Summary Value Secured Risk summary Risk analysis Stage Data availability State validation Upgrades & Governance Updates Operator Sequencing Withdrawals Other considerations Permissions Smart contracts

Deri

There are impactful changes and part of the information might be outdated.

Critical contracts can be upgraded by an EOA which could result in the loss of all funds.

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About

Deri is an Ethereum Layer-3 that leverages Arbitrum Nitro to enable efficient cross-chain futures, options, and derivatives.

Total Value SecuredTVS

$13.55 K2.73%

Past day UOPSDaily UOPS

No data

Gas token

ETH

Type

Other

Purpose

Universal

Host chain

Arbitrum One

Tokens breakdown

Value secured breakdown

0.00% with additional trust assumptions

View TVS breakdown

Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure

Explore more in Discovery UI

Badges

About

Deri is an Ethereum Layer-3 that leverages Arbitrum Nitro to enable efficient cross-chain futures, options, and derivatives.

Why is the project listed in others?

There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges

Consequence: projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds.

Learn more about the recategorisation here.

Value Secured

Compare View TVS breakdown

Exclude restricted RWA tokens

Total

Canonically BridgedCanonically Bridged ValueCanonical

Natively MintedNatively Minted TokensNative

Externally BridgedExternally Bridged ValueExternal

ETH & derivatives

Stablecoins

BTC & derivatives

Other

View TVS breakdown

Compare with other projects

Risk summary

There are 3 additional risks coming from the host chain

Arbitrum One

Fraud proof system is fully deployed but is not yet permissionless as it requires Validators to be whitelisted.

Funds can be stolen if

a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL),
none of the whitelisted verifiers checks the published state. Fraud proofs assume at least one honest and able validator (CRITICAL).

MEV can be extracted if

the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

Risk analysis

The L3 risks depend on the individual properties of L3 and those of the host chain combined.

Critical contracts can be upgraded by an EOA which could result in the loss of all funds.

Fraud proof system is fully deployed but is not yet permissionless as it requires Validators to be whitelisted.

	SEQUENCER FAILURE	STATE VALIDATION	DATA AVAILABILITY	EXIT WINDOW	PROPOSER FAILURE
Arbitrum One L2	Self sequence	Fraud proofs (INT)	Onchain	None	Self propose
Deri L3 • Individual	Self sequence	Fraud proofs (INT)	Onchain	None	Self propose
Deri L3 • Combined	Self sequence	Fraud proofs (INT)	Onchain	None	Self propose

L2 & L3 individual risks

Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure

L3 combined risks

Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure

L3 combined risks

The information below reflects combined L2 & L3 risks.

Sequencer failure

Self sequence

In the event of a sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project’s chain by sending them to L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development.. There can be up to a 2d delay on this operation.

State validation

Fraud proofs (INT)

No actor outside of the single ProposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block. can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 1d challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled..

Data availability

Onchain

All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development..

Exit window

None

There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.

Proposer failure

Self propose

Anyone can become a ProposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block. after 7d 8h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.

Stage

Deri is not even a

Stage 0

project.

The requirement for available node software is under review

Learn more about Stages

Please keep in mind that these stages do not reflect project security, this is an opinionated assessment of project maturity based on subjective criteria, created with a goal of incentivizing projects to push toward better decentralization. Each team may have taken different paths to achieve this goal.

Data availability

All transaction data is recorded on chain

All executed transactions are submitted to an on chain smart contract. The execution of the rollupA blockchain that inherits consensus and data availability from another blockchain called L1. Rollups enable trust minimized bridges with the base layer via proof systems, either optimistic or zero-knowledge. A rollup without a bridge, or without considering the bridge, is called a sovereign rollup. is based entirely on the submitted transactions, so anyone monitoring the contract can know the correct state of the rollup chain.

Learn more about the DA layer here:

Ethereum

State validation

Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by a set of whitelisted validatorsIn the context of L2s, a Validator is an actor that validates the correctness of state transitions. For optimistic rollups this corresponds to challengers, and for ZK rollups this corresponds to the onchain verifier. If a state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. passes the challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled., it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.

State root proposals

Whitelisted validatorsIn the context of L2s, a Validator is an actor that validates the correctness of state transitions. For optimistic rollups this corresponds to challengers, and for ZK rollups this corresponds to the onchain verifier propose state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. as children of a previous state root. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. This structure forms a graph, and therefore, in the contracts, state roots are referred to as nodes. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.1 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proofAlso referred to as a fault proof, it is the construction of an assertion that fraud was perpetrated on an optimistic rollup. More concretely, that an invalid state transition took place according to the protocol rules. The submitter of a fraud proof would expect a reward from the optimistic rollup protocol for helping maintain the integrity of the system.. Stakes can be moved from one nodeA software client that participates in the network. to one of its children, either by calling stakeOnExistingNode or stakeOnNewNode. New nodes cannot be created faster than the minimum assertion period by the same validator, currently set to 15m. The oldest unconfirmed node can be confirmed if the challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled. has passed and there are no siblings, and rejected if the parent is not a confirmed node or if the challenge period has passed and no one is staked on it.

Funds can be stolen if none of the whitelisted verifiers checks the published state. Fraud proofs assume at least one honest and able validator (CRITICAL).

How is fraud proven - Arbitrum documentation FAQ

Challenges

A challenge can be started between two siblings, i.e. two different state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. that share the same parent, by calling the startChallenge function. ValidatorsIn the context of L2s, a Validator is an actor that validates the correctness of state transitions. For optimistic rollups this corresponds to challengers, and for ZK rollups this corresponds to the onchain verifier cannot be in more than one challenge at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with partial concurrency. Since each challenge lasts 1d, this implies that the protocol can be subject to delay attacks, where a malicious actor can delay withdrawals as long as they are willing to pay the cost of losing their stakes. If the protocol is delayed attacked, the new stake requirement increases exponentially for each challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled. of delay. Challenges are played via a bisection game, where asserter and challenger play together to find the first instruction of disagreement. Such instruction is then executed onchain in the WASM OneStepProver contract to determine the winner, who then gets half of the stake of the loser. As said before, a state root is rejected only when no one left is staked on it. The protocol does not enforces valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claim and then provide incorrect midpoints.

Fraud Proof Wars: Arbitrum Classic

Program Hashes

Name	Hash	Repository	Verification	Used in

	0x1848...aa39	Github		Projects used in Search for projects used in

Upgrades & Governance

Past upgrades

The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.

Count of upgrades

Last upgrade

1y 3mo ago

Avg upgrade interval

1y 1mo

Updates

2025 July 14, 13:11 UTC

18changes

Discovery rerun on the same block number with only config-related changes.

New and verified contracts

+	Status: CREATED
	contract UpgradeExecutor (0x0611b78A42903a537BE7a2f9a8783BE39AC63cD9)
	+++ description: Central contract defining the access control permissions for upgrading the system contract implementations.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract OneStepProofEntry (0x0A9F7BD2182EAC312ec99AFcF684Ff40086331Ff)
	+++ description: One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract RollupEventInbox (0x0fF7A97caAb356c5507e5355b6819CB8b93d5591)
	+++ description: Helper contract sending configuration data over the bridge during the systems initialization.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract ProxyAdmin (0x27C7Bfd2cC11429e9b80c443b42FDBe4754F6c91)
	+++ description: None

+	Status: CREATED
	contract ChallengeManager (0x383eFE8D410285c5CbE1B4F296022640759aA834)
	+++ description: Contract that allows challenging state roots. Can be called through the RollupProxy by Validators or the UpgradeExecutor.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract OneStepProverMath (0x5e5aBaD78aa0a0773a43606A978ef53a95a2f391)
	+++ description: One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract ValidatorUtils (0x6c21303F5986180B1394d2C89f3e883890E2867b)
	+++ description: This contract implements view only utilities for validators.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract OneStepProverHostIo (0x742F0619adB993809B1B00E493b5bdb4085B735e)
	+++ description: One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract RollupProxy (0x846387C3D6001F74170455B1074D01f05eB3067a)
	+++ description: Central contract for the project's configuration like its execution logic hash (`wasmModuleRoot`) and addresses of the other system contracts. Entry point for Proposers creating new Rollup Nodes (state commitments) and Challengers submitting fraud proofs (In the Orbit stack, these two roles are both held by the Validators).

+	Status: CREATED
	contract Outbox (0xA597e0212971e65f53f288Ff1fFd26A6C8201f83)
	+++ description: Facilitates L2 to L1 contract calls: Messages initiated from L2 (for example withdrawal messages) eventually resolve in execution on L1.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract CustomGateway (0xa8f6bB820eaD521cf834B7b371cFe025bdacEE99)
	+++ description: Escrows deposited assets for the canonical bridge that are externally governed or need custom token contracts with e.g. minting rights or upgradeability.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract ERC20Gateway (0xB155C77a440DA7c282993a89FeA609598293017A)
	+++ description: Escrows deposited ERC-20 assets for the canonical Bridge. Upon depositing, a generic token representation will be minted at the destination. Withdrawals are initiated by the Outbox contract.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract OneStepProver0 (0xce4b9839C83cB0650B34659B8Fa44609A45b1010)
	+++ description: One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract Bridge (0xD4FE46D2533E7d03382ac6cACF0547F336e59DC0)
	+++ description: Escrow contract for the project's gas token (can be different from ETH). Keeps a list of allowed Inboxes and Outboxes for canonical bridge messaging.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract OneStepProverMemory (0xd76eb58D7fA80AC6119942bA20D9bbbA94Ce66BC)
	+++ description: One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract SequencerInbox (0xe347C1223381b9Dcd6c0F61cf81c90175A7Bae77)
	+++ description: A sequencer (registered in this contract) can submit transaction batches or commitments here.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract GatewayRouter (0xe507b9EF563DB6CcFDcE270160C50b2005BeED20)
	+++ description: This routing contract maps tokens to the correct escrow (gateway) to be then bridged with canonical messaging.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract Inbox (0xFF55fB76F5671dD9eB6c62EffF8D693Bb161a3ad)
	+++ description: Facilitates sending L1 to L2 messages like depositing ETH, but does not escrow funds.

2025 June 19, 11:37 UTC

High severity

22changes

late upgrade to standard orbit contracts.

	contract SequencerInbox (0xe347C1223381b9Dcd6c0F61cf81c90175A7Bae77) {
	+++ description: A sequencer (registered in this contract) can submit transaction batches or commitments here.
	sourceHashes.0:
-	"0x50cf57b01499408fa99da27cf0fee96ec30f0d40667d1aa090c442bc80f0636b"
+	"0x6bb86ac4bd0d31e049f543fcf0a8f94c952252222f115246ef9d5b8104d803cc"
	values.$implementation:
-	"0xeE5a0A8e5d08474F21933d17f4EE076B3eAdBaAB"
+	"0xE742BbD0dD0A9E2cc6dB4C8d363DF06801A85887"
	values.$pastUpgrades.2:
+	["2023-11-19T04:23:39.000Z","0xc8d7afcb2f7f7dc0883a938db4352813e17b7629850cdc54d8cc2eba7e10b095",["0x1c6ACCd9d66f3B993928E7439c9A2d67b94a445F"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.1.2:
-	"2023-11-19T04:23:39.000Z"
+	"2025-05-22T01:59:12.000Z"
	values.$pastUpgrades.1.1:
-	["0x1c6ACCd9d66f3B993928E7439c9A2d67b94a445F"]
+	"0x64f376646580d25cc092327877e062bbd953ecbfa7600864478b6aec7ffb97ff"
	values.$pastUpgrades.1.0:
-	"0xc8d7afcb2f7f7dc0883a938db4352813e17b7629850cdc54d8cc2eba7e10b095"
+	["0xeE5a0A8e5d08474F21933d17f4EE076B3eAdBaAB"]
	values.$pastUpgrades.0.2:
-	"2025-05-22T01:59:12.000Z"
+	["0xE742BbD0dD0A9E2cc6dB4C8d363DF06801A85887"]
	values.$pastUpgrades.0.1:
-	"0x64f376646580d25cc092327877e062bbd953ecbfa7600864478b6aec7ffb97ff"
+	"2025-06-19T02:15:30.000Z"
	values.$pastUpgrades.0.0:
-	["0xeE5a0A8e5d08474F21933d17f4EE076B3eAdBaAB"]
+	"0x6f84858d5890cc27277102d07d76b6db8b418675c23feccb0582ae91a7cfc598"
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	2
+	3
	implementationNames.0xeE5a0A8e5d08474F21933d17f4EE076B3eAdBaAB:
-	"SequencerInbox"
	implementationNames.0xE742BbD0dD0A9E2cc6dB4C8d363DF06801A85887:
+	"SequencerInbox"
	}

	contract Inbox (0xFF55fB76F5671dD9eB6c62EffF8D693Bb161a3ad) {
	+++ description: Facilitates sending L1 to L2 messages like depositing ETH, but does not escrow funds.
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0x99872d99b7163c705118e0a168f99728c3c7089581779077707271cdaad30be3"
+	"0xa7e3f6c355703ed46fcb2156862c4f01792b87beb10a87a81ce3bd5beee79b67"
	sourceHashes.0:
-	"0xa7e3f6c355703ed46fcb2156862c4f01792b87beb10a87a81ce3bd5beee79b67"
+	"0x84cd273689e720a0b7c657b57d9fb127684f3abb87fc4b337a2f0decd9464120"
	values.$implementation:
-	"0x8f6406781cC955398C45a48DcEfeEBDb2c8e2CaA"
+	"0xBaf02424c26b01214aBdeB7F5660C77D8F26C18d"
	values.$pastUpgrades.1:
+	["2023-11-19T04:23:39.000Z","0xc8d7afcb2f7f7dc0883a938db4352813e17b7629850cdc54d8cc2eba7e10b095",["0x8f6406781cC955398C45a48DcEfeEBDb2c8e2CaA"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.0.2:
-	"2023-11-19T04:23:39.000Z"
+	"2025-06-19T02:15:30.000Z"
	values.$pastUpgrades.0.1:
-	"0xc8d7afcb2f7f7dc0883a938db4352813e17b7629850cdc54d8cc2eba7e10b095"
+	"0x6f84858d5890cc27277102d07d76b6db8b418675c23feccb0582ae91a7cfc598"
	values.$pastUpgrades.0.0.0:
-	"0x8f6406781cC955398C45a48DcEfeEBDb2c8e2CaA"
+	"0xBaf02424c26b01214aBdeB7F5660C77D8F26C18d"
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	1
+	2
	implementationNames.0x8f6406781cC955398C45a48DcEfeEBDb2c8e2CaA:
-	"Inbox"
	implementationNames.0xBaf02424c26b01214aBdeB7F5660C77D8F26C18d:
+	"Inbox"
	}

2025 May 22, 08:30 UTC

High severity

58changes

v32 upgrade to standard contracts.

	contract UpgradeExecutor (0x0611b78A42903a537BE7a2f9a8783BE39AC63cD9) {
	+++ description: Central contract defining the access control permissions for upgrading the system contract implementations.
	directlyReceivedPermissions.0.description:
-	"Pause and unpause and set important roles and parameters in the system contracts: Can delegate Sequencer management to a BatchPosterManager address, manage data availability and DACs, set the Sequencer-only window, introduce an allowList to the bridge and whitelist Inboxes/Outboxes."
+	"Pause and unpause and set important roles and parameters in the system contracts: Can delegate Sequencer management to a BatchPosterManager address, manage data availability, DACs and the fastConfirmer role, set the Sequencer-only window, introduce an allowList to the bridge and whitelist Inboxes/Outboxes."
	}

-	Status: DELETED
	contract OneStepProver0 (0x1135265fE014D3FA32B3507E325642B92aFFeAEb)
	+++ description: One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.

	contract ChallengeManager (0x383eFE8D410285c5CbE1B4F296022640759aA834) {
	+++ description: Contract that allows challenging state roots. Can be called through the RollupProxy by Validators or the UpgradeExecutor.
	sourceHashes.0:
-	"0x7e1cd1e10119e118ffaa576ddbe1c0f9810a0859a4bf2f65a4ff596c0ed4183d"
+	"0x1a095768302d7d1c3d02375eaa3341833b4f1aaac707e1c608bce478c87cbf27"
	values.$implementation:
-	"0x09824fe72BFF474d16D9c2774432E381BBD60662"
+	"0xC6adDa3fa1a2Cb75d585eCfE14e1E1Db102B4126"
	values.$pastUpgrades.2:
+	["2025-05-22T01:59:12.000Z","0x64f376646580d25cc092327877e062bbd953ecbfa7600864478b6aec7ffb97ff",["0x16a278342b5521F56849e877294203dF9683F678"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.1:
+	["2023-11-19T04:23:39.000Z","0xc8d7afcb2f7f7dc0883a938db4352813e17b7629850cdc54d8cc2eba7e10b095",["0x09824fe72BFF474d16D9c2774432E381BBD60662"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.0.2:
-	"2023-11-19T04:23:39.000Z"
+	["0xC6adDa3fa1a2Cb75d585eCfE14e1E1Db102B4126"]
	values.$pastUpgrades.0.1:
-	"0xc8d7afcb2f7f7dc0883a938db4352813e17b7629850cdc54d8cc2eba7e10b095"
+	"0x675c13b89d4e518aa8211acf9ebcdc1d1e47afa7476f20263dbb7660d42949c6"
	values.$pastUpgrades.0.0:
-	["0x09824fe72BFF474d16D9c2774432E381BBD60662"]
+	"2025-05-22T02:07:22.000Z"
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	1
+	3
	values.osp:
-	"0x99a2A31300816C1FA3f40818AC9280fe7271F878"
+	"0x0A9F7BD2182EAC312ec99AFcF684Ff40086331Ff"
	implementationNames.0x09824fe72BFF474d16D9c2774432E381BBD60662:
-	"ChallengeManager"
	implementationNames.0xC6adDa3fa1a2Cb75d585eCfE14e1E1Db102B4126:
+	"ChallengeManager"
	}

	EOA (0x46A78349aBA0369D18292a285DE6d5FC5CC2de5c) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.0.description:
-	"Pause and unpause and set important roles and parameters in the system contracts: Can delegate Sequencer management to a BatchPosterManager address, manage data availability and DACs, set the Sequencer-only window, introduce an allowList to the bridge and whitelist Inboxes/Outboxes."
+	"Pause and unpause and set important roles and parameters in the system contracts: Can delegate Sequencer management to a BatchPosterManager address, manage data availability, DACs and the fastConfirmer role, set the Sequencer-only window, introduce an allowList to the bridge and whitelist Inboxes/Outboxes."
	}

-	Status: DELETED
	contract OneStepProverMath (0x4811500e0d376Fa8d2EA3CCb7c61E0afB4F5A7f1)
	+++ description: One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.

	contract RollupProxy (0x846387C3D6001F74170455B1074D01f05eB3067a) {
	+++ description: Central contract for the project's configuration like its execution logic hash (`wasmModuleRoot`) and addresses of the other system contracts. Entry point for Proposers creating new Rollup Nodes (state commitments) and Challengers submitting fraud proofs (In the Orbit stack, these two roles are both held by the Validators).
	template:
-	"orbitstack/RollupProxy"
+	"orbitstack/RollupProxy_fastConfirm"
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0xef94a66bd5339efd18fb9ca1f8031482e7ef7bbe6c5a0a10fae254ab83712406"
+	"0x9349e73cbc2d2b818c1d79711574ba210b56249d8d3845bc78c776caf8f8ff42"
	sourceHashes.0:
-	"0x8b48118fe606012c0dcac2ccc1821785935aec89fab8f219f47b32c482b0017e"
+	"0x7ee21b18b2e18c636bfafc08ff72692cc43302b2599ba75f0abad67282866dd5"
	values.$implementation.1:
-	"0x0aE4dD666748bF0F6dB5c149Eab1D8aD27820A6A"
+	"0x140240BD6de2b4Cfa78c247b2cad5d507892DE02"
	values.$implementation.0:
-	"0xEe9E5546A11Cb5b4A86e92DA05f2ef75C26E4754"
+	"0xFD72BF47Ee50c9ED583acdd20672f29631eBa587"
	values.$pastUpgrades.1:
+	["2023-11-19T04:23:39.000Z","0xc8d7afcb2f7f7dc0883a938db4352813e17b7629850cdc54d8cc2eba7e10b095",["0xEe9E5546A11Cb5b4A86e92DA05f2ef75C26E4754","0x0aE4dD666748bF0F6dB5c149Eab1D8aD27820A6A"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.0.2.1:
-	"0x0aE4dD666748bF0F6dB5c149Eab1D8aD27820A6A"
+	"0x140240BD6de2b4Cfa78c247b2cad5d507892DE02"
	values.$pastUpgrades.0.2.0:
-	"0xEe9E5546A11Cb5b4A86e92DA05f2ef75C26E4754"
+	"0xFD72BF47Ee50c9ED583acdd20672f29631eBa587"
	values.$pastUpgrades.0.1:
-	"2023-11-19T04:23:39.000Z"
+	"0x675c13b89d4e518aa8211acf9ebcdc1d1e47afa7476f20263dbb7660d42949c6"
	values.$pastUpgrades.0.0:
-	"0xc8d7afcb2f7f7dc0883a938db4352813e17b7629850cdc54d8cc2eba7e10b095"
+	"2025-05-22T02:07:22.000Z"
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	1
+	2
	+++ description: ArbOS version derived from known wasmModuleRoots.
	values.arbOsFromWmRoot:
-	"ArbOS v10.2 wasmModuleRoot"
+	"ArbOS v32 wasmModuleRoot"
	+++ description: Root hash of the WASM module used for execution, like a fingerprint of the L2 logic. Can be associated with ArbOS versions.
	values.wasmModuleRoot:
-	"0x0754e09320c381566cc0449904c377a52bd34a6b9404432e80afd573b67f7b17"
+	"0x184884e1eb9fefdc158f6c8ac912bb183bf3cf83f0090317e0bc4ac5860baa39"
	values.anyTrustFastConfirmer:
+	"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
	implementationNames.0xEe9E5546A11Cb5b4A86e92DA05f2ef75C26E4754:
-	"RollupAdminLogic"
	implementationNames.0x0aE4dD666748bF0F6dB5c149Eab1D8aD27820A6A:
-	"RollupUserLogic"
	implementationNames.0xFD72BF47Ee50c9ED583acdd20672f29631eBa587:
+	"RollupAdminLogic"
	implementationNames.0x140240BD6de2b4Cfa78c247b2cad5d507892DE02:
+	"RollupUserLogic"
	}

-	Status: DELETED
	contract OneStepProverHostIo (0x89AF7C4C2198c426cFe6E86de0680A0850503e06)
	+++ description: One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.

-	Status: DELETED
	contract OneStepProofEntry (0x99a2A31300816C1FA3f40818AC9280fe7271F878)
	+++ description: One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.

-	Status: DELETED
	contract OneStepProverMemory (0xDf94F0474F205D086dbc2e66D69a856FCf520622)
	+++ description: One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.

	contract SequencerInbox (0xe347C1223381b9Dcd6c0F61cf81c90175A7Bae77) {
	+++ description: A sequencer (registered in this contract) can submit transaction batches or commitments here.
	sourceHashes.0:
-	"0x08792f333db7e8a060c38033f92e3fc10c30e2648c56fc49c7460ee1c94343a0"
+	"0x50cf57b01499408fa99da27cf0fee96ec30f0d40667d1aa090c442bc80f0636b"
	values.$implementation:
-	"0x1c6ACCd9d66f3B993928E7439c9A2d67b94a445F"
+	"0xeE5a0A8e5d08474F21933d17f4EE076B3eAdBaAB"
	values.$pastUpgrades.1:
+	["2023-11-19T04:23:39.000Z","0xc8d7afcb2f7f7dc0883a938db4352813e17b7629850cdc54d8cc2eba7e10b095",["0x1c6ACCd9d66f3B993928E7439c9A2d67b94a445F"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.0.2:
-	"2023-11-19T04:23:39.000Z"
+	"2025-05-22T01:59:12.000Z"
	values.$pastUpgrades.0.1:
-	["0x1c6ACCd9d66f3B993928E7439c9A2d67b94a445F"]
+	"0x64f376646580d25cc092327877e062bbd953ecbfa7600864478b6aec7ffb97ff"
	values.$pastUpgrades.0.0:
-	"0xc8d7afcb2f7f7dc0883a938db4352813e17b7629850cdc54d8cc2eba7e10b095"
+	["0xeE5a0A8e5d08474F21933d17f4EE076B3eAdBaAB"]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	1
+	2
	values.batchPosterManager:
+	"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
	values.BROTLI_MESSAGE_HEADER_FLAG:
+	"0x00"
	values.DAS_MESSAGE_HEADER_FLAG:
+	"0x80"
	values.DATA_BLOB_HEADER_FLAG:
+	"0x50"
	values.isUsingFeeToken:
+	false
	values.reader4844:
+	"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
	values.TREE_DAS_MESSAGE_HEADER_FLAG:
+	"0x08"
	values.ZERO_HEAVY_MESSAGE_HEADER_FLAG:
+	"0x20"
	implementationNames.0x1c6ACCd9d66f3B993928E7439c9A2d67b94a445F:
-	"SequencerInbox"
	implementationNames.0xeE5a0A8e5d08474F21933d17f4EE076B3eAdBaAB:
+	"SequencerInbox"
	}

+	Status: CREATED
	contract OneStepProofEntry (0x0A9F7BD2182EAC312ec99AFcF684Ff40086331Ff)
	+++ description: One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract OneStepProverMath (0x5e5aBaD78aa0a0773a43606A978ef53a95a2f391)
	+++ description: One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract OneStepProverHostIo (0x742F0619adB993809B1B00E493b5bdb4085B735e)
	+++ description: One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract OneStepProver0 (0xce4b9839C83cB0650B34659B8Fa44609A45b1010)
	+++ description: One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract OneStepProverMemory (0xd76eb58D7fA80AC6119942bA20D9bbbA94Ce66BC)
	+++ description: One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.

2024 May 27, 07:16 UTC

1change

Back to the initial required stake of 0,1 ETH.

	contract RollupProxy (0x846387C3D6001F74170455B1074D01f05eB3067a) {
	+++ description: Manages rollup components, list of Stakers and Validators. Entry point for Validators creating new Rollup Nodes (state commits) and Challengers submitting fraud proofs.
	values.currentRequiredStake:
-	"300000000000000000"
+	"100000000000000000"
	}

2024 May 23, 06:41 UTC

2changes

The required stake is raised from 0.1 to 0.3 ETH. There is only one whitelisted validator who has 0.1 stake and as not confirmed any node since May-21-2024 09:09:22 AM.

	contract RollupProxy (0x846387C3D6001F74170455B1074D01f05eB3067a) {
	+++ description: Manages rollup components, list of Stakers and Validators. Entry point for Validators creating new Rollup Nodes (state commits) and Challengers submitting fraud proofs.
	values.currentRequiredStake:
-	"100000000000000000"

	100000000000000000
+	"300000000000000000"
	}

Operator

The section considers only the L3 properties. For more details please refer to

Arbitrum One

The system has a centralized sequencer

While forcing transaction is open to anyone the system employs a privileged sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. that has priority for submitting transaction batches and ordering transactions.

MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

Sequencer - Arbitrum documentation

Users can force any transaction

Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly. After a delay of 1d in which a SequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. has failed to include a transaction that was directly posted to the smart contract, it can be forcefully included by anyone on the host chain, which finalizes its ordering.

Sequencing

Delayed forced transactions

To force transactions from the host chain, users must first enqueue “delayed” messages in the “delayed” inbox of the BridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. contract. Only authorized Inboxes are allowed to enqueue delayed messages, and the so-called Inbox contract is the one used as the entry point by calling the sendMessage or sendMessageFromOrigin functions. If the centralized sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. doesn’t process the request within some time bound, users can call the forceInclusion function on the SequencerInbox contract to include the message in the canonical chain. The time bound is hardcoded to be 1d.

Withdrawals

The section considers only the L3 properties. For more details please refer to

Arbitrum One

Regular messaging

The user initiates L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups.->L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. messages by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the blockAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over. containing that transaction is settled, the message becomes available for processing on L1. The process of block finalization usually takes several days to complete.

Autonomous exit

Users can (eventually) exit the system by pushing the transaction on L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. and providing the corresponding state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree.. The only way to prevent such withdrawal is via an upgrade.

Other considerations

EVM compatible smart contracts are supported

Arbitrum One uses Nitro technology that allows running fraud proofs by executing EVM code on top of WASM.

Inside Arbitrum Nitro

Permissions

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Go to Disco

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Arbitrum One

Actors:

EOA 10x46A7…de5c

Can upgrade with no delay
- UpgradeExecutor UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- RollupEventInbox UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- ChallengeManager UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- RollupProxy UpgradeExecutor
- Outbox UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- CustomGateway UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- ERC20Gateway UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- BridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- SequencerInbox UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- GatewayRouter UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- Inbox UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
Can interact with RollupProxy
- Pause and unpause and set important roles and parameters in the system contracts: Can delegate SequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. management to a BatchPosterManager address, manage data availabilityThe property of a rollup's data being reachable by any node retrieving the data that were rolled up and executed to reach the proposed state. Data availability (DA), specifically decoupling it from the rollup nodes themselves, is one of the preeminent factors which allows a rollup to scale securely. A rollup is faced with a decision of what to use as a DA layer to guarantee that any node can retrieve this data--permissionlessly under any circumstance. For this reason, using Ethereum for DA currently provides the strongest security guarantees. If data is stored somewhere other than a permissionless L1, then the project is not a rollup, but rather a validium or an optimium., DACs and the fastConfirmer role, set the Sequencer-only window, introduce an allowList to the bridge and whitelist Inboxes/Outboxes UpgradeExecutor

EOA 20x02c9…bBEE

Can interact with SequencerInbox
- Can submit transaction batches or commitments to the SequencerInbox contract on the host chain

EOA 30xD217…a3f0

Can interact with RollupProxy
- Can propose new state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. (called nodes) and challenge state roots on the host chain

Smart contracts

A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions

Go to Disco

Explore in Disco

Note: Contracts presented in this section had their implementations updated since the last time our team looked at this project. The information presented may be inaccurate.

A diagram of the smart contract architecture

Arbitrum One

ChallengeManager0x383e…A834 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Contract that allows challenging state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree.. Can be called through the RollupProxy by ValidatorsIn the context of L2s, a Validator is an actor that validates the correctness of state transitions. For optimistic rollups this corresponds to challengers, and for ZK rollups this corresponds to the onchain verifier or the UpgradeExecutor.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately EOA 1

Can be upgraded by:

EOA 1 with no delay

RollupProxy0x8463…067a Implementation #1 (Upgradable)Implementation #2 (Upgradable)Admin

Central contract for the project’s configuration like its execution logic hashA fixed-length fingerprint of variable-size input, produced by a hash function. (wasmModuleRoot) and addresses of the other system contracts. Entry point for Proposers creating new RollupA blockchain that inherits consensus and data availability from another blockchain called L1. Rollups enable trust minimized bridges with the base layer via proof systems, either optimistic or zero-knowledge. A rollup without a bridge, or without considering the bridge, is called a sovereign rollup. Nodes (state commitments) and Challengers submitting fraud proofs (In the Orbit stack, these two roles are both held by the ValidatorsIn the context of L2s, a Validator is an actor that validates the correctness of state transitions. For optimistic rollups this corresponds to challengers, and for ZK rollups this corresponds to the onchain verifier).

Roles:
- admin: UpgradeExecutor; ultimately EOA 1
- owner: UpgradeExecutor; ultimately EOA 1
- validators: EOA 3

Can be upgraded by:

EOA 1 with no delay

Bridge

Escrow

0xD4FE…9DC0 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Escrow contract for the project’s gasA virtual fuel used to execute smart contracts on a rollup. The EVM (or other VM within the rollup) uses an accounting mechanism to correspond the consumption of gas to the consumption of computing resources, and to limit the consumption of computing resources. token (can be different from ETH). Keeps a list of allowed Inboxes and Outboxes for canonical bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. messaging.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately EOA 1

The following tokens are included in the value secured calculation:

Can be upgraded by:

EOA 1 with no delay

SequencerInbox0xe347…ae77 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

A sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. (registered in this contract) can submit transaction batches or commitments here.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately EOA 1
- batchPosters: EOA 2

Can be upgraded by:

EOA 1 with no delay

UpgradeExecutor0x0611…3cD9 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Central contract defining the access control permissions for upgrading the system contract implementations.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately EOA 1
- executors: EOA 1

Can be upgraded by:

EOA 1 with no delay

Implementation used in:

ERC20Gateway0xB155…017A Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Escrows deposited ERC-20 assets for the canonical BridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge.. Upon depositing, a generic token representation will be minted at the destination. Withdrawals are initiated by the Outbox contract.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately EOA 1

Can be upgraded by:

EOA 1 with no delay

Inbox0xFF55…a3ad Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Facilitates sending L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. to L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. messages like depositing ETH, but does not escrow funds.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately EOA 1

Can be upgraded by:

EOA 1 with no delay

CustomGateway0xa8f6…EE99 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Escrows deposited assets for the canonical bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. that are externally governed or need custom token contracts with e.g. minting rights or upgradeabilityThe ability for rollup smart contracts and parameters used in a rollup to be updated by holders of an admin key. Upgradeability represents a vector of risk for users, and should be decentralized and combined with time delays for greater security guarantees..

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately EOA 1

Can be upgraded by:

EOA 1 with no delay

GatewayRouter0xe507…ED20 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

This routing contract maps tokens to the correct escrow (gateway) to be then bridged with canonical messaging.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately EOA 1

Can be upgraded by:

EOA 1 with no delay

OneStepProofEntry0x0A9F…31Ff

One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proofAlso referred to as a fault proof, it is the construction of an assertion that fraud was perpetrated on an optimistic rollup. More concretely, that an invalid state transition took place according to the protocol rules. The submitter of a fraud proof would expect a reward from the optimistic rollup protocol for helping maintain the integrity of the system., which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.

RollupEventInbox0x0fF7…5591 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Helper contract sending configuration data over the bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. during the systems initialization.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately EOA 1

Can be upgraded by:

EOA 1 with no delay

ProxyAdmin0x27C7…6c91

Roles:
- owner: UpgradeExecutor

OneStepProverMath0x5e5a…f391

ValidatorUtils0x6c21…867b

This contract implements view only utilities for validatorsIn the context of L2s, a Validator is an actor that validates the correctness of state transitions. For optimistic rollups this corresponds to challengers, and for ZK rollups this corresponds to the onchain verifier.

Implementation used in:

OneStepProverHostIo0x742F…735e

OneStepProver00xce4b…1010

OneStepProverMemory0xd76e…66BC

There are impactful changes to the following contracts, and part of the information might be outdated.

Outbox0xA597…1f83 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Facilitates L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. to L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. contract calls: Messages initiated from L2 (for example withdrawal messages) eventually resolve in execution on L1.