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Ronin is an Ethereum Optimium based on the OP Stack, optimized for gaming and NFT applications. It migrated from an independent sidechain to a Layer 2 in May 2026, using EigenDA for data availability and keeping RON as the custom gas token.


  • Total Value SecuredTVS
    $224.55 M6.99%
  • Past day UOPSDaily UOPS
    1.6198.1%
  • Gas token
    RON
  • Type
    Other

  • Purpose
    Universal
  • Chain ID
    2020

  • Tokens breakdown

    Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure

    Badges

    About

    Ronin is an Ethereum Optimium based on the OP Stack, optimized for gaming and NFT applications. It migrated from an independent sidechain to a Layer 2 in May 2026, using EigenDA for data availability and keeping RON as the custom gas token.

    Why is the project listed in others?

    The proof system isn't fully functional

    Consequence: projects without a proper proof system fully rely on single entities to safely update the state. A malicious proposer can finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds.

    There is no data availability bridge

    Consequence: projects without a data availability bridge fully rely on single entities (the sequencer) to honestly rely available data roots on Ethereum. A malicious sequencer can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds.

    Learn more about the recategorisation here.


    Total
    Canonically BridgedCanonically Bridged ValueCanonical
    Natively MintedNatively Minted TokensNative
    Externally BridgedExternally Bridged ValueExternal

    ETH & derivatives
    Stablecoins
    BTC & derivatives
    Other
    Compare with other projects
    Past Day UOPS
    Past Day Ops count
    Max. UOPS
    Past day UOPS/TPS Ratio
    Compare with other projects

    The section shows the operating costs that L2s pay to Ethereum.



    Total cost
    Avg cost per L2 UOP
    Avg cost per day

    Compare with other projects

    This section shows how "live" the project's operators are by displaying how frequently they submit transactions of the selected type. It also highlights anomalies - significant deviations from their typical schedule.

    No ongoing anomalies detected

    Avg. tx data subs. interval
    Avg. state updates interval
    Past 30 days anomalies
    100% normal uptime

    Withdrawals fall back to the permissioned game

    2026 Sep 7th

    Guardian moves the respected game type back to the PermissionedDisputeGame; Kailua proposals stop.

    Learn more

    Kailua ZK proofs enabled

    2026 Jul 1st

    Respected game type moves from the PermissionedDisputeGame to the Kailua ZK game (type 1337).

    Learn more
    Since 2026-09-07 withdrawals settle against the PermissionedDisputeGame instead of the Kailua ZK game. The fault proof systemThe infrastructure that allows projects to verify their state transitions. It is composed by onchain verifiers and offchain provers. The main two flavors are optimistic and ZK proof systems, but they can be combined in a hybrid model. In general though, if a system is able to accept state roots optimistically, even if it has a ZK component, it is considered an optimistic proof system. is deployed but is not functional: the permissioned dispute game commits to the op-program v1.3.1 prestate, whose embedded superchain registry snapshot does not include Ronin (chain ID 2020), so no dispute can be resolved correctly by execution. Security relies entirely on the honesty of the permissioned proposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block..
    Since 2026-09-07 withdrawals settle against the PermissionedDisputeGame instead of the Kailua ZK game. The fault proof systemThe infrastructure that allows projects to verify their state transitions. It is composed by onchain verifiers and offchain provers. The main two flavors are optimistic and ZK proof systems, but they can be combined in a hybrid model. In general though, if a system is able to accept state roots optimistically, even if it has a ZK component, it is considered an optimistic proof system. is deployed but is not functional: the permissioned dispute game commits to the op-program v1.3.1 prestate, whose embedded superchain registry snapshot does not include Ronin (chain ID 2020), so no dispute can be resolved correctly by execution. Security relies entirely on the honesty of the permissioned proposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block..
    Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure
    Sequencer failure
    Self sequence

    In the event of a sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project’s chain by sending them to L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development.. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.

    State validation
    Fraud proofs (INT)

    Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. Only one entity is currently allowed to propose and submit challenges, as only permissioned games are currently allowed.

    Data availability
    External

    Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on EigenDA. The sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. is publishing data to EigenDA v2. Sequencer transaction data roots are not checked against the DACert VerifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. onchain.

    Exit window
    None

    There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.

    Proposer failure
    Cannot withdraw

    Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. on L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development., so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.

    Ronin
    Ronin is not even a
    Stage 0
    project.

    Learn more about Stages
    Please keep in mind that these stages do not reflect project security, this is an opinionated assessment of project maturity based on subjective criteria, created with a goal of incentivizing projects to push toward better decentralization. Each team may have taken different paths to achieve this goal.

    Data is posted to EigenDA

    Transactions roots are posted onchain and the full data is posted on EigenDA. The sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. is publishing data to EigenDA v2. Since the DACert VerifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. is not used, availability of the data is not verified against EigenDA operators, meaning that the Sequencer can single-handedly publish unavailable commitments.

    • Funds can be lost if the sequencer posts an unavailable transaction root (CRITICAL).

    • Funds can be lost if the data is not available on the external provider (CRITICAL).

    1. EigenDA Docs - Overview
    2. Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs
    3. BatchInbox - address
    4. OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function
    A diagram of the state validation
    A diagram of the state validation

    Since 2026-09-07 withdrawals are settled against the PermissionedDisputeGame (game type 1). Only the permissioned proposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block. can create state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. proposals and only the permissioned proposer and challenger can dispute them. The game commits to the op-program v1.3.1 absolute prestate, whose embedded superchain-registry snapshot does not include chain ID 2020, so the fault proof program cannot execute the Ronin state transition and no dispute can be resolved correctly by execution. The Kailua ZK game (game type 1337) remains deployed and registered in the DisputeGameFactory but is not the respected game type, so its proposals are not used for withdrawals.


    State root proposals

    Proposers submit state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the create function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.0 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proofAlso referred to as a fault proof, it is the construction of an assertion that fraud was perpetrated on an optimistic rollup. More concretely, that an invalid state transition took place according to the protocol rules. The submitter of a fraud proof would expect a reward from the optimistic rollup protocol for helping maintain the integrity of the system.. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled. has passed and it is not countered.

    • Funds can be stolen if no whitelisted challenger disputes an invalid state root before the challenge window expires (CRITICAL).

    1. OP stack specification: Fault Dispute Game
    Challenges

    Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 0.00 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the defend or attack functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with full concurrency. Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 3d 12h. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see freeloader claims), an inherited clock with too little time remaining is generally extended by 3h. The extension is 6h when the next claim is immediately before split depth 30, and 1d 3h (the standard extension plus the 1d oracle challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled.) immediately before the last depth. Along a full-depth path, cumulative extensions can therefore add up to 10d 3h. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers’ stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step proverAn entity that generates the cryptographic proof to convince the verifier that the statement is true. In a ZK-Rollup, the prover generates the ZK (validity) proof to submit to the verifier contract. contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks (Spearbit 5.1.3).

    1. Fraud Proof Wars: OPFP
    2. setRespectedGameType(1) - Etherscan
    3. absolutePrestate hash registered in superchain-registry as op-program v1.3.1
    4. op-program v1.3.1 release (commit e3c2f04, 2024-08-23)
    5. superchain-registry snapshot pinned at op-program v1.3.1 build (42bd03ba8313)

    Program Hashes

    Name
    Hash
    Repository
    Verification
    Used in
    0x0385...d54c
    Ronin logoHashKey Chain logoSilent Data logo

    Past upgrades

    The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.

    Count of upgrades
    27
    Last upgrade
    1mo ago
    Avg upgrade interval
    3mo 6d

    Ossification

    Contracts our research team classifies as critical form the project's critical perimeter. Its clock starts at the ossification genesis, and every critical change resets it (changes within 24 hours count as one). The ossification score is the share of recorded code-bug exploits whose exploited code was younger than this perimeter is today. Battle-tested exposure is the value secured, summed over that unchanged period.

    Ossification %
    48since 2026 Sep 21
    TVS & changes (1Y)
    Battle-tested exposure
    $0.00·years
    Critical changes / year
    14across 17 contracts
    Exit window

    Discovery updates

    2026 October 14, 08:17 UTC
    1change

    Ossification review: legacy gateway in the perimeter, RISC Zero router selectors MEDIUM, role holders MEDIUM.

    New and verified contracts

    + Status: CREATED
    contract MultiSigWalletWithDailyLimit (eth:0x2DA02aC5f19Ae362a4121718d990e655eB628D96) [N/A]
    +++ description: None
    2026 October 14, 08:17 UTC
    8changes

    RISC Zero verifier owner Safe: ownership transfer of the five RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStops to an EOA started ( pendingOwner ), and Proposer, Executor and Canceller role grants to the same EOA scheduled on the TimelockController, 3d delay.

    contract TimelockController (eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711) [global/TimelockController] {
    +++ description: A timelock with access control. The current minimum delay is 3d.
    +++ description: since the RiscZeroVerifierRouter does not emit events on verifier changes, we watch the single upstream permissioned address.
    values.callsScheduled.21:
    + {"id":"0xb88d38cc5995760c99a754e1fef6919fc7ee643d4de92b098d916b906b359910","index":0,"target":"eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711","value":0,"data":"0x2f2ff15db09aa5aeb3702cfd50b6b62bc4532604938f21248a27a1d5ca736082b6819cc1000000000000000000000000f616a4f81857cfee54a4a049ec187172574bd412","predecessor":"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","delay":259200}
    +++ description: since the RiscZeroVerifierRouter does not emit events on verifier changes, we watch the single upstream permissioned address.
    values.callsScheduled.22:
    + {"id":"0xb88d38cc5995760c99a754e1fef6919fc7ee643d4de92b098d916b906b359910","index":1,"target":"eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711","value":0,"data":"0x2f2ff15dd8aa0f3194971a2a116679f7c2090f6939c8d4e01a2a8d7e41d55e5351469e63000000000000000000000000f616a4f81857cfee54a4a049ec187172574bd412","predecessor":"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","delay":259200}
    +++ description: since the RiscZeroVerifierRouter does not emit events on verifier changes, we watch the single upstream permissioned address.
    values.callsScheduled.23:
    + {"id":"0xb88d38cc5995760c99a754e1fef6919fc7ee643d4de92b098d916b906b359910","index":2,"target":"eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711","value":0,"data":"0x2f2ff15dfd643c72710c63c0180259aba6b2d05451e3591a24e58b62239378085726f783000000000000000000000000f616a4f81857cfee54a4a049ec187172574bd412","predecessor":"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","delay":259200}
    }
    contract RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop (eth:0x1efDd13f831ceeEa14940806705A53D3211CD698) [risc0/RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop] {
    +++ description: A verifier wrapper for the eth:0xafB31f5b70623CDF4b20Ada3f7230916A5A79df9 that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.
    values.pendingOwner:
    - "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
    + "eth:0xF616A4f81857CFEe54A4A049Ec187172574bd412"
    }
    contract RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop (eth:0x68dC2cB4e61774873971c499D9b239ec5Ac540E3) [risc0/RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop] {
    +++ description: A verifier wrapper for the eth:0x20ff7C2Cf391a5F096A2Cc181cb41916680f8E97 that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.
    values.pendingOwner:
    - "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
    + "eth:0xF616A4f81857CFEe54A4A049Ec187172574bd412"
    }
    contract RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop (eth:0x844D5f01161E3559d36f23d0Aa9E9620949aF782) [risc0/RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop] {
    +++ description: A verifier wrapper for the eth:0x5005aBa3DFf7C940fcc1e48DccCAD611a80eEB85 that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.
    values.pendingOwner:
    - "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
    + "eth:0xF616A4f81857CFEe54A4A049Ec187172574bd412"
    }
    contract RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop (eth:0x9F9994Eb4Cb5200198FEfb470f8b50301662e696) [risc0/RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop] {
    +++ description: A verifier wrapper for the eth:0x2a098988600d87650Fb061FfAff08B97149Fa84D that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.
    values.pendingOwner:
    - "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
    + "eth:0xF616A4f81857CFEe54A4A049Ec187172574bd412"
    }
    contract RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop (eth:0xDa8f3de6fBBdb261Ac771B813a578A7aBdA6B2b1) [risc0/RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop] {
    +++ description: A verifier wrapper for the eth:0x54aCE3ED46529B4d4F3770C8Bad5dDC48717B9bF that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.
    values.pendingOwner:
    - "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
    + "eth:0xF616A4f81857CFEe54A4A049Ec187172574bd412"
    }
    2026 October 09, 08:11 UTC
    3changes

    RISC Zero verifier owner Safe: member rotated, threshold 3/5 → 2/5.

    contract Safe (eth:0x2E5bcc9959dB5F5016F830E47943b07242CB2609) [GnosisSafe] {
    +++ description: None
    values.$members.3:
    - "eth:0xd5D43445d0227a47cA2eACCb9392352746eD9926"
    + "eth:0x9a017883e4A6BB2a6261D92D70f71107F2C39D12"
    values.$threshold:
    - 3
    + 2
    values.multisigThreshold:
    - "3 of 5 (60%)"
    + "2 of 5 (40%)"
    }
    2026 October 02, 12:41 UTC
    Critical code change
    175changes

    Upgrade 19b "Karst" (op-contracts/v7.0.0), executed on 2026-09-21 by RoninConduitOwner via a Conduit-deployed OPContractsManagerV2 (v7.1.17). Absolute prestate unchanged (op-program v1.3.1). Version changes and implementation diffs: - OptimismPortal2 5.2.0 - 5.6.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x97cEbbf8959e2A5476fbe9B98A21806Ec234609B/eth:0xe89F13c5ee4033B2D3cD76C9d6958eFBfe26D3C2 - SystemConfig 3.13.1 - 3.14.2: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xd392c27B84b1cA776528F2704BC67B82a62132d2/eth:0x42Ad0173051225Ac784100e9acD43349707F4db9 - DisputeGameFactory 1.4.0 - 1.6.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xc040F392E52Cb6970CA8E110c280fE24E07C5e2c/eth:0x72B971717E088B59F26d4236BE222ADB6ACD393b - AnchorStateRegistry 3.7.0 - 3.9.0: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x36398155Cd17cfe804F69b233eDDA800DD4D5aA5/eth:0x8F40Cc98D694AB986F026C5383A181FCc9B6B281 - L1StandardBridge 2.8.0 - 2.8.2: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A/eth:0xB37a11AadF167B2F0b8dD85372De4bC66CD4A891 - L1CrossDomainMessenger 2.11.0 - 2.11.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0/eth:0x59D497530b00062f40950ba8EaB88868bf7F86f0 - L1ERC721Bridge 2.9.0 - 2.9.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9/eth:0x9F164f1d02A81e06D639E55F65a87f0070E3Cb2e - OptimismMintableERC20Factory 1.10.2 - 1.11.0: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB/eth:0xaAbEA75Da509fA518Fd8a91Eae4BE5813B829b12 - SuperchainConfig 2.4.0 - 2.4.2: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957/eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550 - PermissionedDisputeGame 2.2.0 - 2.4.0: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x58bf355C5d4EdFc723eF89d99582ECCfd143266A/eth:0xe1dFFCBE4e22B813F26d2106D943C102e7cAb87e - MIPS 1.9.0 - 1.10.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x6463dEE3828677F6270d83d45408044fc5eDB908/eth:0xaCc005DCd857B401e4732E6F7837135A22825cfA - PreimageOracle 1.1.4 - 1.1.5: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x1fb8cdFc6831fc866Ed9C51aF8817Da5c287aDD3/eth:0x1E1d73536A081Ef2F355d29794547a9770Aeb1E0 - DelayedWETH 1.5.0 - 1.5.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x33Dadc2d1aA9BB613A7AE6B28425eA00D44c6998/eth:0xE440CC08A71694C8229323803F59024E3144630e

    contract AnchorStateRegistry (eth:0x0B95fF1d1B113bac3E29Ac0BBF2089126C9aE81A) [opstack/AnchorStateRegistry_post20] {
    +++ description: Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. This variant stores respectedGameType, retirementTimestamp, and disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds locally and drops the legacy *FromGame fields, since the AggregateVerifier model does not expose vm()/weth()/absolutePrestate() on its game implementation.
    template:
    - "opstack/AnchorStateRegistry_post13"
    + "opstack/AnchorStateRegistry_post20"
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0xfdabc8b9b4db9b7aa78227b26e936abaf24f058502b96e8d9a293d49b1e89b47"
    + "0x10f64124093daab87c84d97148854054f9622bf86e09e98d496f123be3368122"
    description:
    - "Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame."
    + "Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. This variant stores respectedGameType, retirementTimestamp, and disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds locally and drops the legacy *FromGame fields, since the AggregateVerifier model does not expose vm()/weth()/absolutePrestate() on its game implementation."
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0x36398155Cd17cfe804F69b233eDDA800DD4D5aA5"
    + "eth:0x8F40Cc98D694AB986F026C5383A181FCc9B6B281"
    values.$pastUpgrades.1:
    + ["2026-09-21T06:51:59.000Z","0x93c0f8357f9f3810aebe40cd46f78bdacb72da718f5c5b6e96c6f2fb5b0a0b34",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.2:
    + ["2026-09-21T06:51:59.000Z","0x93c0f8357f9f3810aebe40cd46f78bdacb72da718f5c5b6e96c6f2fb5b0a0b34",["eth:0x8F40Cc98D694AB986F026C5383A181FCc9B6B281"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 1
    + 3
    values.absolutePrestateFromGame:
    - "0x038512e02c4c3f7bdaec27d00edf55b7155e0905301e1a88083e4e0a6764d54c"
    values.challengePeriodFromOracle:
    - 86400
    values.oracleFromVm:
    - "eth:0x1fb8cdFc6831fc866Ed9C51aF8817Da5c287aDD3"
    values.version:
    - "3.7.0"
    + "3.9.0"
    values.vmFromGame:
    - "eth:0x6463dEE3828677F6270d83d45408044fc5eDB908"
    values.wethFromGame:
    - "eth:0x69Fcd2E75af364295EaF48Dc058338F80CFfb434"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.blacklistedGames:
    + []
    fieldMeta.$admin:
    - {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.disputeGameFactory:
    - {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.systemConfig:
    - {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.blacklistedGames:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    implementationNames.eth:0x36398155Cd17cfe804F69b233eDDA800DD4D5aA5:
    - "AnchorStateRegistry"
    implementationNames.eth:0x8F40Cc98D694AB986F026C5383A181FCc9B6B281:
    + "AnchorStateRegistry"
    usedTypes.0.arg.621:
    + "AggregateVerifier"
    usedTypes.0.arg.8:
    + "FaultDisputeGame"
    }
    - Status: DELETED
    contract PreimageOracle (eth:0x1fb8cdFc6831fc866Ed9C51aF8817Da5c287aDD3) [opstack/PreimageOracle]
    +++ description: The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game.
    contract L1ERC721Bridge (eth:0x3a63087B36Ad5a2fD89C7C8517832dE067Fe4959) [opstack/L1ERC721Bridge] {
    +++ description: Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x1f65fda230b6d0df44e466b06418b2e12a401ef82c07521ad18d2f4ae6c70fb2"
    + "0xc5ed62b03fb7c1340609ace7ebb0c5bf8d43b1814b1ab4f10863bfa21d13b90b"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9"
    + "eth:0x9F164f1d02A81e06D639E55F65a87f0070E3Cb2e"
    values.$pastUpgrades.1:
    + ["2026-09-21T06:51:59.000Z","0x93c0f8357f9f3810aebe40cd46f78bdacb72da718f5c5b6e96c6f2fb5b0a0b34",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.2:
    + ["2026-09-21T06:51:59.000Z","0x93c0f8357f9f3810aebe40cd46f78bdacb72da718f5c5b6e96c6f2fb5b0a0b34",["eth:0x9F164f1d02A81e06D639E55F65a87f0070E3Cb2e"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 1
    + 3
    values.version:
    - "2.9.0"
    + "2.9.1"
    implementationNames.eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9:
    - "L1ERC721Bridge"
    implementationNames.eth:0x9F164f1d02A81e06D639E55F65a87f0070E3Cb2e:
    + "L1ERC721Bridge"
    }
    contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0x45dA2CD511DA5FEAa535eBF166E628314a65843a) [opstack/DisputeGameFactory_v2] {
    +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. This variant exposes per-type reads only; the legacy array views (gameImpls[], initBonds[]) were removed in the new implementation.
    template:
    - "opstack/DisputeGameFactory"
    + "opstack/DisputeGameFactory_v2"
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x8f21dbc160582c568a2a925ddad1b2bb889a9f72bac2067c6e72d43b662ef538"
    + "0x8912e655e26f51d4384fc950df847ae65bccf1f5ec5458642402f385c3dadf78"
    description:
    - "The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them."
    + "The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. This variant exposes per-type reads only; the legacy array views (gameImpls[], initBonds[]) were removed in the new implementation."
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0xc040F392E52Cb6970CA8E110c280fE24E07C5e2c"
    + "eth:0x72B971717E088B59F26d4236BE222ADB6ACD393b"
    values.$pastUpgrades.1:
    + ["2026-09-21T06:51:59.000Z","0x93c0f8357f9f3810aebe40cd46f78bdacb72da718f5c5b6e96c6f2fb5b0a0b34",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.2:
    + ["2026-09-21T06:51:59.000Z","0x93c0f8357f9f3810aebe40cd46f78bdacb72da718f5c5b6e96c6f2fb5b0a0b34",["eth:0x72B971717E088B59F26d4236BE222ADB6ACD393b"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 1
    + 3
    values.game2000:
    - "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
    values.gameImpls:
    - ["eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000","eth:0x58bf355C5d4EdFc723eF89d99582ECCfd143266A","eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000","eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000","eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000","eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000","eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"]
    values.initBonds:
    - [0,0,0,0,0]
    values.permissionedGameArgs:
    - "0x038512e02c4c3f7bdaec27d00edf55b7155e0905301e1a88083e4e0a6764d54c6463dee3828677f6270d83d45408044fc5edb9080b95ff1d1b113bac3e29ac0bbf2089126c9ae81a69fcd2e75af364295eaf48dc058338f80cffb43400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000007e4d379de941e78ab394d4d4917fcce1cc45b6cd6204a4962275df8c60a80d3a25faec5aa7de116a746"
    + "0x038512e02c4c3f7bdaec27d00edf55b7155e0905301e1a88083e4e0a6764d54cacc005dcd857b401e4732e6f7837135a22825cfa0b95ff1d1b113bac3e29ac0bbf2089126c9ae81a2562ae2fb030274e3ceb63fcd32c232ab0fcec6d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000007e4d379de941e78ab394d4d4917fcce1cc45b6cd6204a4962275df8c60a80d3a25faec5aa7de116a746"
    values.version:
    - "1.4.0"
    + "1.6.1"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.wethFromDGF:
    - "eth:0x69Fcd2E75af364295EaF48Dc058338F80CFfb434"
    + "eth:0x2562ae2FB030274E3cEB63fCd32C232ab0FceC6d"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.absolutePrestateFromDGF:
    + "0x038512e02c4c3f7bdaec27d00edf55b7155e0905301e1a88083e4e0a6764d54c"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.anchorStateRegistryFromDGF:
    + "eth:0x0B95fF1d1B113bac3E29Ac0BBF2089126C9aE81A"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.chainIdFromDGF:
    + 2020
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.game0:
    + "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.game1:
    + "eth:0xe1dFFCBE4e22B813F26d2106D943C102e7cAb87e"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.game5:
    + "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.game5AnchorStateRegistry:
    + "UNRESOLVED"
    values.game5Args:
    + "0x"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.game5Proposer:
    + "UNRESOLVED"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.game621:
    + "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.game8:
    + "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.game8AbsolutePrestate:
    + "UNRESOLVED"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.game8AnchorStateRegistry:
    + "UNRESOLVED"
    values.game8Args:
    + "0x"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.game8ChainId:
    + "UNRESOLVED"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.game8Vm:
    + "UNRESOLVED"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.game8Weth:
    + "UNRESOLVED"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.game9:
    + "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.game9AbsolutePrestate:
    + "UNRESOLVED"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.game9AnchorStateRegistry:
    + "UNRESOLVED"
    values.game9Args:
    + "0x"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.game9Vm:
    + "UNRESOLVED"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.game9Weth:
    + "UNRESOLVED"
    values.initBondGame0:
    + 0
    values.initBondGame1:
    + 0
    values.initBondGame5:
    + 0
    values.initBondGame621:
    + 0
    values.initBondGame8:
    + 0
    values.initBondGame9:
    + 0
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.vmFromDGF:
    + "eth:0xaCc005DCd857B401e4732E6F7837135A22825cfA"
    fieldMeta.$admin:
    - {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.owner:
    - {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.gameImpls:
    - {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.game2000:
    - {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.game621:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.game0:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.game1:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.game8:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.game9:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.game5:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.absolutePrestateFromDGF:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.vmFromDGF:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.game8AbsolutePrestate:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.game8Vm:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.game8AnchorStateRegistry:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.game8Weth:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.game8ChainId:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.game9AbsolutePrestate:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.game9Vm:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.game9AnchorStateRegistry:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.game9Weth:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.game5AnchorStateRegistry:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.game5Proposer:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.anchorStateRegistryFromDGF:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.chainIdFromDGF:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    implementationNames.eth:0xc040F392E52Cb6970CA8E110c280fE24E07C5e2c:
    - "DisputeGameFactory"
    implementationNames.eth:0x72B971717E088B59F26d4236BE222ADB6ACD393b:
    + "DisputeGameFactory"
    usedTypes.0:
    + {"typeCaster":"SliceBytes32","arg":{"offset":0}}
    usedTypes.1:
    + {"typeCaster":"SliceAddress","arg":{"offset":32}}
    usedTypes.2:
    + {"typeCaster":"SliceAddress","arg":{"offset":32}}
    usedTypes.3:
    + {"typeCaster":"SliceAddress","arg":{"offset":52}}
    usedTypes.4:
    + {"typeCaster":"SliceAddress","arg":{"offset":72}}
    usedTypes.5:
    + {"typeCaster":"SliceUint256","arg":{"offset":92}}
    usedTypes.6:
    + {"typeCaster":"SliceAddress","arg":{"offset":0}}
    usedTypes.7:
    + {"typeCaster":"SliceAddress","arg":{"offset":20}}
    usedTypes.2:
    - {"typeCaster":"SliceAddress","arg":{"offset":72}}
    }
    contract OptimismMintableERC20Factory (eth:0x51639D151456d0384285C6974e441A5D2B784B7D) [opstack/OptimismMintableERC20Factory] {
    +++ description: A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it's deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain's representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x307d4cb83e682629880fe9bb874a188805e3b93cb11a2cbf80095975f1e5b04e"
    + "0x11b0ed6f15cabf613492a8d54c55304a17cf60f4fd94a655d7e720d4556906d0"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB"
    + "eth:0xaAbEA75Da509fA518Fd8a91Eae4BE5813B829b12"
    values.$pastUpgrades.1:
    + ["2026-09-21T06:51:59.000Z","0x93c0f8357f9f3810aebe40cd46f78bdacb72da718f5c5b6e96c6f2fb5b0a0b34",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.2:
    + ["2026-09-21T06:51:59.000Z","0x93c0f8357f9f3810aebe40cd46f78bdacb72da718f5c5b6e96c6f2fb5b0a0b34",["eth:0xaAbEA75Da509fA518Fd8a91Eae4BE5813B829b12"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 1
    + 3
    values.version:
    - "1.10.2"
    + "1.11.0"
    values.proxyAdmin:
    + "eth:0x757077Ddf12B652430DCE8fF3e4c749F5Ca861fC"
    values.proxyAdminOwner:
    + "eth:0xE9Ad9723C24d946958f9FD3Bc861BbF983525607"
    implementationNames.eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB:
    - "OptimismMintableERC20Factory"
    implementationNames.eth:0xaAbEA75Da509fA518Fd8a91Eae4BE5813B829b12:
    + "OptimismMintableERC20Factory"
    }
    - Status: DELETED
    contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0x58bf355C5d4EdFc723eF89d99582ECCfd143266A) [opstack/PermissionedDisputeGame]
    +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger.
    - Status: DELETED
    contract MIPS (eth:0x6463dEE3828677F6270d83d45408044fc5eDB908) [opstack/MIPS]
    +++ description: The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.
    contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0x652CD53eCf9466E5Fb00D0E11d6CBf6469a56D77) [opstack/OptimismPortal2] {
    +++ description: The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x7883f2d27d696b1fa6259a97c561d651493c2c1324e9646e04dba10adcfd8a21"
    + "0xe1df4caf26d9a0735bd53eeb020546840bd2f2fd4d0d9e2519f873306b5e19b1"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0x97cEbbf8959e2A5476fbe9B98A21806Ec234609B"
    + "eth:0xe89F13c5ee4033B2D3cD76C9d6958eFBfe26D3C2"
    values.$pastUpgrades.1:
    + ["2026-09-21T06:51:59.000Z","0x93c0f8357f9f3810aebe40cd46f78bdacb72da718f5c5b6e96c6f2fb5b0a0b34",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.2:
    + ["2026-09-21T06:51:59.000Z","0x93c0f8357f9f3810aebe40cd46f78bdacb72da718f5c5b6e96c6f2fb5b0a0b34",["eth:0xe89F13c5ee4033B2D3cD76C9d6958eFBfe26D3C2"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 1
    + 3
    values.version:
    - "5.2.0"
    + "5.6.1"
    implementationNames.eth:0x97cEbbf8959e2A5476fbe9B98A21806Ec234609B:
    - "OptimismPortal2"
    implementationNames.eth:0xe89F13c5ee4033B2D3cD76C9d6958eFBfe26D3C2:
    + "OptimismPortal2"
    }
    - Status: DELETED
    contract DelayedWETH (eth:0x69Fcd2E75af364295EaF48Dc058338F80CFfb434) [opstack/DelayedWETH]
    +++ description: Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.
    contract AddressManager (eth:0x6FFbcf498CcF81111f397fa6065dEA13A47E573C) [opstack/AddressManager] {
    +++ description: Legacy contract used to manage a mapping of string names to addresses. Modern OP stack uses a different standard proxy system instead, but this contract is still necessary for backwards compatibility with several older contracts.
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.OVM_L1CrossDomainMessenger:
    - "eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0"
    + "eth:0x59D497530b00062f40950ba8EaB88868bf7F86f0"
    }
    contract ProxyAdmin (eth:0x757077Ddf12B652430DCE8fF3e4c749F5Ca861fC) [global/ProxyAdmin] {
    +++ description: None
    directlyReceivedPermissions.2:
    + {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x2562ae2FB030274E3cEB63fCd32C232ab0FceC6d","role":"admin"}
    directlyReceivedPermissions.6:
    - {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x69Fcd2E75af364295EaF48Dc058338F80CFfb434","role":"admin"}
    }
    contract L1StandardBridge (eth:0x85Ce2Ccef125aa8d018c298d5eA0f2FB5E5063c1) [opstack/L1StandardBridge] {
    +++ description: The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0xcacd38e7b52353ad3463da40b7e7a29b028f95500a82590d2b8f8ffd26b83f6d"
    + "0x6469155800e1489607c8fa062550a362dfa8978885df4714ca4653e5f3d25b0c"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A"
    + "eth:0xB37a11AadF167B2F0b8dD85372De4bC66CD4A891"
    values.version:
    - "2.8.0"
    + "2.8.2"
    implementationNames.eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A:
    - "L1StandardBridge"
    implementationNames.eth:0xB37a11AadF167B2F0b8dD85372De4bC66CD4A891:
    + "L1StandardBridge"
    }
    contract SystemConfig (eth:0xc4f4F908C36C8119f1FBd52CebbDB30C6f2a23C1) [opstack/SystemConfig] {
    +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x703fe68eeb3d5454a8ef012933846f1ff1433fc2df39c0c94f2a550d8325f085"
    + "0x3d8e7cdbbdbf274bba0a11a060b01d5a50e3a478683af9ec079874d1758576d6"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0xd392c27B84b1cA776528F2704BC67B82a62132d2"
    + "eth:0x42Ad0173051225Ac784100e9acD43349707F4db9"
    values.$pastUpgrades.1:
    + ["2026-09-21T06:51:59.000Z","0x93c0f8357f9f3810aebe40cd46f78bdacb72da718f5c5b6e96c6f2fb5b0a0b34",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.2:
    + ["2026-09-21T06:51:59.000Z","0x93c0f8357f9f3810aebe40cd46f78bdacb72da718f5c5b6e96c6f2fb5b0a0b34",["eth:0x42Ad0173051225Ac784100e9acD43349707F4db9"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 1
    + 3
    values.delayedWETH:
    - "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
    + "eth:0x2562ae2FB030274E3cEB63fCd32C232ab0FceC6d"
    values.getAddresses.delayedWETH:
    - "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
    + "eth:0x2562ae2FB030274E3cEB63fCd32C232ab0FceC6d"
    values.getAddresses.opcm:
    + "eth:0x0D5058007D566E60b5473c63A4d43e87F31f348c"
    values.version:
    - "3.13.1"
    + "3.14.2"
    values.lastUsedOPCM:
    + "eth:0x0D5058007D566E60b5473c63A4d43e87F31f348c"
    values.lastUsedOPCMVersion:
    + "7.1.17"
    values.OPCM_SLOT:
    + "0x99f45962df4bc30de8d4c3c6d1ffc0f100edce16e80c7a5768b6d55ca463ff42"
    implementationNames.eth:0xd392c27B84b1cA776528F2704BC67B82a62132d2:
    - "SystemConfig"
    implementationNames.eth:0x42Ad0173051225Ac784100e9acD43349707F4db9:
    + "SystemConfig"
    }
    contract RoninConduitOwner (eth:0xE9Ad9723C24d946958f9FD3Bc861BbF983525607) [GnosisSafe] {
    +++ description: 5-of-6 joint Ronin/Conduit Safe.
    receivedPermissions.5:
    + {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x2562ae2FB030274E3cEB63fCd32C232ab0FceC6d","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x757077Ddf12B652430DCE8fF3e4c749F5Ca861fC"}]}
    receivedPermissions.9:
    - {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x69Fcd2E75af364295EaF48Dc058338F80CFfb434","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x757077Ddf12B652430DCE8fF3e4c749F5Ca861fC"}]}
    }
    contract SuperchainConfig (eth:0xEE552e802A50d855bD08E93dfcc69228FC7B9E2c) [opstack/SuperchainConfigFake_expiry] {
    +++ description: This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3mo 1d if left untouched.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x5fb525d1572fb90d060d122143b915059cbff39e0298b345857fd4267d7f6b28"
    + "0x2cd597b7305a446a1df355e6909cbd75fe38aa045faf4876a8e5496eebc1734f"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957"
    + "eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550"
    values.$pastUpgrades.3:
    + ["2026-09-21T06:51:59.000Z","0x93c0f8357f9f3810aebe40cd46f78bdacb72da718f5c5b6e96c6f2fb5b0a0b34",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.4:
    + ["2026-09-21T06:51:59.000Z","0x93c0f8357f9f3810aebe40cd46f78bdacb72da718f5c5b6e96c6f2fb5b0a0b34",["eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 3
    + 5
    values.version:
    - "2.4.0"
    + "2.4.2"
    implementationNames.eth:0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957:
    - "SuperchainConfig"
    implementationNames.eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550:
    + "SuperchainConfig"
    }
    contract L1CrossDomainMessenger (eth:0xF9aD628d9F907ad5d46Ab80100dacDf09EAc9A8e) [opstack/L1CrossDomainMessenger] {
    +++ description: Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x1f2c13ad1144ce6548e578b834c33b0d65b1564aeb0d5c708ed4e7fb50535cc6"
    + "0x694050f95b40e6d92ee91ca0f60acb9c4a74d1b0325c33fd4bd7445fde90e806"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0"
    + "eth:0x59D497530b00062f40950ba8EaB88868bf7F86f0"
    values.$pastUpgrades.1:
    + ["2026-09-21T06:51:59.000Z","0x93c0f8357f9f3810aebe40cd46f78bdacb72da718f5c5b6e96c6f2fb5b0a0b34",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.2:
    + ["2026-09-21T06:51:59.000Z","0x93c0f8357f9f3810aebe40cd46f78bdacb72da718f5c5b6e96c6f2fb5b0a0b34",["eth:0x59D497530b00062f40950ba8EaB88868bf7F86f0"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 1
    + 3
    values.version:
    - "2.11.0"
    + "2.11.1"
    implementationNames.eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0:
    - "L1CrossDomainMessenger"
    implementationNames.eth:0x59D497530b00062f40950ba8EaB88868bf7F86f0:
    + "L1CrossDomainMessenger"
    }
    + Status: CREATED
    contract PreimageOracle (eth:0x1E1d73536A081Ef2F355d29794547a9770Aeb1E0) [opstack/PreimageOracle]
    +++ description: The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract DelayedWETH (eth:0x2562ae2FB030274E3cEB63fCd32C232ab0FceC6d) [opstack/DelayedWETH]
    +++ description: Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract MIPS (eth:0xaCc005DCd857B401e4732E6F7837135A22825cfA) [opstack/MIPS]
    +++ description: The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0xe1dFFCBE4e22B813F26d2106D943C102e7cAb87e) [opstack/PermissionedDisputeGame]
    +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger.
    2026 September 10, 22:02 UTC
    Critical state change
    6changes

    respectedGameType switched from 1337 (KailuaGame) to 1 (PermissionedDisputeGame) on the AnchorStateRegistry and OptimismPortal2. No implementation change, no game retirement or blacklist. Withdrawals now settle against permissioned proposals. The type-1 prestate is op-program v1.3.1 ( 0x038512e0… ), which cannot execute for chain 2020.

    contract AnchorStateRegistry (eth:0x0B95fF1d1B113bac3E29Ac0BBF2089126C9aE81A) [opstack/AnchorStateRegistry_post13] {
    +++ description: Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame.
    description:
    - "Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the KailuaGame."
    + "Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame."
    values.RespectedGameString:
    - "KailuaGame"
    + "PermissionedDisputeGame"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.respectedGameType:
    - 1337
    + 1
    }
    contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0x652CD53eCf9466E5Fb00D0E11d6CBf6469a56D77) [opstack/OptimismPortal2] {
    +++ description: The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame.
    description:
    - "The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the KailuaGame."
    + "The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame."
    values.RespectedGameString:
    - "KailuaGame"
    + "PermissionedDisputeGame"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.respectedGameType:
    - 1337
    + 1
    }

    The system has a centralized operator

    The operatorAn operator is the entity charged with managing a rollup and progressing its state. A rollup operator can be a centralized sequencer, proposer, prover, challenger, pauser of admin that is able to perform upgrades. is the only entity that can propose blocksAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over.. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.

    • MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

    Users can force any transaction

    Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.

    1. Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs
    2. OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function

    Regular exits

    The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlementThe mechanism with which the execution of rollup blocks and the resultant state is verified and possible disputes are resolved. In the context of rollups or other modular blockchains, it often refers to the proof system used--validity (ZK) or fraud proofs, or a combination thereof. Sometimes it will refer to this mechanism along with where the mechanism's outputs are ultimately published and verified, as in Ethereum being a settlement layer by verifying the proofs and allowing for withdrawals., but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled. of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.

    1. OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function
    2. OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function

    Forced messaging

    If the user experiences censorship from the operatorAn operator is the entity charged with managing a rollup and progressing its state. A rollup operator can be a centralized sequencer, proposer, prover, challenger, pauser of admin that is able to perform upgrades. with regular L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups.->L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.

    1. Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain

    EVM compatible smart contracts are supported

    OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM EquivalenceA perfect degree of compatibility; where one system or concept is indistinguishable from another in the domain being compared. In the context of rollups, it generally refers to the proximity to the EVM and to Ethereum architecture. model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. can be deployed on L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups..

    1. Introducing EVM Equivalence

    External bridge architecture

    The May 2026 L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. migration deployed the OP Stack canonical bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. (OptimismPortal2 and L1StandardBridge) but did not migrate user funds into it; it is currently empty. User assets are custodied on two separate L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. paths, neither of which is the canonical bridge analyzed on this page: (1) Chainlink CCIP TokenPools, the active bridge since April 2025, securing 12 tokens including AXS, USDC, WETH, WBTC (new contract), YGG, PIXEL and SLP via Chainlink DON attestations and the Risk Management NetworkA constellation of nodes (peers) that communicate via a peer-to-peer protocol, for example, in propagating transactions and blocks to other nodes.; (2) the legacy MainchainGateway, deprecated in April 2025 but still holding residual balances (legacy WBTC, ETH backing of legacy WETH, dust), withdrawable through the Ronin BridgeOperator stake-weighted multisig. Sky Mavis has not announced a plan to migrate liquidity into the OP Stack bridge.

    1. MainchainGateway - Etherscan
    2. Ronin Bridge to Chainlink CCIP migration - Ronin Blog
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    Ethereum

    Actors:

    RoninConduitOwner0xE9Ad…5607

    A Multisig with 5/6 threshold. 5-of-6 joint Ronin/Conduit Safe.

    • Can upgrade with no delay
      • AnchorStateRegistry
      • DelayedWETH
      • L1ERC721Bridge
      • DisputeGameFactory
      • OptimismMintableERC20Factory
      • OptimismPortal2
      • KailuaVerifier
      • L1StandardBridge
      • SystemConfig
      • SuperchainConfig
      • L1CrossDomainMessenger
    • Can interact with DisputeGameFactory
      • set the dispute game implementation and initial bond for any game type
    • Can interact with AddressManager
      • set and change address mappings
    • Can interact with SystemConfig
      • it can update the preconfer address, the batch submitter (SequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs.) address and the gasA virtual fuel used to execute smart contracts on a rollup. The EVM (or other VM within the rollup) uses an accounting mechanism to correspond the consumption of gas to the consumption of computing resources, and to limit the consumption of computing resources. configuration of the system
    • Can interact with SuperchainConfig
      • Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof systemThe infrastructure that allows projects to verify their state transitions. It is composed by onchain verifiers and offchain provers. The main two flavors are optimistic and ZK proof systems, but they can be combined in a hybrid model. In general though, if a system is able to accept state roots optimistically, even if it has a ZK component, it is considered an optimistic proof system., the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionlessAnyone willing should be able to join and leave the network at any time, without causing significant disturbance to the network or being detrimental to the party in question. No single entity should have the power to allowlist or blocklist participants.)
    Conduit Multisig 10x4a49…A746

    A Multisig with 4/11 threshold.

    • Can interact with DisputeGameFactory
      • Allowed to challenge or delete state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. proposed by a ProposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block.
    Used in:
    MainchainBridgeManager0x2Cf3…FaDB

    Governance and proxy-admin contract for the legacy MainchainGateway bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge.. Holds the operatorAn operator is the entity charged with managing a rollup and progressing its state. A rollup operator can be a centralized sequencer, proposer, prover, challenger, pauser of admin that is able to perform upgrades./governor set, tallies stake-weighted votes for bridge proposals (operator rotations, threshold changes, withdrawals).

    • Can upgrade with no delay
      • MainchainGateway

    A Multisig with 2/5 threshold.

    • Can interact with TimelockController
      • cancel queued transactions
      • execute transactions that are ready
      • manage all access control roles with 3d delay
      • propose transactions
    • Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop
      • pause the verifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover.
    • Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop
    • Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop
    • Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierRouter
      • add/remove verifiers and the selectors they are mapped to with 3d delay
    • Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop
    • Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop
    Used in:
    LegacyBridgeOwner0x51F6…b26e

    A Multisig with 3/5 threshold.

    • Can upgrade with no delay
      • MainchainBridgeManager
    • Can interact with SystemConfig
      • Allowed to commit transactions from the current layer to the host chain
    • Can interact with DisputeGameFactory
      • Allowed to post new state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. of the current layer to the host chain
    • Can interact with KailuaTreasury
      • propose new state roots before anyone else, giving a first-mover advantage on the optimistic clock
    • Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop
      • pause the verifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover.
    Used in:
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    Note: Contracts presented in this section had their implementations updated since the last time our team looked at this project. The information presented may be inaccurate.

    Ethereum

    RiscZeroGroth16Verifier0x20ff…8E97

    VerifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. contract for RISC Zero Groth16A zk-SNARK proving system introduced by Groth in 2016 that proves arithmetic circuits and requires a separate trusted setup for each circuit. It allows extremely efficient proof verification. proofs (version 2.0.0-rc.3).

    Implementation used in:
    RiscZeroGroth16Verifier0x2a09…a84D

    VerifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. contract for RISC Zero Groth16A zk-SNARK proving system introduced by Groth in 2016 that proves arithmetic circuits and requires a separate trusted setup for each circuit. It allows extremely efficient proof verification. proofs (version 3.0.0).

    Implementation used in:

    The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. and eventually challenge them. This variant exposes per-type reads only; the legacy array views (gameImpls[], initBonds[]) were removed in the new implementation.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately RoninConduitOwner
      • challengerFromDGF: Conduit Multisig 1
      • owner: RoninConduitOwner
      • proposerFromDGF: EOA 2
    Implementation used in:
    RiscZeroGroth16Verifier0x54aC…B9bF

    VerifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. contract for RISC Zero Groth16A zk-SNARK proving system introduced by Groth in 2016 that proves arithmetic circuits and requires a separate trusted setup for each circuit. It allows extremely efficient proof verification. proofs (version 2.0.3).

    Implementation used in:

    The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. to L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups.. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately RoninConduitOwner
    The following tokens are included in the value secured calculation:
    ETH token logo
    Implementation used in:
    RiscZeroGroth16Verifier0xafB3…9df9

    VerifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. contract for RISC Zero Groth16A zk-SNARK proving system introduced by Groth in 2016 that proves arithmetic circuits and requires a separate trusted setup for each circuit. It allows extremely efficient proof verification. proofs (version 2.2.0).

    Implementation used in:

    Contains configuration parameters such as the SequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. address, gas limitThe maximum amount of gas a transaction or block may consume. on this chain and the unsafe blockAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over. signer address.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately RoninConduitOwner
      • batcherHash: EOA 1
      • owner: RoninConduitOwner
    Implementation used in:
    RiscZeroGroth16Verifier0xf70a…E93C

    VerifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. contract for RISC Zero Groth16A zk-SNARK proving system introduced by Groth in 2016 that proves arithmetic circuits and requires a separate trusted setup for each circuit. It allows extremely efficient proof verification. proofs. This older implementation exposes control-root and selector constants but does not expose a VERSION getter.

    Implementation used in:

    This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3mo 1d if left untouched.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately RoninConduitOwner
      • guardian: RoninConduitOwner
    Implementation used in:

    Used to bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately RoninConduitOwner
    Implementation used in:

    The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately RoninConduitOwner

    All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation.

    Implementation used in:

    Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain’s epoch gas limitThe maximum amount of gas a transaction or block may consume., it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately RoninConduitOwner
    Implementation used in:

    Contains the latest confirmed state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. This variant stores respectedGameType, retirementTimestamp, and disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds locally and drops the legacy *FromGame fields, since the AggregateVerifier model does not expose vm()/weth()/absolutePrestate() on its game implementation.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately RoninConduitOwner
    Implementation used in:
    PreimageOracle0x1E1d…b1E0

    The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. for a dispute game.

    Implementation used in:

    Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately RoninConduitOwner
    Implementation used in:
    KailuaGame0x296e…9444

    Implementation of the KailuaGame with type 1337. Based on this implementation, new KailuaGames are created with every new state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. proposal.

    MultiSigWalletWithDailyLimit0x2DA0…8D96
    RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop0x44c2…33e7

    A verifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. wrapper for the RiscZeroGroth16Verifier that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.

    • Roles:
      • owner: EOA 3
    Implementation used in:
    RiscZeroSetVerifier0x5005…EB85

    Set verifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. contract for RISC Zero proofs (version 0.9.0). It allows verifying a whole set of proofs identified with a Merkle root at once, afterwards each individual proof could be efficiently verified just by checking Merkle inclusion against the verified root.

    Implementation used in:
    ProxyAdmin
    2 instances
    0x502e…2E340x7570…61fC
    • Roles:
      • owner: RoninConduitOwner

    A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the networkA constellation of nodes (peers) that communicate via a peer-to-peer protocol, for example, in propagating transactions and blocks to other nodes. it’s deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain’s representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately RoninConduitOwner
    Implementation used in:

    Legacy multi-sig-secured Ronin bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. contract holding the L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. side of deposits made before the April 2025 Chainlink CCIP migration. Still custodies residual user balances (ETH backing legacy WETH on Ronin, the deprecated WBTC contract, and dust). Withdrawals authorised by the Ronin BridgeOperator stake-weighted threshold via MainchainBridgeManager.

    • Roles:
      • admin: MainchainBridgeManager

    All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation.

    Proxy in front of the Kailua proof verifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover.; routes verification requests to the canonical RiscZeroVerifierRouter and asserts the chain-specific rollupA blockchain that inherits consensus and data availability from another blockchain called L1. Rollups enable trust minimized bridges with the base layer via proof systems, either optimistic or zero-knowledge. A rollup without a bridge, or without considering the bridge, is called a sovereign rollup. config and FPVM image ID.

    • Roles:
      • admin: RoninConduitOwner
    RiscZeroVerifierRouter0x8EaB…D319

    A router proxy that routes to verifiers based on selectors. The mapping can be changed by a permissioned owner (TimelockController).

    • Roles:
      • owner: TimelockController; ultimately Safe
    Implementation used in:

    The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.

    Implementation used in:
    Wrapped Ether Token0xC02a…6Cc2
    Implementation used in:
    KailuaTreasury0xc7Ea…b336

    Kailua (RISC Zero ZK fault-proof) treasury: holds participation bonds, mints KailuaGame clones, and defines the vanguard proposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block. economics. Bonds confiscated from eliminated proposers are split 1/3 to the proverAn entity that generates the cryptographic proof to convince the verifier that the statement is true. In a ZK-Rollup, the prover generates the ZK (validity) proof to submit to the verifier contract., 1/3 to the tournament winner, 1/3 burned.

    • Roles:
      • vanguard: EOA 2
    PermissionedDisputeGame0xe1dF…b87e

    Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block. and challenger.

    Implementation used in:
    PauseEnforcer0xF184…6062

    Immutable emergency-pause contract for the legacy MainchainGateway. Holders of the SENTRY_ROLE can flip MainchainGateway into a paused state to halt deposits and withdrawals in an emergency.

    There are impactful changes to the following contracts, and part of the information might be outdated.
    TimelockController0x0b14…b711

    A timelock with access control. The current minimum delay is 3d.

    • Roles:
      • canceller: Safe
      • defaultAdmin: TimelockController; ultimately Safe
      • executor: Safe
      • proposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block.: Safe
    Implementation used in:
    RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop0x1efD…D698

    A verifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. wrapper for the RiscZeroGroth16Verifier that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.

    • Roles:
      • owner: Safe
    Implementation used in:
    RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop0x68dC…40E3

    A verifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. wrapper for the RiscZeroGroth16Verifier that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.

    • Roles:
      • owner: Safe
    Implementation used in:
    RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop0x844D…F782

    A verifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. wrapper for the RiscZeroSetVerifier that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.

    • Roles:
      • owner: Safe
    Implementation used in:
    RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop0x9F99…e696

    A verifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. wrapper for the RiscZeroGroth16Verifier that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.

    • Roles:
      • owner: Safe
    Implementation used in:
    RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop0xDa8f…B2b1

    A verifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. wrapper for the RiscZeroGroth16Verifier that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.

    • Roles:
      • owner: Safe
    Implementation used in:

    The current deployment carries some associated risks:

    • Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).

    Program Hashes

    Name
    Hash
    Repository
    Verification
    Used in
    0x0385...d54c
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