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Kinto
There are impactful changes and part of the information might be outdated.
Kinto shut down on September 30, 2025. Remaining assets were removed from the bridges and are redistributed through onchain smart contracts and the Kinto CVR frontend.
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About
Kinto is an Orbit stack L2 with account abstraction and KYC enabled for all users, supporting both modern financial institutions and decentralized protocols.
- Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors.
- Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs provide less than 30d to exit.
- The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs.
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About
Kinto is an Orbit stack L2 with account abstraction and KYC enabled for all users, supporting both modern financial institutions and decentralized protocols.
The section shows the operating costs that L2s pay to Ethereum.
This section shows how much data the project publishes to its data-availability (DA) layer over time. The project currently posts data to
Ethereum.
This section shows how "live" the project's operators are by displaying how frequently they submit transactions of the selected type. It also highlights anomalies - significant deviations from their typical schedule.
Appchain Stage 1
2025 Mar 27th
Users can exit the L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. in case of unwanted upgrades by actors other than the Security CouncilA Security Council is a sufficiently decentralized set of members that is able to upgrade a system. A properly set up Security Council consists of at least 8 members with a threshold greater than 75%. What 'sufficiently decentralized' means is fundamentally subjective and L2BEAT evaluates each case individually. A Security Council is allowed to instantly upgrade Stage 1 rollups..
Security Council Governance
2024 Nov 3rd
Kinto gives the ownership of all L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. system contracts to a Security CouncilA Security Council is a sufficiently decentralized set of members that is able to upgrade a system. A properly set up Security Council consists of at least 8 members with a threshold greater than 75%. What 'sufficiently decentralized' means is fundamentally subjective and L2BEAT evaluates each case individually. A Security Council is allowed to instantly upgrade Stage 1 rollups. that is properly set up.
Funds can be stolen if
Funds can be lost if
Users can be censored if
MEV can be extracted if
In the event of a sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project’s chain by sending them to L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development.. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.
Fraud proofs allow 9 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. At least 5 Challengers are external to the OperatorAn operator is the entity charged with managing a rollup and progressing its state. A rollup operator can be a centralized sequencer, proposer, prover, challenger, pauser of admin that is able to perform upgrades.. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. There is a 6d 8h challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled..
All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development..
There is no exit windowThe amount of time that users have to exit a system before an unwanted upgrade. It takes into account upgrade delays, forced transaction delays and other time factors. To be considered Stage 1, a rollup needs to have an exit window of at least 7d if upgrades are initiated by a permissioned actor less decentralized than a Security Council. For Stage 2, a rollup needs at least 30d in all cases outside of onchain provable bugs. for users to exit in case of unwanted upgrades of the L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. as they are initiated by the Security CouncilA Security Council is a sufficiently decentralized set of members that is able to upgrade a system. A properly set up Security Council consists of at least 8 members with a threshold greater than 75%. What 'sufficiently decentralized' means is fundamentally subjective and L2BEAT evaluates each case individually. A Security Council is allowed to instantly upgrade Stage 1 rollups. with instant upgrade power and without proper notice. Upgrades initiated by actors other than the Security Council (e.g. KYC providers) on Layer 2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. guarantee at least a 7d exit window to the user.
Anyone can become a ProposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block. after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.
Rollup operators cannot compromise the system, but being application-specific might bring additional risk.
Kinto enforces the use of smart wallets and KYC. A valid state transition in Kinto disallows all transactions by EOAs and new contracts creation, unless specifically whitelisted. This setup effectively enforces smart wallet use because the auxiliary contracts of the standard KintoWallet smart wallet (like the EntryPoint and the KintoWalletFactory) are whitelisted. The KYC validation is part of the KintoWallet signature verification. Since all users must use the same implementation of this smart wallet, all user transactions on Kinto check for an up-to-date KYC flag, and are dropped in case the check fails. The system ensures that KYC can be revoked only if the Security Council proactively agrees to a proposed status change by a KYC provider. The Security Council has been historically following KYC provider decisions and it is explicitly tasked to do so. The KintoWallet implementation supports different signer thresholds with a maximum of 4 signers. The first signer for each users smart wallet though is enforced to be held by Turnkey in a TEE. Users can make transactions using this first signer only through Kinto's frontend. Authenticated by a passkey, the Turnkey TEE then signs the transaction for them and submits it to the L2. The user can still choose to not trust Turnkey by adding 2 EOA signers to their wallet and setting their signer policy to 2/3 during wallet creation. Contracts outside of the ones necessary to interact with the smart wallet and to withdraw the gas token are out of scope for the stage assessment and might present additional risks.
All data required for proofs is published on chain
All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobsThe data that a rollup publishes to its L1/data availability (DA) layer. They consist of the L2 transactions that are rolled up, along with some metadata. Blobs are introduced as a new transaction type within Ethereum with EIP-4844, and has rollup scaling specifically in mind. Blobs persist on Ethereum’s Beacon Chain ephemerally. or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.
- Sequencing followed by deterministic execution - Arbitrum documentation
- SequencerInbox.sol - source code, addSequencerL2BatchFromOrigin function
Ethereum
Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by a set of whitelisted validatorsIn the context of L2s, a Validator is an actor that validates the correctness of state transitions. For optimistic rollups this corresponds to challengers, and for ZK rollups this corresponds to the onchain verifier. If a state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. passes the challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled., it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.
Whitelisted validatorsIn the context of L2s, a Validator is an actor that validates the correctness of state transitions. For optimistic rollups this corresponds to challengers, and for ZK rollups this corresponds to the onchain verifier propose state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. as children of a previous state root. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. This structure forms a graph, and therefore, in the contracts, state roots are referred to as nodes. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.1 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proofAlso referred to as a fault proof, it is the construction of an assertion that fraud was perpetrated on an optimistic rollup. More concretely, that an invalid state transition took place according to the protocol rules. The submitter of a fraud proof would expect a reward from the optimistic rollup protocol for helping maintain the integrity of the system.. Stakes can be moved from one nodeA software client that participates in the network. to one of its children, either by calling stakeOnExistingNode or stakeOnNewNode. New nodes cannot be created faster than the minimum assertion period by the same validator, currently set to 15m. The oldest unconfirmed node can be confirmed if the challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled. has passed and there are no siblings, and rejected if the parent is not a confirmed node or if the challenge period has passed and no one is staked on it.
Funds can be stolen if none of the whitelisted verifiers checks the published state. Fraud proofs assume at least one honest and able validator (CRITICAL).
A challenge can be started between two siblings, i.e. two different state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. that share the same parent, by calling the startChallenge function. ValidatorsIn the context of L2s, a Validator is an actor that validates the correctness of state transitions. For optimistic rollups this corresponds to challengers, and for ZK rollups this corresponds to the onchain verifier cannot be in more than one challenge at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with partial concurrency. Since each challenge lasts 6d 8h, this implies that the protocol can be subject to delay attacks, where a malicious actor can delay withdrawals as long as they are willing to pay the cost of losing their stakes. If the protocol is delayed attacked, the new stake requirement increases exponentially for each challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled. of delay. Challenges are played via a bisection game, where asserter and challenger play together to find the first instruction of disagreement. Such instruction is then executed onchain in the WASM OneStepProver contract to determine the winner, who then gets half of the stake of the loser. As said before, a state root is rejected only when no one left is staked on it. The protocol does not enforces valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claim and then provide incorrect midpoints.
Program Hashes
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0x58a9...675c | Code unknown | None | | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
All critical system smart contracts are upgradeable (can be arbitrarily changed). This permission is held by the 6/8 Kinto Security CouncilA Security Council is a sufficiently decentralized set of members that is able to upgrade a system. A properly set up Security Council consists of at least 8 members with a threshold greater than 75%. What 'sufficiently decentralized' means is fundamentally subjective and L2BEAT evaluates each case individually. A Security Council is allowed to instantly upgrade Stage 1 rollups. on Layer 1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. and can be executed without any delay. On the Kinto Layer 2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups., critical permissions are mostly guarded by an AccessManager contract, and then passed down with configurable delays to both the Security Council and the 2/4 Kinto Multisig 2.
The Appchain designation of Kinto is mainly due to a modified L2 nodeA software client that participates in the network., which queries a special censoring contract on L2 (called KintoAppRegistry) for a whitelist to filter transactions. This makes the KintoAppRegistry contract a critical system contract and any change to its configuration equivalent to an upgrade of the Layer 2 system. The KintoAppRegistry contract is also governed via the AccessManager by the Security Council or the Kinto Multisig 2 with a 12d delay.
Another critical contract on the Appchain is called KintoID. Permissioned actors with the ‘KYC provider’ role in the KintoID contract can ‘sanction’ (freeze) user smart wallets, preventing them from transacting. To protect users from this role which is mostly held by EOAs, a sanction expires if not confirmed by the Security Council within 3d. An expired sanction guarantees the user a 9d cooldown window during which they cannot be sanctioned again.
The canonical (enforced) smartwallet for users on Kinto can be upgraded via the KintoWalletFactory, using the same path via the AccessManager. Additionally, each smart wallet must use a recoverer address custodied by Turnkey. This allows users to reset the wallet signers via their email in case they lose their passkey. It also necessitates a recovery delay to prevent turnkey from maliciously using their recoverer permission. During this period of 12d, the user can cancel the recovery process with any transaction in their smart wallet.
The permissioned sanctions logic by KYC providers necessitates at least an 12d delay on all upgrades that aren’t executed by the Security Council, allowing the user at least 7d to exit.
Past upgrades
The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.
2025 September 03, 11:21 UTC3changesms signer change.
ms signer change.
| contract Kinto Multisig (eth:0xf152Abda9E4ce8b134eF22Dc3C6aCe19C4895D82) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| values.$members.0: | |
| - | "eth:0x5D973Ea995d14799E528B14472346bfDE21eAe2e" |
| values.$threshold: | |
| - | 3 |
| + | 2 |
| values.multisigThreshold: | |
| - | "3 of 4 (75%)" |
| + | "2 of 3 (67%)" |
| } | |
2025 August 19, 08:24 UTCHigh severity2changesRemoved one KYC provider. There are now 6, down from 7.
Removed one KYC provider. There are now 6, down from 7.
| contract KintoID (0xf369f78E3A0492CC4e96a90dae0728A38498e9c7) { | |
| +++ description: Manages Kinto's KYC system: The KYC_PROVIDER roles responsible for managing the KYC status and KYC metadata of user wallets. Each KintoWallet checks the KYC status of its user in this contract as part of the signature check. | |
| values.accessControl.KYC_PROVIDER_ROLE.members.0: | |
| - | "kinto:0x52F09693c9eEaA93A64BA697e3d3e43a1eB65477" |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.KYC_PROVIDERs.0: | |
| - | "kinto:0x52F09693c9eEaA93A64BA697e3d3e43a1eB65477" |
| } | |
2025 July 25, 13:26 UTC14changesKinto has added SC members to the validator list to satisfy the new stage 1 requirement.
Kinto has added SC members to the validator list to satisfy the new stage 1 requirement.
| EOA KintoFoundation (0x08E674c4538caE03B6c05405881dDCd95DcaF5a8) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| receivedPermissions: | |
| + | [{"permission":"validate","from":"eth:0x5073dA9cA4810f3E0aA01c20c7d9d02C3f522e11","description":"Can propose new state roots (called nodes) and challenge state roots on the host chain.","role":".validators"}] |
| } | |
| EOA (0x4a3BB34aDE10127752015A6aF6136da15fde636A) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| receivedPermissions: | |
| + | [{"permission":"validate","from":"eth:0x5073dA9cA4810f3E0aA01c20c7d9d02C3f522e11","description":"Can propose new state roots (called nodes) and challenge state roots on the host chain.","role":".validators","via":[{"address":"eth:0xD98B32e5D0Dcb5853e498225a15447a59b7a40e1"}]}] |
| } | |
| contract RollupProxy (0x5073dA9cA4810f3E0aA01c20c7d9d02C3f522e11) { | |
| +++ description: Central contract for the project's configuration like its execution logic hash (`wasmModuleRoot`) and addresses of the other system contracts. Entry point for Proposers creating new Rollup Nodes (state commitments) and Challengers submitting fraud proofs (In the Orbit stack, these two roles are both held by the Validators). | |
| +++ description: Increments on each Validator change. | |
| values.setValidatorCount: | |
| - | 4 |
| + | 5 |
| values.validators.0: | |
| + | "eth:0x08E674c4538caE03B6c05405881dDCd95DcaF5a8" |
| values.validators.3: | |
| + | "eth:0x5FB5040dfC5B8b9Ea40dFBd881188Ec85cDC0621" |
| values.validators.6: | |
| + | "eth:0x94561e98DD5E55271f91A103e4979aa6C493745E" |
| values.validators.7: | |
| + | "eth:0xD98B32e5D0Dcb5853e498225a15447a59b7a40e1" |
| } | |
| EOA Certora 1 (0x5FB5040dfC5B8b9Ea40dFBd881188Ec85cDC0621) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| receivedPermissions: | |
| + | [{"permission":"validate","from":"eth:0x5073dA9cA4810f3E0aA01c20c7d9d02C3f522e11","description":"Can propose new state roots (called nodes) and challenge state roots on the host chain.","role":".validators"}] |
| } | |
| EOA (0x8A577165f8ef813296043d5f75fF2F2F2349afFd) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| receivedPermissions: | |
| + | [{"permission":"validate","from":"eth:0x5073dA9cA4810f3E0aA01c20c7d9d02C3f522e11","description":"Can propose new state roots (called nodes) and challenge state roots on the host chain.","role":".validators","via":[{"address":"eth:0xD98B32e5D0Dcb5853e498225a15447a59b7a40e1"}]}] |
| } | |
| EOA KintsugiFoundation (0x94561e98DD5E55271f91A103e4979aa6C493745E) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| receivedPermissions: | |
| + | [{"permission":"validate","from":"eth:0x5073dA9cA4810f3E0aA01c20c7d9d02C3f522e11","description":"Can propose new state roots (called nodes) and challenge state roots on the host chain.","role":".validators"}] |
| } | |
| EOA (0xad40f1440544475f4B70573a106F41dF1860598b) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| receivedPermissions: | |
| + | [{"permission":"validate","from":"eth:0x5073dA9cA4810f3E0aA01c20c7d9d02C3f522e11","description":"Can propose new state roots (called nodes) and challenge state roots on the host chain.","role":".validators","via":[{"address":"eth:0xD98B32e5D0Dcb5853e498225a15447a59b7a40e1"}]}] |
| } | |
| EOA (0xCb5BCC84741b379BFa0968b841C5de1fC9240CBd) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| receivedPermissions: | |
| + | [{"permission":"validate","from":"eth:0x5073dA9cA4810f3E0aA01c20c7d9d02C3f522e11","description":"Can propose new state roots (called nodes) and challenge state roots on the host chain.","role":".validators","via":[{"address":"eth:0xD98B32e5D0Dcb5853e498225a15447a59b7a40e1"}]}] |
| } | |
| contract Turnkey Multisig (0xD98B32e5D0Dcb5853e498225a15447a59b7a40e1) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| directlyReceivedPermissions: | |
| + | [{"permission":"validate","from":"eth:0x5073dA9cA4810f3E0aA01c20c7d9d02C3f522e11","description":"Can propose new state roots (called nodes) and challenge state roots on the host chain.","role":".validators"}] |
| } | |
| EOA (0xDcbb957bF991A0b252Fd996946Ea27E51ECabA69) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| receivedPermissions: | |
| + | [{"permission":"validate","from":"eth:0x5073dA9cA4810f3E0aA01c20c7d9d02C3f522e11","description":"Can propose new state roots (called nodes) and challenge state roots on the host chain.","role":".validators","via":[{"address":"eth:0xD98B32e5D0Dcb5853e498225a15447a59b7a40e1"}]}] |
| } | |
2025 July 14, 12:46 UTC21changesDiscovery rerun on the same block number with only config-related changes.
Discovery rerun on the same block number with only config-related changes.
New and verified contracts
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract Bridger (0x0f1b7bd7762662B23486320AA91F30312184f70C) | |
| +++ description: Bridger gateway that can swap assets to 'L2 final assets' defined by the admin before bridging them to the L2. It does not have a function to bridge via the canonical bridge and uses the external socket bridge by default. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract Kinto Security Council (0x17Eb10e12a78f986C78F973Fc70eD88072B33B7d) | |
| +++ description: None | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract ValidatorUtils (0x2b0E04Dc90e3fA58165CB41E2834B44A56E766aF) | |
| +++ description: This contract implements view only utilities for validators. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract OneStepProver0 (0x2C1e1A31d2bC26f7BE3CAB5Cb0806641847B3C59) | |
| +++ description: One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract RollupProxy (0x5073dA9cA4810f3E0aA01c20c7d9d02C3f522e11) | |
| +++ description: Central contract for the project's configuration like its execution logic hash (`wasmModuleRoot`) and addresses of the other system contracts. Entry point for Proposers creating new Rollup Nodes (state commitments) and Challengers submitting fraud proofs (In the Orbit stack, these two roles are both held by the Validators). | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract RollupEventInbox (0x52EcE832AF3DF3125BbfD6423E0425dB3fA99D3F) | |
| +++ description: Helper contract sending configuration data over the bridge during the systems initialization. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract OneStepProverHostIo (0x551E2501074D80E22c5FfB69b5fd8ba2939593b7) | |
| +++ description: One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract UpgradeExecutor (0x59B851c8b1643e0735Ec3F2f0e528f3d89c3408a) | |
| +++ description: Central contract defining the access control permissions for upgrading the system contract implementations. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract ChallengeManager (0x6228e2FB8C561f1a5A963039Bc38Eb6D539A1A7F) | |
| +++ description: Contract that allows challenging state roots. Can be called through the RollupProxy by Validators or the UpgradeExecutor. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract Outbox (0x655761AD5FC251F414D6993A73184B0669F278c8) | |
| +++ description: Facilitates L2 to L1 contract calls: Messages initiated from L2 (for example withdrawal messages) eventually resolve in execution on L1. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract ProxyAdmin (0x74C717C01425eb475A5fC55d2A4a9045fC9800df) | |
| +++ description: None | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract OneStepProverMemory (0x778ca912Bd8b35dDA84852B47BA8624e08f640A6) | |
| +++ description: One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract ERC20Gateway (0x7870D5398DB488c669B406fBE57b8d05b6A35e42) | |
| +++ description: Escrows deposited ERC-20 assets for the canonical Bridge. Upon depositing, a generic token representation will be minted at the destination. Withdrawals are initiated by the Outbox contract. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract Bridge (0x859a53Fe2C8DA961387030E7CB498D6D20d0B2DB) | |
| +++ description: Escrow contract for the project's gas token (can be different from ETH). Keeps a list of allowed Inboxes and Outboxes for canonical bridge messaging. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract OneStepProverMath (0xacED35d61f71A804E7627b5622c267C8Ac31d38e) | |
| +++ description: One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract Inbox (0xBFfaA85c1756472fFC37e6D172A7eC0538C14474) | |
| +++ description: Facilitates sending L1 to L2 messages like depositing ETH, but does not escrow funds. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract GatewayRouter (0xD9041DeCaDcBA88844b373e7053B4AC7A3390D60) | |
| +++ description: This routing contract maps tokens to the correct escrow (gateway) to be then bridged with canonical messaging. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract Turnkey Multisig (0xD98B32e5D0Dcb5853e498225a15447a59b7a40e1) | |
| +++ description: None | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract OneStepProofEntry (0xEd696D87C351C2ef687c1c484c3e297B276a40d1) | |
| +++ description: One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract Kinto Multisig (0xf152Abda9E4ce8b134eF22Dc3C6aCe19C4895D82) | |
| +++ description: None | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract SequencerInbox (0xF4Ef823D57819AC7202a081A5B49376BD28E7b3a) | |
| +++ description: A sequencer (registered in this contract) can submit transaction batches or commitments here. | |
2025 July 14, 12:46 UTC13changesDiscovery rerun on the same block number with only config-related changes.
Discovery rerun on the same block number with only config-related changes.
New and verified contracts
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract NioGuardians (0x0100005D52Be9ab3ccE0C70Abf6F6FA2C48e91C9) | |
| +++ description: Contract using NFTs as voting tokens to be used by Nio Guardians in the NioGovernor. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract NioGovernor (0x010600ff5f36C8eF3b6Aaf2A88C2DE85C798594a) | |
| +++ description: Governance contract allowing token- and NFT based voting. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract Faucet (0x0719D47A213149E2Ef8d3f5afDaDA8a8E22dfc03) | |
| +++ description: None | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract SponsorPaymaster (0x1842a4EFf3eFd24c50B63c3CF89cECEe245Fc2bd) | |
| +++ description: Paymaster used for user transactions eligible for sponsorship. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract EntryPoint (0x2843C269D2a64eCfA63548E8B3Fc0FD23B7F70cb) | |
| +++ description: Used as entrypoint to transact using smartwallets and UserOps. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract Kinto Multisig 2 (0x2e2B1c42E38f5af81771e65D87729E57ABD1337a) | |
| +++ description: None | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract Socket (0x3e9727470C66B1e77034590926CDe0242B5A3dCc) | |
| +++ description: Central contract for bridging via the external socket bridge. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract KintoAppRegistry (0x5A2b641b84b0230C8e75F55d5afd27f4Dbd59d5b) | |
| +++ description: Central system contract defining addresses that are allowed to be called by EOAs. The modified Kinto node reads this configuration and drops all other transactions from EOAs (enforced by a modified state transition function). As a result, users can only transact using a canonical smart wallet. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract BeaconKintoWallet (0x87f0eE85bF3198654900a422832157abBba30828) | |
| +++ description: Beacon proxy for the KintoWallet smartwallet implementation that is used for all users. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract KintoWalletFactory (0x8a4720488CA32f1223ccFE5A087e250fE3BC5D75) | |
| +++ description: Deploys new KintoWallet smartwallets for users upon passing KYC checks. Also manages the beacon implementation for all KintoWallets and their recovery logic. KintoWallets can be funded with ETH via this contract. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract BundleBulker (0x8d2D899402ed84b6c0510bB1ad34ee436ADDD20d) | |
| +++ description: None | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract AccessManager (0xacC000818e5Bbd911D5d449aA81CB5cA24024739) | |
| +++ description: OpenZeppelin AccessManager contract: Serves as a proxy contract defining the roles, permissions and delays to call functions in target contracts. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract KintoID (0xf369f78E3A0492CC4e96a90dae0728A38498e9c7) | |
| +++ description: Manages Kinto's KYC system: The KYC_PROVIDER roles responsible for managing the KYC status and KYC metadata of user wallets. Each KintoWallet checks the KYC status of its user in this contract as part of the signature check. | |
The system has a centralized sequencer
While forcing transaction is open to anyone the system employs a privileged sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. that has priority for submitting transaction batches and ordering transactions.
MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
Users can force any transaction
Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly. After a delay of 1d in which a SequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. has failed to include a transaction that was directly posted to the smart contract, it can be forcefully included by anyone on the host chain, which finalizes its ordering.
Delayed forced transactions
To force transactions from the host chain, users must first enqueue “delayed” messages in the “delayed” inbox of the BridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. contract. Only authorized Inboxes are allowed to enqueue delayed messages, and the so-called Inbox contract is the one used as the entry point by calling the sendMessage or sendMessageFromOrigin functions. If the centralized sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. doesn’t process the request within some time bound, users can call the forceInclusion function on the SequencerInbox contract to include the message in the canonical chain. The time bound is hardcoded to be 1d.
Regular messaging
The user initiates L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups.->L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. messages by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the blockAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over. containing that transaction is settled, the message becomes available for processing on L1. The process of block finalization usually takes several days to complete.
Autonomous exit
Users can (eventually) exit the system by pushing the transaction on L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. and providing the corresponding state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree.. The only way to prevent such withdrawal is via an upgrade.
Enforced smart wallets and KYC
The Kinto L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. nodeA software client that participates in the network. is a fork of Arbitrum’s geth implementation with notable changes to the state transition function. A valid state transition in Kinto disallows all transactions by EOAs and new contract creation, unless specifically whitelisted. The current whitelist is sourced directly from the KintoAppRegistry smart contract on Kinto L2, and can be modified by the L2 governance. This setup effectively enforces smart wallet use because the auxiliary contracts of the standard KintoWallet smart wallet (like the EntryPoint and the KintoWalletFactory) are whitelisted.
The KYC validation is part of the KintoWallet signature verification. Since all users must use the same implementation of this smart wallet, all user transactions on Kinto check for an up-to-date KYC flag, and are dropped in case the check fails.
Users can be censored if a KYC provider changes the users' KYC status and the Security Council confirms it.
Funds can be lost if the user interacts with a compromised whitelisted contract.
Ethereum
Actors:
A Multisig with 2/3 threshold.
- Can upgrade with no delay
- Bridger
A Multisig with 1/5 threshold. Member of Kinto Security CouncilA Security Council is a sufficiently decentralized set of members that is able to upgrade a system. A properly set up Security Council consists of at least 8 members with a threshold greater than 75%. What 'sufficiently decentralized' means is fundamentally subjective and L2BEAT evaluates each case individually. A Security Council is allowed to instantly upgrade Stage 1 rollups..
Member of Kinto Security CouncilA Security Council is a sufficiently decentralized set of members that is able to upgrade a system. A properly set up Security Council consists of at least 8 members with a threshold greater than 75%. What 'sufficiently decentralized' means is fundamentally subjective and L2BEAT evaluates each case individually. A Security Council is allowed to instantly upgrade Stage 1 rollups..
- Can interact with RollupProxy
- Can propose new state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. (called nodes) and challenge state roots on the host chain
- Can interact with RollupProxy
- Can propose new state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. (called nodes) and challenge state roots on the host chain
Member of Turnkey Multisig.
- Can interact with RollupProxy
- Can propose new state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. (called nodes) and challenge state roots on the host chain Turnkey Multisig
Member of Kinto Security CouncilA Security Council is a sufficiently decentralized set of members that is able to upgrade a system. A properly set up Security Council consists of at least 8 members with a threshold greater than 75%. What 'sufficiently decentralized' means is fundamentally subjective and L2BEAT evaluates each case individually. A Security Council is allowed to instantly upgrade Stage 1 rollups., Kinto Multisig.
- Can interact with RollupProxy
- Can propose new state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. (called nodes) and challenge state roots on the host chain
- Can interact with SequencerInbox
- Can submit transaction batches or commitments to the SequencerInbox contract on the host chain
A Multisig with 6/8 threshold.
- Can upgrade with no delay
- RollupProxy UpgradeExecutor
- RollupEventInbox UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- UpgradeExecutor UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- ChallengeManager UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- Outbox UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- ERC20Gateway UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- BridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- Inbox UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- GatewayRouter UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- SequencerInbox UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- Can interact with RollupProxy
- Pause and unpause and set important roles and parameters in the system contracts: Can delegate SequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. management to a BatchPosterManager address, manage data availabilityThe property of a rollup's data being reachable by any node retrieving the data that were rolled up and executed to reach the proposed state. Data availability (DA), specifically decoupling it from the rollup nodes themselves, is one of the preeminent factors which allows a rollup to scale securely. A rollup is faced with a decision of what to use as a DA layer to guarantee that any node can retrieve this data--permissionlessly under any circumstance. For this reason, using Ethereum for DA currently provides the strongest security guarantees. If data is stored somewhere other than a permissionless L1, then the project is not a rollup, but rather a validium or an optimium., DACs and the fastConfirmer role, set the Sequencer-only window, introduce an allowList to the bridge and whitelist Inboxes/Outboxes UpgradeExecutor
Kinto
Actors:
A Multisig with 2/4 threshold.
- Can upgrade with no delay
- Faucet
- SponsorPaymaster
- Can interact with NioGuardians
- mint Nio Guardian NFTs to any address, inheriting the permissions of the NFT
- Can interact with AccessManager
- change the configuration of all AccessManager permissions (minimum delay shown, the total delay can be longer for some operations) with 12d delay - acting directly with 12d delay
- approve smart wallet recoveries for any KintoWallet
- Can interact with KintoID
- manage the KYC status of any user (sanction status and KYC metadata) and mint/burn KintoID NFTs
- Can interact with AccessManager
- change the configuration of all AccessManager permissions (minimum delay shown, the total delay can be longer for some operations) with 7d delay - acting directly with 7d delay
- manage the whitelisted addresses in the KintoAppRegistry which affects censorship on the entire rollupA blockchain that inherits consensus and data availability from another blockchain called L1. Rollups enable trust minimized bridges with the base layer via proof systems, either optimistic or zero-knowledge. A rollup without a bridge, or without considering the bridge, is called a sovereign rollup. with 11d delay - acting directly with 11d delay
- upgrade the implementation of the core contracts KintoID, KintoAppRegistry and KintoWalletFactory with 11d delay - acting directly with 11d delay
- confirm sanctions, making them permanent without providing an exit windowThe amount of time that users have to exit a system before an unwanted upgrade. It takes into account upgrade delays, forced transaction delays and other time factors. To be considered Stage 1, a rollup needs to have an exit window of at least 7d if upgrades are initiated by a permissioned actor less decentralized than a Security Council. For Stage 2, a rollup needs at least 30d in all cases outside of onchain provable bugs.
Ethereum
Central contract for the project’s configuration like its execution logic hashA fixed-length fingerprint of variable-size input, produced by a hash function. (wasmModuleRoot) and addresses of the other system contracts. Entry point for Proposers creating new RollupA blockchain that inherits consensus and data availability from another blockchain called L1. Rollups enable trust minimized bridges with the base layer via proof systems, either optimistic or zero-knowledge. A rollup without a bridge, or without considering the bridge, is called a sovereign rollup. Nodes (state commitments) and Challengers submitting fraud proofs (In the Orbit stack, these two roles are both held by the ValidatorsIn the context of L2s, a Validator is an actor that validates the correctness of state transitions. For optimistic rollups this corresponds to challengers, and for ZK rollups this corresponds to the onchain verifier).
- Roles:
- admin: UpgradeExecutor; ultimately Kinto Security CouncilA Security Council is a sufficiently decentralized set of members that is able to upgrade a system. A properly set up Security Council consists of at least 8 members with a threshold greater than 75%. What 'sufficiently decentralized' means is fundamentally subjective and L2BEAT evaluates each case individually. A Security Council is allowed to instantly upgrade Stage 1 rollups.
- owner: UpgradeExecutor; ultimately Kinto Security Council
- validators: Ankr, Caldera2, Certora 1, Hypernative2, KintoFoundation, KintsugiFoundation, MamoriLabs3, Turnkey Multisig, Venn2; ultimately EOA 1, EOA 2, EOA 3, EOA 4, EOA 5
Contract that allows challenging state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree.. Can be called through the RollupProxy by ValidatorsIn the context of L2s, a Validator is an actor that validates the correctness of state transitions. For optimistic rollups this corresponds to challengers, and for ZK rollups this corresponds to the onchain verifier or the UpgradeExecutor.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Kinto Security CouncilA Security Council is a sufficiently decentralized set of members that is able to upgrade a system. A properly set up Security Council consists of at least 8 members with a threshold greater than 75%. What 'sufficiently decentralized' means is fundamentally subjective and L2BEAT evaluates each case individually. A Security Council is allowed to instantly upgrade Stage 1 rollups.
A sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. (registered in this contract) can submit transaction batches or commitments here.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Kinto Security CouncilA Security Council is a sufficiently decentralized set of members that is able to upgrade a system. A properly set up Security Council consists of at least 8 members with a threshold greater than 75%. What 'sufficiently decentralized' means is fundamentally subjective and L2BEAT evaluates each case individually. A Security Council is allowed to instantly upgrade Stage 1 rollups.
- batchPosters: EOA 6
Central contract defining the access control permissions for upgrading the system contract implementations.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Kinto Security CouncilA Security Council is a sufficiently decentralized set of members that is able to upgrade a system. A properly set up Security Council consists of at least 8 members with a threshold greater than 75%. What 'sufficiently decentralized' means is fundamentally subjective and L2BEAT evaluates each case individually. A Security Council is allowed to instantly upgrade Stage 1 rollups.
- executors: Kinto Security Council
Facilitates L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. to L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. contract calls: Messages initiated from L2 (for example withdrawal messages) eventually resolve in execution on L1.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Kinto Security CouncilA Security Council is a sufficiently decentralized set of members that is able to upgrade a system. A properly set up Security Council consists of at least 8 members with a threshold greater than 75%. What 'sufficiently decentralized' means is fundamentally subjective and L2BEAT evaluates each case individually. A Security Council is allowed to instantly upgrade Stage 1 rollups.
Escrows deposited ERC-20 assets for the canonical BridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge.. Upon depositing, a generic token representation will be minted at the destination. Withdrawals are initiated by the Outbox contract.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Kinto Security CouncilA Security Council is a sufficiently decentralized set of members that is able to upgrade a system. A properly set up Security Council consists of at least 8 members with a threshold greater than 75%. What 'sufficiently decentralized' means is fundamentally subjective and L2BEAT evaluates each case individually. A Security Council is allowed to instantly upgrade Stage 1 rollups.
Facilitates sending L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. to L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. messages like depositing ETH, but does not escrow funds.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Kinto Security CouncilA Security Council is a sufficiently decentralized set of members that is able to upgrade a system. A properly set up Security Council consists of at least 8 members with a threshold greater than 75%. What 'sufficiently decentralized' means is fundamentally subjective and L2BEAT evaluates each case individually. A Security Council is allowed to instantly upgrade Stage 1 rollups.
This routing contract maps tokens to the correct escrow (gateway) to be then bridged with canonical messaging.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Kinto Security CouncilA Security Council is a sufficiently decentralized set of members that is able to upgrade a system. A properly set up Security Council consists of at least 8 members with a threshold greater than 75%. What 'sufficiently decentralized' means is fundamentally subjective and L2BEAT evaluates each case individually. A Security Council is allowed to instantly upgrade Stage 1 rollups.
Bridger gateway that can swap assets to ‘L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. final assets’ defined by the admin before bridging them to the L2. It does not have a function to bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. via the canonical bridge and uses the external socket bridge by default.
- Roles:
- admin: Kinto Multisig
This contract implements view only utilities for validatorsIn the context of L2s, a Validator is an actor that validates the correctness of state transitions. For optimistic rollups this corresponds to challengers, and for ZK rollups this corresponds to the onchain verifier.
One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proofAlso referred to as a fault proof, it is the construction of an assertion that fraud was perpetrated on an optimistic rollup. More concretely, that an invalid state transition took place according to the protocol rules. The submitter of a fraud proof would expect a reward from the optimistic rollup protocol for helping maintain the integrity of the system., which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.
Helper contract sending configuration data over the bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. during the systems initialization.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Kinto Security CouncilA Security Council is a sufficiently decentralized set of members that is able to upgrade a system. A properly set up Security Council consists of at least 8 members with a threshold greater than 75%. What 'sufficiently decentralized' means is fundamentally subjective and L2BEAT evaluates each case individually. A Security Council is allowed to instantly upgrade Stage 1 rollups.
One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proofAlso referred to as a fault proof, it is the construction of an assertion that fraud was perpetrated on an optimistic rollup. More concretely, that an invalid state transition took place according to the protocol rules. The submitter of a fraud proof would expect a reward from the optimistic rollup protocol for helping maintain the integrity of the system., which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.
- Roles:
- owner: UpgradeExecutor
One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proofAlso referred to as a fault proof, it is the construction of an assertion that fraud was perpetrated on an optimistic rollup. More concretely, that an invalid state transition took place according to the protocol rules. The submitter of a fraud proof would expect a reward from the optimistic rollup protocol for helping maintain the integrity of the system., which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.
One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proofAlso referred to as a fault proof, it is the construction of an assertion that fraud was perpetrated on an optimistic rollup. More concretely, that an invalid state transition took place according to the protocol rules. The submitter of a fraud proof would expect a reward from the optimistic rollup protocol for helping maintain the integrity of the system., which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.
One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proofAlso referred to as a fault proof, it is the construction of an assertion that fraud was perpetrated on an optimistic rollup. More concretely, that an invalid state transition took place according to the protocol rules. The submitter of a fraud proof would expect a reward from the optimistic rollup protocol for helping maintain the integrity of the system., which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.
Escrow contract for the project’s gasA virtual fuel used to execute smart contracts on a rollup. The EVM (or other VM within the rollup) uses an accounting mechanism to correspond the consumption of gas to the consumption of computing resources, and to limit the consumption of computing resources. token (can be different from ETH). Keeps a list of allowed Inboxes and Outboxes for canonical bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. messaging.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Kinto Security CouncilA Security Council is a sufficiently decentralized set of members that is able to upgrade a system. A properly set up Security Council consists of at least 8 members with a threshold greater than 75%. What 'sufficiently decentralized' means is fundamentally subjective and L2BEAT evaluates each case individually. A Security Council is allowed to instantly upgrade Stage 1 rollups.
Kinto
Central system contract defining addresses that are allowed to be called by EOAs. The modified Kinto nodeA software client that participates in the network. reads this configuration and drops all other transactions from EOAs (enforced by a modified state transition function). As a result, users can only transact using a canonical smart wallet.
- Roles:
- admin: AccessManager
- owner: AccessManager
Deploys new KintoWallet smartwallets for users upon passing KYC checks. Also manages the beacon implementation for all KintoWallets and their recovery logic. KintoWallets can be funded with ETH via this contract.
- Roles:
- admin: AccessManager
- owner: AccessManager
Manages Kinto’s KYC system: The KYC_PROVIDER roles responsible for managing the KYC status and KYC metadata of user wallets. Each KintoWallet checks the KYC status of its user in this contract as part of the signature check.
- Roles:
- dEFAULT_ADMINs: AccessManager
- gOVERNANCErs: AccessManager
- kYC_PROVIDERs: AccessManager, EOA 10, EOA 7, EOA 8, EOA 9, Kinto Multisig 2
- uPGRADERs: AccessManager
OpenZeppelin AccessManager contract: Serves as a proxy contract defining the roles, permissions and delays to call functions in target contracts.
- Roles:
- kintoMultisig2Permission: Kinto Multisig 2
- securityCouncilPermission: KintoSecurityCouncil_L2Alias
Central contract for bridging via the external socket bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge..
Used as entrypoint to transact using smartwallets and UserOps.
Beacon proxy for the KintoWallet smartwallet implementation that is used for all users.
- Roles:
- owner: KintoWalletFactory
The current deployment carries some associated risks:
Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).
Program Hashes
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