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SummaryValue SecuredActivityOnchain costsData postedLivenessMilestones & IncidentsRisk summaryRisk analysisStageData availabilityState validationUpgrades & GovernanceUpdatesOperatorWithdrawalsOther considerationsPermissionsSmart contracts

Boba Network logo
Boba Network

There are impactful changes and part of the information might be outdated.

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About

Boba is an OP stack Optimistic Rollup built by the Enya team as core contributors to the Boba Foundation.

  • Total Value SecuredTVS
    $5.09 M5.78%
  • Past day UOPSDaily UOPS
    0.024.19%
  • Gas token
    ETH
  • Type
    Other
  • Purpose
    Universal
  • Chain ID
    288

    • Tokens breakdown

    Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure
    Explore more in Discovery UI

    Badges

    About

    Boba is an OP stack Optimistic Rollup built by the Enya team as core contributors to the Boba Foundation.

    Why is the project listed in others?

    There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges

    Consequence: projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds.

    Learn more about the recategorisation here.

    Value SecuredView TVS breakdown
    Total
    Canonically BridgedCanonically Bridged ValueCanonical
    Natively MintedNatively Minted TokensNative
    Externally BridgedExternally Bridged ValueExternal
    ETH & derivatives
    Stablecoins
    BTC & derivatives
    Other
    View TVS breakdown
    Activity

    2025 Jun 10 — 2026 Jun 10

    Past Day UOPS
    0.024.19%
    Past Day Ops count
    1.88 K
    Max. UOPS
    0.51
    2024 Apr 18
    Past day UOPS/TPS Ratio
    <1.01
    Onchain costs

    The section shows the operating costs that L2s pay to Ethereum.

    2025 Jun 10 — 2026 Jun 10

    Total cost
    $17.25 K
    Avg cost per L2 UOP
    $0.006758
    Avg cost per day
    $47.13
    Data posted

    This section shows how much data the project publishes to its data-availability (DA) layer over time. The project currently posts data toEthereumEthereum.

    2025 Jun 26 — 2026 Jun 10

    Data posted
    1.33 GiB
    Avg size per day
    3.88 MiB
    Avg size per L2 UOP
    581.84 B
    Liveness

    This section shows how "live" the project's operators are by displaying how frequently they submit transactions of the selected type. It also highlights anomalies - significant deviations from their typical schedule.

    No ongoing anomalies detected

    2026 May 11 — Jun 10

    Avg. tx data subs. interval
    49 minutes
    Avg. state updates interval
    1 hour
    Past 30 days anomalies
    98% normal uptime

    Last 30 day anomalies

    All liveness anomalies detected for this project in the last 30 days, helping you review recent downtime and availability issues.

    There are implementation changes to tracked contracts, anomaly data might be inaccurate.

    No State updates were performed for 8h 4m 24s (from 2026 Jun 05, 13:08 UTC until 2026 Jun 05, 21:12 UTC). These typically occur every 1h 1m 10s on average.

    No Tx data submissions were performed for 7h 20m 48s (from 2026 Jun 05, 13:39 UTC until 2026 Jun 05, 21:00 UTC). These typically occur every 49min 24s on average.

    Milestones & Incidents

    Boba Anchorage Upgrade

    2024 Apr 16th

    Boba upgrades to Bedrock (OP Stack) and to EIP-4844 data blobs for L1 data availability.

    Learn more

    Boba launches L2 on BNB

    2022 Nov 1st

    Boba launches on BnB.

    Learn more
    Risk summary

    Funds can be stolen if

    1. a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).

    MEV can be extracted if

    1. the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
    Risk analysis
    Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure
    Sequencer failure
    Self sequence

    In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project’s chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.

    State validation
    Fraud proofs (INT)

    Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. Only one entity is currently allowed to propose and submit challenges, as only permissioned games are currently allowed.

    Data availability
    Onchain

    All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.

    Exit window
    None

    There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.

    Proposer failure
    Cannot withdraw

    Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.

    Stage
    Boba Network
    Boba Network is not even a
    Stage 0
    project.
    The requirement for available node software is under review
    Learn more about Stages
    Please keep in mind that these stages do not reflect project security, this is an opinionated assessment of project maturity based on subjective criteria, created with a goal of incentivizing projects to push toward better decentralization. Each team may have taken different paths to achieve this goal.
    Data availability

    All data required for proofs is published on chain

    All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.

    1. Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs
    2. BatchInbox - address
    3. OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function
    Learn more about the DA layer here: Ethereum logoEthereum
    State validation

    Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by permissioned operators only. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.

    State root proposals

    Proposers submit state roots as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the create function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.0 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge period has passed and it is not countered.

    1. OP stack specification: Fault Dispute Game
    Challenges

    Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state roots using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 0.00 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the defend or attack functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with full concurrency. Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 3d 12h. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see freeloader claims), if a clock gets inherited with less than 3h, it generally gets extended by 3h with the exception of 6h right before depth 30, and 1d right before the last depth. The maximum clock extension that a top level claim can get is therefore 10d. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers’ stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step prover contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks (Spearbit 5.1.3).

    1. Fraud Proof Wars: OPFP

    Program Hashes

    Name
    Hash
    Repository
    Verification
    Used in
    0x03ca...7d1b
    Github
    Boba Network logoShape logoSettlus logo
    Upgrades & Governance

    Past upgrades

    The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.

    Count of upgrades
    40
    Last upgrade
    19d 22h ago
    Avg upgrade interval
    4mo 8d
    Updates
    2026 May 25, 13:24 UTC
    High severity
    95changes

    OP Stack Upgrade 17 (op-contracts/v5.0.0) — adds Jovian-hardfork minBaseFee and daFootprintGasScalar config to SystemConfig, refreshes Cannon for op-program Go 1.24, and swaps in the OP-Mainnet-shared MIPS FPVM. Executed 2026-05-21 by Boba Multisig (self-operated). Implementation rotations: - OptimismPortal2 5.0.0 → 5.1.1 — diff - SystemConfig 3.7.0 → 3.11.0 — diff (adds daFootprintGasScalar , minBaseFee ) - DisputeGameFactory 1.2.0 → 1.3.0 — diff (PermissionedDisputeGame impl redeployed) - L1CrossDomainMessenger 2.10.0 → 2.11.0 — diff - L1StandardBridge 2.7.0 → 2.8.0 — diff - L1ERC721Bridge 2.8.0 → 2.9.0 — diff - SuperchainConfig (local fork) 2.3.0 → 2.4.0 — diff - OptimismMintableERC20Factory 1.10.1 → 1.10.2 — diff MIPS FPVM swapped to the shared 0x6463dEE3… (pre-existing); old MIPS retired. All contracts remain templatized.

    OP Stack Upgrade 17 (op-contracts/v5.0.0) — adds Jovian-hardfork minBaseFee and daFootprintGasScalar config to SystemConfig, refreshes Cannon for op-program Go 1.24, and swaps in the OP-Mainnet-shared MIPS FPVM. Executed 2026-05-21 by Boba Multisig (self-operated). Implementation rotations:

    • OptimismPortal2 5.0.0 → 5.1.1 — diff
    • SystemConfig 3.7.0 → 3.11.0 — diff (adds daFootprintGasScalar, minBaseFee)
    • DisputeGameFactory 1.2.0 → 1.3.0 — diff (PermissionedDisputeGame impl redeployed)
    • L1CrossDomainMessenger 2.10.0 → 2.11.0 — diff
    • L1StandardBridge 2.7.0 → 2.8.0 — diff
    • L1ERC721Bridge 2.8.0 → 2.9.0 — diff
    • SuperchainConfig (local fork) 2.3.0 → 2.4.0 — diff
    • OptimismMintableERC20Factory 1.10.1 → 1.10.2 — diff

    MIPS FPVM swapped to the shared 0x6463dEE3… (pre-existing); old MIPS retired. All contracts remain templatized.

    - Status: DELETED
    contract MIPS (eth:0x07BABE08EE4D07dBA236530183B24055535A7011) [opstack/MIPS]
    +++ description: The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.
    contract SystemConfig (eth:0x158Fd5715F16Ac1F2Dc959A299B383aAaf9B59EB) [opstack/SystemConfig] {
    +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x2fe946108f24ddfa96c7feaf21d4c6dd66c8b3f7c4cbb23e9344ea06e73e8ad5"
    + "0xaa1b3bedab4e63198240e9dea4503f0e615e4d18a545961c9f11b72143279fbc"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0x2bFE4A5Bd5A41e9d848d843ebCDFa15954e9A557"
    + "eth:0x2fA28989fc559836E9d66dFf3010C7F7f41c65ED"
    values.$pastUpgrades.7:
    + ["2026-05-21T18:54:35.000Z","0x5913ef62a245ac8220a38c8be65227ca90fa4d1bebfe8aa4e2ca9c2df9a3b7c7",["eth:0x2fA28989fc559836E9d66dFf3010C7F7f41c65ED"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 7
    + 8
    values.version:
    - "3.7.0"
    + "3.11.0"
    values.daFootprintGasScalar:
    + 0
    values.minBaseFee:
    + 0
    implementationNames.eth:0x2bFE4A5Bd5A41e9d848d843ebCDFa15954e9A557:
    - "SystemConfig"
    implementationNames.eth:0x2fA28989fc559836E9d66dFf3010C7F7f41c65ED:
    + "SystemConfig"
    }
    - Status: DELETED
    contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0x496F1ed169cdb9226200A2A75A7ECD186611832a) [opstack/PermissionedDisputeGame]
    +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger.
    contract OptimismMintableERC20Factory (eth:0x4d898F66327Fa050131A17ed17a39EBeCC81f0c3) [opstack/OptimismMintableERC20Factory] {
    +++ description: A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it's deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain's representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x38811adfaa2c3c1a79fd731951dfcb607841950cdc119cd765fadcc62bc8e61d"
    + "0x307d4cb83e682629880fe9bb874a188805e3b93cb11a2cbf80095975f1e5b04e"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0x5493f4677A186f64805fe7317D6993ba4863988F"
    + "eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB"
    values.$pastUpgrades.3:
    + ["2026-05-21T18:54:35.000Z","0x5913ef62a245ac8220a38c8be65227ca90fa4d1bebfe8aa4e2ca9c2df9a3b7c7",["eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 3
    + 4
    values.version:
    - "1.10.1"
    + "1.10.2"
    implementationNames.eth:0x5493f4677A186f64805fe7317D6993ba4863988F:
    - "OptimismMintableERC20Factory"
    implementationNames.eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB:
    + "OptimismMintableERC20Factory"
    }
    contract L1CrossDomainMessenger (eth:0x6D4528d192dB72E282265D6092F4B872f9Dff69e) [opstack/L1CrossDomainMessenger] {
    +++ description: Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x41241fec96b435c5be890fb46cf7083bcdea2929a2319776b2b4c345157cca83"
    + "0x1f2c13ad1144ce6548e578b834c33b0d65b1564aeb0d5c708ed4e7fb50535cc6"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0x22D12E0FAebD62d429514A65EBAe32dd316c12D6"
    + "eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0"
    values.$pastUpgrades.10:
    + ["2026-05-21T18:54:35.000Z","0x5913ef62a245ac8220a38c8be65227ca90fa4d1bebfe8aa4e2ca9c2df9a3b7c7",["eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 10
    + 11
    values.version:
    - "2.10.0"
    + "2.11.0"
    implementationNames.eth:0x22D12E0FAebD62d429514A65EBAe32dd316c12D6:
    - "L1CrossDomainMessenger"
    implementationNames.eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0:
    + "L1CrossDomainMessenger"
    }
    contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0x7B02D13904D8e6E0f0Efaf756aB14Cb0FF21eE7e) [opstack/OptimismPortal2] {
    +++ description: The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x9914d3a9740b6c5148ddd6fe3fd05b3002a6b198b95c29a083d156590756cc50"
    + "0x3e7e2cb08ba995795937c9c2e8ea9d0e4d2e2de852f389055073384d5f79c59d"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0x381E729FF983FA4BCEd820e7b922d79bF653B999"
    + "eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202"
    values.$pastUpgrades.6:
    + ["2026-05-21T18:54:35.000Z","0x5913ef62a245ac8220a38c8be65227ca90fa4d1bebfe8aa4e2ca9c2df9a3b7c7",["eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 6
    + 7
    values.version:
    - "5.0.0"
    + "5.1.1"
    implementationNames.eth:0x381E729FF983FA4BCEd820e7b922d79bF653B999:
    - "OptimismPortal2"
    implementationNames.eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202:
    + "OptimismPortal2"
    }
    contract SuperchainConfig (eth:0x996ffD627901f10C80A7d4B72A12316D2e77c076) [opstack/SuperchainConfigFake_expiry] {
    +++ description: This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3mo 1d if left untouched.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x4b6112b20005468606b7ad8a57a804691831c75294e9c4285fb4ec919dc97adb"
    + "0x5fb525d1572fb90d060d122143b915059cbff39e0298b345857fd4267d7f6b28"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0xCe28685EB204186b557133766eCA00334EB441E4"
    + "eth:0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957"
    values.$pastUpgrades.5:
    + ["2026-05-21T18:54:35.000Z","0x5913ef62a245ac8220a38c8be65227ca90fa4d1bebfe8aa4e2ca9c2df9a3b7c7",["eth:0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 5
    + 6
    values.version:
    - "2.3.0"
    + "2.4.0"
    implementationNames.eth:0xCe28685EB204186b557133766eCA00334EB441E4:
    - "SuperchainConfig"
    implementationNames.eth:0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957:
    + "SuperchainConfig"
    }
    contract L1ERC721Bridge (eth:0xA6Ad22bb0E73DEF40a24E510cFbc93807d8bf87e) [opstack/L1ERC721Bridge] {
    +++ description: Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0xe22ab87b389c247bfa7f37a4e2dae609f73d58f6f816fcce4b71ce73fd68e0c3"
    + "0x1f65fda230b6d0df44e466b06418b2e12a401ef82c07521ad18d2f4ae6c70fb2"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0x7f1d12fB2911EB095278085f721e644C1f675696"
    + "eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9"
    values.$pastUpgrades.6:
    + ["2026-05-21T18:54:35.000Z","0x5913ef62a245ac8220a38c8be65227ca90fa4d1bebfe8aa4e2ca9c2df9a3b7c7",["eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 6
    + 7
    values.version:
    - "2.8.0"
    + "2.9.0"
    implementationNames.eth:0x7f1d12fB2911EB095278085f721e644C1f675696:
    - "L1ERC721Bridge"
    implementationNames.eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9:
    + "L1ERC721Bridge"
    }
    contract L1StandardBridge (eth:0xdc1664458d2f0B6090bEa60A8793A4E66c2F1c00) [opstack/L1StandardBridge] {
    +++ description: The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x7f3570779a89b4af4e8b7ffada16c3089994f35ea1fea21b2163861908749e88"
    + "0xcacd38e7b52353ad3463da40b7e7a29b028f95500a82590d2b8f8ffd26b83f6d"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0xe32B192fb1DcA88fCB1C56B3ACb429e32238aDCb"
    + "eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A"
    values.version:
    - "2.7.0"
    + "2.8.0"
    implementationNames.eth:0xe32B192fb1DcA88fCB1C56B3ACb429e32238aDCb:
    - "L1StandardBridge"
    implementationNames.eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A:
    + "L1StandardBridge"
    }
    contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0xF45a5f1e36fCeA3Cc830A98c6c3C5ceA7d6af852) [opstack/DisputeGameFactory] {
    +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0xdfa3b1f4fa753fd7160333c8075b29324bfc8f7c0764ca98384afe6e33790856"
    + "0x7daf6049672fd2ab7dc8dd3b6287e1d0a40958346c5e2857c4616a73dcac4da6"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0x33D1e8571a85a538ed3D5A4d88f46C112383439D"
    + "eth:0x74Fac1D45B98bae058F8F566201c9A81B85C7D50"
    values.$pastUpgrades.3:
    + ["2026-05-21T18:54:35.000Z","0x5913ef62a245ac8220a38c8be65227ca90fa4d1bebfe8aa4e2ca9c2df9a3b7c7",["eth:0x74Fac1D45B98bae058F8F566201c9A81B85C7D50"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 3
    + 4
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.gameImpls.1:
    - "eth:0x496F1ed169cdb9226200A2A75A7ECD186611832a"
    + "eth:0xae0949CDd54660Cfc985EC9DEb091eD63ae98670"
    values.permissionedGameArgs:
    - "EXPECT_REVERT"
    + "0x"
    values.version:
    - "1.2.0"
    + "1.3.0"
    implementationNames.eth:0x33D1e8571a85a538ed3D5A4d88f46C112383439D:
    - "DisputeGameFactory"
    implementationNames.eth:0x74Fac1D45B98bae058F8F566201c9A81B85C7D50:
    + "DisputeGameFactory"
    }
    + Status: CREATED
    contract MIPS (eth:0x6463dEE3828677F6270d83d45408044fc5eDB908) [opstack/MIPS]
    +++ description: The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0xae0949CDd54660Cfc985EC9DEb091eD63ae98670) [opstack/PermissionedDisputeGame]
    +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger.
    2026 May 05, 17:21 UTC
    High severity
    142changes

    Major OP Stack contracts upgrade on bobanetwork. Core contract upgrades: - SystemConfig v2.5.0 → v3.7.0 : max gas 200M → 500M; new fields paused , l2ChainId , guardian , proxyAdmin / proxyAdminOwner , superchainConfig , initVersion ; getAddresses no longer exposes disputeGameFactory (the DisputeGameFactory contract itself still exists at 0xF45a5f1e... , just no longer reached through SystemConfig). - OptimismPortal2 v3.10.0 → v5.0.0 (via 3.13/3.14 hops). Gains anchorStateRegistry pointing to a newly-tracked AnchorStateRegistry at 0x38073f4D... . - L1CrossDomainMessenger v2.6.0 → v2.10.0 . - DelayedWETH rotated : old 0x4e27966e... deleted, new 0x7e021d19... (v1.5.0) created. - SuperchainConfig (boba's local fork at 0x996ffD62... ) implementation upgraded to a pause-expiry variant. Added new shape hash to opstack/SuperchainConfigFake expiry/shapes.json to restore the template. - Boba Multisig permissions reshuffled — lost old interact on the deleted DelayedWETH; gained upgrade over the new AnchorStateRegistry and new DelayedWETH (both via the same ProxyAdmin).

    Major OP Stack contracts upgrade on bobanetwork.

    Core contract upgrades:

    • SystemConfig v2.5.0 → v3.7.0: max gas 200M → 500M; new fields paused, l2ChainId, guardian, proxyAdmin/proxyAdminOwner, superchainConfig, initVersion; getAddresses no longer exposes disputeGameFactory (the DisputeGameFactory contract itself still exists at 0xF45a5f1e..., just no longer reached through SystemConfig).
    • OptimismPortal2 v3.10.0 → v5.0.0 (via 3.13/3.14 hops). Gains anchorStateRegistry pointing to a newly-tracked AnchorStateRegistry at 0x38073f4D....
    • L1CrossDomainMessenger v2.6.0 → v2.10.0.
    • DelayedWETH rotated: old 0x4e27966e... deleted, new 0x7e021d19... (v1.5.0) created.
    • SuperchainConfig (boba’s local fork at 0x996ffD62...) implementation upgraded to a pause-expiry variant. Added new shape hash to opstack/SuperchainConfigFake_expiry/shapes.json to restore the template.
    • Boba Multisig permissions reshuffled — lost old interact on the deleted DelayedWETH; gained upgrade over the new AnchorStateRegistry and new DelayedWETH (both via the same ProxyAdmin).
    contract SystemConfig (eth:0x158Fd5715F16Ac1F2Dc959A299B383aAaf9B59EB) {
    +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x921de6fc906d159fdcef862d2b9559063f5e7b9b7588fa5f33153360ddf296e7"
    + "0xc64176b1425d9639f5082ecef5e30b3b365111e2be71596ab1bd831edba65bd9"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0x340f923E5c7cbB2171146f64169EC9d5a9FfE647"
    + "eth:0x2bFE4A5Bd5A41e9d848d843ebCDFa15954e9A557"
    values.$pastUpgrades.6:
    + ["2026-05-04T17:57:11.000Z","0x414821f167bab34013197c69b5592b1eff7280d97b96f4b1d8b6002ea9d9d9eb",["eth:0x2bFE4A5Bd5A41e9d848d843ebCDFa15954e9A557"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 6
    + 7
    values.DISPUTE_GAME_FACTORY_SLOT:
    - "0x52322a25d9f59ea17656545543306b7aef62bc0cc53a0e65ccfa0c75b97aa906"
    values.getAddresses.disputeGameFactory:
    - "eth:0xF45a5f1e36fCeA3Cc830A98c6c3C5ceA7d6af852"
    values.maximumGasLimit:
    - 200000000
    + 500000000
    values.version:
    - "2.5.0"
    + "3.7.0"
    values.guardian:
    + "eth:0x56121a8612474C3eB65D69a3b871f284705b9bC4"
    values.initVersion:
    + 3
    values.l2ChainId:
    + 288
    values.paused:
    + false
    values.proxyAdmin:
    + "eth:0x6e598cec2701FfAA3c06175dc3Af0317a749a0Dc"
    values.proxyAdminOwner:
    + "eth:0x56121a8612474C3eB65D69a3b871f284705b9bC4"
    values.superchainConfig:
    + "eth:0x996ffD627901f10C80A7d4B72A12316D2e77c076"
    implementationNames.eth:0x340f923E5c7cbB2171146f64169EC9d5a9FfE647:
    - "SystemConfig"
    implementationNames.eth:0x2bFE4A5Bd5A41e9d848d843ebCDFa15954e9A557:
    + "SystemConfig"
    }
    - Status: DELETED
    contract DelayedWETH (eth:0x4e27966e7D3727bE584d32081fc341321B047bF6)
    +++ description: Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.
    contract Boba Multisig (eth:0x56121a8612474C3eB65D69a3b871f284705b9bC4) {
    +++ description: None
    receivedPermissions.1:
    - {"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x4e27966e7D3727bE584d32081fc341321B047bF6","description":"can pull funds from the contract in case of emergency.","role":".owner"}
    receivedPermissions.3:
    + {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x38073f4D9100908e35Ca6D85595d78c4EAC3a4B1","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x6e598cec2701FfAA3c06175dc3Af0317a749a0Dc"}]}
    receivedPermissions.5:
    - {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x4e27966e7D3727bE584d32081fc341321B047bF6","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x6e598cec2701FfAA3c06175dc3Af0317a749a0Dc"}]}
    receivedPermissions.7:
    + {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x7e021d19C9949109919DCb522df6BaeC1D6638a6","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x6e598cec2701FfAA3c06175dc3Af0317a749a0Dc"}]}
    receivedPermissions.11:
    - {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xec22De453c5819F96E000Bf3aD5262019ca2151b","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x6e598cec2701FfAA3c06175dc3Af0317a749a0Dc"}]}
    }
    contract L1CrossDomainMessenger (eth:0x6D4528d192dB72E282265D6092F4B872f9Dff69e) {
    +++ description: Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x03bcdc719cb7bd0a1377c01bb50b30a6122b308f673b7d7b15a3bb8628e6bd8c"
    + "0x12cf78bcfa479caaee8133c0f935dcdcc333cdc116805f6b81bd80f6ba52128c"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0x5D5a095665886119693F0B41d8DFeE78da033e8B"
    + "eth:0x22D12E0FAebD62d429514A65EBAe32dd316c12D6"
    values.$pastUpgrades.9:
    + ["2026-05-04T17:57:11.000Z","0x414821f167bab34013197c69b5592b1eff7280d97b96f4b1d8b6002ea9d9d9eb",["eth:0x22D12E0FAebD62d429514A65EBAe32dd316c12D6"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 9
    + 10
    values.version:
    - "2.6.0"
    + "2.10.0"
    values.initVersion:
    + 3
    values.proxyAdmin:
    + "eth:0x6e598cec2701FfAA3c06175dc3Af0317a749a0Dc"
    values.proxyAdminOwner:
    + "eth:0x56121a8612474C3eB65D69a3b871f284705b9bC4"
    values.systemConfig:
    + "eth:0x158Fd5715F16Ac1F2Dc959A299B383aAaf9B59EB"
    implementationNames.eth:0x5D5a095665886119693F0B41d8DFeE78da033e8B:
    - "L1CrossDomainMessenger"
    implementationNames.eth:0x22D12E0FAebD62d429514A65EBAe32dd316c12D6:
    + "L1CrossDomainMessenger"
    }
    contract ProxyAdmin (eth:0x6e598cec2701FfAA3c06175dc3Af0317a749a0Dc) {
    +++ description: None
    directlyReceivedPermissions.2:
    + {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x38073f4D9100908e35Ca6D85595d78c4EAC3a4B1","role":"admin"}
    directlyReceivedPermissions.3:
    - {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x4e27966e7D3727bE584d32081fc341321B047bF6","role":"admin"}
    directlyReceivedPermissions.6:
    + {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x7e021d19C9949109919DCb522df6BaeC1D6638a6","role":"admin"}
    directlyReceivedPermissions.9:
    - {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xec22De453c5819F96E000Bf3aD5262019ca2151b","role":"admin"}
    }
    contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0x7B02D13904D8e6E0f0Efaf756aB14Cb0FF21eE7e) {
    +++ description: The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0xc483ef9e0a5ec2a0450732e743b3784de0cd3876b8fadfce14c0805a0846d26b"
    + "0x8ca0818fc584e81a5cead0efc1c32f3273182323dcbd08a60779d55cb0aa90c9"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4"
    + "eth:0x381E729FF983FA4BCEd820e7b922d79bF653B999"
    values.$pastUpgrades.5:
    + ["2026-05-04T17:57:11.000Z","0x414821f167bab34013197c69b5592b1eff7280d97b96f4b1d8b6002ea9d9d9eb",["eth:0x381E729FF983FA4BCEd820e7b922d79bF653B999"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 5
    + 6
    values.respectedGameTypeUpdatedAt:
    - 1750959851
    + 1777917431
    values.version:
    - "3.14.0"
    + "5.0.0"
    values.anchorStateRegistry:
    + "eth:0x38073f4D9100908e35Ca6D85595d78c4EAC3a4B1"
    values.ethLockbox:
    + "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
    values.initVersion:
    + 3
    values.proxyAdmin:
    + "eth:0x6e598cec2701FfAA3c06175dc3Af0317a749a0Dc"
    values.proxyAdminOwner:
    + "eth:0x56121a8612474C3eB65D69a3b871f284705b9bC4"
    implementationNames.eth:0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4:
    - "OptimismPortal2"
    implementationNames.eth:0x381E729FF983FA4BCEd820e7b922d79bF653B999:
    + "OptimismPortal2"
    }
    contract SuperchainConfig (eth:0x996ffD627901f10C80A7d4B72A12316D2e77c076) {
    +++ description: This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3mo 1d if left untouched.
    template:
    - "opstack/SuperchainConfigFake"
    + "opstack/SuperchainConfigFake_expiry"
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x03dba37173051b02bc81487e181c791bcf1aef664c249e5d035f11f488bdd686"
    + "0x5a0e73c7d129cc83e1c387b55df0141890c02d2cb4111b8a1b6376d737d88f6b"
    description:
    - "This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages the `PAUSED_SLOT`, a boolean value indicating whether the local chain is paused, and `GUARDIAN_SLOT`, the address of the guardian which can pause and unpause the system."
    + "This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3mo 1d if left untouched."
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0x4da82a327773965b8d4D85Fa3dB8249b387458E7"
    + "eth:0xCe28685EB204186b557133766eCA00334EB441E4"
    values.$pastUpgrades.4:
    + ["2026-05-04T17:57:11.000Z","0x414821f167bab34013197c69b5592b1eff7280d97b96f4b1d8b6002ea9d9d9eb",["eth:0xCe28685EB204186b557133766eCA00334EB441E4"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 4
    + 5
    values.GUARDIAN_SLOT:
    - "0xd30e835d3f35624761057ff5b27d558f97bd5be034621e62240e5c0b784abe68"
    values.PAUSED_SLOT:
    - "0x54176ff9944c4784e5857ec4e5ef560a462c483bf534eda43f91bb01a470b1b6"
    values.version:
    - "1.2.0"
    + "2.3.0"
    values.initVersion:
    + 2
    values.pauseExpiry:
    + 7884000
    values.pauseExpiryFmt:
    + "3mo 1d"
    values.proxyAdmin:
    + "eth:0x6e598cec2701FfAA3c06175dc3Af0317a749a0Dc"
    values.proxyAdminOwner:
    + "eth:0x56121a8612474C3eB65D69a3b871f284705b9bC4"
    implementationNames.eth:0x4da82a327773965b8d4D85Fa3dB8249b387458E7:
    - "SuperchainConfig"
    implementationNames.eth:0xCe28685EB204186b557133766eCA00334EB441E4:
    + "SuperchainConfig"
    category.name:
    - "Governance"
    + "Shared Infrastructure"
    category.priority:
    - 3
    + 4
    fieldMeta:
    + {"paused":{"severity":"HIGH"}}
    }
    - Status: DELETED
    contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0x9bF49c12BAf9FDca154c3C917591f79c7DA5a1F4)
    +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger.
    contract L1ERC721Bridge (eth:0xA6Ad22bb0E73DEF40a24E510cFbc93807d8bf87e) {
    +++ description: Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x28669b49da3effd51f0f9424ca9cdd455c5b9327c09a40c65fc06f114a6eb837"
    + "0xab560cdc633c64552a47cd693ebc9aaab91fe80bec99e9e89b9d13d89a994c22"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0x7aE1d3BD877a4C5CA257404ce26BE93A02C98013"
    + "eth:0x7f1d12fB2911EB095278085f721e644C1f675696"
    values.$pastUpgrades.5:
    + ["2026-05-04T17:57:11.000Z","0x414821f167bab34013197c69b5592b1eff7280d97b96f4b1d8b6002ea9d9d9eb",["eth:0x7f1d12fB2911EB095278085f721e644C1f675696"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 5
    + 6
    values.version:
    - "2.4.0"
    + "2.8.0"
    values.initVersion:
    + 3
    values.proxyAdmin:
    + "eth:0x6e598cec2701FfAA3c06175dc3Af0317a749a0Dc"
    values.proxyAdminOwner:
    + "eth:0x56121a8612474C3eB65D69a3b871f284705b9bC4"
    values.systemConfig:
    + "eth:0x158Fd5715F16Ac1F2Dc959A299B383aAaf9B59EB"
    implementationNames.eth:0x7aE1d3BD877a4C5CA257404ce26BE93A02C98013:
    - "L1ERC721Bridge"
    implementationNames.eth:0x7f1d12fB2911EB095278085f721e644C1f675696:
    + "L1ERC721Bridge"
    }
    contract L1StandardBridge (eth:0xdc1664458d2f0B6090bEa60A8793A4E66c2F1c00) {
    +++ description: The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x4e15d99844dc5a4304c2396a66c95ec41218ea311c8e524b118fad7beed0bb53"
    + "0x29b630d028d2dfddff75dc128b41ae51836c874dcd31a62c9d7313599e6261fb"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0x0b09ba359A106C9ea3b181CBc5F394570c7d2a7A"
    + "eth:0xe32B192fb1DcA88fCB1C56B3ACb429e32238aDCb"
    values.version:
    - "2.3.0"
    + "2.7.0"
    values.initVersion:
    + 3
    values.proxyAdmin:
    + "eth:0x6e598cec2701FfAA3c06175dc3Af0317a749a0Dc"
    values.proxyAdminOwner:
    + "eth:0x56121a8612474C3eB65D69a3b871f284705b9bC4"
    values.systemConfig:
    + "eth:0x158Fd5715F16Ac1F2Dc959A299B383aAaf9B59EB"
    implementationNames.eth:0x0b09ba359A106C9ea3b181CBc5F394570c7d2a7A:
    - "L1StandardBridge"
    implementationNames.eth:0xe32B192fb1DcA88fCB1C56B3ACb429e32238aDCb:
    + "L1StandardBridge"
    }
    - Status: DELETED
    contract AnchorStateRegistry (eth:0xec22De453c5819F96E000Bf3aD5262019ca2151b)
    +++ description: Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game.
    - Status: DELETED
    contract MIPS (eth:0xF027F4A985560fb13324e943edf55ad6F1d15Dc1)
    +++ description: The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.
    contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0xF45a5f1e36fCeA3Cc830A98c6c3C5ceA7d6af852) {
    +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x85ca17941ef36ac6b28a4f8f89803d0d41ef419c47586dcd3acdb47ee9617285"
    + "0x93342e3d1e616bd6c727a5f73b09c0811bdab764dc9ad7346278593fb66b3689"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0x4bbA758F006Ef09402eF31724203F316ab74e4a0"
    + "eth:0x33D1e8571a85a538ed3D5A4d88f46C112383439D"
    values.$pastUpgrades.2:
    + ["2026-05-04T17:57:11.000Z","0x414821f167bab34013197c69b5592b1eff7280d97b96f4b1d8b6002ea9d9d9eb",["eth:0x33D1e8571a85a538ed3D5A4d88f46C112383439D"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 2
    + 3
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.gameImpls.1:
    - "eth:0x9bF49c12BAf9FDca154c3C917591f79c7DA5a1F4"
    + "eth:0x496F1ed169cdb9226200A2A75A7ECD186611832a"
    values.version:
    - "1.0.1"
    + "1.2.0"
    values.initVersion:
    + 1
    values.proxyAdmin:
    + "eth:0x6e598cec2701FfAA3c06175dc3Af0317a749a0Dc"
    values.proxyAdminOwner:
    + "eth:0x56121a8612474C3eB65D69a3b871f284705b9bC4"
    implementationNames.eth:0x4bbA758F006Ef09402eF31724203F316ab74e4a0:
    - "DisputeGameFactory"
    implementationNames.eth:0x33D1e8571a85a538ed3D5A4d88f46C112383439D:
    + "DisputeGameFactory"
    }
    + Status: CREATED
    contract MIPS (eth:0x07BABE08EE4D07dBA236530183B24055535A7011)
    +++ description: The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract AnchorStateRegistry (eth:0x38073f4D9100908e35Ca6D85595d78c4EAC3a4B1)
    +++ description: Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0x496F1ed169cdb9226200A2A75A7ECD186611832a)
    +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract DelayedWETH (eth:0x7e021d19C9949109919DCb522df6BaeC1D6638a6)
    +++ description: Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.
    2026 March 30, 17:26 UTC
    High severity
    63changes

    Upgrade 14: Isthmus L1 Contracts + MT-Cannon. https://gov.optimism.io/t/upgrade-proposal-14-isthmus-l1-contracts-mt-cannon/9796 Implementation diffs: - SystemConfig (2.4.0 → 2.5.0): diff - L1CrossDomainMessenger (2.5.0 → 2.6.0): diff - OptimismPortal2 (3.13.0 → 3.14.0): diff - L1ERC721Bridge (2.3.1 → 2.4.0): diff - L1StandardBridge (2.2.2 → 2.3.0): diff - MIPS → MIPS64 (MT-Cannon, MIPS32 single-threaded replaced by MIPS64 multi-threaded): diff - PermissionedDisputeGame (replaced): diff

    Upgrade 14: Isthmus L1 Contracts + MT-Cannon. https://gov.optimism.io/t/upgrade-proposal-14-isthmus-l1-contracts-mt-cannon/9796

    Implementation diffs:

    • SystemConfig (2.4.0 → 2.5.0): diff
    • L1CrossDomainMessenger (2.5.0 → 2.6.0): diff
    • OptimismPortal2 (3.13.0 → 3.14.0): diff
    • L1ERC721Bridge (2.3.1 → 2.4.0): diff
    • L1StandardBridge (2.2.2 → 2.3.0): diff
    • MIPS → MIPS64 (MT-Cannon, MIPS32 single-threaded replaced by MIPS64 multi-threaded): diff
    • PermissionedDisputeGame (replaced): diff
    contract SystemConfig (eth:0x158Fd5715F16Ac1F2Dc959A299B383aAaf9B59EB) {
    +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x6e293d82eb36a83fb5d8b06268cd4fbf46027b87eea77fcc68f78e4b010a3774"
    + "0x921de6fc906d159fdcef862d2b9559063f5e7b9b7588fa5f33153360ddf296e7"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0x760C48C62A85045A6B69f07F4a9f22868659CbCc"
    + "eth:0x340f923E5c7cbB2171146f64169EC9d5a9FfE647"
    values.$pastUpgrades.5:
    + ["2026-03-28T05:53:35.000Z","0x4de9fd6572f134dd8b9dd0a9754a288e20c590b65be6434bdcd78af60b9fd05f",["eth:0x340f923E5c7cbB2171146f64169EC9d5a9FfE647"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 5
    + 6
    values.version:
    - "2.4.0"
    + "2.5.0"
    values.operatorFeeConstant:
    + 0
    values.operatorFeeScalar:
    + 0
    implementationNames.eth:0x760C48C62A85045A6B69f07F4a9f22868659CbCc:
    - "SystemConfig"
    implementationNames.eth:0x340f923E5c7cbB2171146f64169EC9d5a9FfE647:
    + "SystemConfig"
    }
    - Status: DELETED
    contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0x43Acf69Ab2d79e0608ec3593343e7f3A88F034f2)
    +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger.
    contract L1CrossDomainMessenger (eth:0x6D4528d192dB72E282265D6092F4B872f9Dff69e) {
    +++ description: Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0xfaa50769db48b1d2c04c06a8a0a4771b87b3c0ff20a508115bfdb2b576fdb454"
    + "0x03bcdc719cb7bd0a1377c01bb50b30a6122b308f673b7d7b15a3bb8628e6bd8c"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0x3eA6084748ED1b2A9B5D4426181F1ad8C93F6231"
    + "eth:0x5D5a095665886119693F0B41d8DFeE78da033e8B"
    values.$pastUpgrades.8:
    + ["2026-03-28T05:53:35.000Z","0x4de9fd6572f134dd8b9dd0a9754a288e20c590b65be6434bdcd78af60b9fd05f",["eth:0x5D5a095665886119693F0B41d8DFeE78da033e8B"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 8
    + 9
    values.version:
    - "2.5.0"
    + "2.6.0"
    values.ENCODING_OVERHEAD:
    + 260
    values.FLOOR_CALLDATA_OVERHEAD:
    + 40
    values.TX_BASE_GAS:
    + 21000
    implementationNames.eth:0x3eA6084748ED1b2A9B5D4426181F1ad8C93F6231:
    - "L1CrossDomainMessenger"
    implementationNames.eth:0x5D5a095665886119693F0B41d8DFeE78da033e8B:
    + "L1CrossDomainMessenger"
    }
    contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0x7B02D13904D8e6E0f0Efaf756aB14Cb0FF21eE7e) {
    +++ description: The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x67ee16b5b6c32cdcc862bea390e45017908e6945cfaa01d3ef75dc9de7c9d946"
    + "0xc483ef9e0a5ec2a0450732e743b3784de0cd3876b8fadfce14c0805a0846d26b"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0x2D7e764a0D9919e16983a46595CfA81fc34fa7Cd"
    + "eth:0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4"
    values.$pastUpgrades.4:
    + ["2026-03-28T05:53:35.000Z","0x4de9fd6572f134dd8b9dd0a9754a288e20c590b65be6434bdcd78af60b9fd05f",["eth:0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 4
    + 5
    values.version:
    - "3.13.0"
    + "3.14.0"
    implementationNames.eth:0x2D7e764a0D9919e16983a46595CfA81fc34fa7Cd:
    - "OptimismPortal2"
    implementationNames.eth:0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4:
    + "OptimismPortal2"
    }
    contract L1ERC721Bridge (eth:0xA6Ad22bb0E73DEF40a24E510cFbc93807d8bf87e) {
    +++ description: Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x9de28f19e0d1200bf0afda5ab90c9d2dffa44a775e71cfe9232ee1808338996c"
    + "0x28669b49da3effd51f0f9424ca9cdd455c5b9327c09a40c65fc06f114a6eb837"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0x276d3730f219f7ec22274f7263180b8452B46d47"
    + "eth:0x7aE1d3BD877a4C5CA257404ce26BE93A02C98013"
    values.$pastUpgrades.4:
    + ["2026-03-28T05:53:35.000Z","0x4de9fd6572f134dd8b9dd0a9754a288e20c590b65be6434bdcd78af60b9fd05f",["eth:0x7aE1d3BD877a4C5CA257404ce26BE93A02C98013"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 4
    + 5
    values.version:
    - "2.3.1"
    + "2.4.0"
    implementationNames.eth:0x276d3730f219f7ec22274f7263180b8452B46d47:
    - "L1ERC721Bridge"
    implementationNames.eth:0x7aE1d3BD877a4C5CA257404ce26BE93A02C98013:
    + "L1ERC721Bridge"
    }
    - Status: DELETED
    contract MIPS (eth:0xaA59A0777648BC75cd10364083e878c1cCd6112a)
    +++ description: The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.
    contract L1StandardBridge (eth:0xdc1664458d2f0B6090bEa60A8793A4E66c2F1c00) {
    +++ description: The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x4a2d83507f25be218f504b76815e4494138af88734cc54d34666c631aea88af5"
    + "0x4e15d99844dc5a4304c2396a66c95ec41218ea311c8e524b118fad7beed0bb53"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0x78972E88Ab8BBB517a36cAea23b931BAB58AD3c6"
    + "eth:0x0b09ba359A106C9ea3b181CBc5F394570c7d2a7A"
    values.version:
    - "2.2.2"
    + "2.3.0"
    implementationNames.eth:0x78972E88Ab8BBB517a36cAea23b931BAB58AD3c6:
    - "L1StandardBridge"
    implementationNames.eth:0x0b09ba359A106C9ea3b181CBc5F394570c7d2a7A:
    + "L1StandardBridge"
    }
    contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0xF45a5f1e36fCeA3Cc830A98c6c3C5ceA7d6af852) {
    +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them.
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.gameImpls.1:
    - "eth:0x43Acf69Ab2d79e0608ec3593343e7f3A88F034f2"
    + "eth:0x9bF49c12BAf9FDca154c3C917591f79c7DA5a1F4"
    }
    + Status: CREATED
    contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0x9bF49c12BAf9FDca154c3C917591f79c7DA5a1F4)
    +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract MIPS (eth:0xF027F4A985560fb13324e943edf55ad6F1d15Dc1)
    +++ description: The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.
    2026 March 25, 10:03 UTC
    High severity
    119changes

    Upgrade 13: OPCM and Incident Response Improvements. https://gov.optimism.io/t/upgrade-proposal-13-opcm-and-incident-response-improvements/9739

    Upgrade 13: OPCM and Incident Response Improvements. https://gov.optimism.io/t/upgrade-proposal-13-opcm-and-incident-response-improvements/9739

    contract SystemConfig (eth:0x158Fd5715F16Ac1F2Dc959A299B383aAaf9B59EB) {
    +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0xf2ca03f1fb80fdb3c1281ea41b46245c8e6811a03a9ad7129f60cfedaac0e231"
    + "0x6e293d82eb36a83fb5d8b06268cd4fbf46027b87eea77fcc68f78e4b010a3774"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0xAB9d6cB7A427c0765163A7f45BB91cAfe5f2D375"
    + "eth:0x760C48C62A85045A6B69f07F4a9f22868659CbCc"
    values.$pastUpgrades.4:
    + ["2026-03-16T18:36:23.000Z","0x5b60a86783e3b49210eb4badbfd7032b33cf0ca6e147a86422c3159742b945d0",["eth:0x760C48C62A85045A6B69f07F4a9f22868659CbCc"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 4
    + 5
    values.gasPayingToken:
    - {"addr_":"eth:0xEeeeeEeeeEeEeeEeEeEeeEEEeeeeEeeeeeeeEEeE","decimals_":18}
    values.gasPayingTokenName:
    - "Ether"
    values.gasPayingTokenSymbol:
    - "ETH"
    values.isCustomGasToken:
    - false
    values.version:
    - "2.3.0"
    + "2.4.0"
    values.getAddresses:
    + {"l1CrossDomainMessenger":"eth:0x6D4528d192dB72E282265D6092F4B872f9Dff69e","l1ERC721Bridge":"eth:0xA6Ad22bb0E73DEF40a24E510cFbc93807d8bf87e","l1StandardBridge":"eth:0xdc1664458d2f0B6090bEa60A8793A4E66c2F1c00","disputeGameFactory":"eth:0xF45a5f1e36fCeA3Cc830A98c6c3C5ceA7d6af852","optimismPortal":"eth:0x7B02D13904D8e6E0f0Efaf756aB14Cb0FF21eE7e","optimismMintableERC20Factory":"eth:0x4d898F66327Fa050131A17ed17a39EBeCC81f0c3"}
    implementationNames.eth:0xAB9d6cB7A427c0765163A7f45BB91cAfe5f2D375:
    - "SystemConfig"
    implementationNames.eth:0x760C48C62A85045A6B69f07F4a9f22868659CbCc:
    + "SystemConfig"
    }
    contract OptimismMintableERC20Factory (eth:0x4d898F66327Fa050131A17ed17a39EBeCC81f0c3) {
    +++ description: A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it's deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain's representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x4c5ac4e53576924cabbd2a471f368a541bc3f4b1f53fa41a389692fcc62f6176"
    + "0x9650b4bba6299e410f01a369a95a2c57e1c3ca35f0d80c13f4f59fc468f370e5"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0xE01efbeb1089D1d1dB9c6c8b135C934C0734c846"
    + "eth:0x5493f4677A186f64805fe7317D6993ba4863988F"
    values.$pastUpgrades.2:
    + ["2026-03-16T18:36:23.000Z","0x5b60a86783e3b49210eb4badbfd7032b33cf0ca6e147a86422c3159742b945d0",["eth:0x5493f4677A186f64805fe7317D6993ba4863988F"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 2
    + 3
    values.version:
    - "1.9.0"
    + "1.10.1"
    implementationNames.eth:0xE01efbeb1089D1d1dB9c6c8b135C934C0734c846:
    - "OptimismMintableERC20Factory"
    implementationNames.eth:0x5493f4677A186f64805fe7317D6993ba4863988F:
    + "OptimismMintableERC20Factory"
    }
    contract DelayedWETH (eth:0x4e27966e7D3727bE584d32081fc341321B047bF6) {
    +++ description: Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0xfff6f4cca21febd4323222e2ca87ec8b78edfdeeca942468fbf331e537815484"
    + "0x1c7d0fda5ed6d8fc7f5b5f7df5e307f0fcfd173fa5833ea9fce8875d5d44d86a"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0x71e966Ae981d1ce531a7b6d23DC0f27B38409087"
    + "eth:0x5e40B9231B86984b5150507046e354dbFbeD3d9e"
    values.$pastUpgrades.1:
    + ["2026-03-16T18:36:23.000Z","0x5b60a86783e3b49210eb4badbfd7032b33cf0ca6e147a86422c3159742b945d0",["eth:0x5e40B9231B86984b5150507046e354dbFbeD3d9e"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 1
    + 2
    values.delay:
    - 604800
    + 302400
    values.version:
    - "1.1.0"
    + "1.3.0"
    implementationNames.eth:0x71e966Ae981d1ce531a7b6d23DC0f27B38409087:
    - "DelayedWETH"
    implementationNames.eth:0x5e40B9231B86984b5150507046e354dbFbeD3d9e:
    + "DelayedWETH"
    }
    contract Boba Multisig (eth:0x56121a8612474C3eB65D69a3b871f284705b9bC4) {
    +++ description: None
    receivedPermissions.10:
    - {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xd50395Fd129A40B77119b2994d285Ef1919D7Ac7","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x6e598cec2701FfAA3c06175dc3Af0317a749a0Dc"}]}
    receivedPermissions.11:
    + {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xec22De453c5819F96E000Bf3aD5262019ca2151b","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x6e598cec2701FfAA3c06175dc3Af0317a749a0Dc"}]}
    }
    - Status: DELETED
    contract MIPS (eth:0x5fE03a12C1236F9C22Cb6479778DDAa4bce6299C)
    +++ description: The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.
    EOA (eth:0x67b2426fB1ba42c6168e53E1e40E116A4E963d60) {
    +++ description: None
    receivedPermissions:
    - [{"permission":"challenge","from":"eth:0x97e8B3e46a251A657A56CEe8c24E4C0F1864be64","role":".challenger"}]
    }
    contract L1CrossDomainMessenger (eth:0x6D4528d192dB72E282265D6092F4B872f9Dff69e) {
    +++ description: Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x1cc8a3b7de3d2c54c4706bb3f3015714d3b56647fc9fbfd6f8b068f5f63c1c25"
    + "0xfaa50769db48b1d2c04c06a8a0a4771b87b3c0ff20a508115bfdb2b576fdb454"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0xD3494713A5cfaD3F5359379DfA074E2Ac8C6Fd65"
    + "eth:0x3eA6084748ED1b2A9B5D4426181F1ad8C93F6231"
    values.$pastUpgrades.7:
    + ["2026-03-16T18:36:23.000Z","0x5b60a86783e3b49210eb4badbfd7032b33cf0ca6e147a86422c3159742b945d0",["eth:0x3eA6084748ED1b2A9B5D4426181F1ad8C93F6231"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 7
    + 8
    values.version:
    - "2.3.0"
    + "2.5.0"
    implementationNames.eth:0xD3494713A5cfaD3F5359379DfA074E2Ac8C6Fd65:
    - "L1CrossDomainMessenger"
    implementationNames.eth:0x3eA6084748ED1b2A9B5D4426181F1ad8C93F6231:
    + "L1CrossDomainMessenger"
    }
    contract ProxyAdmin (eth:0x6e598cec2701FfAA3c06175dc3Af0317a749a0Dc) {
    +++ description: None
    directlyReceivedPermissions.8:
    - {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xd50395Fd129A40B77119b2994d285Ef1919D7Ac7","role":"admin"}
    directlyReceivedPermissions.9:
    + {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xec22De453c5819F96E000Bf3aD5262019ca2151b","role":"admin"}
    }
    contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0x7B02D13904D8e6E0f0Efaf756aB14Cb0FF21eE7e) {
    +++ description: The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x41be46bdb67af1b7af90e1bd70a1fcd31a3352282beb83b846a5189675c37ac1"
    + "0x67ee16b5b6c32cdcc862bea390e45017908e6945cfaa01d3ef75dc9de7c9d946"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0xe2F826324b2faf99E513D16D266c3F80aE87832B"
    + "eth:0x2D7e764a0D9919e16983a46595CfA81fc34fa7Cd"
    values.$pastUpgrades.3:
    + ["2026-03-16T18:36:23.000Z","0x5b60a86783e3b49210eb4badbfd7032b33cf0ca6e147a86422c3159742b945d0",["eth:0x2D7e764a0D9919e16983a46595CfA81fc34fa7Cd"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 3
    + 4
    values.version:
    - "3.10.0"
    + "3.13.0"
    implementationNames.eth:0xe2F826324b2faf99E513D16D266c3F80aE87832B:
    - "OptimismPortal2"
    implementationNames.eth:0x2D7e764a0D9919e16983a46595CfA81fc34fa7Cd:
    + "OptimismPortal2"
    }
    - Status: DELETED
    contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0x97e8B3e46a251A657A56CEe8c24E4C0F1864be64)
    +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger.
    contract SuperchainConfig (eth:0x996ffD627901f10C80A7d4B72A12316D2e77c076) {
    +++ description: This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages the `PAUSED_SLOT`, a boolean value indicating whether the local chain is paused, and `GUARDIAN_SLOT`, the address of the guardian which can pause and unpause the system.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x3ac96c9c95e25f689f65a50f24b325e3f891029cb1cea96dc642418bbb535b1d"
    + "0x03dba37173051b02bc81487e181c791bcf1aef664c249e5d035f11f488bdd686"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0xe4e0f760409EB1661db76a4365c0803C3630270f"
    + "eth:0x4da82a327773965b8d4D85Fa3dB8249b387458E7"
    values.$pastUpgrades.3:
    + ["2026-03-16T18:36:23.000Z","0x5b60a86783e3b49210eb4badbfd7032b33cf0ca6e147a86422c3159742b945d0",["eth:0x4da82a327773965b8d4D85Fa3dB8249b387458E7"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 3
    + 4
    values.version:
    - "1.1.0"
    + "1.2.0"
    implementationNames.eth:0xe4e0f760409EB1661db76a4365c0803C3630270f:
    - "SuperchainConfig"
    implementationNames.eth:0x4da82a327773965b8d4D85Fa3dB8249b387458E7:
    + "SuperchainConfig"
    }
    - Status: DELETED
    contract PreimageOracle (eth:0x9c065e11870B891D214Bc2Da7EF1f9DDFA1BE277)
    +++ description: The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game.
    contract L1ERC721Bridge (eth:0xA6Ad22bb0E73DEF40a24E510cFbc93807d8bf87e) {
    +++ description: Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x482ec6e91304ac39a3fb4505634427bddfddee23b8e93a4f7f995ca5083ae3c3"
    + "0x9de28f19e0d1200bf0afda5ab90c9d2dffa44a775e71cfe9232ee1808338996c"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0xAE2AF01232a6c4a4d3012C5eC5b1b35059caF10d"
    + "eth:0x276d3730f219f7ec22274f7263180b8452B46d47"
    values.$pastUpgrades.3:
    + ["2026-03-16T18:36:23.000Z","0x5b60a86783e3b49210eb4badbfd7032b33cf0ca6e147a86422c3159742b945d0",["eth:0x276d3730f219f7ec22274f7263180b8452B46d47"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 3
    + 4
    values.version:
    - "2.1.0"
    + "2.3.1"
    implementationNames.eth:0xAE2AF01232a6c4a4d3012C5eC5b1b35059caF10d:
    - "L1ERC721Bridge"
    implementationNames.eth:0x276d3730f219f7ec22274f7263180b8452B46d47:
    + "L1ERC721Bridge"
    }
    - Status: DELETED
    contract AnchorStateRegistry (eth:0xd50395Fd129A40B77119b2994d285Ef1919D7Ac7)
    +++ description: Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game.
    contract L1StandardBridge (eth:0xdc1664458d2f0B6090bEa60A8793A4E66c2F1c00) {
    +++ description: The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x1010ff7f40ab4d53e6d9996aefa04423dabe9d0e22fac2d02b330ed3aa2c5740"
    + "0x4a2d83507f25be218f504b76815e4494138af88734cc54d34666c631aea88af5"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0x64B5a5Ed26DCb17370Ff4d33a8D503f0fbD06CfF"
    + "eth:0x78972E88Ab8BBB517a36cAea23b931BAB58AD3c6"
    values.version:
    - "2.1.0"
    + "2.2.2"
    implementationNames.eth:0x64B5a5Ed26DCb17370Ff4d33a8D503f0fbD06CfF:
    - "L1StandardBridge"
    implementationNames.eth:0x78972E88Ab8BBB517a36cAea23b931BAB58AD3c6:
    + "L1StandardBridge"
    }
    EOA (eth:0xf115011037999B39F0f89A40722AC8887a5f0515) {
    +++ description: None
    receivedPermissions:
    - [{"permission":"propose","from":"eth:0x97e8B3e46a251A657A56CEe8c24E4C0F1864be64","role":".proposer"}]
    }
    contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0xF45a5f1e36fCeA3Cc830A98c6c3C5ceA7d6af852) {
    +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x7f307d6191215a72b6c24c01b3c2fc87c84f7fb346790132e58736caa2d1dd14"
    + "0x85ca17941ef36ac6b28a4f8f89803d0d41ef419c47586dcd3acdb47ee9617285"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0xc641A33cab81C559F2bd4b21EA34C290E2440C2B"
    + "eth:0x4bbA758F006Ef09402eF31724203F316ab74e4a0"
    values.$pastUpgrades.1:
    + ["2026-03-16T18:36:23.000Z","0x5b60a86783e3b49210eb4badbfd7032b33cf0ca6e147a86422c3159742b945d0",["eth:0x4bbA758F006Ef09402eF31724203F316ab74e4a0"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 1
    + 2
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.gameImpls.1:
    - "eth:0x97e8B3e46a251A657A56CEe8c24E4C0F1864be64"
    + "eth:0x43Acf69Ab2d79e0608ec3593343e7f3A88F034f2"
    values.version:
    - "1.0.0"
    + "1.0.1"
    implementationNames.eth:0xc641A33cab81C559F2bd4b21EA34C290E2440C2B:
    - "DisputeGameFactory"
    implementationNames.eth:0x4bbA758F006Ef09402eF31724203F316ab74e4a0:
    + "DisputeGameFactory"
    }
    + Status: CREATED
    contract PreimageOracle (eth:0x1fb8cdFc6831fc866Ed9C51aF8817Da5c287aDD3)
    +++ description: The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0x43Acf69Ab2d79e0608ec3593343e7f3A88F034f2)
    +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract MIPS (eth:0xaA59A0777648BC75cd10364083e878c1cCd6112a)
    +++ description: The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract AnchorStateRegistry (eth:0xec22De453c5819F96E000Bf3aD5262019ca2151b)
    +++ description: Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game.
    2025 December 22, 12:27 UTC
    High severity
    8changes

    safe multisig upgrade.

    safe multisig upgrade.

    contract Boba Multisig (eth:0x56121a8612474C3eB65D69a3b871f284705b9bC4) {
    +++ description: None
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0xd42bbf9f7dcd3720a7fc6bdc6edfdfae8800a37d6dd4decfa0ef6ca4a2e88940"
    + "0x7d388119a66f3eae147d748f86136f073d907d6b36f7e87e9363c4c7a2899a8a"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0xd9Db270c1B5E3Bd161E8c8503c55cEABeE709552"
    + "eth:0x41675C099F32341bf84BFc5382aF534df5C7461a"
    values.VERSION:
    - "1.3.0"
    + "1.4.1"
    implementationNames.eth:0xd9Db270c1B5E3Bd161E8c8503c55cEABeE709552:
    - "GnosisSafe"
    implementationNames.eth:0x41675C099F32341bf84BFc5382aF534df5C7461a:
    + "Safe"
    }
    Operator

    The system has a centralized operator

    The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.

    • MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

    Users can force any transaction

    Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.

    1. Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs
    2. OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function
    Withdrawals

    Regular exits

    The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.

    1. OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function
    2. OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function

    Forced messaging

    If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.

    1. Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain
    Other considerations

    EVM compatible smart contracts are supported

    OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.

    1. Introducing EVM Equivalence
    Permissions
    A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions
    Go to Disco
    Disco UI Banner
    Disco UI BannerExplore in Disco

    Ethereum

    Actors:

    Boba Multisig0x5612…9bC4

    A Multisig with 2/3 threshold.

    • Can upgrade with no delay
      • SystemConfig
      • AnchorStateRegistry
      • OptimismMintableERC20Factory
      • L1CrossDomainMessenger
      • OptimismPortal2
      • DelayedWETH
      • SuperchainConfig
      • L1ERC721Bridge
      • L1StandardBridge
      • DisputeGameFactory
    • Can interact with AddressManager
      • set and change address mappings
    • Can interact with SuperchainConfig
      • Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless)

    Participants (3):

    0xCCDE…1C630x6976…02ab0xBEC9…aCb4
    EOA 10xA4eD…d960
    • Can interact with SystemConfig
      • Allowed to commit transactions from the current layer to the host chain
    EOA 20xD382…3369
    • Can interact with SystemConfig
      • it can update the preconfer address, the batch submitter (Sequencer) address and the gas configuration of the system
    Smart contracts
    A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions
    Go to Disco
    Disco UI Banner
    Disco UI BannerExplore in Disco
    Note: Contracts presented in this section had their implementations updated since the last time our team looked at this project. The information presented may be inaccurate.
    A diagram of the smart contract architecture
    A diagram of the smart contract architecture

    Ethereum

    SuperchainConfig0x996f…c076Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3mo 1d if left untouched.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Boba Multisig
      • guardian: Boba Multisig
    Can be upgraded by:
    Boba Multisig with no delay
    Implementation used in:
    L1StandardBridge
    Escrow
    0xdc16…1c00Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Boba Multisig

    All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation.

    Can be upgraded by:
    Boba Multisig with no delay
    Implementation used in:
    PreimageOracle0x1fb8…aDD3

    The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game.

    Implementation used in:
    MIPS0x6463…B908

    The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.

    Implementation used in:
    ProxyAdmin0x6e59…a0Dc
    • Roles:
      • owner: Boba Multisig
    DelayedWETH0x7e02…38a6Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Boba Multisig
    Can be upgraded by:
    Boba Multisig with no delay
    Implementation used in:
    PermissionedDisputeGame0xae09…8670

    Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger.

    There are impactful changes to the following contracts, and part of the information might be outdated.
    SystemConfig0x158F…59EBImplementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Boba Multisig
      • batcherHash: EOA 1
      • owner: EOA 2
    Can be upgraded by:
    Boba Multisig with no delay
    Implementation used in:
    OptimismPortal2
    Escrow
    0x7B02…eE7eImplementation (Upgradable)Admin

    The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Boba Multisig
    The following tokens are included in the value secured calculation:
    ETH token logo
    Can be upgraded by:
    Boba Multisig with no delay
    Implementation used in:
    DisputeGameFactory0xF45a…f852Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Boba Multisig
    Can be upgraded by:
    Boba Multisig with no delay
    Implementation used in:
    L1CrossDomainMessenger0x6D45…f69eImplementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain’s epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Boba Multisig
    Can be upgraded by:
    Boba Multisig with no delay
    Implementation used in:
    L1ERC721Bridge0xA6Ad…f87eImplementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Boba Multisig
    Can be upgraded by:
    Boba Multisig with no delay
    Implementation used in:
    AnchorStateRegistry0x3807…a4B1Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Boba Multisig
    Can be upgraded by:
    Boba Multisig with no delay
    Implementation used in:
    OptimismMintableERC20Factory0x4d89…f0c3Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it’s deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain’s representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Boba Multisig
    Can be upgraded by:
    Boba Multisig with no delay
    Implementation used in:

    The current deployment carries some associated risks:

    • Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).

    Program Hashes

    Name
    Hash
    Repository
    Verification
    Used in
    0x03ca...7d1b
    Github
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