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Zora is a fast, cost-efficient, and scalable Layer 2 built to help bring media onchain, powered by the OP Stack.
Zora is a fast, cost-efficient, and scalable Layer 2 built to help bring media onchain, powered by the OP Stack.
Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.
There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.
Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.
OP Stack projects can use the OP fault proof system, already being deployed on some. This project though is not using fault proofs yet and is relying on the honesty of the permissioned Proposer and Challengers to ensure state correctness. The smart contract system permits invalid state roots.
Funds can be stolen if an invalid state root is submitted to the system (CRITICAL).
All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.
The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.
MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.
The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is finalized the funds become available for withdrawal on L1. The process of block finalization takes a challenge period of 7d to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.
Funds can be frozen if the centralized validator goes down. Users cannot produce blocks themselves and exiting the system requires new block production (CRITICAL).
If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular exit they can submit their withdrawal requests directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all withdrawals, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular withdrawals initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular exit.
OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.
Challenger is an actor allowed to challenge or delete state roots proposed by a Proposer.
Guardian is an actor allowed to pause deposits and withdrawals.
Proposer is an actor allowed to post new state roots of the current layer to the host chain.
Used in:
Used in:
Those are the participants of the SuperchainProxyAdminOwner.
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Those are the participants of the OpFoundationOperationsSafe.
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Those are the participants of the SecurityCouncilMultisig.
Those are the participants of the ZoraMultisig.
Those are the participants of the ZoraMultisig2.
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Those are the participants of the SuperchainGuardianMultisig.
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Those are the participants of the GnosisSafe.
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Those are the participants of the OpFoundationUpgradeSafe.
A Proposer.
A Sequencer.
The main entry point to deposit funds from host chain to this chain. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. This contract stores the following tokens: ETH.
Upgrade delay: No delay
Implementation used in:
Implementation used in:
The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain. This contract can store any token. This contract can store any token.
Upgrade delay: No delay
Implementation used in:
Implementation used in:
Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.
Upgrade delay: No delay
Implementation used in:
Used to manage global configuration values for multiple OP Chains within a single Superchain network. The SuperchainConfig contract manages the PAUSED_SLOT
, a boolean value indicating whether the Superchain is paused, and GUARDIAN_SLOT
, the address of the guardian which can pause and unpause the system.
Upgrade delay: No delay
Proxy used in:
Contains a list of proposed state roots which Proposers assert to be a result of block execution. Currently only the PROPOSER address can submit new state roots.
Upgrade delay: No delay
Implementation used in:
A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it’s deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintablERC20 as this chain’s representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.
Upgrade delay: No delay
Implementation used in:
Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain’s epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.
Implementation used in:
Legacy contract used to manage a mapping of string names to addresses. Modern OP stack uses a different standard proxy system instead, but this contract is still necessary for backwards compatibility with several older contracts.
Implementation used in:
Legacy contract used to manage a mapping of string names to addresses. Modern OP stack uses a different standard proxy system instead, but this contract is still necessary for backwards compatibility with several older contracts.
Main entry point for users depositing ERC20 token that do not require custom gateway.
Upgrade delay: No delay
Implementation used in:
Main entry point for users depositing ETH.
Upgrade delay: No delay
Implementation used in:
The current deployment carries some associated risks:
Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).