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There are impactful changes and part of the information might be outdated.
Ronin is an Ethereum Optimium based on the OP Stack, optimized for gaming and NFT applications. It migrated from an independent sidechain to a Layer 2 in May 2026, using EigenDA for data availability and keeping RON as the custom gas token.
Ronin is an Ethereum Optimium based on the OP Stack, optimized for gaming and NFT applications. It migrated from an independent sidechain to a Layer 2 in May 2026, using EigenDA for data availability and keeping RON as the custom gas token.
Consequence: projects without a proper proof system fully rely on single entities to safely update the state. A malicious proposer can finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds.
Consequence: projects without a data availability bridge fully rely on single entities (the sequencer) to honestly rely available data roots on Ethereum. A malicious sequencer can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds.
Learn more about the recategorisation here.
The section shows the operating costs that L2s pay to Ethereum.
This section shows how "live" the project's operators are by displaying how frequently they submit transactions of the selected type. It also highlights anomalies - significant deviations from their typical schedule.
Withdrawals fall back to the permissioned game
2026 Sep 7th
Guardian moves the respected game type back to the PermissionedDisputeGame; Kailua proposals stop.
Kailua ZK proofs enabled
2026 Jul 1st
Respected game type moves from the PermissionedDisputeGame to the Kailua ZK game (type 1337).
In the event of a sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project’s chain by sending them to L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development.. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.
Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. Only one entity is currently allowed to propose and submit challenges, as only permissioned games are currently allowed.
Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on EigenDA. The sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. is publishing data to EigenDA v2. Sequencer transaction data roots are not checked against the DACert VerifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. onchain.
There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.
Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. on L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development., so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.
Transactions roots are posted onchain and the full data is posted on EigenDA. The sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. is publishing data to EigenDA v2. Since the DACert VerifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. is not used, availability of the data is not verified against EigenDA operators, meaning that the Sequencer can single-handedly publish unavailable commitments.
Funds can be lost if the sequencer posts an unavailable transaction root (CRITICAL).
Funds can be lost if the data is not available on the external provider (CRITICAL).

Since 2026-09-07 withdrawals are settled against the PermissionedDisputeGame (game type 1). Only the permissioned proposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block. can create state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. proposals and only the permissioned proposer and challenger can dispute them. The game commits to the op-program v1.3.1 absolute prestate, whose embedded superchain-registry snapshot does not include chain ID 2020, so the fault proof program cannot execute the Ronin state transition and no dispute can be resolved correctly by execution. The Kailua ZK game (game type 1337) remains deployed and registered in the DisputeGameFactory but is not the respected game type, so its proposals are not used for withdrawals.
Proposers submit state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the create function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.0 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proofAlso referred to as a fault proof, it is the construction of an assertion that fraud was perpetrated on an optimistic rollup. More concretely, that an invalid state transition took place according to the protocol rules. The submitter of a fraud proof would expect a reward from the optimistic rollup protocol for helping maintain the integrity of the system.. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled. has passed and it is not countered.
Funds can be stolen if no whitelisted challenger disputes an invalid state root before the challenge window expires (CRITICAL).
Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 0.00 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the defend or attack functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with full concurrency. Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 3d 12h. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see freeloader claims), an inherited clock with too little time remaining is generally extended by 3h. The extension is 6h when the next claim is immediately before split depth 30, and 1d 3h (the standard extension plus the 1d oracle challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled.) immediately before the last depth. Along a full-depth path, cumulative extensions can therefore add up to 10d 3h. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers’ stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step proverAn entity that generates the cryptographic proof to convince the verifier that the statement is true. In a ZK-Rollup, the prover generates the ZK (validity) proof to submit to the verifier contract. contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks (Spearbit 5.1.3).
Name | Hash | Repository | Verification | Used in | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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0x0385...d54c | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.
respectedGameType switched from 1337 (KailuaGame) to 1 (PermissionedDisputeGame) on the AnchorStateRegistry and OptimismPortal2. No implementation change, no game retirement or blacklist. Withdrawals now settle against permissioned proposals. The type-1 prestate is op-program v1.3.1 ( 0x038512e0… ), which cannot execute for chain 2020.
respectedGameType switched from 1337 (KailuaGame) to 1 (PermissionedDisputeGame) on the AnchorStateRegistry and OptimismPortal2. No implementation change, no game retirement or blacklist. Withdrawals now settle against permissioned proposals.
The type-1 prestate is op-program v1.3.1 (0x038512e0…), which cannot execute for chain 2020.
| contract AnchorStateRegistry (eth:0x0B95fF1d1B113bac3E29Ac0BBF2089126C9aE81A) [opstack/AnchorStateRegistry_post13] { | |
| +++ description: Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame. | |
| description: | |
| - | "Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the KailuaGame." |
| + | "Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame." |
| values.RespectedGameString: | |
| - | "KailuaGame" |
| + | "PermissionedDisputeGame" |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.respectedGameType: | |
| - | 1337 |
| + | 1 |
| } | |
| contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0x652CD53eCf9466E5Fb00D0E11d6CBf6469a56D77) [opstack/OptimismPortal2] { | |
| +++ description: The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame. | |
| description: | |
| - | "The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the KailuaGame." |
| + | "The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame." |
| values.RespectedGameString: | |
| - | "KailuaGame" |
| + | "PermissionedDisputeGame" |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.respectedGameType: | |
| - | 1337 |
| + | 1 |
| } | |
Conduit Multisig 1: member added; threshold 4/10 → 4/11.
Conduit Multisig 1: member added; threshold 4/10 → 4/11.
| contract Conduit Multisig 1 (eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746) [GnosisSafe] { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| values.$members.0: | |
| + | "eth:0x9402c42dB162d5a0927c032136f40Cc9C71853F2" |
| values.multisigThreshold: | |
| - | "4 of 10 (40%)" |
| + | "4 of 11 (36%)" |
| } | |
Kailua cutover: respectedGameType on OptimismPortal2 and AnchorStateRegistry moved from 1 (PermissionedDisputeGame) to 1337 (KailuaGame). Withdrawals now clear through the ZK fault-proof game. DisputeGameFactory game1337 slot repointed from KailuaTreasury ( eth:0xc7EaCDd1… ) to the KailuaGame implementation ( eth:0x296e7aD6… ); the treasury continues to hold bonds and mint game clones. KailuaVerifier proxy upgraded (impl eth:0x7fC721AC… → eth:0xDd26da83… , 2026-07-01), with new FPVM IMAGE ID ( 0xd3c097df… ) and ROLLUP CONFIG HASH ( 0x96ff8605… ). KailuaTreasury economic parameters now live: participationBond = 0.5 ETH, vanguard = eth:0xD379de94… , vanguardAdvantage = 1 month.
Kailua cutover: respectedGameType on OptimismPortal2 and AnchorStateRegistry moved from 1 (PermissionedDisputeGame) to 1337 (KailuaGame). Withdrawals now clear through the ZK fault-proof game.
DisputeGameFactory game1337 slot repointed from KailuaTreasury (eth:0xc7EaCDd1…) to the KailuaGame implementation (eth:0x296e7aD6…); the treasury continues to hold bonds and mint game clones.
KailuaVerifier proxy upgraded (impl eth:0x7fC721AC… → eth:0xDd26da83…, 2026-07-01), with new FPVM_IMAGE_ID (0xd3c097df…) and ROLLUP_CONFIG_HASH (0x96ff8605…).
KailuaTreasury economic parameters now live: participationBond = 0.5 ETH, vanguard = eth:0xD379de94…, vanguardAdvantage = 1 month.
| contract AnchorStateRegistry (eth:0x0B95fF1d1B113bac3E29Ac0BBF2089126C9aE81A) [opstack/AnchorStateRegistry_post13] { | |
| +++ description: Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the KailuaGame. | |
| description: | |
| - | "Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame." |
| + | "Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the KailuaGame." |
| values.RespectedGameString: | |
| - | "PermissionedDisputeGame" |
| + | "KailuaGame" |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.respectedGameType: | |
| - | 1 |
| + | 1337 |
| } | |
| contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0x45dA2CD511DA5FEAa535eBF166E628314a65843a) [opstack/DisputeGameFactory] { | |
| +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. | |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.game1337: | |
| - | "eth:0xc7EaCDd1E755d2823463Abc4434CA445F752b336" |
| + | "eth:0x296e7aD6D441b0627768bC0650179a4206479444" |
| } | |
| contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0x652CD53eCf9466E5Fb00D0E11d6CBf6469a56D77) [opstack/OptimismPortal2] { | |
| +++ description: The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the KailuaGame. | |
| description: | |
| - | "The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame." |
| + | "The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the KailuaGame." |
| values.RespectedGameString: | |
| - | "PermissionedDisputeGame" |
| + | "KailuaGame" |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.respectedGameType: | |
| - | 1 |
| + | 1337 |
| } | |
| contract KailuaVerifier (eth:0x6b49976a7340D0A3C00d1bEBE0E36E2367D89c7C) [N/A] { | |
| +++ description: Proxy in front of the Kailua proof verifier; routes verification requests to the canonical RiscZeroVerifierRouter and asserts the chain-specific rollup config and FPVM image ID. | |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x7fC721ACC2183c292737C5a28Ea1B30d19f1cF29" |
| + | "eth:0xDd26da83B27987A7040caE31f2E35d9Bd6f5DE59" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.1: | |
| + | ["2026-07-01T10:19:35.000Z","0x07bf7a192a2ea3b5324ef5cef339715fc6b972b261463e751f39a3f7bb2ae72d",["eth:0xDd26da83B27987A7040caE31f2E35d9Bd6f5DE59"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 1 |
| + | 2 |
| values.FPVM_IMAGE_ID: | |
| - | "0xc2e7bc71ae10caf806a1a073e4170daf3f4ac31099f1f854f7062dd70ed12fe3" |
| + | "0xd3c097dfec583bb305eefcb5dcddc313b072e372cee66e13492c37fb50e6a90b" |
| values.ROLLUP_CONFIG_HASH: | |
| - | "0xc1f5bee1ef35d2b73a7cd351e650b2b123cb3bec91b0de3941af90539d5fc829" |
| + | "0x96ff86054c51b6b832108a14d93ced530c42e0ee5a113b47671c912fc19f5b1a" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x7fC721ACC2183c292737C5a28Ea1B30d19f1cF29: | |
| - | "KailuaVerifier" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xDd26da83B27987A7040caE31f2E35d9Bd6f5DE59: | |
| + | "KailuaVerifier" |
| } | |
| contract KailuaTreasury (eth:0xc7EaCDd1E755d2823463Abc4434CA445F752b336) [risc0/KailuaTreasury] { | |
| +++ description: Kailua (RISC Zero ZK fault-proof) treasury: holds participation bonds, mints KailuaGame clones, and defines the vanguard proposer economics. Bonds confiscated from eliminated proposers are split 1/3 to the prover, 1/3 to the tournament winner, 1/3 burned. | |
| values.participationBond: | |
| - | 0 |
| + | "500000000000000000" |
| values.participationBondFmt: | |
| - | "0" |
| + | "0.5" |
| values.vanguard: | |
| - | "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" |
| + | "eth:0xD379de941E78Ab394d4D4917FcCE1CC45b6cd620" |
| values.vanguardAdvantage: | |
| - | 0 |
| + | 2592000 |
| values.vanguardAdvantageFmt: | |
| - | "0s" |
| + | "1mo" |
| } | |
| EOA (eth:0xD379de941E78Ab394d4D4917FcCE1CC45b6cd620) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| receivedPermissions.1: | |
| + | {"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0xc7EaCDd1E755d2823463Abc4434CA445F752b336","description":"propose new state roots before anyone else, giving a first-mover advantage on the optimistic clock.","role":".vanguard"} |
| } | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract KailuaGame (eth:0x296e7aD6D441b0627768bC0650179a4206479444) [risc0/KailuaGame] | |
| +++ description: Implementation of the KailuaGame with type 1337. Based on this implementation, new KailuaGames are created with every new state root proposal. | |
Guardian role on OptimismPortal2, SystemConfig and SuperchainConfig moved from Conduit Multisig 1 to the joint Ronin/Conduit Safe (RoninConduitOwner): SuperchainConfig was re-initialized via the standard StorageSetter→same-impl pattern, bumping initVersion 1 → 2 and setting the new guardian address. Conduit Multisig 1 remains challenger in DGF.
Guardian role on OptimismPortal2, SystemConfig and SuperchainConfig moved from Conduit Multisig 1 to the joint Ronin/Conduit Safe (RoninConduitOwner): SuperchainConfig was re-initialized via the standard StorageSetter→same-impl pattern, bumping initVersion 1 → 2 and setting the new guardian address. Conduit Multisig 1 remains challenger in DGF.
| contract Conduit Multisig 1 (eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746) [GnosisSafe] { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| values.$members.4: | |
| - | "eth:0x65D1d44B8B2fE15d45A03708E0835C7E98a56007" |
| values.$members.8: | |
| - | "eth:0xa4000bDD2bB92ce6750b31F1eeda47Bd1cB8e6e4" |
| values.multisigThreshold: | |
| - | "4 of 12 (33%)" |
| + | "4 of 10 (40%)" |
| receivedPermissions.1: | |
| - | {"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0xEE552e802A50d855bD08E93dfcc69228FC7B9E2c","description":"Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless).","role":".guardian"} |
| } | |
| contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0x652CD53eCf9466E5Fb00D0E11d6CBf6469a56D77) [opstack/OptimismPortal2] { | |
| +++ description: The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame. | |
| values.guardian: | |
| - | "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746" |
| + | "eth:0xE9Ad9723C24d946958f9FD3Bc861BbF983525607" |
| } | |
| contract SystemConfig (eth:0xc4f4F908C36C8119f1FBd52CebbDB30C6f2a23C1) [opstack/SystemConfig] { | |
| +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address. | |
| values.guardian: | |
| - | "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746" |
| + | "eth:0xE9Ad9723C24d946958f9FD3Bc861BbF983525607" |
| } | |
| contract RoninConduitOwner (eth:0xE9Ad9723C24d946958f9FD3Bc861BbF983525607) [GnosisSafe] { | |
| +++ description: 5-of-6 joint Ronin/Conduit Safe. | |
| receivedPermissions.2: | |
| + | {"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0xEE552e802A50d855bD08E93dfcc69228FC7B9E2c","description":"Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless).","role":".guardian"} |
| } | |
| contract SuperchainConfig (eth:0xEE552e802A50d855bD08E93dfcc69228FC7B9E2c) [opstack/SuperchainConfigFake_expiry] { | |
| +++ description: This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3mo 1d if left untouched. | |
| values.$pastUpgrades.1: | |
| + | ["2026-06-09T07:02:35.000Z","0x7e9202c4d6cb60aa8f0d86f9524f58cc3b5edb505495f61503d9374e3859cdb6",["eth:0x6322C2f2D6a4305Fc033754d486A5A067Ee5F9b1"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.2: | |
| + | ["2026-06-09T07:02:35.000Z","0x7e9202c4d6cb60aa8f0d86f9524f58cc3b5edb505495f61503d9374e3859cdb6",["eth:0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 1 |
| + | 3 |
| values.guardian: | |
| - | "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746" |
| + | "eth:0xE9Ad9723C24d946958f9FD3Bc861BbF983525607" |
| } | |
Kailua (RISC Zero ZK fault-proof) deployed but not yet active. DisputeGameFactory registered game type 1337 → KailuaTreasury ( eth:0xc7EaCDd1… ). OptimismPortal2 and AnchorStateRegistry still have respectedGameType = 1 (PermissionedDisputeGame); cutover requires a separate change. Ronin KailuaTreasury (v1.2.0, eth:0xc7EaCDd1… ): verifier extracted to a separate KAILUA VERIFIER proxy, bond accounting reworked. Diff vs BOB v0.1.0 baseline: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xc7EaCDd1E755d2823463Abc4434CA445F752b336/eth:0x9B3E1661bccAF907893B71e4016c01513ae9263C. RoninConduitOwner got admin over the KailuaVerifier proxy ( eth:0x6b49976a… ), so the verifier proxy is upgradable along the same path as the other OP Stack contracts. RiscZeroVerifierRouter ( eth:0x8EaB2D97… ) is the shared RISC Zero verifier-selector router. Owner is a TimelockController ( eth:0x0b144E07… , 3d delay) governed by Safe eth:0x2E5bcc… . Both are shared RISC Zero infrastructure, not Ronin-specific.
Kailua (RISC Zero ZK fault-proof) deployed but not yet active.
DisputeGameFactory registered game type 1337 → KailuaTreasury (eth:0xc7EaCDd1…).
OptimismPortal2 and AnchorStateRegistry still have respectedGameType = 1 (PermissionedDisputeGame); cutover requires a separate change.
Ronin KailuaTreasury (v1.2.0, eth:0xc7EaCDd1…): verifier extracted to a separate KAILUA_VERIFIER proxy, bond accounting reworked. Diff vs BOB v0.1.0 baseline: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xc7EaCDd1E755d2823463Abc4434CA445F752b336/eth:0x9B3E1661bccAF907893B71e4016c01513ae9263C.
RoninConduitOwner got admin over the KailuaVerifier proxy (eth:0x6b49976a…), so the verifier proxy is upgradable along the same path as the other OP Stack contracts.
RiscZeroVerifierRouter (eth:0x8EaB2D97…) is the shared RISC Zero verifier-selector router. Owner is a TimelockController (eth:0x0b144E07…, 3d delay) governed by Safe eth:0x2E5bcc…. Both are shared RISC Zero infrastructure, not Ronin-specific.
| contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0x45dA2CD511DA5FEAa535eBF166E628314a65843a) [opstack/DisputeGameFactory] { | |
| +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. | |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.game1337: | |
| - | "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" |
| + | "eth:0xc7EaCDd1E755d2823463Abc4434CA445F752b336" |
| } | |
| contract Conduit Multisig 1 (eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746) [GnosisSafe] { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| values.$members.0: | |
| + | "eth:0xcdC931935768c0562AfE989A366a3Dc4d52F4853" |
| values.$members.8: | |
| - | "eth:0x3840f487A17A41100DD1Bf0946c34f132a57Fd5f" |
| } | |
| contract RoninConduitOwner (eth:0xE9Ad9723C24d946958f9FD3Bc861BbF983525607) [GnosisSafe] { | |
| +++ description: 5-of-6 joint Ronin/Conduit Safe. | |
| receivedPermissions.8: | |
| + | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x6b49976a7340D0A3C00d1bEBE0E36E2367D89c7C","role":"admin"} |
| } | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract TimelockController (eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711) [global/TimelockController] | |
| +++ description: A timelock with access control. The current minimum delay is 3d. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop (eth:0x1efDd13f831ceeEa14940806705A53D3211CD698) [risc0/RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop] | |
| +++ description: A verifier wrapper for the eth:0xafB31f5b70623CDF4b20Ada3f7230916A5A79df9 that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract RiscZeroGroth16Verifier (eth:0x20ff7C2Cf391a5F096A2Cc181cb41916680f8E97) [taiko/RiscZeroGroth16Verifier] | |
| +++ description: Verifier contract for RISC Zero Groth16 proofs (version 2.0.0-rc.3). | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract RiscZeroGroth16Verifier (eth:0x2a098988600d87650Fb061FfAff08B97149Fa84D) [taiko/RiscZeroGroth16Verifier] | |
| +++ description: Verifier contract for RISC Zero Groth16 proofs (version 3.0.0). | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract Safe (eth:0x2E5bcc9959dB5F5016F830E47943b07242CB2609) [GnosisSafe] | |
| +++ description: None | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop (eth:0x44c220f0598345195cE99AD6A57aDfFcb9Ea33e7) [risc0/RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop] | |
| +++ description: A verifier wrapper for the eth:0xf70aBAb028Eb6F4100A24B203E113D94E87DE93C that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract RiscZeroSetVerifier (eth:0x5005aBa3DFf7C940fcc1e48DccCAD611a80eEB85) [risc0/RiscZeroSetVerifier] | |
| +++ description: Set verifier contract for RISC Zero proofs (version 0.9.0). It allows verifying a whole set of proofs identified with a Merkle root at once, afterwards each individual proof could be efficiently verified just by checking Merkle inclusion against the verified root. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract RiscZeroGroth16Verifier (eth:0x54aCE3ED46529B4d4F3770C8Bad5dDC48717B9bF) [N/A] | |
| +++ description: None | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop (eth:0x68dC2cB4e61774873971c499D9b239ec5Ac540E3) [risc0/RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop] | |
| +++ description: A verifier wrapper for the eth:0x20ff7C2Cf391a5F096A2Cc181cb41916680f8E97 that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract KailuaVerifier (eth:0x6b49976a7340D0A3C00d1bEBE0E36E2367D89c7C) [N/A] | |
| +++ description: Proxy in front of the Kailua proof verifier; routes verification requests to the canonical RiscZeroVerifierRouter and asserts the chain-specific rollup config and FPVM image ID. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop (eth:0x844D5f01161E3559d36f23d0Aa9E9620949aF782) [risc0/RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop] | |
| +++ description: A verifier wrapper for the eth:0x5005aBa3DFf7C940fcc1e48DccCAD611a80eEB85 that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract RiscZeroVerifierRouter (eth:0x8EaB2D97Dfce405A1692a21b3ff3A172d593D319) [risc0/RiscZeroVerifierRouter] | |
| +++ description: A router proxy that routes to verifiers based on selectors. The mapping can be changed by a permissioned owner (eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711). | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop (eth:0x9F9994Eb4Cb5200198FEfb470f8b50301662e696) [risc0/RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop] | |
| +++ description: A verifier wrapper for the eth:0x2a098988600d87650Fb061FfAff08B97149Fa84D that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract RiscZeroGroth16Verifier (eth:0xafB31f5b70623CDF4b20Ada3f7230916A5A79df9) [taiko/RiscZeroGroth16Verifier] | |
| +++ description: Verifier contract for RISC Zero Groth16 proofs (version 2.2.0). | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract KailuaTreasury (eth:0xc7EaCDd1E755d2823463Abc4434CA445F752b336) [risc0/KailuaTreasury] | |
| +++ description: Kailua (RISC Zero ZK fault-proof) game implementation registered as game type 1337 in the DisputeGameFactory. Deployed but NOT yet active. Bonds confiscated from eliminated proposers are split 1/3 to the prover, 1/3 to the tournament winner, 1/3 burned. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop (eth:0xDa8f3de6fBBdb261Ac771B813a578A7aBdA6B2b1) [risc0/RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop] | |
| +++ description: A verifier wrapper for the eth:0x54aCE3ED46529B4d4F3770C8Bad5dDC48717B9bF that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract RiscZeroGroth16Verifier (eth:0xf70aBAb028Eb6F4100A24B203E113D94E87DE93C) [N/A] | |
| +++ description: None | |
The operatorAn operator is the entity charged with managing a rollup and progressing its state. A rollup operator can be a centralized sequencer, proposer, prover, challenger, pauser of admin that is able to perform upgrades. is the only entity that can propose blocksAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over.. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.
MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.
The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlementThe mechanism with which the execution of rollup blocks and the resultant state is verified and possible disputes are resolved. In the context of rollups or other modular blockchains, it often refers to the proof system used--validity (ZK) or fraud proofs, or a combination thereof. Sometimes it will refer to this mechanism along with where the mechanism's outputs are ultimately published and verified, as in Ethereum being a settlement layer by verifying the proofs and allowing for withdrawals., but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled. of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.
If the user experiences censorship from the operatorAn operator is the entity charged with managing a rollup and progressing its state. A rollup operator can be a centralized sequencer, proposer, prover, challenger, pauser of admin that is able to perform upgrades. with regular L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups.->L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.
OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM EquivalenceA perfect degree of compatibility; where one system or concept is indistinguishable from another in the domain being compared. In the context of rollups, it generally refers to the proximity to the EVM and to Ethereum architecture. model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. can be deployed on L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups..
The May 2026 L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. migration deployed the OP Stack canonical bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. (OptimismPortal2 and L1StandardBridge) but did not migrate user funds into it; it is currently empty. User assets are custodied on two separate L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. paths, neither of which is the canonical bridge analyzed on this page: (1) Chainlink CCIP TokenPools, the active bridge since April 2025, securing 12 tokens including AXS, USDC, WETH, WBTC (new contract), YGG, PIXEL and SLP via Chainlink DON attestations and the Risk Management NetworkA constellation of nodes (peers) that communicate via a peer-to-peer protocol, for example, in propagating transactions and blocks to other nodes.; (2) the legacy MainchainGateway, deprecated in April 2025 but still holding residual balances (legacy WBTC, ETH backing of legacy WETH, dust), withdrawable through the Ronin BridgeOperator stake-weighted multisig. Sky Mavis has not announced a plan to migrate liquidity into the OP Stack bridge.

A Multisig with 4/11 threshold.
Participants (11):
0x9402…53F20xcdC9…48530xA9FC…8d090x6BB4…83A60x2103…911c0x8117…E7Ac0xA073…bda20xF331…647D0xa0C6…90380xefCf…dD5C0x4D80…5BAeGovernance and proxy-admin contract for the legacy MainchainGateway bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge.. Holds the operatorAn operator is the entity charged with managing a rollup and progressing its state. A rollup operator can be a centralized sequencer, proposer, prover, challenger, pauser of admin that is able to perform upgrades./governor set, tallies stake-weighted votes for bridge proposals (operator rotations, threshold changes, withdrawals).
A Multisig with 3/5 threshold.
A Multisig with 3/5 threshold.
A Multisig with 5/6 threshold. 5-of-6 joint Ronin/Conduit Safe.

VerifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. contract for RISC Zero Groth16A zk-SNARK proving system introduced by Groth in 2016 that proves arithmetic circuits and requires a separate trusted setup for each circuit. It allows extremely efficient proof verification. proofs (version 2.0.0-rc.3).
VerifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. contract for RISC Zero Groth16A zk-SNARK proving system introduced by Groth in 2016 that proves arithmetic circuits and requires a separate trusted setup for each circuit. It allows extremely efficient proof verification. proofs (version 3.0.0).
VerifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. contract for RISC Zero Groth16A zk-SNARK proving system introduced by Groth in 2016 that proves arithmetic circuits and requires a separate trusted setup for each circuit. It allows extremely efficient proof verification. proofs (version 2.0.3).
VerifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. contract for RISC Zero Groth16A zk-SNARK proving system introduced by Groth in 2016 that proves arithmetic circuits and requires a separate trusted setup for each circuit. It allows extremely efficient proof verification. proofs (version 2.2.0).
VerifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. contract for RISC Zero Groth16A zk-SNARK proving system introduced by Groth in 2016 that proves arithmetic circuits and requires a separate trusted setup for each circuit. It allows extremely efficient proof verification. proofs. This older implementation exposes control-root and selector constants but does not expose a VERSION getter.
A timelock with access control. The current minimum delay is 3d.
The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. for a dispute game.
Implementation of the KailuaGame with type 1337. Based on this implementation, new KailuaGames are created with every new state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. proposal.
Set verifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. contract for RISC Zero proofs (version 0.9.0). It allows verifying a whole set of proofs identified with a Merkle root at once, afterwards each individual proof could be efficiently verified just by checking Merkle inclusion against the verified root.
Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block. and challenger.
Legacy multi-sig-secured Ronin bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. contract holding the L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. side of deposits made before the April 2025 Chainlink CCIP migration. Still custodies residual user balances (ETH backing legacy WETH on Ronin, the deprecated WBTC contract, and dust). Withdrawals authorised by the Ronin BridgeOperator stake-weighted threshold via MainchainBridgeManager.
All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation.
The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.
Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.
Proxy in front of the Kailua proof verifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover.; routes verification requests to the canonical RiscZeroVerifierRouter and asserts the chain-specific rollupA blockchain that inherits consensus and data availability from another blockchain called L1. Rollups enable trust minimized bridges with the base layer via proof systems, either optimistic or zero-knowledge. A rollup without a bridge, or without considering the bridge, is called a sovereign rollup. config and FPVM image ID.
A router proxy that routes to verifiers based on selectors. The mapping can be changed by a permissioned owner (TimelockController).
Kailua (RISC Zero ZK fault-proof) treasury: holds participation bonds, mints KailuaGame clones, and defines the vanguard proposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block. economics. Bonds confiscated from eliminated proposers are split 1/3 to the proverAn entity that generates the cryptographic proof to convince the verifier that the statement is true. In a ZK-Rollup, the prover generates the ZK (validity) proof to submit to the verifier contract., 1/3 to the tournament winner, 1/3 burned.
Immutable emergency-pause contract for the legacy MainchainGateway. Holders of the SENTRY_ROLE can flip MainchainGateway into a paused state to halt deposits and withdrawals in an emergency.
The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. and eventually challenge them.
The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. to L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups.. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame.

Contains configuration parameters such as the SequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. address, gas limitThe maximum amount of gas a transaction or block may consume. on this chain and the unsafe blockAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over. signer address.
This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3mo 1d if left untouched.
Used to bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.
The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.
All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation.
Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain’s epoch gas limitThe maximum amount of gas a transaction or block may consume., it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.
Contains the latest confirmed state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame.
A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the networkA constellation of nodes (peers) that communicate via a peer-to-peer protocol, for example, in propagating transactions and blocks to other nodes. it’s deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain’s representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.
The current deployment carries some associated risks:
Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).
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