Search

Search for projects by name or address

SummaryValue SecuredActivityOnchain costsData postedLivenessMilestones & IncidentsRisk summaryRisk analysisStageData availabilityState derivationState validationUpgrades & GovernanceUpdatesOperatorWithdrawalsPermissionsSmart contracts

Scroll logo
Scroll

Badges

About

Scroll is ZK Rollup that extends Ethereum’s capabilities through ZK tech and EVM compatibility.

  • Total Value SecuredTVS
    $43.33 M9.24%
  • Past day UOPSDaily UOPS
    0.177.49%
  • Stage
  • Gas token
    ETH
  • Type
    ZK Rollup
  • Purpose
    Universal
  • Chain ID
    534352

    • Tokens breakdown

    Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure
    Explore more in Discovery UI

    Badges

    About

    Scroll is ZK Rollup that extends Ethereum’s capabilities through ZK tech and EVM compatibility.

    Value SecuredView TVS breakdown
    Total
    Canonically BridgedCanonically Bridged ValueCanonical
    Natively MintedNatively Minted TokensNative
    Externally BridgedExternally Bridged ValueExternal
    ETH & derivatives
    Stablecoins
    BTC & derivatives
    Other
    View TVS breakdown
    Activity

    2025 Jun 09 — 2026 Jun 09

    Past Day UOPS
    0.177.49%
    Past Day Ops count
    15.09 K
    Max. UOPS
    20.75
    2024 Oct 22
    Past day UOPS/TPS Ratio
    <1.01
    Onchain costs

    The section shows the operating costs that L2s pay to Ethereum.

    2025 Jun 09 — 2026 Jun 09

    Total cost
    $57.41 K
    Avg cost per L2 UOP
    $0.002476
    Avg cost per day
    $156.85
    Data posted

    This section shows how much data the project publishes to its data-availability (DA) layer over time. The project currently posts data toEthereumEthereum.

    2025 Jun 09 — 2026 Jun 09

    Data posted
    19.20 GiB
    Avg size per day
    53.71 MiB
    Avg size per L2 UOP
    888.99 B
    Liveness

    This section shows how "live" the project's operators are by displaying how frequently they submit transactions of the selected type. It also highlights anomalies - significant deviations from their typical schedule.

    No ongoing anomalies detected

    2026 May 10 — Jun 10

    Avg. tx data subs. interval
    1 hour
    Avg. proof subs. interval
    1 hour
    Avg. state updates interval
    1 hour
    Past 30 days anomalies
    98% normal uptime

    Last 30 day anomalies

    All liveness anomalies detected for this project in the last 30 days, helping you review recent downtime and availability issues.

    No State updates were performed for 9h 42m (from 2026 Jun 05, 12:32 UTC until 2026 Jun 05, 22:14 UTC). These typically occur every 1h 26m 25s on average.

    No Tx data submissions were performed for 8h 27m 12s (from 2026 Jun 05, 13:43 UTC until 2026 Jun 05, 22:10 UTC). These typically occur every 1h 25m 55s on average.

    Milestones & Incidents

    Security Council removal

    2026 Jun 1st

    Independent 9-of-12 Security Council replaced by a 3-of-4 team admin multisig; drops to Stage 0.

    Learn more

    Emergency verifier upgrade

    2026 Feb 23rd

    Emergency verifier replacement due to a bug in the guest prover program.

    Learn more
    Risk summary

    Funds can be stolen if

    1. a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).

    MEV can be extracted if

    1. the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
    Risk analysis
    Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure
    Sequencer failure
    Self sequence

    In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project’s chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 7d delay on this operation. Proposing new blocks requires creating ZK proofs.

    State validation
    Validity proofs (ST, SN)

    STARKs and SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. STARKs proofs are wrapped in SNARKs proofs for efficiency. SNARKs require a trusted setup.

    Data availability
    Onchain

    All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.

    Exit window
    None

    There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.

    Proposer failure
    Self propose

    If the Proposer fails, users can leverage the source available prover to submit proofs to the L1 bridge.

    Stage
    Scroll
    Scroll is a
    Stage 0
    ZK Rollup.
    Learn more about Stages
    Please keep in mind that these stages do not reflect project security, this is an opinionated assessment of project maturity based on subjective criteria, created with a goal of incentivizing projects to push toward better decentralization. Each team may have taken different paths to achieve this goal.
    Data availability

    All data required for proofs is published on chain

    All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.

    1. ScrollChain.sol - Etherscan source code commitBatches() function
    Learn more about the DA layer here: Ethereum logoEthereum
    State derivation
    Node software

    The node software to reconstruct the state is available here. Note that it uses the L2 p2p network to fetch blocks, and not the L1 network. The consistency with L1 data can be checked by running the scroll-geth node with the --rollup.verify flag.

    Compression scheme

    Data batches are compressed using the zstd algorithm.

    Genesis state

    The genesis file can be found here, which contains two prefunded addresses and five predeployed contracts.

    Data format

    Blocks are grouped into chunks, chunks are grouped into batches, and batches are grouped into bundles. Chunk encoding format can be found here, and batch encoding format can be found here.

    State validation

    Each update to the system state must be accompanied by a ZK proof that ensures that the new state was derived by correctly applying a series of valid user transactions to the previous state. These proofs are then verified on Ethereum by a smart contract.

    Prover Architecture

    The prover code can be found here.

    ZK Circuits

    Scroll circuits are OpenVM-based Guest Programs that use the OpenVM prover. The source code of the base circuits can be found here.

    Verification Keys Generation

    SNARK verification keys can be generated and checked against Ethereum verifier contract using this guide. The system requires a trusted setup.

    Validity proofs

    Each update to the system state must be accompanied by a ZK proof that ensures that the new state was derived by correctly applying a series of valid user transactions to the previous state. These proofs are then verified on Ethereum by a smart contract.

    1. ScrollChain.sol - Etherscan source code, verifyAggregateProof() and verifyBundleProof() calls
    PROVER
    OpenVM
    OpenVM

    Trusted Setups

    Onchain verifier

    PlonkVerifierPostEuclid-2
    by
    PlonkVerifierGalileo
    by

    Used in

    Scroll logo

    Onchain verifier

    PlonkVerifierPostEuclid-2
    by
    PlonkVerifierGalileo
    by

    Used in

    Scroll logo

    Program Hashes

    Name
    Hash
    Repository
    Verification
    Used in
    0x003a...bf72
    Github
    Scroll logo
    0x0093...7909
    Github
    Scroll logo
    0x0062...d297
    Github
    Scroll logo
    0x0091...f8e3
    Github
    Scroll logo
    Upgrades & Governance

    All core contracts in the Scroll protocol are upgradable by the ProxyAdmin, which is controlled by the ScrollAdminMultisig through the ScrollOwner contract. The ScrollOwner is a central governance contract controlled by four distinct Timelocks: two governed by the ScrollAdminMultisig and two by the Scroll team multisigs. Each multisig can initiate specific types of changes with differing delay guarantees. On 2026-06-01, Scroll removed its independent 9-of-12 Security Council and transferred its roles on the TimelockSCSlow (3d execution delay) and TimelockSCEmergency (No execution delay) on both chains to the ScrollAdminMultisig, along with admin of the L2 AgoraGovernor. Emergency pause of core contracts is managed through the PauseController, which allows the team to pause batch commitment and finalization in permissioned mode, as well as L1->L2 messaging. Each pause is subject to a cooldown period of 1mo execution delay, during which the Scroll Security Council Minority can unpause. SCR token holders perform onchain voting on governance proposals through the AgoraGovernor contract on L2. However, onchain governance proposals do not contain transaction payloads, so onchain voting only acts as an onchain temperature check.

    Past upgrades

    The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.

    Count of upgrades
    42
    Last upgrade
    4mo 4d ago
    Avg upgrade interval
    10mo 22d
    Updates
    2026 June 05, 10:11 UTC
    High severity
    82changes

    Security Council removal. On 2026-06-01, Scroll executed a multiSend transaction replacing its independent 9-of-12 Security Council ( eth:0x1a37bF… / scr:0x1a37bF… ) with the 3-of-4 ScrollAdminMultisig ( 0xcca54B0916Cee2186b47E9709BEdcb7041A8F761 ). This upgrade moves the chain to Stage 0. - L1 execution tx: 0xbc6079d5…b373765 (2026-06-01T12:36:23Z) - L2 execution tx: 0x7278f818…14b62bd (2026-06-01T12:42:30Z) - Forum announcement (2026-04-13): Governance Update: Security Council Transition All Security Council permissions ( TIMELOCK ADMIN ROLE , PROPOSER ROLE , EXECUTOR ROLE , CANCELLER ROLE on TimelockSCSlow and TimelockSCEmergency on both chains, plus L2 AgoraGovernor.admin ) transferred to ScrollAdminMultisig . Pre-existing co-holders ( Scroll Multisig 1 , AgoraGovernor on L2 slow) are unchanged. Still pending (queued in TimelockSCSlow, 3-day). A batch was scheduled to transfer SECURITY COUNCIL MINORITY NO DELAY ROLE on ScrollOwner away from the independent 3/12 Scroll Security Council Minority to ScrollAdminMultisig . Not yet executed in this discovery snapshot.

    Security Council removal. On 2026-06-01, Scroll executed a multiSend transaction replacing its independent 9-of-12 Security Council (eth:0x1a37bF… / scr:0x1a37bF…) with the 3-of-4 ScrollAdminMultisig (0xcca54B0916Cee2186b47E9709BEdcb7041A8F761). This upgrade moves the chain to Stage 0.

    All Security Council permissions (TIMELOCK_ADMIN_ROLE, PROPOSER_ROLE, EXECUTOR_ROLE, CANCELLER_ROLE on TimelockSCSlow and TimelockSCEmergency on both chains, plus L2 AgoraGovernor.admin) transferred to ScrollAdminMultisig. Pre-existing co-holders (Scroll Multisig 1, AgoraGovernor on L2 slow) are unchanged.

    Still pending (queued in TimelockSCSlow, 3-day). A batch was scheduled to transfer SECURITY_COUNCIL_MINORITY_NO_DELAY_ROLE on ScrollOwner away from the independent 3/12 Scroll Security Council Minority to ScrollAdminMultisig. Not yet executed in this discovery snapshot.

    contract TimelockSCEmergency (eth:0x0CD4c0F24a0A9f3E2Fe80ed385D8AD5a2FfECA44) [scroll/L1Timelock] {
    +++ description: A timelock with access control. The current minimum delay is 0s. Proposals that passed their minimum delay can be executed by anyone.
    values.accessControl.TIMELOCK_ADMIN_ROLE.members.1:
    - "eth:0x1a37bF1Ccbf570C92FE2239FefaaAF861c2924DD"
    + "eth:0xcca54B0916Cee2186b47E9709BEdcb7041A8F761"
    values.accessControl.PROPOSER_ROLE.members.0:
    - "eth:0x1a37bF1Ccbf570C92FE2239FefaaAF861c2924DD"
    + "eth:0xcca54B0916Cee2186b47E9709BEdcb7041A8F761"
    values.accessControl.EXECUTOR_ROLE.members.1:
    - "eth:0x1a37bF1Ccbf570C92FE2239FefaaAF861c2924DD"
    + "eth:0xcca54B0916Cee2186b47E9709BEdcb7041A8F761"
    values.accessControl.CANCELLER_ROLE.members.0:
    - "eth:0x1a37bF1Ccbf570C92FE2239FefaaAF861c2924DD"
    + "eth:0xcca54B0916Cee2186b47E9709BEdcb7041A8F761"
    values.Canceller.0:
    - "eth:0x1a37bF1Ccbf570C92FE2239FefaaAF861c2924DD"
    + "eth:0xcca54B0916Cee2186b47E9709BEdcb7041A8F761"
    +++ description: Executing proposals is only open to all addresses if this resolves to the 0x0 address
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.Executor.1:
    - "eth:0x1a37bF1Ccbf570C92FE2239FefaaAF861c2924DD"
    + "eth:0xcca54B0916Cee2186b47E9709BEdcb7041A8F761"
    values.Proposer.0:
    - "eth:0x1a37bF1Ccbf570C92FE2239FefaaAF861c2924DD"
    + "eth:0xcca54B0916Cee2186b47E9709BEdcb7041A8F761"
    values.timelockAdminAC.1:
    - "eth:0x1a37bF1Ccbf570C92FE2239FefaaAF861c2924DD"
    + "eth:0xcca54B0916Cee2186b47E9709BEdcb7041A8F761"
    }
    contract GnosisSafeL2 (eth:0x11cd09a0c5B1dc674615783b0772a9bFD53e3A8F) [GnosisSafe] {
    +++ description: None
    values.$members.1:
    - "eth:0x7742637569CE1dd9AA9F4F91EaAc7c028C5e1f4d"
    values.$members.2:
    - "eth:0xbB2491beFBd46CF26F7e9B9Dec16E0c31f9c5ae3"
    values.$members.6:
    - "eth:0x9106372987a14400F283bc1AfC122A57130c18a3"
    values.$members.7:
    - "eth:0xDD659911EcBD4458db07Ee7cDdeC79bf8F859AbC"
    values.$members.9:
    - "eth:0xa28b7D23e9F8D8d5346A7901ecC9eC8ea48bAEcD"
    values.$members.11:
    - "eth:0x32E8B0B9783d65170fd37f79079d5707107cCc62"
    values.multisigThreshold:
    - "2 of 12 (17%)"
    + "2 of 6 (33%)"
    }
    - Status: DELETED
    contract Safe (eth:0x1a37bF1Ccbf570C92FE2239FefaaAF861c2924DD) [GnosisSafe]
    +++ description: None
    contract TimelockSCSlow (eth:0x3f9041350B661c74C6CbE440c8Bd6BC4C168a9fd) [scroll/L1Timelock] {
    +++ description: A timelock with access control. The current minimum delay is 3d. Proposals that passed their minimum delay can be executed by anyone.
    values.accessControl.TIMELOCK_ADMIN_ROLE.members.1:
    - "eth:0x1a37bF1Ccbf570C92FE2239FefaaAF861c2924DD"
    + "eth:0xcca54B0916Cee2186b47E9709BEdcb7041A8F761"
    values.accessControl.PROPOSER_ROLE.members.0:
    - "eth:0x1a37bF1Ccbf570C92FE2239FefaaAF861c2924DD"
    + "eth:0xcca54B0916Cee2186b47E9709BEdcb7041A8F761"
    values.accessControl.EXECUTOR_ROLE.members.0:
    - "eth:0x1a37bF1Ccbf570C92FE2239FefaaAF861c2924DD"
    values.accessControl.EXECUTOR_ROLE.members.1:
    + "eth:0xcca54B0916Cee2186b47E9709BEdcb7041A8F761"
    values.accessControl.CANCELLER_ROLE.members.0:
    - "eth:0x1a37bF1Ccbf570C92FE2239FefaaAF861c2924DD"
    + "eth:0xcca54B0916Cee2186b47E9709BEdcb7041A8F761"
    values.Canceller.0:
    - "eth:0x1a37bF1Ccbf570C92FE2239FefaaAF861c2924DD"
    + "eth:0xcca54B0916Cee2186b47E9709BEdcb7041A8F761"
    +++ description: Executing proposals is only open to all addresses if this resolves to the 0x0 address
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.Executor.0:
    - "eth:0x1a37bF1Ccbf570C92FE2239FefaaAF861c2924DD"
    +++ description: Executing proposals is only open to all addresses if this resolves to the 0x0 address
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.Executor.1:
    + "eth:0xcca54B0916Cee2186b47E9709BEdcb7041A8F761"
    values.Proposer.0:
    - "eth:0x1a37bF1Ccbf570C92FE2239FefaaAF861c2924DD"
    + "eth:0xcca54B0916Cee2186b47E9709BEdcb7041A8F761"
    values.timelockAdminAC.1:
    - "eth:0x1a37bF1Ccbf570C92FE2239FefaaAF861c2924DD"
    + "eth:0xcca54B0916Cee2186b47E9709BEdcb7041A8F761"
    }
    EOA (eth:0x498C0c17e26EEEC63375A4A20Ba8A91Aa357CbcD) {
    +++ description: None
    proxyType:
    - "EOA"
    + "EIP7702 EOA"
    sourceHashes:
    + ["0x1f44812af62d28f019e30e8eb2af596fb36c7db9d34576972c0405e110a6ef45"]
    values:
    + {"$implementation":"eth:0x63c0c19a282a1B52b07dD5a65b58948A07DAE32B","delegationManager":"eth:0xdb9B1e94B5b69Df7e401DDbedE43491141047dB3","DOMAIN_VERSION":"1","eip712Domain":{"fields":"0x0f","name":"EIP7702StatelessDeleGator","version":"1","chainId":1,"verifyingContract":"eth:0x498C0c17e26EEEC63375A4A20Ba8A91Aa357CbcD","salt":"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","extensions":[]},"entryPoint":"eth:0x0000000071727De22E5E9d8BAf0edAc6f37da032","getDeposit":0,"getDomainHash":"0xe8c593be46a5ed8888fb0c3e5e73bf758d388267b7f243139256b041295bf293","getNonce":0,"NAME":"EIP7702StatelessDeleGator","PACKED_USER_OP_TYPEHASH":"0xbc37962d8bd1d319c95199bdfda6d3f92baa8903a61b32d5f4ec1f4b36a3bc18","VERSION":"1.3.0"}
    }
    - Status: DELETED
    contract SafeL2 (scr:0x1a37bF1Ccbf570C92FE2239FefaaAF861c2924DD) [GnosisSafe]
    +++ description: None
    contract TimelockSCEmergencyScroll (scr:0x1f807E2E8ab2e61230a0A9C271F90242831278b4) [scroll/L1Timelock] {
    +++ description: A timelock with access control. The current minimum delay is 0s. Proposals that passed their minimum delay can be executed by anyone.
    values.accessControl.TIMELOCK_ADMIN_ROLE.members.1:
    - "scr:0x1a37bF1Ccbf570C92FE2239FefaaAF861c2924DD"
    + "scr:0xcca54B0916Cee2186b47E9709BEdcb7041A8F761"
    values.accessControl.PROPOSER_ROLE.members.0:
    - "scr:0x1a37bF1Ccbf570C92FE2239FefaaAF861c2924DD"
    + "scr:0xcca54B0916Cee2186b47E9709BEdcb7041A8F761"
    values.accessControl.EXECUTOR_ROLE.members.1:
    - "scr:0x1a37bF1Ccbf570C92FE2239FefaaAF861c2924DD"
    + "scr:0xcca54B0916Cee2186b47E9709BEdcb7041A8F761"
    values.accessControl.CANCELLER_ROLE.members.0:
    - "scr:0x1a37bF1Ccbf570C92FE2239FefaaAF861c2924DD"
    + "scr:0xcca54B0916Cee2186b47E9709BEdcb7041A8F761"
    values.Canceller.0:
    - "scr:0x1a37bF1Ccbf570C92FE2239FefaaAF861c2924DD"
    + "scr:0xcca54B0916Cee2186b47E9709BEdcb7041A8F761"
    +++ description: Executing proposals is only open to all addresses if this resolves to the 0x0 address
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.Executor.1:
    - "scr:0x1a37bF1Ccbf570C92FE2239FefaaAF861c2924DD"
    + "scr:0xcca54B0916Cee2186b47E9709BEdcb7041A8F761"
    values.Proposer.0:
    - "scr:0x1a37bF1Ccbf570C92FE2239FefaaAF861c2924DD"
    + "scr:0xcca54B0916Cee2186b47E9709BEdcb7041A8F761"
    values.timelockAdminAC.1:
    - "scr:0x1a37bF1Ccbf570C92FE2239FefaaAF861c2924DD"
    + "scr:0xcca54B0916Cee2186b47E9709BEdcb7041A8F761"
    }
    contract AgoraGovernor (scr:0x2f3F2054776bd3C2fc30d750734A8F539Bb214f0) [N/A] {
    +++ description: Used to propose and manage onchain governance proposals.
    values.admin:
    - "scr:0x1a37bF1Ccbf570C92FE2239FefaaAF861c2924DD"
    + "scr:0xcca54B0916Cee2186b47E9709BEdcb7041A8F761"
    }
    contract TimelockSCSlow (scr:0x79D83D1518e2eAA64cdc0631df01b06e2762CC14) [scroll/L1Timelock] {
    +++ description: A timelock with access control. The current minimum delay is 3d. Proposals that passed their minimum delay can be executed by anyone.
    values.accessControl.TIMELOCK_ADMIN_ROLE.members.1:
    - "scr:0x1a37bF1Ccbf570C92FE2239FefaaAF861c2924DD"
    + "scr:0xcca54B0916Cee2186b47E9709BEdcb7041A8F761"
    values.accessControl.PROPOSER_ROLE.members.1:
    - "scr:0x1a37bF1Ccbf570C92FE2239FefaaAF861c2924DD"
    + "scr:0xcca54B0916Cee2186b47E9709BEdcb7041A8F761"
    values.accessControl.EXECUTOR_ROLE.members.1:
    - "scr:0x1a37bF1Ccbf570C92FE2239FefaaAF861c2924DD"
    values.accessControl.EXECUTOR_ROLE.members.2:
    + "scr:0xcca54B0916Cee2186b47E9709BEdcb7041A8F761"
    values.accessControl.CANCELLER_ROLE.members.1:
    - "scr:0x1a37bF1Ccbf570C92FE2239FefaaAF861c2924DD"
    + "scr:0xcca54B0916Cee2186b47E9709BEdcb7041A8F761"
    values.Canceller.1:
    - "scr:0x1a37bF1Ccbf570C92FE2239FefaaAF861c2924DD"
    + "scr:0xcca54B0916Cee2186b47E9709BEdcb7041A8F761"
    +++ description: Executing proposals is only open to all addresses if this resolves to the 0x0 address
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.Executor.1:
    - "scr:0x1a37bF1Ccbf570C92FE2239FefaaAF861c2924DD"
    +++ description: Executing proposals is only open to all addresses if this resolves to the 0x0 address
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.Executor.2:
    + "scr:0xcca54B0916Cee2186b47E9709BEdcb7041A8F761"
    values.Proposer.1:
    - "scr:0x1a37bF1Ccbf570C92FE2239FefaaAF861c2924DD"
    + "scr:0xcca54B0916Cee2186b47E9709BEdcb7041A8F761"
    values.timelockAdminAC.1:
    - "scr:0x1a37bF1Ccbf570C92FE2239FefaaAF861c2924DD"
    + "scr:0xcca54B0916Cee2186b47E9709BEdcb7041A8F761"
    }
    + Status: CREATED
    contract ScrollAdminMultisig (eth:0xcca54B0916Cee2186b47E9709BEdcb7041A8F761) [GnosisSafe]
    +++ description: Multisig of Scroll team operators that controls the rollup's upgrade and proof-system parameter paths.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract ScrollAdminMultisig (scr:0xcca54B0916Cee2186b47E9709BEdcb7041A8F761) [GnosisSafe]
    +++ description: L2 counterpart of ScrollAdminMultisig.
    2026 May 21, 21:42 UTC
    14changes

    - Scroll Multisig 2: signer rotated. - Scroll Multisig 3: signer removed, threshold 3/5 → 2/4.

    • Scroll Multisig 2: signer rotated.
    • Scroll Multisig 3: signer removed, threshold 3/5 → 2/4.
    contract Scroll Multisig 2 (eth:0xbdA143d49da40C2cDA27c40edfBbe8A0D4AE0cBc) [GnosisSafe] {
    +++ description: None
    values.$members.1:
    - "eth:0xEe9bb388d320F4305af6a4a1a70c862D3F4d0D5B"
    + "eth:0x716f84f747e2B75aBB917ff0bCb0a71C41AA8831"
    }
    contract Scroll Multisig 3 (eth:0xEfc9D1096fb65c832207E5e7F13C2D1102244dbe) [GnosisSafe] {
    +++ description: None
    values.$members.0:
    - "eth:0xEe9bb388d320F4305af6a4a1a70c862D3F4d0D5B"
    values.$threshold:
    - 3
    + 2
    values.multisigThreshold:
    - "3 of 5 (60%)"
    + "2 of 4 (50%)"
    }
    contract Scroll Multisig 2 (scr:0xbdA143d49da40C2cDA27c40edfBbe8A0D4AE0cBc) [GnosisSafe] {
    +++ description: None
    values.$members.1:
    - "scr:0xEe9bb388d320F4305af6a4a1a70c862D3F4d0D5B"
    + "scr:0x716f84f747e2B75aBB917ff0bCb0a71C41AA8831"
    }
    contract Scroll Multisig 3 (scr:0xEfc9D1096fb65c832207E5e7F13C2D1102244dbe) [GnosisSafe] {
    +++ description: None
    values.$members.0:
    - "scr:0xEe9bb388d320F4305af6a4a1a70c862D3F4d0D5B"
    values.$threshold:
    - 3
    + 2
    values.multisigThreshold:
    - "3 of 5 (60%)"
    + "2 of 4 (50%)"
    }
    2026 May 19, 13:56 UTC
    8changes

    Scroll Multisig 1 ( 0x1FF1fc1BB4d1f081f6E0a7E7E3240F3ECC5B236f , same Safe on both Ethereum and Scroll L2) — member[0] rotated from 0xEe9bb388... to 0x716f84f7... . Permission entries for the .Executor role on both chains follow the new signer.

    Scroll Multisig 1 (0x1FF1fc1BB4d1f081f6E0a7E7E3240F3ECC5B236f, same Safe on both Ethereum and Scroll L2) — member[0] rotated from 0xEe9bb388... to 0x716f84f7.... Permission entries for the .Executor role on both chains follow the new signer.

    contract Scroll Multisig 1 (eth:0x1FF1fc1BB4d1f081f6E0a7E7E3240F3ECC5B236f) [GnosisSafe] {
    +++ description: None
    values.$members.0:
    - "eth:0xEe9bb388d320F4305af6a4a1a70c862D3F4d0D5B"
    + "eth:0x716f84f747e2B75aBB917ff0bCb0a71C41AA8831"
    }
    EOA (eth:0x716f84f747e2B75aBB917ff0bCb0a71C41AA8831) {
    +++ description: None
    receivedPermissions:
    + [{"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x0CD4c0F24a0A9f3E2Fe80ed385D8AD5a2FfECA44","description":"execute transactions that are ready.","role":".Executor","via":[{"address":"eth:0x1FF1fc1BB4d1f081f6E0a7E7E3240F3ECC5B236f"}]},{"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x0e58939204eEDa84F796FBc86840A50af10eC4F4","description":"execute transactions that are ready.","role":".Executor","via":[{"address":"eth:0x1FF1fc1BB4d1f081f6E0a7E7E3240F3ECC5B236f"}]},{"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x3f9041350B661c74C6CbE440c8Bd6BC4C168a9fd","description":"execute transactions that are ready.","role":".Executor","via":[{"address":"eth:0x1FF1fc1BB4d1f081f6E0a7E7E3240F3ECC5B236f"}]},{"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x826714adD4dDA2b8750794A467C892c0Cd49216b","description":"execute transactions that are ready.","role":".Executor","via":[{"address":"eth:0x1FF1fc1BB4d1f081f6E0a7E7E3240F3ECC5B236f"}]}]
    }
    EOA (eth:0xEe9bb388d320F4305af6a4a1a70c862D3F4d0D5B) {
    +++ description: None
    receivedPermissions:
    - [{"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x0CD4c0F24a0A9f3E2Fe80ed385D8AD5a2FfECA44","description":"execute transactions that are ready.","role":".Executor","via":[{"address":"eth:0x1FF1fc1BB4d1f081f6E0a7E7E3240F3ECC5B236f"}]},{"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x0e58939204eEDa84F796FBc86840A50af10eC4F4","description":"execute transactions that are ready.","role":".Executor","via":[{"address":"eth:0x1FF1fc1BB4d1f081f6E0a7E7E3240F3ECC5B236f"}]},{"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x3f9041350B661c74C6CbE440c8Bd6BC4C168a9fd","description":"execute transactions that are ready.","role":".Executor","via":[{"address":"eth:0x1FF1fc1BB4d1f081f6E0a7E7E3240F3ECC5B236f"}]},{"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x826714adD4dDA2b8750794A467C892c0Cd49216b","description":"execute transactions that are ready.","role":".Executor","via":[{"address":"eth:0x1FF1fc1BB4d1f081f6E0a7E7E3240F3ECC5B236f"}]}]
    }
    contract Scroll Multisig 1 (scr:0x1FF1fc1BB4d1f081f6E0a7E7E3240F3ECC5B236f) [GnosisSafe] {
    +++ description: None
    values.$members.0:
    - "scr:0xEe9bb388d320F4305af6a4a1a70c862D3F4d0D5B"
    + "scr:0x716f84f747e2B75aBB917ff0bCb0a71C41AA8831"
    }
    EOA (scr:0x716f84f747e2B75aBB917ff0bCb0a71C41AA8831) {
    +++ description: None
    receivedPermissions:
    + [{"permission":"interact","from":"scr:0x1f807E2E8ab2e61230a0A9C271F90242831278b4","description":"execute transactions that are ready.","role":".Executor","via":[{"address":"scr:0x1FF1fc1BB4d1f081f6E0a7E7E3240F3ECC5B236f"}]},{"permission":"interact","from":"scr:0x2b14d0E4b042d11C7e3Fc653132a2c82EFa7d376","description":"execute transactions that are ready.","role":".Executor","via":[{"address":"scr:0x1FF1fc1BB4d1f081f6E0a7E7E3240F3ECC5B236f"}]},{"permission":"interact","from":"scr:0xA77D19C1F2B06C9aeA9bE88C17B771a33892734f","description":"execute transactions that are ready.","role":".Executor","via":[{"address":"scr:0x1FF1fc1BB4d1f081f6E0a7E7E3240F3ECC5B236f"}]}]
    }
    EOA (scr:0xEe9bb388d320F4305af6a4a1a70c862D3F4d0D5B) {
    +++ description: None
    receivedPermissions:
    - [{"permission":"interact","from":"scr:0x1f807E2E8ab2e61230a0A9C271F90242831278b4","description":"execute transactions that are ready.","role":".Executor","via":[{"address":"scr:0x1FF1fc1BB4d1f081f6E0a7E7E3240F3ECC5B236f"}]},{"permission":"interact","from":"scr:0x2b14d0E4b042d11C7e3Fc653132a2c82EFa7d376","description":"execute transactions that are ready.","role":".Executor","via":[{"address":"scr:0x1FF1fc1BB4d1f081f6E0a7E7E3240F3ECC5B236f"}]},{"permission":"interact","from":"scr:0xA77D19C1F2B06C9aeA9bE88C17B771a33892734f","description":"execute transactions that are ready.","role":".Executor","via":[{"address":"scr:0x1FF1fc1BB4d1f081f6E0a7E7E3240F3ECC5B236f"}]}]
    }
    2026 February 23, 14:39 UTC
    4changes

    Emergency upgrade: ZkEvmVerifierPostFeynman replaced at index 9 of MultipleVersionRollupVerifier due to a bug in the guest prover program. Old verifier 0x4F43... deleted, new verifier 0x0dE1... created with identical source code but updated verifierDigest (verification key update).

    Emergency upgrade: ZkEvmVerifierPostFeynman replaced at index 9 of MultipleVersionRollupVerifier due to a bug in the guest prover program. Old verifier 0x4F43… deleted, new verifier 0x0dE1… created with identical source code but updated verifierDigest (verification key update).

    contract MultipleVersionRollupVerifier (eth:0x4CEA3E866e7c57fD75CB0CA3E9F5f1151D4Ead3F) {
    +++ description: Contract used to update the verifier and keep track of current and old versions.
    values.latestVerifier.9.verifier:
    - "eth:0x4F438522956c8826B9e29B4c775b2d8a6a803181"
    + "eth:0x0dE180164Dc571522457101F5c47B2eaB36d0A82"
    }
    - Status: DELETED
    contract ZkEvmVerifierPostFeynman (eth:0x4F438522956c8826B9e29B4c775b2d8a6a803181)
    +++ description: None
    + Status: CREATED
    contract ZkEvmVerifierPostFeynman (eth:0x0dE180164Dc571522457101F5c47B2eaB36d0A82)
    +++ description: None
    2026 February 10, 15:07 UTC
    9changes

    EURC (Euro Coin) bridge integration: new L1USDCGateway, Euro Coin Token, and MasterMinter contracts added. L1GatewayRouter updated with new gateway entry. Scroll Multisig 3 member replaced on both L1 and L2.

    EURC (Euro Coin) bridge integration: new L1USDCGateway, Euro Coin Token, and MasterMinter contracts added. L1GatewayRouter updated with new gateway entry. Scroll Multisig 3 member replaced on both L1 and L2.

    contract ProxyAdmin (eth:0xEB803eb3F501998126bf37bB823646Ed3D59d072) {
    +++ description: None
    directlyReceivedPermissions.12:
    + {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xbc4b3d9A89F187dBaA0D2E60985Ea1FFFa5247d2","role":"admin"}
    }
    contract Scroll Multisig 3 (eth:0xEfc9D1096fb65c832207E5e7F13C2D1102244dbe) {
    +++ description: None
    values.$members.3:
    - "eth:0xfc31892C5500AbE00974280b28907BaA9190E384"
    + "eth:0x716f84f747e2B75aBB917ff0bCb0a71C41AA8831"
    }
    contract L1GatewayRouter (eth:0xF8B1378579659D8F7EE5f3C929c2f3E332E41Fd6) {
    +++ description: Main entry point for depositing ETH and ERC20 tokens, which are then forwarded to the correct gateway.
    values.gateways.eth:0x1aBaEA1f7C830bD89Acc67eC4af516284b1bC33c:
    + "eth:0xbc4b3d9A89F187dBaA0D2E60985Ea1FFFa5247d2"
    }
    contract Scroll Multisig 3 (scr:0xEfc9D1096fb65c832207E5e7F13C2D1102244dbe) {
    +++ description: None
    values.$members.3:
    - "scr:0xfc31892C5500AbE00974280b28907BaA9190E384"
    + "scr:0x716f84f747e2B75aBB917ff0bCb0a71C41AA8831"
    }
    + Status: CREATED
    contract MasterMinter (eth:0x02398771Fd1db790Ef2b656ca3BcB3075f27A72c)
    +++ description: Manager contract for minter management [sic].
    + Status: CREATED
    contract Euro Coin Token (eth:0x1aBaEA1f7C830bD89Acc67eC4af516284b1bC33c)
    +++ description: None
    + Status: CREATED
    contract L1USDCGateway (eth:0xbc4b3d9A89F187dBaA0D2E60985Ea1FFFa5247d2)
    +++ description: None
    Operator

    The system has a centralized sequencer

    While forcing transaction is open to anyone the system employs a privileged sequencer that has priority for submitting transaction batches and ordering transactions.

    • MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

    1. ScrollChain.sol - Etherscan source code, finalizeBundlePostEuclidV2() function modifier

    Users can force any transaction

    Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly. The enforced liveness mechanism is activated if either an L1 message has not been finalized for more than 7d or a batch has not been finalized for more than 7d. When activated, transactions that were directly posted to the smart contract can be forcefully included by anyone on the host chain, which finalizes their ordering.

    1. EnforcedTxGateway.sol - Etherscan source code
    2. L1MessageQueueV2 - Etherscan proxy contract
    Withdrawals

    Regular messaging

    The user initiates L2->L1 messages by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is settled, the message becomes available for processing on L1. ZK proofs are required to settle blocks.

    1. L1ETHGateway.sol - Etherscan source code, finalizeWithdrawETH function
    Permissions
    A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions
    Go to Disco
    Disco UI Banner
    Disco UI BannerExplore in Disco

    Ethereum

    Actors:

    ScrollAdminMultisig0xcca5…F761

    A Multisig with 3/4 threshold. Multisig of Scroll team operators that controls the rollup’s upgrade and proof-system parameter paths.

    • Can interact with TimelockSCEmergency
      • cancel queued transactions
      • execute transactions that are ready
      • propose transactions
      • update the minimum delay and manage all access control roles of the timelock
    • Can interact with TimelockSCSlow
      • cancel queued transactions
      • execute transactions that are ready
      • propose transactions
      • update the minimum delay and manage all access control roles of the timelock with 3d delay or with no delay
    • Can interact with ScrollOwner
      • disable enforced batch mode
      • update and reset the PauseController cooldown period
      • update ScrollChain zk proof verifier
      • update the L1ScrollMessenger fee vault address
      • update the minimum delay message queue parameters and enforced mode parameters
      • upgrade all core contracts of the system

    Participants (4):

    0x8460…30ae0xEbbe…Dc68EOA 2EOA 3
    1. Governance Update: Security Council Transition, Contributor Roles & Operational Adjustments (Scroll forum, 2026-04-13)
    2. L1 execution tx
    Scroll Multisig 20xbdA1…0cBc

    A Multisig with 2/4 threshold.

    • Can interact with ScrollOwner
      • pause the ScrollChain in permissioned mode and the L1 -> L2 message queue
      • remove permissioned batchers and provers to the whitelist, and update the sequencer address
      • revert unfinalized batches
    • Can interact with TimelockEmergency
      • cancel queued transactions
      • propose transactions
      • update the minimum delay and manage all access control roles of the timelock

    Participants (4):

    EOA 1EOA 3EOA 4EOA 2
    Scroll Multisig 30xEfc9…4dbe

    A Multisig with 2/4 threshold.

    • Can interact with TimelockFast
      • cancel queued transactions
      • propose transactions
      • update the minimum delay and manage all access control roles of the timelock with 1d delay or with no delay
    • Can interact with ScrollOwner
      • add permissioned batchers and provers to the whitelist with 1d delay
      • set ERC20 gateways in the L1GatewayRouter with 1d delay

    Participants (4):

    0x8460…30ae0xEbbe…Dc68EOA 3EOA 2
    Scroll Security Council Minority0x40bD…c6eE

    A Multisig with 3/12 threshold.

    • Can interact with ScrollOwner
      • unpause core contracts via the PauseController

    Participants (12):

    0x70DF…a86d0x0f50…A4dA0xE47D…0f2aSafeSafeSafe0x383C…e3B7SafeGnosisSafeL20x3031…f4430x9B2C…81D40xFb77…DaFf
    Scroll Multisig 10x1FF1…236f

    A Multisig with 1/4 threshold.

    Participants (4):

    EOA 3EOA 4EOA 1EOA 2
    2 EOAs
    EOA 1EOA 4

    Member of Scroll Multisig 1, Scroll Multisig 4, Scroll Multisig 2.

    • Can interact with TimelockSCEmergency
      • execute transactions that are ready
    • Can interact with TimelockFast
      • execute transactions that are ready
    • Can interact with TimelockSCSlow
      • execute transactions that are ready
    • Can interact with TimelockEmergency
      • execute transactions that are ready
    EOA 20x6aE9…664b

    Member of Scroll Multisig 1, Scroll Multisig 4, Scroll Multisig 2, ScrollAdminMultisig, Scroll Multisig 3.

    • Can interact with TimelockSCEmergency
      • execute transactions that are ready
    • Can interact with TimelockFast
      • execute transactions that are ready
    • Can interact with TimelockSCSlow
      • execute transactions that are ready
    • Can interact with TimelockEmergency
      • execute transactions that are ready
    EOA 30x716f…8831

    Member of Scroll Multisig 1, Scroll Multisig 2, ScrollAdminMultisig, Scroll Multisig 3.

    • Can interact with TimelockSCEmergency
      • execute transactions that are ready
    • Can interact with TimelockFast
      • execute transactions that are ready
    • Can interact with TimelockSCSlow
      • execute transactions that are ready
    • Can interact with TimelockEmergency
      • execute transactions that are ready

    Scroll

    Actors:

    ScrollAdminMultisig0xcca5…F761

    A Multisig with 3/4 threshold. L2 counterpart of ScrollAdminMultisig.

    • Can interact with ScrollOwner
      • disable enforced batch mode
      • update ScrollChain zk proof verifier
      • upgrade all core contracts of the system
    • Can interact with TimelockSCEmergencyScroll
      • cancel queued transactions
      • execute transactions that are ready
      • propose transactions
      • update the minimum delay and manage all access control roles of the timelock
    • Can interact with AgoraGovernor
      • can configure contract settings such as voting delay, quorum, contract manager with 3d delay
    • Can interact with TimelockSCSlow
      • cancel queued transactions
      • execute transactions that are ready
      • propose transactions
      • update the minimum delay and manage all access control roles of the timelock with 3d delay or with no delay

    Participants (4):

    0x8460…30ae0xEbbe…Dc68EOA 6EOA 7
    1. L2 execution tx
    AgoraGovernor0x2f3F…14f0

    Used to propose and manage onchain governance proposals.

    • Can interact with AgoraGovernor
      • can configure contract settings such as voting delay, quorum, contract manager with 3d delay
    • Can interact with TimelockSCSlow
      • cancel queued transactions
      • execute transactions that are ready
      • propose transactions
      • update the minimum delay and manage all access control roles of the timelock with 3d delay
    Scroll Multisig 20xbdA1…0cBc

    A Multisig with 2/4 threshold.

    • Can interact with TimelockEmergency
      • cancel queued transactions
      • propose transactions
      • update the minimum delay and manage all access control roles of the timelock

    Participants (4):

    EOA 5EOA 7EOA 8EOA 6
    Scroll Multisig 30xEfc9…4dbe

    A Multisig with 2/4 threshold.

    • Can interact with TimelockFast
      • cancel queued transactions
      • propose transactions
      • update the minimum delay and manage all access control roles of the timelock with 1d delay or with no delay

    Participants (4):

    0x8460…30ae0xEbbe…Dc68EOA 7EOA 6
    GnosisSafeL20x2B2A…4351

    A Multisig with 2/2 threshold.

    • Can interact with AgoraGovernor
      • can propose new onchain governance proposals without the required threshold of votes

    Participants (2):

    0x1Da4…8f500x5585…1320
    ProxyAdmin0x8e34…cE45
    • Can upgrade with no delay
      • L2LidoGateway
    Scroll Multisig 10x1FF1…236f

    A Multisig with 1/4 threshold.

    Participants (4):

    EOA 7EOA 8EOA 5EOA 6
    2 EOAs
    EOA 5EOA 8

    Member of Scroll Multisig 1, Scroll Multisig 2.

    • Can interact with TimelockSCEmergencyScroll
      • execute transactions that are ready
    • Can interact with TimelockFast
      • execute transactions that are ready
    • Can interact with TimelockSCSlow
      • execute transactions that are ready
    • Can interact with TimelockEmergency
      • execute transactions that are ready
    2 EOAs
    EOA 6EOA 7

    Member of Scroll Multisig 1, Scroll Multisig 2, ScrollAdminMultisig, Scroll Multisig 3.

    • Can interact with TimelockSCEmergencyScroll
      • execute transactions that are ready
    • Can interact with TimelockFast
      • execute transactions that are ready
    • Can interact with TimelockSCSlow
      • execute transactions that are ready
    • Can interact with TimelockEmergency
      • execute transactions that are ready
    Smart contracts
    A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions
    Go to Disco
    Disco UI Banner
    Disco UI BannerExplore in Disco
    A diagram of the smart contract architecture
    A diagram of the smart contract architecture

    Ethereum

    MultipleVersionRollupVerifier0x4CEA…ad3F

    Contract used to update the verifier and keep track of current and old versions.

    L1MessageQueueV20x5697…D18aImplementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Contains the array of queued L1 -> L2 messages, either appended using the L1ScrollMessenger or the EnforcedTxGateway.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin
    L1ScrollMessenger
    Escrow
    0x6774…b367Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Contract used to send L1 -> L2 and relay messages from L2. It allows to replay failed messages and to drop skipped messages. L1 -> L2 messages sent using this contract pay for L2 gas on L1 and will have the aliased address of this contract as the sender.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin
    The following tokens are included in the value secured calculation:
    ETH token logo
    EnforcedTxGateway0x72CA…7A5dImplementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Contracts to force L1 -> L2 messages with the proper sender.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin
    ScrollOwner0x7985…26a6

    Owner of all contracts in the system. It implements an extension of AccessControl that manages roles and functions allowed to be called by each role.

    • Roles:
      • opsFast: TimelockFast; ultimately Scroll Multisig 3
      • opsNoDelay: TimelockEmergency; ultimately Scroll Multisig 2
      • scMinorityNoDelay: Scroll Security Council Minority
      • scNoDelay: TimelockSCEmergency; ultimately ScrollAdminMultisig
    SystemConfig0x8432…7a4DImplementation (Upgradable)Admin

    System configuration contract for Scroll, contains enforcedBatchParameters and messageQueueParameters determining permissionless mode.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin
      • owner: ScrollOwner
    ScrollChain0xa13B…E556Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    The main contract of the Scroll chain. Allows to post transaction data and state roots, along with proofs. Sequencing and proposing are behind a whitelist unless enforcedBatchMode is activated.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin
    TimelockSCEmergency0x0CD4…CA44

    A timelock with access control. The current minimum delay is 0s. Proposals that passed their minimum delay can be executed by anyone.

    • Roles:
      • canceller: ScrollAdminMultisig
      • executor: Scroll Multisig 1, ScrollAdminMultisig; ultimately EOA 1, EOA 2, EOA 3, EOA 4
      • proposer: ScrollAdminMultisig
      • timelockAdmin: ScrollAdminMultisig, TimelockSCEmergency; ultimately ScrollAdminMultisig
    TimelockFast0x0e58…C4F4

    A timelock with access control. The current minimum delay is 1d. Proposals that passed their minimum delay can be executed by anyone.

    • Roles:
      • canceller: Scroll Multisig 3
      • executor: Scroll Multisig 1; ultimately EOA 1, EOA 2, EOA 3, EOA 4
      • proposer: Scroll Multisig 3
      • timelockAdmin: Scroll Multisig 3, TimelockFast; ultimately Scroll Multisig 3
    TimelockSCSlow0x3f90…a9fd

    A timelock with access control. The current minimum delay is 3d. Proposals that passed their minimum delay can be executed by anyone.

    • Roles:
      • canceller: ScrollAdminMultisig
      • executor: Scroll Multisig 1, ScrollAdminMultisig; ultimately EOA 1, EOA 2, EOA 3, EOA 4
      • proposer: ScrollAdminMultisig
      • timelockAdmin: ScrollAdminMultisig, TimelockSCSlow; ultimately ScrollAdminMultisig
    TimelockEmergency0x8267…216b

    A timelock with access control. The current minimum delay is 0s. Proposals that passed their minimum delay can be executed by anyone.

    • Roles:
      • canceller: Scroll Multisig 2
      • executor: Scroll Multisig 1; ultimately EOA 1, EOA 2, EOA 3, EOA 4
      • proposer: Scroll Multisig 2
      • timelockAdmin: Scroll Multisig 2, TimelockEmergency; ultimately Scroll Multisig 2
    L1ERC721Gateway0x6260…554BImplementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Contract used to bridge ERC721 tokens from L1 to L2.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin
    L1ETHGateway0x7F2b…E905Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Contract used to bridge ETH from L1 to L2.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin
    pufETHEscrow
    Escrow
    0xA033…2b2aImplementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Contract used to bridge ERC20 tokens from L1 to L2. It allows to change the token mappings.

    The following tokens are included in the value secured calculation:
    pufETH token logo
    L1CustomERC20Gateway
    Escrow
    0xb2b1…B6ffImplementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Contract used to bridge ERC20 tokens from L1 to L2. It allows to change the token mappings.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin

    All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation.

    L1ERC1155Gateway0xb94f…75B6Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Contract used to bridge ERC1155 tokens from L1 to L2.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin
    L1StandardERC20Gateway
    Escrow
    0xD8A7…F8f9Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Contract used to bridge ERC20 tokens from L1 to L2. It uses a fixed token list.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin

    All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation.

    L1GatewayRouter0xF8B1…1Fd6Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Main entry point for depositing ETH and ERC20 tokens, which are then forwarded to the correct gateway.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin
    wstETHescrowLido
    Escrow
    0x6625…f504Implementation (Upgradable)Admin
    The following tokens are included in the value secured calculation:
    wstETH token logo
    DaiEscrow
    Escrow
    0x6726…F515Implementation (Upgradable)Admin
    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin
    The following tokens are included in the value secured calculation:
    DAI token logo
    L1WETHGateway0x7AC4…D4fEImplementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Contract used to bridge WETH from L1 to L2.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin
    L1USDCGateway
    Escrow
    0xf1AF…5c7BImplementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Contract used to bridge USDC tokens from L1 to L2.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin
    The following tokens are included in the value secured calculation:
    USDC token logo
    PlonkVerifierV1-10x03a7…0110
    1. Source Code
    ZkEvmVerifierPostFeynman0x0dE1…0A82
    PlonkVerifierPostEuclid-20x3985…6eA4
    1. Source Code
    ZkEvmVerifierPostFeynman0x4AF7…DDb5
    PlonkVerifierGalileo0x749f…C75e
    1. Source Code
    PlonkVerifierV2-10x8c1b…30f7
    1. Source Code
    ZkEvmVerifierPostFeynman0xa8d4…F485
    PauseController0xb8f7…9D8bImplementation (Upgradable)Admin
    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin
    L1USDCGateway0xbc4b…47d2Implementation (Upgradable)Admin
    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin
    ZkEvmVerifierPostEuclid-20xc084…29bA
    ProxyAdmin0xEB80…d072
    • Roles:
      • owner: ScrollOwner

    Scroll

    ScrollOwner0x13D2…437B

    Owner of all contracts in the system. It implements an extension of AccessControl that manages roles and functions allowed to be called by each role.

    • Roles:
      • scNoDelay: TimelockSCEmergencyScroll; ultimately ScrollAdminMultisig
    L2GatewayRouter0xE2b4…447AImplementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Contract used to withdraw ERC20 tokens on L2 and finalize deposit the tokens from L1.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin
    TimelockSCEmergencyScroll0x1f80…78b4

    A timelock with access control. The current minimum delay is 0s. Proposals that passed their minimum delay can be executed by anyone.

    • Roles:
      • canceller: ScrollAdminMultisig
      • executor: Scroll Multisig 1, ScrollAdminMultisig; ultimately EOA 5, EOA 6, EOA 7, EOA 8
      • proposer: ScrollAdminMultisig
      • timelockAdmin: ScrollAdminMultisig, TimelockSCEmergencyScroll; ultimately ScrollAdminMultisig
    TimelockFast0x2b14…d376

    A timelock with access control. The current minimum delay is 1d. Proposals that passed their minimum delay can be executed by anyone.

    • Roles:
      • canceller: Scroll Multisig 3
      • executor: Scroll Multisig 1; ultimately EOA 5, EOA 6, EOA 7, EOA 8
      • proposer: Scroll Multisig 3
      • timelockAdmin: Scroll Multisig 3, TimelockFast; ultimately Scroll Multisig 3
    TimelockSCSlow0x79D8…CC14

    A timelock with access control. The current minimum delay is 3d. Proposals that passed their minimum delay can be executed by anyone.

    • Roles:
      • canceller: AgoraGovernor, ScrollAdminMultisig
      • executor: AgoraGovernor, Scroll Multisig 1, ScrollAdminMultisig; ultimately EOA 5, EOA 6, EOA 7, EOA 8
      • proposer: AgoraGovernor, ScrollAdminMultisig
      • timelockAdmin: ScrollAdminMultisig, TimelockSCSlow; ultimately AgoraGovernor, ScrollAdminMultisig
    TimelockEmergency0xA77D…734f

    A timelock with access control. The current minimum delay is 0s. Proposals that passed their minimum delay can be executed by anyone.

    • Roles:
      • canceller: Scroll Multisig 2
      • executor: Scroll Multisig 1; ultimately EOA 5, EOA 6, EOA 7, EOA 8
      • proposer: Scroll Multisig 2
      • timelockAdmin: Scroll Multisig 2, TimelockEmergency; ultimately Scroll Multisig 2
    Scroll USDC0x06eF…63A4Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Contract of the USDC token on Scroll.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin
    L2USDCGateway0x33B6…2142Implementation (Upgradable)Admin
    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin
    L2GatewayRouter0x4C09…9d79Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Counterpart to the L1GatewayRouter contract.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin
    L2MessageQueue0x5300…0000

    Used to append messages to the L2MessageQueue from the L2ScrollMessenger.

    L2ERC1155Gateway0x6259…3bccImplementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Counterpart to the L1ERC1155Gateway contract.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin
    L2CustomERC20Gateway0x64CC…7988Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Counterpart to the L1CustomERC20Gateway contract.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin
    ScrollStandardERC20Factory0x66e5…1484

    Contract used to deploy ScrollStandardERC20 tokens for L2StandardERC20Gateway.

    L2ETHGateway0x6EA7…cDF0Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Contract of the L2ScrollMessenger contract.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin
    L2WETHGateway0x7003…1cf9Implementation (Upgradable)Admin
    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin
    L2ScrollMessenger0x781e…9CbCImplementation (Upgradable)Admin

    ETH is pre-minted to this contract in the genesis block and released on Scroll whenever corresponding deposits are made on Ethereum.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin
    L2ERC721Gateway0x7bC0…0582Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Counterpart to the L1ERC721Gateway contract.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin
    ProxyAdmin0x82e5…bC81
    • Roles:
      • owner: ScrollOwner
    L2LidoGateway0x8aE8…56c9Implementation (Upgradable)Admin
    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin
    Can be upgraded by:
    ProxyAdmin with no delay
    ProxyAdmin0xA76a…d026
    • Roles:
      • owner: ScrollOwner
    L2PauseController0xAf9a…49ddImplementation (Upgradable)Admin
    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin
    MasterMinter0xb5cE…e4BE

    Contract that uses controllers to manage minters for USDC on Scroll.

    ScrollStandardERC200xC7d8…3f69

    Contract of the ERC20 standard token used by the ERC20 factory.

    SCRToken0xd296…7b1bImplementation (Upgradable)Admin
    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin
    ProxyAdmin0xde49…5F1e
    • Roles:
      • owner: ScrollOwner

    The current deployment carries some associated risks:

    • Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).

    Program Hashes

    Name
    Hash
    Repository
    Verification
    Used in
    0x003a...bf72
    Github
    Scroll logo
    0x0093...7909
    Github
    Scroll logo
    0x0062...d297
    Github
    Scroll logo
    0x0091...f8e3
    Github
    Scroll logo