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SummaryValue SecuredActivityOnchain costsData postedLivenessRisk summaryRisk analysisStageData availabilityState derivationState validationUpgrades & GovernanceUpdatesOperatorWithdrawalsOther considerationsPermissionsSmart contracts

HashKey Chain logo
HashKey Chain

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About

HashKey Chain is a regulatory-compliant, institutional-grade OP stack Layer 2 solution bridging traditional finance and Web3. It is powered by Hong Kong's premier virtual asset ecosystem.

  • Total Value SecuredTVS
    $8.65 M0.28%
  • Past day UOPSDaily UOPS
    0.47426%
  • Gas token
    HSK
  • Type
    Other
  • Purposes
    Universal, Exchange
  • Chain ID
    177

    • Tokens breakdown

    Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure
    Explore more in Discovery UI

    Badges

    About

    HashKey Chain is a regulatory-compliant, institutional-grade OP stack Layer 2 solution bridging traditional finance and Web3. It is powered by Hong Kong's premier virtual asset ecosystem.

    Why is the project listed in others?

    The proof system isn't fully functional

    Consequence: projects without a proper proof system fully rely on single entities to safely update the state. A malicious proposer can finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds.

    Learn more about the recategorisation here.

    Value Secured

    CompareView TVS breakdown
    Total
    Canonically BridgedCanonically Bridged ValueCanonical
    Natively MintedNatively Minted TokensNative
    Externally BridgedExternally Bridged ValueExternal
    ETH & derivatives
    Stablecoins
    BTC & derivatives
    Other
    View TVS breakdown
    Compare with other projects

    Activity

    Compare
    Past Day UOPS
    Past Day Ops count
    Max. UOPS
    Past day UOPS/TPS Ratio
    Compare with other projects

    Onchain costs

    Compare

    The section shows the operating costs that L2s pay to Ethereum.

    Total cost
    Avg cost per L2 UOP
    Avg cost per day
    Compare with other projects

    Data posted

    Compare

    This section shows how much data the project publishes to its data-availability (DA) layer over time. The project currently posts data to; previously it posted toEthereumEthereum.

    Data posted
    Avg size per day
    Avg size per L2 UOP
    Compare with other projects

    Liveness

    This section shows how "live" the project's operators are by displaying how frequently they submit transactions of the selected type. It also highlights anomalies - significant deviations from their typical schedule.

    No ongoing anomalies detected
    Avg. tx data subs. interval
    Avg. state updates interval
    Past 30 days anomalies
    96% normal uptime

    Last 30 day anomalies

    All liveness anomalies detected for this project in the last 30 days, helping you review recent downtime and availability issues.

    No Tx data submissions were performed for 24m 36s (from 2026 Sep 14, 06:53 UTC until 2026 Sep 14, 07:17 UTC). These typically occur every 28m 2s on average.

    No State updates were performed for 1d (from 2026 Aug 31, 07:25 UTC until 2026 Sep 01, 07:29 UTC). These typically occur every 11h 33m on average.

    No Tx data submissions were performed for 35m 12s (from 2026 Sep 01, 06:52 UTC until 2026 Sep 01, 07:27 UTC). These typically occur every 28m 2s on average.

    Risk summary

    The fault proof systemThe infrastructure that allows projects to verify their state transitions. It is composed by onchain verifiers and offchain provers. The main two flavors are optimistic and ZK proof systems, but they can be combined in a hybrid model. In general though, if a system is able to accept state roots optimistically, even if it has a ZK component, it is considered an optimistic proof system. is deployed but is not functional. The chain ID is not included in the superchain registry snapshot embedded in the op-program release that the dispute games commit to, causing the dispute game to panic during execution. Security relies entirely on the permissioned proposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block. and challengers.

    Funds can be stolen if

    1. a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL),
    2. no whitelisted challenger disputes an invalid state root before the challenge window expires (CRITICAL).

    MEV can be extracted if

    1. the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

    Risk analysis

    The fault proof systemThe infrastructure that allows projects to verify their state transitions. It is composed by onchain verifiers and offchain provers. The main two flavors are optimistic and ZK proof systems, but they can be combined in a hybrid model. In general though, if a system is able to accept state roots optimistically, even if it has a ZK component, it is considered an optimistic proof system. is deployed but is not functional. The chain ID is not included in the superchain registry snapshot embedded in the op-program release that the dispute games commit to, causing the dispute game to panic during execution. Security relies entirely on the permissioned proposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block. and challengers.
    Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure
    Sequencer failure
    Self sequence

    In the event of a sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project’s chain by sending them to L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development.. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.

    State validation
    Fraud proofs (INT)

    Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. Only one entity is currently allowed to propose and submit challenges, as only permissioned games are currently allowed.

    Data availability
    Onchain

    All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development..

    Exit window
    None

    There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.

    Proposer failure
    Cannot withdraw

    Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. on L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development., so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.

    Stage

    HashKey Chain
    HashKey Chain is not even a
    Stage 0
    project.
    Learn more about Stages
    Please keep in mind that these stages do not reflect project security, this is an opinionated assessment of project maturity based on subjective criteria, created with a goal of incentivizing projects to push toward better decentralization. Each team may have taken different paths to achieve this goal.

    Data availability

    All data required for proofs is published on chain

    All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobsThe data that a rollup publishes to its L1/data availability (DA) layer. They consist of the L2 transactions that are rolled up, along with some metadata. Blobs are introduced as a new transaction type within Ethereum with EIP-4844, and has rollup scaling specifically in mind. Blobs persist on Ethereum’s Beacon Chain ephemerally. or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.

    1. Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs
    2. BatchInbox - address
    3. OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function
    Learn more about the DA layer here: Ethereum logoEthereum

    State derivation

    Node software

    The rollupA blockchain that inherits consensus and data availability from another blockchain called L1. Rollups enable trust minimized bridges with the base layer via proof systems, either optimistic or zero-knowledge. A rollup without a bridge, or without considering the bridge, is called a sovereign rollup. nodeA software client that participates in the network. is composed of two software components: op-node, implementing consensusAn agreement on the latest and correct state of a blockchain. Unlike L1 blockchains which coordinate participating nodes with consensus rules, rollups rely on L1s for reaching consensus by checking the state of the rollup smart contract deployed thereon. related logic, and op-geth, implementing execution logic. The configuration file can be found here.

    Compression scheme

    Data batches are compressed using the zlib algorithm with best compression level.

    Genesis state

    The genesis file can be found here.

    Data format

    The format specification of SequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs.’s data batches can be found here.

    State validation

    Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by permissioned operators only. If a state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. passes the challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled., it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.

    State root proposals

    Proposers submit state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the create function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.0 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proofAlso referred to as a fault proof, it is the construction of an assertion that fraud was perpetrated on an optimistic rollup. More concretely, that an invalid state transition took place according to the protocol rules. The submitter of a fraud proof would expect a reward from the optimistic rollup protocol for helping maintain the integrity of the system.. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled. has passed and it is not countered.

    • Funds can be stolen if no whitelisted challenger disputes an invalid state root before the challenge window expires (CRITICAL).

    1. OP stack specification: Fault Dispute Game
    Challenges

    Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 0.00 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the defend or attack functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with full concurrency. Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 3d 12h. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see freeloader claims), an inherited clock with too little time remaining is generally extended by 3h. The extension is 6h when the next claim is immediately before split depth 30, and 1d 3h (the standard extension plus the 1d oracle challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled.) immediately before the last depth. Along a full-depth path, cumulative extensions can therefore add up to 10d 3h. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers’ stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step proverAn entity that generates the cryptographic proof to convince the verifier that the statement is true. In a ZK-Rollup, the prover generates the ZK (validity) proof to submit to the verifier contract. contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks (Spearbit 5.1.3).

    1. Fraud Proof Wars: OPFP

    Program Hashes

    Name
    Hash
    Repository
    Verification
    Used in
    0x0385...d54c
    Github
    Ronin logoHashKey Chain logoSilent Data logo

    Upgrades & Governance

    Past upgrades

    The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.

    Count of upgrades
    3
    Last upgrade
    1mo 25d ago
    Avg upgrade interval
    8mo 20d

    Updates

    2026 September 07, 21:34 UTC
    1change

    SystemConfig unsafeBlockSigner rotated.

    SystemConfig unsafeBlockSigner rotated.

    contract SystemConfig (eth:0x43F8DeFe3E9286D152E91BB16a248808E7247198) [opstack/SystemConfig] {
    +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address.
    values.unsafeBlockSigner:
    - "eth:0x0dD773e949a7E53f622A3A5cC89a6C6663652638"
    + "eth:0x98a6bBaE1f8F7e78c96d90f1705c1fA3BD29fbfC"
    }
    2026 August 11, 08:22 UTC
    High severity
    14changes

    SystemConfig implementation upgraded (upgradeCount 1 - 2), adding owner-gated eip1559Denominator/Elasticity, operatorFeeScalar/Constant, daFootprintGasScalar (all 0, unconfigured) and minBaseFee (set to 500 gwei floor). l2ChainId and superchainConfig are new storage slots the source comments mark as reserved placeholders for a future OP v5 upgrade, intentionally left unset here. Owner unchanged (NXV Safe, 3-of-5). Diff: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xbc10fE919504D53953d27989CD5B48B9A7c08Be0/eth:0xE4577dCF1C44F04cf489AA995E01e988f461cc4A

    SystemConfig implementation upgraded (upgradeCount 1 -> 2), adding owner-gated eip1559Denominator/Elasticity, operatorFeeScalar/Constant, daFootprintGasScalar (all 0, unconfigured) and minBaseFee (set to 500 gwei floor). l2ChainId and superchainConfig are new storage slots the source comments mark as reserved placeholders for a future OP v5 upgrade, intentionally left unset here. Owner unchanged (NXV Safe, 3-of-5).

    Diff: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xbc10fE919504D53953d27989CD5B48B9A7c08Be0/eth:0xE4577dCF1C44F04cf489AA995E01e988f461cc4A

    contract SystemConfig (eth:0x43F8DeFe3E9286D152E91BB16a248808E7247198) [opstack/SystemConfig] {
    +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x5d5d38c092a6c8e1ec90659e0b12a8a490cfe629934e11c688e5e55c948a134d"
    + "0xf27c4a47f5f30ee0ed7d69662eb98874c98bc6957423153a1383eb983a2bbf5f"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0xbc10fE919504D53953d27989CD5B48B9A7c08Be0"
    + "eth:0xE4577dCF1C44F04cf489AA995E01e988f461cc4A"
    values.$pastUpgrades.1:
    + ["2026-08-04T08:28:23.000Z","0x6dab15d826dc253e57c4cd55634e061e01df3d1045528e3dde13840bbddde1fd",["eth:0xE4577dCF1C44F04cf489AA995E01e988f461cc4A"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 1
    + 2
    values.daFootprintGasScalar:
    + 0
    +++ description: volatility param: lower denominator -> quicker fee changes on L2
    values.eip1559Denominator:
    + 0
    values.eip1559Elasticity:
    + 0
    values.l2ChainId:
    + 0
    values.minBaseFee:
    + 500000000000
    values.operatorFeeConstant:
    + 0
    values.operatorFeeScalar:
    + 0
    values.superchainConfig:
    + "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
    implementationNames.eth:0xbc10fE919504D53953d27989CD5B48B9A7c08Be0:
    - "SystemConfig"
    implementationNames.eth:0xE4577dCF1C44F04cf489AA995E01e988f461cc4A:
    + "SystemConfig"
    }
    2026 June 23, 10:25 UTC
    25changes

    Moved some GnosisSafes to NXV multisigs (supposedly simplified version of GnosisSafe), see: nexvault.com

    Moved some GnosisSafes to NXV multisigs (supposedly simplified version of GnosisSafe), see: nexvault.com

    - Status: DELETED
    contract Hashkey Multisig 3 (eth:0x29Fbda675Fa5a07B621C2C1a6E3F874C14F612F3) [GnosisSafe]
    +++ description: None
    contract SystemConfig (eth:0x43F8DeFe3E9286D152E91BB16a248808E7247198) [opstack/SystemConfig] {
    +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address.
    values.owner:
    - "eth:0x29Fbda675Fa5a07B621C2C1a6E3F874C14F612F3"
    + "eth:0x391832Fb1884E6772Dbd9f24cE2db35E9B20B696"
    }
    contract Hashkey Multisig 1 (eth:0x441F31C4cdf772558D4EA31f3114de59aE145E7c) [GnosisSafe] {
    +++ description: None
    receivedPermissions.0:
    - {"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x679A65aD62972Ea3561F40A12e93CcA6f79F35E6","description":"set and change address mappings.","role":".owner","via":[{"address":"eth:0x7986eD289935A0F47FC434C00cDE309fE2c51f1C"}]}
    receivedPermissions.3:
    - {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x0407af506d86bFA5e401099b2fC2355590638f19","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x7986eD289935A0F47FC434C00cDE309fE2c51f1C"}]}
    receivedPermissions.4:
    - {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x04Ec030f362CE5A0b5Fe2d4B4219f287C2EBDE50","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x7986eD289935A0F47FC434C00cDE309fE2c51f1C"}]}
    receivedPermissions.5:
    - {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x2171E6d3B7964fA9654Ce41dA8a8fFAff2Cc70be","description":"upgrading the bridge implementation can give access to all funds escrowed therein.","role":".$admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x7986eD289935A0F47FC434C00cDE309fE2c51f1C"}]}
    receivedPermissions.6:
    - {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x43F8DeFe3E9286D152E91BB16a248808E7247198","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x7986eD289935A0F47FC434C00cDE309fE2c51f1C"}]}
    receivedPermissions.7:
    - {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x4deC2aA521108d78d983c0c12656c6CF8631F2ED","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x7986eD289935A0F47FC434C00cDE309fE2c51f1C"}]}
    receivedPermissions.8:
    - {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x899F07862D3A03F70E07b7f01183934b485d2e97","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x7986eD289935A0F47FC434C00cDE309fE2c51f1C"}]}
    receivedPermissions.9:
    - {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xBb70D595147A141e268532BFEF61A8c25054d26D","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x7986eD289935A0F47FC434C00cDE309fE2c51f1C"}]}
    receivedPermissions.10:
    - {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xd4C83D93c6fAE3E0804B785F9Cf465BE95449D04","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x7986eD289935A0F47FC434C00cDE309fE2c51f1C"}]}
    receivedPermissions.11:
    - {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xd9c31D15f2c649e525C2574bC025b3CAafAaf6fe","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x7986eD289935A0F47FC434C00cDE309fE2c51f1C"}]}
    receivedPermissions.12:
    - {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xe7Aa79B59CAc06F9706D896a047fEb9d3BDA8bD3","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x7986eD289935A0F47FC434C00cDE309fE2c51f1C"}]}
    receivedPermissions.13:
    - {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xfd1255b6c09D939E7F3896A16C32CDBCD6F8B40A","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x7986eD289935A0F47FC434C00cDE309fE2c51f1C"}]}
    directlyReceivedPermissions:
    - [{"permission":"act","from":"eth:0x7986eD289935A0F47FC434C00cDE309fE2c51f1C","role":".owner"}]
    }
    contract ProxyAdmin (eth:0x7986eD289935A0F47FC434C00cDE309fE2c51f1C) [global/ProxyAdmin] {
    +++ description: None
    values.owner:
    - "eth:0x441F31C4cdf772558D4EA31f3114de59aE145E7c"
    + "eth:0x3228F00FbFD0e1F4c282601c489664B10932C40f"
    }
    - Status: DELETED
    contract Hashkey Multisig 2 (eth:0xC7fCbE26c1Db751d63869F72F782a56710f6be5A) [GnosisSafe]
    +++ description: None
    contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0xe7Aa79B59CAc06F9706D896a047fEb9d3BDA8bD3) [opstack/OptimismPortal2] {
    +++ description: The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame.
    values.guardian:
    - "eth:0xC7fCbE26c1Db751d63869F72F782a56710f6be5A"
    + "eth:0x6F2b20996ADAf3ae64Da901A67f659C2c48f66C9"
    }
    contract SuperchainConfig (eth:0xfd1255b6c09D939E7F3896A16C32CDBCD6F8B40A) [opstack/SuperchainConfigFake] {
    +++ description: This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages the `PAUSED_SLOT`, a boolean value indicating whether the local chain is paused, and `GUARDIAN_SLOT`, the address of the guardian which can pause and unpause the system.
    values.$pastUpgrades.1:
    + ["2026-05-25T05:51:23.000Z","0x3bfc8a22ff71232436c67628de837c36002264a5dfbc55b38b957f5ba471538c",["eth:0x3a6CBE32Ed9E11662362400C293485109bdF2CcC"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.2:
    + ["2026-05-25T05:51:23.000Z","0x3bfc8a22ff71232436c67628de837c36002264a5dfbc55b38b957f5ba471538c",["eth:0x1d31a15050DBE75c6c060D6da696332a5CB943e1"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 1
    + 3
    values.guardian:
    - "eth:0xC7fCbE26c1Db751d63869F72F782a56710f6be5A"
    + "eth:0x6F2b20996ADAf3ae64Da901A67f659C2c48f66C9"
    }
    + Status: CREATED
    contract NXV (eth:0x3228F00FbFD0e1F4c282601c489664B10932C40f) [NXV]
    +++ description: None
    + Status: CREATED
    contract NXV (eth:0x391832Fb1884E6772Dbd9f24cE2db35E9B20B696) [NXV]
    +++ description: None
    + Status: CREATED
    contract NXV (eth:0x6F2b20996ADAf3ae64Da901A67f659C2c48f66C9) [NXV]
    +++ description: None
    2026 March 04, 12:16 UTC
    High severity
    5changes

    PermissionedDisputeGame redeployed with a new proposer address (same implementation, same version 1.3.1-beta.2, same absolutePrestate). Proposer rotated from 0xD1B3Ea8b98C86b1fc00B28096CB504d930D17A54 to 0xF660E0982b3720bc01692f9D10c647f688FD07ba. Diff (identical code) Batcher and unsafeBlockSigner addresses rotated in SystemConfig.

    PermissionedDisputeGame redeployed with a new proposer address (same implementation, same version 1.3.1-beta.2, same absolutePrestate). Proposer rotated from 0xD1B3Ea8b98C86b1fc00B28096CB504d930D17A54 to 0xF660E0982b3720bc01692f9D10c647f688FD07ba. Diff (identical code)

    Batcher and unsafeBlockSigner addresses rotated in SystemConfig.

    contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0x04Ec030f362CE5A0b5Fe2d4B4219f287C2EBDE50) {
    +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them.
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.gameImpls.1:
    - "eth:0x80243779986D4F08b7bc2888a8Ce086E0d45dF41"
    + "eth:0xE38135e20BA018a5542C83De258d80d6883Da8A3"
    }
    contract SystemConfig (eth:0x43F8DeFe3E9286D152E91BB16a248808E7247198) {
    +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address.
    values.batcherHash:
    - "eth:0xFa35501cab42175918093F40C317642919F45165"
    + "eth:0x5e70713222FaF60c9e9fB69240D06ae6D688563A"
    values.unsafeBlockSigner:
    - "eth:0x38Eb7BDa08297a65d399FbE46F061116f6Dd0ECB"
    + "eth:0x0dD773e949a7E53f622A3A5cC89a6C6663652638"
    }
    - Status: DELETED
    contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0x80243779986D4F08b7bc2888a8Ce086E0d45dF41)
    +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0xE38135e20BA018a5542C83De258d80d6883Da8A3)
    +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger.
    2026 January 27, 16:55 UTC
    High severity
    6changes

    Key rotation: New PermissionedDisputeGame deployed with new proposer address (0xC5576... → 0xD1B3E...). Since PermissionedDisputeGame has immutable constructor params, a new contract was needed to change the proposer. SystemConfig also updated with new batcher (0xFa35501...) and new unsafe block signer (0x38Eb7B...). Same implementation code and absolutePrestate (v1.3.1 govApproved).

    Key rotation: New PermissionedDisputeGame deployed with new proposer address (0xC5576… → 0xD1B3E…). Since PermissionedDisputeGame has immutable constructor params, a new contract was needed to change the proposer. SystemConfig also updated with new batcher (0xFa35501…) and new unsafe block signer (0x38Eb7B…). Same implementation code and absolutePrestate (v1.3.1 govApproved).

    contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0x04Ec030f362CE5A0b5Fe2d4B4219f287C2EBDE50) {
    +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them.
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.gameImpls.1:
    - "eth:0x78075eA46A562c3201E61664645c0f0537a8DDd5"
    + "eth:0x80243779986D4F08b7bc2888a8Ce086E0d45dF41"
    }
    contract SystemConfig (eth:0x43F8DeFe3E9286D152E91BB16a248808E7247198) {
    +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address.
    values.batcherHash:
    - "eth:0xf09ebb62b5ba0cf402b77aBA61691cBCf005206f"
    + "eth:0xFa35501cab42175918093F40C317642919F45165"
    values.unsafeBlockSigner:
    - "eth:0xCc467FdB41B5b5A4E23021CAd69ED27550a41694"
    + "eth:0x38Eb7BDa08297a65d399FbE46F061116f6Dd0ECB"
    }
    - Status: DELETED
    contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0x78075eA46A562c3201E61664645c0f0537a8DDd5)
    +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger.
    EOA (eth:0xFCF35CeE40325db21c3dc5b45849251E78Be47eb) {
    +++ description: None
    receivedPermissions:
    - [{"permission":"challenge","from":"eth:0x78075eA46A562c3201E61664645c0f0537a8DDd5","role":".challenger"}]
    }
    + Status: CREATED
    contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0x80243779986D4F08b7bc2888a8Ce086E0d45dF41)
    +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger.

    Operator

    The system has a centralized operator

    The operatorAn operator is the entity charged with managing a rollup and progressing its state. A rollup operator can be a centralized sequencer, proposer, prover, challenger, pauser of admin that is able to perform upgrades. is the only entity that can propose blocksAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over.. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.

    • MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

    Users can force any transaction

    Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.

    1. Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs
    2. OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function

    Withdrawals

    Regular exits

    The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlementThe mechanism with which the execution of rollup blocks and the resultant state is verified and possible disputes are resolved. In the context of rollups or other modular blockchains, it often refers to the proof system used--validity (ZK) or fraud proofs, or a combination thereof. Sometimes it will refer to this mechanism along with where the mechanism's outputs are ultimately published and verified, as in Ethereum being a settlement layer by verifying the proofs and allowing for withdrawals., but a 3d 12h period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled. of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.

    1. OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function
    2. OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function

    Forced messaging

    If the user experiences censorship from the operatorAn operator is the entity charged with managing a rollup and progressing its state. A rollup operator can be a centralized sequencer, proposer, prover, challenger, pauser of admin that is able to perform upgrades. with regular L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups.->L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.

    1. Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain

    Other considerations

    EVM compatible smart contracts are supported

    OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM EquivalenceA perfect degree of compatibility; where one system or concept is indistinguishable from another in the domain being compared. In the context of rollups, it generally refers to the proximity to the EVM and to Ethereum architecture. model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. can be deployed on L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups..

    1. Introducing EVM Equivalence

    Permissions

    A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions
    Go to Disco
    Disco UI Banner
    Disco UI BannerExplore in Disco

    Ethereum

    Actors:

    NXV0x3228…C40f

    A Multisig with 3/5 threshold.

    • Can upgrade with no delay
      • OptimismMintableERC20Factory
      • DisputeGameFactory
      • L1StandardBridge
      • SystemConfig
      • AnchorStateRegistry
      • L1CrossDomainMessenger
      • DelayedWETH
      • L1ERC721Bridge
      • DelayedWETH
      • OptimismPortal2
      • SuperchainConfig
    • Can interact with AddressManager
      • set and change address mappings

    Participants (5):

    0x18B0…03380x6622…022A0xAFf8…70A70xC00d…9d470xd1E1…8fbe
    NXV0x3918…B696

    A Multisig with 3/5 threshold.

    • Can interact with SystemConfig
      • it can update the preconfer address, the batch submitter (SequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs.) address and the gasA virtual fuel used to execute smart contracts on a rollup. The EVM (or other VM within the rollup) uses an accounting mechanism to correspond the consumption of gas to the consumption of computing resources, and to limit the consumption of computing resources. configuration of the system

    Participants (5):

    0x0dE9…987A0x0Fa3…780D0x19a3…d0BD0x7015…A5b10xcd2B…A93A
    NXV0x6F2b…66C9

    A Multisig with 3/5 threshold.

    • Can interact with SuperchainConfig
      • Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof systemThe infrastructure that allows projects to verify their state transitions. It is composed by onchain verifiers and offchain provers. The main two flavors are optimistic and ZK proof systems, but they can be combined in a hybrid model. In general though, if a system is able to accept state roots optimistically, even if it has a ZK component, it is considered an optimistic proof system., the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionlessAnyone willing should be able to join and leave the network at any time, without causing significant disturbance to the network or being detrimental to the party in question. No single entity should have the power to allowlist or blocklist participants.)

    Participants (5):

    0x2d46…15690x3B5a…46610x4fe1…1c6D0xDfA1…dC1F0xfF57…c0f2
    Hashkey Multisig 10x441F…5E7c

    A Multisig with 3/5 threshold.

    • Can interact with DelayedWETH
      • can pull funds from the contract in case of emergency
    • Can interact with DelayedWETH
      • can pull funds from the contract in case of emergency

    Participants (5):

    0xa4e1…B2B60x01D9…151c0x7623…189e0x2381…0d060xa31d…aEC9
    EOA 10x5e70…563A
    • Can interact with SystemConfig
      • Allowed to commit transactions from the current layer to the host chain

    Smart contracts

    A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions
    Go to Disco
    Disco UI Banner
    Disco UI BannerExplore in Disco
    A diagram of the smart contract architecture
    A diagram of the smart contract architecture

    Ethereum

    DisputeGameFactory0x04Ec…DE50Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. and eventually challenge them.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately NXV
    Can be upgraded by:
    NXV with no delay
    SystemConfig0x43F8…7198Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Contains configuration parameters such as the SequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. address, gas limitThe maximum amount of gas a transaction or block may consume. on this chain and the unsafe blockAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over. signer address.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately NXV
      • batcherHash: EOA 1
      • owner: NXV
    Can be upgraded by:
    NXV with no delay
    OptimismPortal2
    Escrow
    0xe7Aa…8bD3Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. to L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups.. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately NXV
    The following tokens are included in the value secured calculation:
    ETH token logoHSK token logo
    Can be upgraded by:
    NXV with no delay
    SuperchainConfig0xfd12…B40AImplementation (Upgradable)Admin

    This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages the PAUSED_SLOT, a boolean value indicating whether the local chain is paused, and GUARDIAN_SLOT, the address of the guardian which can pause and unpause the system.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately NXV
      • guardian: NXV
    Can be upgraded by:
    NXV with no delay
    L1StandardBridge
    Escrow
    0x2171…70beImplementation (Upgradable)Admin

    The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately NXV

    All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation.

    Can be upgraded by:
    NXV with no delay
    L1CrossDomainMessenger0x899F…2e97Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain’s epoch gas limitThe maximum amount of gas a transaction or block may consume., it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately NXV
    Can be upgraded by:
    NXV with no delay
    L1ERC721Bridge0xd4C8…9D04Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Used to bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately NXV
    Can be upgraded by:
    NXV with no delay
    OptimismMintableERC20Factory0x0407…8f19Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the networkA constellation of nodes (peers) that communicate via a peer-to-peer protocol, for example, in propagating transactions and blocks to other nodes. it’s deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain’s representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately NXV
    Can be upgraded by:
    NXV with no delay
    AnchorStateRegistry0x4deC…F2EDImplementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Contains the latest confirmed state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately NXV
    Can be upgraded by:
    NXV with no delay
    PreimageOracle0x5B9b…270b

    The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. for a dispute game.

    MIPS0x7447…b8BA

    The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.

    ProxyAdmin0x7986…1f1C
    • Roles:
      • owner: NXV
    DelayedWETH0xBb70…d26DImplementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately NXV
      • owner: Hashkey Multisig 1
    Can be upgraded by:
    NXV with no delay
    FaultDisputeGame0xC3E7…B8aA

    Logic of the dispute game. When a state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. is proposed, a dispute game contract is deployed. Challengers can use such contracts to challenge the proposed state root.

    DelayedWETH0xd9c3…f6feImplementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately NXV
      • owner: Hashkey Multisig 1
    Can be upgraded by:
    NXV with no delay
    PermissionedDisputeGame0xE381…a8A3

    Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block. and challenger.

    The current deployment carries some associated risks:

    • Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).

    Program Hashes

    Name
    Hash
    Repository
    Verification
    Used in
    0x0385...d54c
    Github
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