + | "eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.6: | |
| + | ["2026-05-04T07:38:35.000Z","0xab0f76e93f0bb490faf06b904f76c92132cd96ed9a51a716be72dba72c70ec61",["eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 6 |
| + | 7 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.10.0" |
| + | "2.11.0" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x22D12E0FAebD62d429514A65EBAe32dd316c12D6: | |
| - | "L1CrossDomainMessenger" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0: | |
| + | "L1CrossDomainMessenger" |
| } |
| contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0x2c03e8BF8b16Af89079852BE87f0e9eC674a5952) { | |
| +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x93342e3d1e616bd6c727a5f73b09c0811bdab764dc9ad7346278593fb66b3689" |
| + | "0x19f3f7c7ee3977705261bfb86f826d5f97b885796f2246be7cc3e815c3e95dca" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x33D1e8571a85a538ed3D5A4d88f46C112383439D" |
| + | "eth:0x74Fac1D45B98bae058F8F566201c9A81B85C7D50" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.3: | |
| + | ["2026-05-04T07:38:35.000Z","0xab0f76e93f0bb490faf06b904f76c92132cd96ed9a51a716be72dba72c70ec61",["eth:0x74Fac1D45B98bae058F8F566201c9A81B85C7D50"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 3 |
| + | 4 |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.gameImpls.1: | |
| - | "eth:0x0621932Ea17bE6ad17409c0A9A112E166Afc0653" |
| + | "eth:0xE7A58c18D90E24fbf679E75678cA2b557dd9de49" |
| values.permissionedGameArgs: | |
| - | "EXPECT_REVERT" |
| + | "0x" |
| values.version: | |
| - | "1.2.0" |
| + | "1.3.0" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x33D1e8571a85a538ed3D5A4d88f46C112383439D: | |
| - | "DisputeGameFactory" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x74Fac1D45B98bae058F8F566201c9A81B85C7D50: | |
| + | "DisputeGameFactory" |
| } |
| contract OptimismMintableERC20Factory (eth:0x319322906beAdf69dF5d4607169c63D692B1aDC1) { | |
| +++ description: A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it's deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain's representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x9650b4bba6299e410f01a369a95a2c57e1c3ca35f0d80c13f4f59fc468f370e5" |
| + | "0x25bad2bdb7df4347412a48e271dea1489299460192b43b8ca52ed191b4940992" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x5493f4677A186f64805fe7317D6993ba4863988F" |
| + | "eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.3: | |
| + | ["2026-05-04T07:38:35.000Z","0xab0f76e93f0bb490faf06b904f76c92132cd96ed9a51a716be72dba72c70ec61",["eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 3 |
| + | 4 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "1.10.1" |
| + | "1.10.2" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x5493f4677A186f64805fe7317D6993ba4863988F: | |
| - | "OptimismMintableERC20Factory" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB: | |
| + | "OptimismMintableERC20Factory" |
| } |
| contract L1StandardBridge (eth:0x62Edd5f4930Ea92dCa3fB81689bDD9b9d076b57B) { | |
| +++ description: The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x29b630d028d2dfddff75dc128b41ae51836c874dcd31a62c9d7313599e6261fb" |
| + | "0x0114d3af66179d6404d14360203dc6bcf404f23e2db4ee1b5848e923e131bc00" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0xe32B192fb1DcA88fCB1C56B3ACb429e32238aDCb" |
| + | "eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A" |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.7.0" |
| + | "2.8.0" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xe32B192fb1DcA88fCB1C56B3ACb429e32238aDCb: | |
| - | "L1StandardBridge" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A: | |
| + | "L1StandardBridge" |
| } |
| contract Optimism Security Council (eth:0xc2819DC788505Aac350142A7A707BF9D03E3Bd03) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| values.$members.12: | |
| - | "eth:0x92827223f6b397CE9F208eE352bacA710765cACb" |
| + | "eth:0xcbC7dCeb857F0b25523618cCa0A03c419a6d7eA6" |
| } |
| contract L1ERC721Bridge (eth:0xe9d3E49b0636016c5fE9eaA2347948D0bA9f15Af) { | |
| +++ description: Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0xab560cdc633c64552a47cd693ebc9aaab91fe80bec99e9e89b9d13d89a994c22" |
| + | "0x75cd470a9d1c1afc343b599b1c14731f55bb36fe8a4e844ddb88a0b791918795" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x7f1d12fB2911EB095278085f721e644C1f675696" |
| + | "eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.6: | |
| + | ["2026-05-04T07:38:35.000Z","0xab0f76e93f0bb490faf06b904f76c92132cd96ed9a51a716be72dba72c70ec61",["eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 6 |
| + | 7 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.8.0" |
| + | "2.9.0" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x7f1d12fB2911EB095278085f721e644C1f675696: | |
| - | "L1ERC721Bridge" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9: | |
| + | "L1ERC721Bridge" |
| } |
| contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0xEB06fFa16011B5628BaB98E29776361c83741dd3) { | |
| +++ description: The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x8ca0818fc584e81a5cead0efc1c32f3273182323dcbd08a60779d55cb0aa90c9" |
| + | "0xec3fef2865ee3bd465fea37851bfc490f143eba36d1e45d220832d39770aa8f2" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x381E729FF983FA4BCEd820e7b922d79bF653B999" |
| + | "eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.6: | |
| + | ["2026-05-04T07:38:35.000Z","0xab0f76e93f0bb490faf06b904f76c92132cd96ed9a51a716be72dba72c70ec61",["eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 6 |
| + | 7 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "5.0.0" |
| + | "5.1.1" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x381E729FF983FA4BCEd820e7b922d79bF653B999: | |
| - | "OptimismPortal2" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202: | |
| + | "OptimismPortal2" |
| } |
| contract SystemConfig (eth:0xfF11e41D5C4F522E423Ff6C064Ff8D55AF8f7355) { | |
| +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0xc64176b1425d9639f5082ecef5e30b3b365111e2be71596ab1bd831edba65bd9" |
| + | "0x09e12b8c0307a4da75a8b84ed7c88ced81e386ec09025ec5b36873b4f69614d0" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x2bFE4A5Bd5A41e9d848d843ebCDFa15954e9A557" |
| + | "eth:0x2fA28989fc559836E9d66dFf3010C7F7f41c65ED" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.8: | |
| + | ["2026-05-04T07:38:35.000Z","0xab0f76e93f0bb490faf06b904f76c92132cd96ed9a51a716be72dba72c70ec61",["eth:0x2fA28989fc559836E9d66dFf3010C7F7f41c65ED"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 8 |
| + | 9 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "3.7.0" |
| + | "3.11.0" |
| values.daFootprintGasScalar: | |
| + | 0 |
| values.minBaseFee: | |
| + | 0 |
| implementationNames.eth:0x2bFE4A5Bd5A41e9d848d843ebCDFa15954e9A557: | |
| - | "SystemConfig" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x2fA28989fc559836E9d66dFf3010C7F7f41c65ED: | |
| + | "SystemConfig" |
| } |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract MIPS (eth:0x6463dEE3828677F6270d83d45408044fc5eDB908) | |
| +++ description: The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0xE7A58c18D90E24fbf679E75678cA2b557dd9de49) | |
| +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger. |
2026 April 01, 07:34 UTC4changesGas parameter update: basefeeScalar and blobbasefeeScalar increased.
Gas parameter update: basefeeScalar and blobbasefeeScalar increased.
| contract SystemConfig (eth:0xfF11e41D5C4F522E423Ff6C064Ff8D55AF8f7355) { | |
| +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address. | |
| values.basefeeScalar: | |
| - | 26812 |
| + | 67290 |
| values.blobbasefeeScalar: | |
| - | 906223 |
| + | 1510372 |
| } |
2026 March 25, 10:04 UTCHigh severity133changesUpgrade 14: Isthmus L1 Contracts + MT-Cannon. https://gov.optimism.io/t/upgrade-proposal-14-isthmus-l1-contracts-mt-cannon/9796 Also includes the shared OpFoundation signer rotation.
Upgrade 14: Isthmus L1 Contracts + MT-Cannon. https://gov.optimism.io/t/upgrade-proposal-14-isthmus-l1-contracts-mt-cannon/9796
Also includes the shared OpFoundation signer rotation.
| EOA (eth:0x0D8a607F3d2de86adD04Df00f06794cB339A40de) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| receivedPermissions: | |
| - | [{"permission":"propose","from":"eth:0xfFC1CC63846dac521FB173dE86d0D765Df4DF735","role":".proposer"}] |
| } |
| contract ProxyAdmin (eth:0x11B190Ae661c6d6884dFEE48E215691E0DdB842e) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| directlyReceivedPermissions.4.from: | |
| - | "eth:0x4279be4CCbFd62FA8f7adE5A30F98d601101CF61" |
| + | "eth:0x36B4f78990619Fdd8F7E9cc7965326336f2bd706" |
| directlyReceivedPermissions.6.from: | |
| - | "eth:0x846d9469BAaF481f8516f7c1d03990672B68CB09" |
| + | "eth:0xc55f722cF6e14907B844a8B8D3CFd0C04Cf3Ed9B" |
| } |
| contract L1CrossDomainMessenger (eth:0x2b18602877181C3cB72C687E2A771E123A3788E3) { | |
| +++ description: Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0xfaa50769db48b1d2c04c06a8a0a4771b87b3c0ff20a508115bfdb2b576fdb454" |
| + | "0x12cf78bcfa479caaee8133c0f935dcdcc333cdc116805f6b81bd80f6ba52128c" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x3eA6084748ED1b2A9B5D4426181F1ad8C93F6231" |
| + | "eth:0x22D12E0FAebD62d429514A65EBAe32dd316c12D6" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.4: | |
| + | ["2026-03-16T07:53:47.000Z","0xbba5fc3724938e6ca6020735a7228ea48d2f585b5d14ddbb92faa343e49c8154",["eth:0x5D5a095665886119693F0B41d8DFeE78da033e8B"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.5: | |
| + | ["2026-03-25T08:07:11.000Z","0xae63a02fd16176b4b8f5d7da48f3c23d05bf5f171f93991f2b9002789668d759",["eth:0x22D12E0FAebD62d429514A65EBAe32dd316c12D6"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 4 |
| + | 6 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.5.0" |
| + | "2.10.0" |
| values.ENCODING_OVERHEAD: | |
| + | 260 |
| values.FLOOR_CALLDATA_OVERHEAD: | |
| + | 40 |
| values.initVersion: | |
| + | 3 |
| values.proxyAdmin: | |
| + | "eth:0x11B190Ae661c6d6884dFEE48E215691E0DdB842e" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| + | "eth:0xA4fB12D15Eb85dc9284a7df0AdBC8B696EdbbF1d" |
| values.systemConfig: | |
| + | "eth:0xfF11e41D5C4F522E423Ff6C064Ff8D55AF8f7355" |
| values.TX_BASE_GAS: | |
| + | 21000 |
| implementationNames.eth:0x3eA6084748ED1b2A9B5D4426181F1ad8C93F6231: | |
| - | "L1CrossDomainMessenger" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x22D12E0FAebD62d429514A65EBAe32dd316c12D6: | |
| + | "L1CrossDomainMessenger" |
| } |
| contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0x2c03e8BF8b16Af89079852BE87f0e9eC674a5952) { | |
| +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x85ca17941ef36ac6b28a4f8f89803d0d41ef419c47586dcd3acdb47ee9617285" |
| + | "0x93342e3d1e616bd6c727a5f73b09c0811bdab764dc9ad7346278593fb66b3689" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x4bbA758F006Ef09402eF31724203F316ab74e4a0" |
| + | "eth:0x33D1e8571a85a538ed3D5A4d88f46C112383439D" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.2: | |
| + | ["2026-03-25T08:07:11.000Z","0xae63a02fd16176b4b8f5d7da48f3c23d05bf5f171f93991f2b9002789668d759",["eth:0x33D1e8571a85a538ed3D5A4d88f46C112383439D"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 2 |
| + | 3 |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.gameImpls.1: | |
| - | "eth:0xfFC1CC63846dac521FB173dE86d0D765Df4DF735" |
| + | "eth:0x0621932Ea17bE6ad17409c0A9A112E166Afc0653" |
| values.version: | |
| - | "1.0.1" |
| + | "1.2.0" |
| values.initVersion: | |
| + | 1 |
| values.proxyAdmin: | |
| + | "eth:0x11B190Ae661c6d6884dFEE48E215691E0DdB842e" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| + | "eth:0xA4fB12D15Eb85dc9284a7df0AdBC8B696EdbbF1d" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x4bbA758F006Ef09402eF31724203F316ab74e4a0: | |
| - | "DisputeGameFactory" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x33D1e8571a85a538ed3D5A4d88f46C112383439D: | |
| + | "DisputeGameFactory" |
| } |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract AnchorStateRegistry (eth:0x4279be4CCbFd62FA8f7adE5A30F98d601101CF61) | |
| +++ description: Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract GnosisSafe (eth:0x42d27eEA1AD6e22Af6284F609847CB3Cd56B9c64) | |
| +++ description: None |
| contract L1StandardBridge (eth:0x62Edd5f4930Ea92dCa3fB81689bDD9b9d076b57B) { | |
| +++ description: The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x4a2d83507f25be218f504b76815e4494138af88734cc54d34666c631aea88af5" |
| + | "0x29b630d028d2dfddff75dc128b41ae51836c874dcd31a62c9d7313599e6261fb" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x78972E88Ab8BBB517a36cAea23b931BAB58AD3c6" |
| + | "eth:0xe32B192fb1DcA88fCB1C56B3ACb429e32238aDCb" |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.2.2" |
| + | "2.7.0" |
| values.initVersion: | |
| + | 3 |
| values.proxyAdmin: | |
| + | "eth:0x11B190Ae661c6d6884dFEE48E215691E0DdB842e" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| + | "eth:0xA4fB12D15Eb85dc9284a7df0AdBC8B696EdbbF1d" |
| values.systemConfig: | |
| + | "eth:0xfF11e41D5C4F522E423Ff6C064Ff8D55AF8f7355" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x78972E88Ab8BBB517a36cAea23b931BAB58AD3c6: | |
| - | "L1StandardBridge" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xe32B192fb1DcA88fCB1C56B3ACb429e32238aDCb: | |
| + | "L1StandardBridge" |
| } |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract DelayedWETH (eth:0x846d9469BAaF481f8516f7c1d03990672B68CB09) | |
| +++ description: Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds. |
| contract OpFoundationUpgradeSafe (eth:0x847B5c174615B1B7fDF770882256e2D3E95b9D92) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| values.$members.0: | |
| - | "eth:0x42d27eEA1AD6e22Af6284F609847CB3Cd56B9c64" |
| + | "eth:0x6419F81580343DF023E68715C6e269aFb00a2cc7" |
| values.$members.2: | |
| - | "eth:0xE7dEA1306D9F829bA469d1904c50903b46ebd02e" |
| + | "eth:0xC2Db495f5a1F91172A361AAFA6FdE47c41de6dF5" |
| values.$members.6: | |
| - | "eth:0x9bbFB9919062C29a5eE15aCD93c9D7c3b14d31aa" |
| + | "eth:0xc222ab08333109243B1f4E2a80e3D0A190714AB5" |
| } |
| contract Alchemy Multisig 1 (eth:0xA4fB12D15Eb85dc9284a7df0AdBC8B696EdbbF1d) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| receivedPermissions.0: | |
| - | {"permission":"challenge","from":"eth:0xfFC1CC63846dac521FB173dE86d0D765Df4DF735","role":".challenger"} |
| receivedPermissions.5.from: | |
| - | "eth:0x4279be4CCbFd62FA8f7adE5A30F98d601101CF61" |
| + | "eth:0x36B4f78990619Fdd8F7E9cc7965326336f2bd706" |
| receivedPermissions.7.from: | |
| - | "eth:0x846d9469BAaF481f8516f7c1d03990672B68CB09" |
| + | "eth:0xc55f722cF6e14907B844a8B8D3CFd0C04Cf3Ed9B" |
| } |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract MIPS (eth:0xaA59A0777648BC75cd10364083e878c1cCd6112a) | |
| +++ description: The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute. |
| contract L1ERC721Bridge (eth:0xe9d3E49b0636016c5fE9eaA2347948D0bA9f15Af) { | |
| +++ description: Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x9de28f19e0d1200bf0afda5ab90c9d2dffa44a775e71cfe9232ee1808338996c" |
| + | "0xab560cdc633c64552a47cd693ebc9aaab91fe80bec99e9e89b9d13d89a994c22" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x276d3730f219f7ec22274f7263180b8452B46d47" |
| + | "eth:0x7f1d12fB2911EB095278085f721e644C1f675696" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.4: | |
| + | ["2026-03-16T07:53:47.000Z","0xbba5fc3724938e6ca6020735a7228ea48d2f585b5d14ddbb92faa343e49c8154",["eth:0x7aE1d3BD877a4C5CA257404ce26BE93A02C98013"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.5: | |
| + | ["2026-03-25T08:07:11.000Z","0xae63a02fd16176b4b8f5d7da48f3c23d05bf5f171f93991f2b9002789668d759",["eth:0x7f1d12fB2911EB095278085f721e644C1f675696"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 4 |
| + | 6 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.3.1" |
| + | "2.8.0" |
| values.initVersion: | |
| + | 3 |
| values.proxyAdmin: | |
| + | "eth:0x11B190Ae661c6d6884dFEE48E215691E0DdB842e" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| + | "eth:0xA4fB12D15Eb85dc9284a7df0AdBC8B696EdbbF1d" |
| values.systemConfig: | |
| + | "eth:0xfF11e41D5C4F522E423Ff6C064Ff8D55AF8f7355" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x276d3730f219f7ec22274f7263180b8452B46d47: | |
| - | "L1ERC721Bridge" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x7f1d12fB2911EB095278085f721e644C1f675696: | |
| + | "L1ERC721Bridge" |
| } |
| contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0xEB06fFa16011B5628BaB98E29776361c83741dd3) { | |
| +++ description: The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x67ee16b5b6c32cdcc862bea390e45017908e6945cfaa01d3ef75dc9de7c9d946" |
| + | "0x8ca0818fc584e81a5cead0efc1c32f3273182323dcbd08a60779d55cb0aa90c9" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x2D7e764a0D9919e16983a46595CfA81fc34fa7Cd" |
| + | "eth:0x381E729FF983FA4BCEd820e7b922d79bF653B999" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.4: | |
| + | ["2026-03-16T07:53:47.000Z","0xbba5fc3724938e6ca6020735a7228ea48d2f585b5d14ddbb92faa343e49c8154",["eth:0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.5: | |
| + | ["2026-03-25T08:07:11.000Z","0xae63a02fd16176b4b8f5d7da48f3c23d05bf5f171f93991f2b9002789668d759",["eth:0x381E729FF983FA4BCEd820e7b922d79bF653B999"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 4 |
| + | 6 |
| values.respectedGameTypeUpdatedAt: | |
| - | 1738700903 |
| + | 1774426031 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "3.13.0" |
| + | "5.0.0" |
| values.anchorStateRegistry: | |
| + | "eth:0xc55f722cF6e14907B844a8B8D3CFd0C04Cf3Ed9B" |
| values.ethLockbox: | |
| + | "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" |
| values.initVersion: | |
| + | 3 |
| values.proxyAdmin: | |
| + | "eth:0x11B190Ae661c6d6884dFEE48E215691E0DdB842e" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| + | "eth:0xA4fB12D15Eb85dc9284a7df0AdBC8B696EdbbF1d" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x2D7e764a0D9919e16983a46595CfA81fc34fa7Cd: | |
| - | "OptimismPortal2" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x381E729FF983FA4BCEd820e7b922d79bF653B999: | |
| + | "OptimismPortal2" |
| } |
| EOA (eth:0xee1Af3f99AF8C5b93512FbE2A3f0dD5568CE087f) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| receivedPermissions.0: | |
| - | {"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x846d9469BAaF481f8516f7c1d03990672B68CB09","description":"can pull funds from the contract in case of emergency.","role":".owner"} |
| } |
| contract SystemConfig (eth:0xfF11e41D5C4F522E423Ff6C064Ff8D55AF8f7355) { | |
| +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x6e293d82eb36a83fb5d8b06268cd4fbf46027b87eea77fcc68f78e4b010a3774" |
| + | "0xc64176b1425d9639f5082ecef5e30b3b365111e2be71596ab1bd831edba65bd9" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x760C48C62A85045A6B69f07F4a9f22868659CbCc" |
| + | "eth:0x2bFE4A5Bd5A41e9d848d843ebCDFa15954e9A557" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.6: | |
| + | ["2026-03-16T07:53:47.000Z","0xbba5fc3724938e6ca6020735a7228ea48d2f585b5d14ddbb92faa343e49c8154",["eth:0x340f923E5c7cbB2171146f64169EC9d5a9FfE647"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.7: | |
| + | ["2026-03-25T08:07:11.000Z","0xae63a02fd16176b4b8f5d7da48f3c23d05bf5f171f93991f2b9002789668d759",["eth:0x2bFE4A5Bd5A41e9d848d843ebCDFa15954e9A557"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 6 |
| + | 8 |
| values.DISPUTE_GAME_FACTORY_SLOT: | |
| - | "0x52322a25d9f59ea17656545543306b7aef62bc0cc53a0e65ccfa0c75b97aa906" |
| values.getAddresses.disputeGameFactory: | |
| - | "eth:0x2c03e8BF8b16Af89079852BE87f0e9eC674a5952" |
| values.maximumGasLimit: | |
| - | 200000000 |
| + | 500000000 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.4.0" |
| + | "3.7.0" |
| values.guardian: | |
| + | "eth:0x09f7150D8c019BeF34450d6920f6B3608ceFdAf2" |
| values.initVersion: | |
| + | 3 |
| values.l2ChainId: | |
| + | 360 |
| values.operatorFeeConstant: | |
| + | 0 |
| values.operatorFeeScalar: | |
| + | 0 |
| values.paused: | |
| + | false |
| values.proxyAdmin: | |
| + | "eth:0x11B190Ae661c6d6884dFEE48E215691E0DdB842e" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| + | "eth:0xA4fB12D15Eb85dc9284a7df0AdBC8B696EdbbF1d" |
| values.superchainConfig: | |
| + | "eth:0x95703e0982140D16f8ebA6d158FccEde42f04a4C" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x760C48C62A85045A6B69f07F4a9f22868659CbCc: | |
| - | "SystemConfig" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x2bFE4A5Bd5A41e9d848d843ebCDFa15954e9A557: | |
| + | "SystemConfig" |
| } |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0xfFC1CC63846dac521FB173dE86d0D765Df4DF735) | |
| +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0x0621932Ea17bE6ad17409c0A9A112E166Afc0653) | |
| +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract MIPS (eth:0x07BABE08EE4D07dBA236530183B24055535A7011) | |
| +++ description: The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract DelayedWETH (eth:0x36B4f78990619Fdd8F7E9cc7965326336f2bd706) | |
| +++ description: Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract AnchorStateRegistry (eth:0xc55f722cF6e14907B844a8B8D3CFd0C04Cf3Ed9B) | |
| +++ description: Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame. |
The system has a centralized operator
MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
Users can force any transaction
Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.
Regular exits
The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.
Forced messaging
If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.
EVM compatible smart contracts are supported
OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.
Ethereum
Roles:
Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless).
- OpFoundationUpgradeSafe has the role if the number of Optimism Security Council members falls below 8
- SaferSafes has the role if the number of Optimism Security Council members falls below 8
- Optimism EOA 1 has the role though restricted to the SuperchainConfig’s
pause()function
Allowed to commit transactions from the current layer to the host chain.
Actors:
A Multisig with 5/8 threshold.
- Can upgrade with no delay
- L1CrossDomainMessenger ProxyAdmin
- DisputeGameFactory ProxyAdmin
- OptimismMintableERC20Factory ProxyAdmin
- DelayedWETH ProxyAdmin
- L1StandardBridge ProxyAdmin
- AnchorStateRegistry ProxyAdmin
- L1ERC721Bridge ProxyAdmin
- OptimismPortal2 ProxyAdmin
- SystemConfig ProxyAdmin
- Can interact with AddressManager
- set and change address mappings ProxyAdmin
Participants (8):
0xa335…d1100xFB00…B1ca0x35A2…E1d70x0012…55120x04a2…F2Bd0xd144…16700xeD99…56540xB2aa…1a9dA Multisig with 5/7 threshold. It uses the following modules: SaferSafes (A Gnosis Safe module combining LivenessModule and TimelockGuard. Provides liveness checks where a fallback owner can challenge and take over if Safe owners are unresponsive, plus optional timelock delays for transaction scheduling). Member of SuperchainProxyAdminOwner.
- A Guardian LivenessModule if the number of Optimism Security Council members falls below 8 → Optimism Security Council → Optimism Guardian Multisig
A Gnosis Safe module combining LivenessModule and TimelockGuard. Provides liveness checks where a fallback owner can challenge and take over if Safe owners are unresponsive, plus optional timelock delays for transaction scheduling.
- A Guardian OpFoundationUpgradeSafe → LivenessModule if the number of Optimism Security Council members falls below 8 → Optimism Security Council → Optimism Guardian Multisig
A Multisig with 10/13 threshold. It uses the following modules: LivenessModule (used to remove members inactive for 3mo 8d while making sure that the threshold remains above 75%. If the number of members falls below 8, the OpFoundationUpgradeSafe takes ownership of the multisig). Member of Optimism Guardian Multisig, SuperchainProxyAdminOwner.
- A Guardian Optimism Guardian Multisig
Participants (13):
0xE61F…76aE0x652B…cB5f0x5c1f…7a810x4A73…e61E0x3A53…aa940xEF9A…877c0x6323…c8650xd5b7…aC900x7ed8…9E390x0aA3…75D70x0a87…efE60xbfA0…E0d90xcbC7…7eA6A Multisig with 2/2 threshold.
- Can upgrade with no delay
- SuperchainConfig SuperchainProxyAdmin
- Can interact with AddressManager
- set and change address mappings SuperchainProxyAdmin
Modular contract to be used together with the LivenessModule. Tracks liveness / activity of Safe owners.
- Can interact with LivenessModule
- can remove members of Optimism Security Council inactive for 3mo 8d
A Multisig with 1/1 threshold. It uses the following modules: DeputyPauseModule (Allows 0x2fA150379bF32b6d79Eeb4ff9bD280E76049a87c, called the deputy pauser, to act on behalf of the OpFoundationUpgradeSafe if set as its Safe module).
Participants (1):
Optimism Security Council- A Sequencer - acting directly
- A Guardian DeputyPauseModule though restricted to the SuperchainConfig’s
pause()function → Optimism Guardian Multisig
Ethereum
The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Alchemy Multisig 1
Used to manage global configuration values for multiple OP Chains within a single Superchain network. The SuperchainConfig contract manages individual pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3 months if left untouched.
- Roles:
- admin: SuperchainProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner
- guardian: Optimism Guardian Multisig; ultimately OpFoundationUpgradeSafe, Optimism EOA 1, Optimism Security Council, SaferSafes
Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain’s epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Alchemy Multisig 1
The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Alchemy Multisig 1
All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation.
Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Alchemy Multisig 1
used to remove members inactive for 3mo 8d while making sure that the threshold remains above 75%. If the number of members falls below 8, the OpFoundationUpgradeSafe takes ownership of the multisig
- Roles:
- fallbackOwner: OpFoundationUpgradeSafe if the number of Optimism Security Council members falls below 8
- livenessGuard: LivenessGuard
- Roles:
- owner: Alchemy Multisig 1
The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game.
A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it’s deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain’s representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Alchemy Multisig 1
Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Alchemy Multisig 1
Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger.
The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.
Allows 0x2fA150379bF32b6d79Eeb4ff9bD280E76049a87c, called the deputy pauser, to act on behalf of the OpFoundationUpgradeSafe if set as its Safe module.
- Roles:
- deputy: Optimism EOA 1 though restricted to the SuperchainConfig’s
pause()function
- deputy: Optimism EOA 1 though restricted to the SuperchainConfig’s
Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Alchemy Multisig 1
The current deployment carries some associated risks:
Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).
Program Hashes
Name | Hash | Repository | Verification | Used in | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
0x03ca...7d1b | | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||