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Xai is an Ethereum Layer-3 that leverages Arbitrum AnyTrust to enable open trade in the next generation of video games.
Xai is an Ethereum Layer-3 that leverages Arbitrum AnyTrust to enable open trade in the next generation of video games.
Consequence: projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds.
Consequence: projects with a low DAC threshold rely on the honesty of few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. These entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds.
Learn more about the recategorisation here.
| SEQUENCER FAILURE | STATE VALIDATION | DATA AVAILABILITY | EXIT WINDOW | PROPOSER FAILURE | |
| Arbitrum One L2 | Self sequence | Fraud proofs (INT) | Onchain | None | Self propose |
| Xai L3 • Individual | Self sequence | Fraud proofs (INT) | External (DAC) | None | Self propose |
| Xai L3 • Combined | Self sequence | Fraud proofs (INT) | External (DAC) | None | Self propose |
In the event of a sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project’s chain by sending them to L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development.. There can be up to a 2d delay on this operation.
Fraud proofs only allow 2 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled..
Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC)A set of members whose task is attesting and ensuring that the data is available for the public. An onchain DAC verifier checks that a threshold of signatures from the DAC members is reached before considering a data commitment as available and therefore valid to be used in the system. with a threshold of 3/5 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.
There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.
Anyone can become a ProposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block. after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.
Set of parties responsible for signing and attesting to the availability of data.
There are no onchain assets at risk of being slashed in case of a data withholding attack. However, there is indirect economic security derived by the committee members being publicly known, and their reputation is at stake should they behave maliciously.
There is no fraud detection mechanism in place. A data withholding attack can only be detected by nodes downloading the full data from the DA layerAn infrastructure that is used to make publish data so that it's available to the public. They take the form of Data Availability Committees (DACs) or blockchains. Not to confuse with the layer responsible with ordering, since ordering and DA can be separated..
The committee does not meet basic security standards, either due to insufficient size, lack of member diversity, or poorly defined threshold parameters. The system lacks an effective DA bridgeSystem that verifies that data has been made available. It takes the form of a smart contract verifying a consensus or, if the data is verified directly by either downloading the full data or sampling, of an enshrined bridge. and it is reliant on the assumption of an honest sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs., creating significant risks to data integrity and availability.
There is no delay in the upgradeabilityThe ability for rollup smart contracts and parameters used in a rollup to be updated by holders of an admin key. Upgradeability represents a vector of risk for users, and should be decentralized and combined with time delays for greater security guarantees. of the bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge.. Users have no time to exit the system before the bridge implementation update is completed.
The relayer role is permissioned, and the DA bridgeSystem that verifies that data has been made available. It takes the form of a smart contract verifying a consensus or, if the data is verified directly by either downloading the full data or sampling, of an enshrined bridge. does not have a Security CouncilA Security Council is a sufficiently decentralized set of members that is able to upgrade a system. A properly set up Security Council consists of at least 8 members with a threshold greater than 75%. What 'sufficiently decentralized' means is fundamentally subjective and L2BEAT evaluates each case individually. A Security Council is allowed to instantly upgrade Stage 1 rollups. or a governance mechanism to propose new relayers. In case of relayer failure, the DA bridge will halt and be unable to recover without the intervention of a centralized entity.

The DAC uses a data availabilityThe property of a rollup's data being reachable by any node retrieving the data that were rolled up and executed to reach the proposed state. Data availability (DA), specifically decoupling it from the rollup nodes themselves, is one of the preeminent factors which allows a rollup to scale securely. A rollup is faced with a decision of what to use as a DA layer to guarantee that any node can retrieve this data--permissionlessly under any circumstance. For this reason, using Ethereum for DA currently provides the strongest security guarantees. If data is stored somewhere other than a permissionless L1, then the project is not a rollup, but rather a validium or an optimium. solution built on the AnyTrust protocol. It is composed of the following components:
Committee members run servers that support APIs for storing and retrieving data blobs. The Sequencer API allows the rollupA blockchain that inherits consensus and data availability from another blockchain called L1. Rollups enable trust minimized bridges with the base layer via proof systems, either optimistic or zero-knowledge. A rollup without a bridge, or without considering the bridge, is called a sovereign rollup. Sequencer to submit data blobs for storage, while the REST API enables anyone to fetch data by hashA fixed-length fingerprint of variable-size input, produced by a hash function.. When the Sequencer produces a data batch, it sends the batch along with an expiration time to Committee members, who store it and sign it. Once enough signatures are collected, the Sequencer aggregates them into a valid DACert and posts it to the L1 chain inbox. If the Sequencer fails to collect enough signatures, it falls back to posting the full data to the L1 chain as calldata.
A DACert includes a hash of the data blockAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over., an expiration time, and proof that the required threshold of Committee members have signed off on the data. The proof consists of a hash of the Keyset used in signing, a bitmap indicating which members signed, and a BLS aggregated signature. L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. nodes reading from the sequencer inbox verify the certificate’s validity by checking the number of signers, the aggregated signature, and that the expiration time is at least two weeks ahead of the L2 timestamp. If the DACert is valid, it provides a proof that the corresponding data is available from honest committee members.

The DA commitments are posted to the destination chain through the sequencer inbox, using the inbox as a DA bridge. The DA commitment consists of Data Availability Certificate (DACert), including a hash of the data block, an expiration time, and a proof that the required threshold of Committee members have signed off on the data. The sequencer distributes the data and collects signatures from Committee members offchain. Only the DACert is posted by the sequencer to the destination chain inbox (the DA bridge), achieving destination chain transaction ordering finalityStrongest confirmation rule that can be given on the ordering of transactions. On Ethereum, a transaction is finalized when the corresponding epoch becomes final, which currently takes around 15 mins from transaction inclusion. A rollup transaction can be said to be final when the corresponding data is published to L1 and its ordering cannot be reverted. If outputs, i.e. state diffs are published, then also a proof proving their correctness must be verified to consider the transaction final. in a single onchain transaction.
Funds can be lost if a malicious committee attests to an invalid data availability certificate.
Funds can be lost if the bridge contract or its dependencies receive a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades.

After some period of time, the published state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. is assumed to be correct. For a certain time period, one of the whitelisted actors can submit a fraud proofAlso referred to as a fault proof, it is the construction of an assertion that fraud was perpetrated on an optimistic rollup. More concretely, that an invalid state transition took place according to the protocol rules. The submitter of a fraud proof would expect a reward from the optimistic rollup protocol for helping maintain the integrity of the system. that shows that the state was incorrect. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. After the state root is published, there is also a trusted entity, called Challenger, that signs it and submits the signature to a Referee smart contract. The signatures submitted to the referee are used then verified by sentry nodes. The role of sentry nodes is to verify (assert) the submitted state root after it has been submitted. There is no integrated way to flag an invalid state root, sentry nodes will have to raise the alarm by external means, making them just observation nodes.
Funds can be stolen if none of the whitelisted verifiers checks the published state. Fraud proofs assume at least one honest and able validator (CRITICAL).
Name | Hash | Repository | Verification | Used in | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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0xdb69...b69a | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.
SafeL2 owning the ProxyAdmin of the Sentry contracts: member added; threshold lowered 4/6 → 3/7. XaiFundsReiceiverMultisig: 3 members removed; threshold 3/7 → 2/4. Team Secret removed from the listed DAC members: its key left the keyset on 2025-01-12; the current 3/5 keyset is Xai, Ex Populus, LayerZero, Alt Layer and Offchain Labs.
SafeL2 owning the ProxyAdmin of the Sentry contracts: member added; threshold lowered 4/6 → 3/7.
XaiFundsReiceiverMultisig: 3 members removed; threshold 3/7 → 2/4.
Team Secret removed from the listed DAC members: its key left the keyset on 2025-01-12; the current 3/5 keyset is Xai, Ex Populus, LayerZero, Alt Layer and Offchain Labs.
| contract SafeL2 (arb1:0x754286508D57Fae1256bC288461E075552175CBa) [GnosisSafe] { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| values.$members.0: | |
| + | "arb1:0x194654c631686077d3C34a0e7c1856E4BE2E2705" |
| values.$threshold: | |
| - | 4 |
| + | 3 |
| values.multisigThreshold: | |
| - | "4 of 6 (67%)" |
| + | "3 of 7 (43%)" |
| } | |
| contract XaiFundsReiceiverMultisig (arb1:0xFCF7248C495d6fd3641eE43F861c48Ebe402c878) [GnosisSafe] { | |
| +++ description: The designated fundsReceiver in the NodeLicenseRegistry. Receives all ETH from 'Sentry Node License' mints. | |
| values.$members.1: | |
| - | "arb1:0x739bd9Ed651d200dc84d0b0dF444CA47CBFf520f" |
| values.$members.2: | |
| - | "arb1:0x90D77E3a3B660E54E04cD622937765d2375FB2e3" |
| values.$members.5: | |
| - | "arb1:0xE529a3271f9CC84B1FE9107ab4764a8dF177782a" |
| values.$threshold: | |
| - | 3 |
| + | 2 |
| values.multisigThreshold: | |
| - | "3 of 7 (43%)" |
| + | "2 of 4 (50%)" |
| } | |
XaiFundsReiceiverMultisig (receives ETH from Sentry Node License mints) added a new 1-of-3 SafeL2 ( 0x1946…2705 ) as a member. Top-Safe per-member share drops: 3/6 (50%) → 3/7 (43%).
XaiFundsReiceiverMultisig (receives ETH from Sentry Node License mints) added a new 1-of-3 SafeL2 (0x1946…2705) as a member. Top-Safe per-member share drops: 3/6 (50%) → 3/7 (43%).
| contract XaiFundsReiceiverMultisig (arb1:0xFCF7248C495d6fd3641eE43F861c48Ebe402c878) [GnosisSafe] { | |
| +++ description: The designated fundsReceiver in the NodeLicenseRegistry. Receives all ETH from 'Sentry Node License' mints. | |
| values.$members.0: | |
| + | "arb1:0x194654c631686077d3C34a0e7c1856E4BE2E2705" |
| values.multisigThreshold: | |
| - | "3 of 6 (50%)" |
| + | "3 of 7 (43%)" |
| } | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract SafeL2 (arb1:0x194654c631686077d3C34a0e7c1856E4BE2E2705) [GnosisSafe] | |
| +++ description: None | |
Upgrade to ArbOS v40.
Upgrade to ArbOS v40.
| contract RollupProxy (arb1:0xC47DacFbAa80Bd9D8112F4e8069482c2A3221336) { | |
| +++ description: Central contract for the project's configuration like its execution logic hash (`wasmModuleRoot`) and addresses of the other system contracts. Entry point for Proposers creating new Rollup Nodes (state commitments) and Challengers submitting fraud proofs (In the Orbit stack, these two roles are both held by the Validators). | |
| +++ description: ArbOS version derived from known wasmModuleRoots. | |
| values.arbOsFromWmRoot: | |
| - | "ArbOS v32 wasmModuleRoot" |
| + | "ArbOS v40 wasmModuleRoot" |
| +++ description: Root hash of the WASM module used for execution, like a fingerprint of the L2 logic. Can be associated with ArbOS versions. | |
| values.wasmModuleRoot: | |
| - | "0x184884e1eb9fefdc158f6c8ac912bb183bf3cf83f0090317e0bc4ac5860baa39" |
| + | "0xdb698a2576298f25448bc092e52cf13b1e24141c997135d70f217d674bbeb69a" |
| } | |
msig changes.
msig changes.
| contract ProxyAdmin (arb1:0xD88c8E0aE21beA6adE41A41130Bb4cd43e6b1723) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| values.owner: | |
| - | "arb1:0x7C94E07bbf73518B0E25D1Be200a5b58F46F9dC7" |
| + | "arb1:0x754286508D57Fae1256bC288461E075552175CBa" |
| } | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract SafeL2 (arb1:0x754286508D57Fae1256bC288461E075552175CBa) | |
| +++ description: None | |
DAC key changed.
DAC key changed.
| contract SequencerInbox (0x995a9d3ca121D48d21087eDE20bc8acb2398c8B1) { | |
| +++ description: A sequencer (registered in this contract) can submit transaction batches or commitments here. | |
| values.dacKeyset.blsSignatures.1: | |
| - | "YBnmxAj50xHWx74c8TEJQ4hMxDc8au4r/8ZjDdm9VZZeVz30yudFDkKd5gzt/bnDkxL/fS3uO/uyV5IK/x5g53D7ZBMcrVJF3UMriIitIvf/jriRsnCi1TSZVG+RpGoMNAAji+ipTEVV5YnQPi/AVGQIGwmoEzhA/giQH7evlxzC1Q876MQqHTwwfIrX63UZ5hPEs84OyTq5gHvR71UYbI7TEzHRNi3RJTfgsidx8Q1v2jndA5HfYUq2pxmmPPkIoxHSK+Syt24Fe9q/6dIMN76BXMDpbXu1+r0QdQMPLEfSWm/aquMI6sN1ljaa958XThaluC1z+iqrR9b5e8LoEq1OliZf2qCHnv9MFX51KCF42zEQiz493XQrf0HUJIfCag==" |
| values.dacKeyset.blsSignatures.4: | |
| + | "YAs1+BYgCS8HZ5vbTRT1nbt71wSvrFO3cFKUzWPXaud5V0ErIbWmk4ITu7VxEdDGnAyGmwwfVf2KjZXtsmDHYvXqED6z2fWva8RuY8wTrK5DYRVrPFpZxyFvfkO6j5TXyBPelZmJQzpQlFjx0eMoq4HFloDG1utysJywf3SqUuZKoU074I8pfkz4DSA8gomp6ACZNDBe+1rzvo4jFyzIKbhzveNanj9UWNEBJcrorD+ajWHW/Mrwn0P9RY5MeBt/CQQdCeHvOxTp95aWg2dXYv3iEB3WgH0i06da5gyjit809RYytX2x5I8pbgzugpsieBf8RrKq9FZujcdJJVAVtYJf/hWdptqcwEDdhfZTE2uMOVNJGFnwQ95wYdMT1jQpHA==" |
| values.keySetUpdates: | |
| - | 8 |
| + | 9 |
| } | |
While forcing transaction is open to anyone the system employs a privileged sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. that has priority for submitting transaction batches and ordering transactions.
MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly. After a delay of 1d in which a SequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. has failed to include a transaction that was directly posted to the smart contract, it can be forcefully included by anyone on the host chain, which finalizes its ordering.
To force transactions from the host chain, users must first enqueue “delayed” messages in the “delayed” inbox of the BridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. contract. Only authorized Inboxes are allowed to enqueue delayed messages, and the so-called Inbox contract is the one used as the entry point by calling the sendMessage or sendMessageFromOrigin functions. If the centralized sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. doesn’t process the request within some time bound, users can call the forceInclusion function on the SequencerInbox contract to include the message in the canonical chain. The time bound is hardcoded to be 1d.
The user initiates L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups.->L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. messages by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the blockAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over. containing that transaction is settled, the message becomes available for processing on L1. The process of block finalization usually takes several days to complete.
Users can (eventually) exit the system by pushing the transaction on L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. and providing the corresponding state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree.. The only way to prevent such withdrawal is via an upgrade.
Arbitrum One uses Nitro technology that allows running fraud proofs by executing EVM code on top of WASM.

A Multisig with 3/5 threshold.
A Multisig with 3/7 threshold.
A Multisig with 1/3 threshold. Member of XaiMultisig.
A Multisig with 1/3 threshold. Member of SafeL2, XaiFundsReiceiverMultisig.
A Multisig with 2/4 threshold. The designated fundsReceiver in the NodeLicenseRegistry. Receives all ETH from ‘Sentry NodeA software client that participates in the network. License’ mints.


Contract that allows challenging state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree.. Can be called through the RollupProxy by ValidatorsIn the context of L2s, a Validator is an actor that validates the correctness of state transitions. For optimistic rollups this corresponds to challengers, and for ZK rollups this corresponds to the onchain verifier or the UpgradeExecutor.
Escrow contract for the project’s gasA virtual fuel used to execute smart contracts on a rollup. The EVM (or other VM within the rollup) uses an accounting mechanism to correspond the consumption of gas to the consumption of computing resources, and to limit the consumption of computing resources. token (can be different from ETH). Keeps a list of allowed Inboxes and Outboxes for canonical bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. messaging.

A sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. (registered in this contract) can submit transaction batches or commitments here.
Central contract for the project’s configuration like its execution logic hashA fixed-length fingerprint of variable-size input, produced by a hash function. (wasmModuleRoot) and addresses of the other system contracts. Entry point for Proposers creating new RollupA blockchain that inherits consensus and data availability from another blockchain called L1. Rollups enable trust minimized bridges with the base layer via proof systems, either optimistic or zero-knowledge. A rollup without a bridge, or without considering the bridge, is called a sovereign rollup. Nodes (state commitments) and Challengers submitting fraud proofs (In the Orbit stack, these two roles are both held by the ValidatorsIn the context of L2s, a Validator is an actor that validates the correctness of state transitions. For optimistic rollups this corresponds to challengers, and for ZK rollups this corresponds to the onchain verifier).
Central contract defining the access control permissions for upgrading the system contract implementations.
Facilitates L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. to L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. contract calls: Messages initiated from L2 (for example withdrawal messages) eventually resolve in execution on L1.
Facilitates sending L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. to L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. messages like depositing ETH, but does not escrow funds.
Escrows deposited ERC-20 assets for the canonical BridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge.. Upon depositing, a generic token representation will be minted at the destination. Withdrawals are initiated by the Outbox contract.
All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation.
This routing contract maps tokens to the correct escrow (gateway) to be then bridged with canonical messaging.
One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proofAlso referred to as a fault proof, it is the construction of an assertion that fraud was perpetrated on an optimistic rollup. More concretely, that an invalid state transition took place according to the protocol rules. The submitter of a fraud proof would expect a reward from the optimistic rollup protocol for helping maintain the integrity of the system., which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.
Helper contract sending configuration data over the bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. during the systems initialization.
One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proofAlso referred to as a fault proof, it is the construction of an assertion that fraud was perpetrated on an optimistic rollup. More concretely, that an invalid state transition took place according to the protocol rules. The submitter of a fraud proof would expect a reward from the optimistic rollup protocol for helping maintain the integrity of the system., which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.
Manages beacon addresses for the v2 staking pools.
This contract implements view only utilities for validatorsIn the context of L2s, a Validator is an actor that validates the correctness of state transitions. For optimistic rollups this corresponds to challengers, and for ZK rollups this corresponds to the onchain verifier.
One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proofAlso referred to as a fault proof, it is the construction of an assertion that fraud was perpetrated on an optimistic rollup. More concretely, that an invalid state transition took place according to the protocol rules. The submitter of a fraud proof would expect a reward from the optimistic rollup protocol for helping maintain the integrity of the system., which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.
One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proofAlso referred to as a fault proof, it is the construction of an assertion that fraud was perpetrated on an optimistic rollup. More concretely, that an invalid state transition took place according to the protocol rules. The submitter of a fraud proof would expect a reward from the optimistic rollup protocol for helping maintain the integrity of the system., which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.
One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proofAlso referred to as a fault proof, it is the construction of an assertion that fraud was perpetrated on an optimistic rollup. More concretely, that an invalid state transition took place according to the protocol rules. The submitter of a fraud proof would expect a reward from the optimistic rollup protocol for helping maintain the integrity of the system., which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.
The PoolFactory allows creating and managing staking pools for V2 staking. Users can stake esXAI (and / or Sentry Keys) in pools. This contract’s address is whitelisted in the esXAI token contract, which allows it to initiate arbitrary esXAI token transfers. V2 staking through this contract is currently set to true.
The referee contract manages the Xai Sentry protocol. Sentry nodes that are tasked to watch the state transitions on Xai receive esXAI rewards for their service. These watchers participate in a game with a central ‘challenger’ by posting their assertions to make sure they are actually watching. In case of a malicious state transition, sentries are supposed to raise an alarm offchain. The referee contract is also a whitelisted address in the esXAI token contract, which allows it to initiate arbitrary esXAI token transfers. New staking through this contract is disabled in favor of the new v2 staking. V1 Stakers can continue to get staking rewards here or withdraw/migrate their assets.
This is the contract where Xai Sentry Keys for running a sentry nodeA software client that participates in the network. are minted.
The current deployment carries some associated risks:
Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).
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