Website	re.al
App	re.al/bridge re.al/app/bridge
Docs	docs.re.al
Explorer	explorer.re.al
Repository	github.com/re-al-Foundation
Social	@real_rwa Discord mirror.xyz/0xBE105a62f39a2E0b09772C49E3EcF6ef21BEd85C

Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure

Milestones

Re.al Mainnet Launch

2024 May 15th

Re.al launches its mainnet with some initial dapps deployed.

Learn more

Arcana Launch

2024 May 15th

Arcana launches their platform for rebasing, delta-neutral yields on re.al.

Learn more

RWA Token Launch

2024 May 15th

Re.al launches the RWA token and its governance protocol.

Learn more

Risk summary

Fraud proof system is fully deployed but is not yet permissionless as it requires Validators to be whitelisted.

Fraud proof system is fully deployed but is not yet permissionless as it requires Validators to be whitelisted.

Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure

State validation

Fraud proofs (INT)

No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.

Data availability

External (DAC)

Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published on chain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.

Exit window

None

There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.

Sequencer failure

Self sequence

In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project’s chain by sending them to L1. There is a 1d delay on this operation.

Proposer failure

Self propose

Anyone can become a Proposer after 6d 8h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.

Technology

Fraud proofs ensure state correctness

After some period of time, the published state root is assumed to be correct. For a certain time period, one of the whitelisted actors can submit a fraud proof that shows that the state was incorrect. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks.

Funds can be stolen if none of the whitelisted verifiers checks the published state. Fraud proofs assume at least one honest and able validator (CRITICAL).

Data is not stored on chain

Users transactions are not published on-chain, but rather sent to external trusted parties, also known as committee members (DAC). Members of the DAC collectively produce a Data Availability Certificate (comprising BLS signatures from a quorum) guaranteeing that the data behind the new transaction batch will be available until the expiry period elapses (currently a minimum of two weeks). This signature is not verified by L1, however external Validators will skip the batch if BLS signature is not valid resulting. This will result in a fraud proof challenge if this batch is included in a consecutive state update. It is assumed that at least one honest DAC member that signed the batch will reveal tx data to the Validators if Sequencer decides to act maliciously and withhold the data. If the Sequencer cannot gather enough signatures from the DAC, it will “fall back to rollup” mode and by posting the full data directly to the L1 chain. The current DAC threshold is 1 out of 1.

Funds can be lost if the external data becomes unavailable (CRITICAL).
Users can be censored if the committee restricts their access to the external data.

Inside AnyTrust - Arbitrum documentation

Operator

The system has a centralized sequencer

While forcing transaction is open to anyone the system employs a privileged sequencer that has priority for submitting transaction batches and ordering transactions.

MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

Sequencer - Arbitrum documentation

Users can force any transaction

Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on-chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract directly. Anyone can become a Proposer after approximately 6d 8h (45818 blocks) of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.

Withdrawals

Regular exit

The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is finalized the funds become available for withdrawal on L1. The process of block finalization usually takes several days to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.

Tradeable Bridge Exit

When a user initiates a regular withdrawal a third party verifying the chain can offer to buy this withdrawal by paying the user on L1. The user will get the funds immediately, however the third party has to wait for the block to be finalized. This is implemented as a first party functionality inside Arbitrum’s token bridge.

Tradeable Bridge Exits - Arbitrum documentation

Autonomous exit

Users can (eventually) exit the system by pushing the transaction on L1 and providing the corresponding state root. The only way to prevent such withdrawal is via an upgrade.

Other considerations

EVM compatible smart contracts are supported

Arbitrum One uses Nitro technology that allows running fraud proofs by executing EVM code on top of WASM.

Funds can be lost if there are mistakes in the highly complex Nitro and WASM one-step prover implementation.

Inside Arbitrum Nitro

Permissions

The system uses the following set of permissioned addresses:

ProxyAdmin 0xB032…80f1

Admin of UpgradeExecutor, ChallengeManager, Outbox, Bridge, Inbox.

Validators/Proposers 0x4b8F…eb62

They can submit new state roots and challenge state roots. Some of the operators perform their duties through special purpose smart contracts.

Sequencers 0x0e00…Fa2E

Central actors allowed to submit transaction batches to L1.

GelatoMultisig 0xBeA2…9Bbb

Multisig that can execute upgrades of the L2 system contracts via the UpgradeExecutor. This is a Gnosis Safe with 6 / 10 threshold.

Used in:

GelatoMultisig participants (10) 0xB0C2…f621 0x28bB…680c 0x691C…aAD2 0x5bE3…A54d 0xBc0c…5E0d 0xc85a…0849 0x27b1…8ad3 0x01a0…c32e 0xf83b…60b5 0x547D…1a26

Those are the participants of the GelatoMultisig.

EscrowMultisig 0xD47E…23d4

Multisig that owns reETH-strategy and escrow-related contracts and can move deposited funds. Also governs the reETH token as a minter. This is a Gnosis Safe with 4 / 5 threshold.

EscrowMultisig participants (5) 0x240B…b82A 0xf16D…4Fe0 0x6bD4…2283 0xFbce…EF6A 0x7cFa…25bD

Those are the participants of the EscrowMultisig.

Bridger Owner 0xeB65…b3A3

Can upgrade the Bridger contract.

Smart contracts

The system consists of the following smart contracts on the host chain (Ethereum):

StrategyManager 0x5Cba…DdD8

A gateway contract that manages strategies for assets that are deposited to the AssetsVault. From a user PoV this happens when bridging to the L2.

SwapManager 0x4AC3…c335

Performs swaps via Curve or UniswapV3 to serve instant withdrawals from the reETH RealVault.

RealVault 0xFC1d…A5e1

This contract is responsible for managing deposit, withdrawal, and settlement processes for the assets backing reETH using the ERC4626 (tokenized vault) standard.

AssetsVault 0xf985…2294

This escrow contract receives ETH that users bridge to Re.al L2. This ETH is then converted to yielding assets using the StrategyManager.

Bridger 0xbf2F…26f8 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

A Routing contract to the standard orbit stack bridge of the L2.

Can be upgraded by: Bridger Owner

Upgrade delay: No delay

RollupProxy 0xc4F7…9d2a Admin Admin logic (Upgradable)User logic (Upgradable)

Main contract implementing Arbitrum One Rollup. Manages other Rollup components, list of Stakers and Validators. Entry point for Validators creating new Rollup Nodes (state commits) and Challengers submitting fraud proofs.

Implementation used in: