Zora
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About
Zora is a fast, cost-efficient, and scalable Layer 2 built to help bring media onchain, powered by the OP Stack.
$25.36 M
6.51%
- The proof system is still under development.
- Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators.
- Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.
Badges
About
Zora is a fast, cost-efficient, and scalable Layer 2 built to help bring media onchain, powered by the OP Stack.
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Choose token
Ether (ETH)
USD Coin (USDC)...
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Funds can be stolen if
Funds can be frozen if
MEV can be extracted if
State validation
In developmentCurrently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.
Exit window
NoneThere is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.
Sequencer failure
Self sequenceProposer failure
Cannot withdrawOnly the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.
Zora is a - The project calls itself a rollup.
- L2 state roots are posted to Ethereum L1.
- Inputs for the state transition function are posted to L1.
- A source-available node exists that can recreate the state from L1 data. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code. View code
- The proof system is still under development.
- Users’ withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators.
- Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.
- Upgrades unrelated to on-chain provable bugs provide less than 30d to exit.
Fraud proofs are in development
Ultimately, OP stack chains will use interactive fraud proofs to enforce state correctness. This feature is currently in development and the system permits invalid state roots.
Funds can be stolen if an invalid state root is submitted to the system (CRITICAL).
All data required for proofs is published on chain
All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.
The system has a centralized operator
The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.
MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
Users can force any transaction
Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on-chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract directly.
Regular exit
The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is finalized the funds become available for withdrawal on L1. The process of block finalization takes a challenge period of 7d to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.
Funds can be frozen if the centralized validator goes down. Users cannot produce blocks themselves and exiting the system requires new block production (CRITICAL).
Forced exit
If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular exit they can submit their withdrawal requests directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all withdrawals, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular withdrawals initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular exit.
EVM compatible smart contracts are supported
OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.
The system uses the following set of permissioned addresses:
Challenger is an actor allowed to delete state roots proposed by a Proposer.
Guardian is an actor allowed to pause deposits and withdrawals.
Used in:
Proposer is an actor allowed to post new state roots of current layer to the host chain.
Sequencer is an actor allowed to commit transactions from current layer to the host chain.
A Guardian. This is a Gnosis Safe with 1 / 1 threshold. It uses the following modules: DeputyGuardianModule.
Used in:
Those are the participants of the SuperchainGuardianMultisig.
Member of FoundationMultisig_1, FoundationMultisig_2. This is a Gnosis Safe with 2 / 2 threshold.
Those are the participants of the GnosisSafe.
Owner of ProxyAdmin. It can act on behalf of ProxyAdmin, inheriting its permissions. This is a Gnosis Safe with 4 / 7 threshold.
Used in:
Those are the participants of the ConduitMultisig.
Admin of SuperchainConfig. Owner of Lib_AddressManager.
Used in:
Owner of SuperchainProxyAdmin. It can act on behalf of SuperchainProxyAdmin, inheriting its permissions. This is a Gnosis Safe with 2 / 2 threshold.
Used in:
Those are the participants of the SuperchainProxyAdminOwner.
Member of SuperchainProxyAdminOwner. Fallback Owner of LivenessModule - takes ownership of SecurityCouncilMultisig if the number of members falls below 8. This is a Gnosis Safe with 5 / 7 threshold.
Used in:
Those are the participants of the FoundationMultisig_1.
Deputy Guardian of DeputyGuardianModule. It can act on behalf of the SuperchainGuardianMultisig. This is a Gnosis Safe with 5 / 7 threshold.
Used in:
Those are the participants of the FoundationMultisig_2.
Member of SuperchainGuardianMultisig, SuperchainProxyAdminOwner. This is a Gnosis Safe with 10 / 13 threshold. It uses the following modules: LivenessModule.
Used in:
Those are the participants of the SecurityCouncilMultisig.
Those are the participants of the ZoraMultisig.
A Challenger. This is a Gnosis Safe with 4 / 6 threshold.
Those are the participants of the ChallengerMultisig.
Admin of OptimismPortal, L1StandardBridge, L1ERC721Bridge, L2OutputOracle, SystemConfig, OptimismMintableERC20Factory. Owner of AddressManager. It can upgrade the bridge implementation potentially gaining access to all funds, and change any system component.
The system consists of the following smart contracts on the host chain (Ethereum):
The main entry point to deposit funds from host chain to this chain. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. This contract stores the following tokens: ETH.
Upgrade delay: No delay
Implementation used in:
Liveness Guard of LivenessModule - used to remove members inactive for 98d.
The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain. This contract can store any token. This contract can store any token.
Upgrade delay: No delay
Implementation used in:
Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.
Upgrade delay: No delay
Implementation used in:
Used to manage global configuration values for multiple OP Chains within a single Superchain network. The SuperchainConfig contract manages the PAUSED_SLOT, a boolean value indicating whether the Superchain is paused, and GUARDIAN_SLOT, the address of the guardian which can pause and unpause the system.
Upgrade delay: No delay
Proxy used in:
Contains a list of proposed state roots which Proposers assert to be a result of block execution. Currently only the PROPOSER address can submit new state roots.
Upgrade delay: No delay
Implementation used in:
A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it’s deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintablERC20 as this chain’s representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.
Upgrade delay: No delay
Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain’s epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.
Implementation used in:
Value Locked is calculated based on these smart contracts and tokens:
Main entry point for users depositing ERC20 token that do not require custom gateway.
Upgrade delay: No delay
Implementation used in:
Main entry point for users depositing ETH.
Upgrade delay: No delay
Implementation used in:
The current deployment carries some associated risks:
Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).
