Summary Value Secured Activity Onchain costs Liveness Risk summary Risk analysis Stage Data availability State validation Upgrades & Governance Updates Operator Sequencing Withdrawals Other considerations Permissions Smart contracts

SX Network

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About

SX Network is an Orbit stack Optimistic Rollup, built to scale the SX team's existing sports betting platform.

Total Value SecuredTVS

$22.60 M2.98%

Past day UOPSDaily UOPS

0.1922.4%

Gas token

Type

Other

Purposes

Universal, Betting

Chain ID

4162

Tokens breakdown

Value secured breakdown

0.00% with additional trust assumptions

View TVS breakdown

Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure

Explore more in Discovery UI

Badges

About

SX Network is an Orbit stack Optimistic Rollup, built to scale the SX team's existing sports betting platform.

Why is the project listed in others?

There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges

Consequence: projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds.

Learn more about the recategorisation here.

Value Secured

Compare View TVS breakdown

Exclude restricted RWA tokens

Total

Canonically BridgedCanonically Bridged ValueCanonical

Natively MintedNatively Minted TokensNative

Externally BridgedExternally Bridged ValueExternal

ETH & derivatives

Stablecoins

BTC & derivatives

Other

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Activity

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Past Day UOPS

Past Day Ops count

Max. UOPS

Past day UOPS/TPS Ratio

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Onchain costs

Compare

The section shows the operating costs that L2s pay to Ethereum.

Total cost

Avg cost per L2 UOP

Avg cost per day

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Liveness

This section shows how "live" the project's operators are by displaying how frequently they submit transactions of the selected type. It also highlights anomalies - significant deviations from their typical schedule.

No ongoing anomalies detected

Avg. tx data subs. interval

Avg. state updates interval

Past 30 days anomalies

99% normal uptime

Last 30 day anomalies

All liveness anomalies detected for this project in the last 30 days, helping you review recent downtime and availability issues.

No State updates were performed for 50m 24s (from 2026 Sep 23, 15:48 UTC until 2026 Sep 23, 16:38 UTC). These typically occur every 57m 42s on average.

No State updates were performed for 48m 24s (from 2026 Sep 23, 14:59 UTC until 2026 Sep 23, 15:48 UTC). These typically occur every 57m 42s on average.

Risk summary

Fraud proof system is fully deployed but is not yet permissionless as it requires Validators to be whitelisted.

Funds can be stolen if

a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL),
none of the whitelisted verifiers checks the published state. Fraud proofs assume at least one honest and able validator (CRITICAL),
validators with the 'fast-confirmer' permission finalize a malicious state root before the challenge period has passed (CRITICAL).

MEV can be extracted if

the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

Risk analysis

Fraud proof system is fully deployed but is not yet permissionless as it requires Validators to be whitelisted.

Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure

Sequencer failure

Self sequence

In the event of a sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project’s chain by sending them to L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development.. There can be up to a 4d delay on this operation.

State validation

Fraud proofs (INT)

Fraud proofs allow 6 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. There are fewer than 5 Challengers external to the OperatorAn operator is the entity charged with managing a rollup and progressing its state. A rollup operator can be a centralized sequencer, proposer, prover, challenger, pauser of admin that is able to perform upgrades. among these. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. There is a 6d 8h challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled..

Data availability

Onchain

All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development..

Exit window

None

There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.

Proposer failure

Self propose

Anyone can become a ProposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block. after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.

Stage

SX Network is not even a

Stage 0

project.

The requirement for available node software is under review

Learn more about Stages

Please keep in mind that these stages do not reflect project security, this is an opinionated assessment of project maturity based on subjective criteria, created with a goal of incentivizing projects to push toward better decentralization. Each team may have taken different paths to achieve this goal.

Data availability

All transaction data is recorded on chain

All executed transactions are submitted to an on chain smart contract. The execution of the rollupA blockchain that inherits consensus and data availability from another blockchain called L1. Rollups enable trust minimized bridges with the base layer via proof systems, either optimistic or zero-knowledge. A rollup without a bridge, or without considering the bridge, is called a sovereign rollup. is based entirely on the submitted transactions, so anyone monitoring the contract can know the correct state of the rollup chain.

Learn more about the DA layer here:

Ethereum

State validation

Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by a set of whitelisted validatorsIn the context of L2s, a Validator is an actor that validates the correctness of state transitions. For optimistic rollups this corresponds to challengers, and for ZK rollups this corresponds to the onchain verifier. If a state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. passes the challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled., it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.

State root proposals

Whitelisted validatorsIn the context of L2s, a Validator is an actor that validates the correctness of state transitions. For optimistic rollups this corresponds to challengers, and for ZK rollups this corresponds to the onchain verifier propose state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. as children of a previous state root. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. This structure forms a graph, and therefore, in the contracts, state roots are referred to as nodes. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.1 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proofAlso referred to as a fault proof, it is the construction of an assertion that fraud was perpetrated on an optimistic rollup. More concretely, that an invalid state transition took place according to the protocol rules. The submitter of a fraud proof would expect a reward from the optimistic rollup protocol for helping maintain the integrity of the system.. Stakes can be moved from one nodeA software client that participates in the network. to one of its children, either by calling stakeOnExistingNode or stakeOnNewNode. New nodes cannot be created faster than the minimum assertion period by the same validator, currently set to 15m. The oldest unconfirmed node can be confirmed if the challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled. has passed and there are no siblings, and rejected if the parent is not a confirmed node or if the challenge period has passed and no one is staked on it.

Funds can be stolen if none of the whitelisted verifiers checks the published state. Fraud proofs assume at least one honest and able validator (CRITICAL).

How is fraud proven - Arbitrum documentation FAQ

Challenges

A challenge can be started between two siblings, i.e. two different state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. that share the same parent, by calling the startChallenge function. ValidatorsIn the context of L2s, a Validator is an actor that validates the correctness of state transitions. For optimistic rollups this corresponds to challengers, and for ZK rollups this corresponds to the onchain verifier cannot be in more than one challenge at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with partial concurrency. Since each challenge lasts 6d 8h, this implies that the protocol can be subject to delay attacks, where a malicious actor can delay withdrawals as long as they are willing to pay the cost of losing their stakes. If the protocol is delayed attacked, the new stake requirement increases exponentially for each challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled. of delay. Challenges are played via a bisection game, where asserter and challenger play together to find the first instruction of disagreement. Such instruction is then executed onchain in the WASM OneStepProver contract to determine the winner, who then gets half of the stake of the loser. As said before, a state root is rejected only when no one left is staked on it. The protocol does not enforces valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claim and then provide incorrect midpoints.

Fraud Proof Wars: Arbitrum Classic

Fast confirmations

Whitelisted validatorsIn the context of L2s, a Validator is an actor that validates the correctness of state transitions. For optimistic rollups this corresponds to challengers, and for ZK rollups this corresponds to the onchain verifier can fast-confirm state-roots after the initial 15m minimum assertion period has passed on a state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. and skip the 6d 8h challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled.. This finalizes the fast-confirmed state root an permits withdrawals based on it.

Funds can be stolen if validators with the 'fast-confirmer' permission finalize a malicious state root before the challenge period has passed (CRITICAL).

Fast withdrawals for AnyTrust chains - Arbitrum documentation

Program Hashes

Name	Hash	Repository	Verification	Used in

	0xdb69...b69a	Github		Projects used in Search for projects used in

Upgrades & Governance

Past upgrades

The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.

Count of upgrades

Last upgrade

1y 6mo ago

Avg upgrade interval

1y 1mo

Updates

2026 March 09, 12:32 UTC

3changes

RaaS provider changed from Gelato to Caldera. The executor Safe (0xa4C325e...) is renamed to CalderaMultisig to reflect this. SxNetworkMultisig member at index 0 rotated from 0x2627... to 0xC711... .

RaaS provider changed from Gelato to Caldera. The executor Safe (0xa4C325e…) is renamed to CalderaMultisig to reflect this.

SxNetworkMultisig member at index 0 rotated from 0x2627... to 0xC711....

	EOA (eth:0xC711f8aCC65306D4f16F874Fe88C43eF23504F5c) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.0:
+	{"permission":"fastconfirm","from":"eth:0x36c6C69A6186D4475fc5c21181CD980Bd6E5e11F","description":"Can finalize a state root before the challenge period has passed. This allows withdrawing from the bridge based on the state root.","role":".anyTrustFastConfirmer","via":[{"address":"eth:0xddb901e4E9A2e659aa1d6476d5D7A2833E7c3dFa"}]}
	receivedPermissions.1:
+	{"permission":"validate","from":"eth:0x36c6C69A6186D4475fc5c21181CD980Bd6E5e11F","description":"Can propose new state roots (called nodes) and challenge state roots on the host chain.","role":".validators","via":[{"address":"eth:0xddb901e4E9A2e659aa1d6476d5D7A2833E7c3dFa"}]}
	}

	contract SxNetworkMultisig (eth:0xddb901e4E9A2e659aa1d6476d5D7A2833E7c3dFa) {
	+++ description: None
	values.$members.0:
-	"eth:0x262711cA4DA6409Da795D8af9E18DDaF47397f80"
+	"eth:0xC711f8aCC65306D4f16F874Fe88C43eF23504F5c"
	}

2026 March 02, 22:16 UTC

18changes

SXNetwork transitioned from an AnyTrust Optimium (DAC) to a Calldata Rollup. The sequencerVersion changed from 0x88 (Celestia/AnyTrust) to 0x00 (standard calldata), meaning transaction data is now posted directly to Ethereum L1. This changes the project's stage from "Not applicable" to "Stage 0" and removes the DAC dependency entirely. Additionally, ownership transferred from Gelato Multisig (4 of 9, Safe v1.3.0) to a new Safe (3 of 5, Safe v1.4.1) with entirely new signers. Validator set updated: one validator removed, one added, stakerCount increased from 2 to 3. Batch poster rotation: one added, one removed.

Additionally, ownership transferred from Gelato Multisig (4 of 9, Safe v1.3.0) to a new Safe (3 of 5, Safe v1.4.1) with entirely new signers. Validator set updated: one validator removed, one added, stakerCount increased from 2 to 3. Batch poster rotation: one added, one removed.

	EOA (eth:0x262711cA4DA6409Da795D8af9E18DDaF47397f80) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.2:
-	{"permission":"validate","from":"eth:0x36c6C69A6186D4475fc5c21181CD980Bd6E5e11F","description":"Can propose new state roots (called nodes) and challenge state roots on the host chain.","role":".validators"}
	}

	contract RollupProxy (eth:0x36c6C69A6186D4475fc5c21181CD980Bd6E5e11F) {
	+++ description: Central contract for the project's configuration like its execution logic hash (`wasmModuleRoot`) and addresses of the other system contracts. Entry point for Proposers creating new Rollup Nodes (state commitments) and Challengers submitting fraud proofs (In the Orbit stack, these two roles are both held by the Validators).
	+++ description: Increments on each Validator change.
	values.setValidatorCount:
-	4
+	6
	values.stakerCount:
-	2
+	3
	values.validators.0:
-	"eth:0x262711cA4DA6409Da795D8af9E18DDaF47397f80"
	values.validators.2:
+	"eth:0xC711f8aCC65306D4f16F874Fe88C43eF23504F5c"
	}

	contract UpgradeExecutor (eth:0x44Ec40D86b4643Bd5110ED07BE188F8473Ad2d3a) {
	+++ description: Central contract defining the access control permissions for upgrading the system contract implementations.
	values.accessControl.EXECUTOR_ROLE.members.0:
-	"eth:0xBeA2Bc852a160B8547273660E22F4F08C2fa9Bbb"
+	"eth:0xa4C325e25215C1fB2405EB28d81d2dFdbfC8D24C"
	values.executors.0:
-	"eth:0xBeA2Bc852a160B8547273660E22F4F08C2fa9Bbb"
+	"eth:0xa4C325e25215C1fB2405EB28d81d2dFdbfC8D24C"
	}

-	Status: DELETED
	EOA (eth:0xB65540bBA534E88EB4a5062D0E6519C07063b259)
	+++ description: None

-	Status: DELETED
	contract Gelato Multisig (eth:0xBeA2Bc852a160B8547273660E22F4F08C2fa9Bbb)
	+++ description: None

	contract SequencerInbox (eth:0xD80a805c86C14c879420eC6acb366D04D318fC0C) {
	+++ description: A sequencer (registered in this contract) can submit transaction batches or commitments here.
	values.batchPosters.1:
+	"eth:0x2EA9bb3d1022b8E63366aE3ea48Ada4E2Cd2ac46"
	values.batchPosters.4:
-	"eth:0xf244224843657bb59A6456754992Ea973655D918"
	values.dacKeyset.membersCount:
-	2
+	1
	values.dacKeyset.blsSignatures.0:
-	"YAW3zWmUnWa5bjus3lTpb2Nbm7dXxRdf3b+t7oLeR35v4TdZyBBliKCDBGOUb/GX9QiBL1uX01ojtrLB2lOYCkUSMyeL5LTuOfIz3NSnc9WlXrNn5GYXvtHzEEpgXWrqMwj5BsraZQMqDNLmTiTVorTHUPJgCYmmkvf6FAHZj/PSAT6iXOGD0/pIgcCAWo2w5wjZaVQzArukpt8Xpj9USXrf8nKlqkVdo83BOfLFV/vkBhrMUI6EILTJRFjS9ZIrchcs1T2I4DiCiox9erUl2mxJy86TIGCdhXkwWb9AP1JBD7WeQZOSkbOSbCfDO0njvAGJgq/9d5D4Wbud6AVJvAAOH4Gqhz7yEWQIXehiVcVLKf2NfuppDpaS35Xwa0KtSg=="
	values.dacKeyset.blsSignatures.1:
-	"YAaK3sypeExYzlInkMHqVKLuzHqfLT5DQWHB2v9z1tJxBz0xePbTPrQqYeJzq0kxZBZmWIBh0BCHlMQaua0yntYyJ0XURJtvcIo7cYDn7EWEpK2fNq0u2lFy6LbiL7p1Lxn/5GppMGKaL5jaocl7rkLs4kKqBJnm0BgibjjhuqZkl3w72uwqXrZRk6KYWF3+0w4sFM5ohbG8AW43vIB4Fj4jnK+8FkcJ+e9lR7mjBnCptf7hSw2LcakQw8lHR1SpJQqzNsy1y5rW8LIDWRPMe7by7o89GUZlKiWUuCaDUjYRwiILu6ZxaGILcv1N1v0hgQLbL7Zm/5vIcHcHIfxnSqtpRDR3ktJX+bQ6O0BYuDCM7sZTDdAC2PcDN7wIxjICNA=="
+	"YACRv5Sg0FxAlm6TmKBsvqG9ErZYeaDniYBR0S22raMmbTczq9FkH7yJsRHIxmhh/gO6gGJ7KF0u+Lf74t8k28237EyDnMQw80ZQn4d6zAL/7ho/uorq9DTj+vINz59BZQWo85EZml6f+aI3mz9FaTPy6nCIMNIsGOPppozq2ETpuNuHgNMBR4YfgSWRgxDqfRX7Q0C8VEdJQoXtYtg18a1RW7D799pLMugsHAUu9qOW53q9VVbNATxUKYHI2cbo4RCkF2j4oiYCfU7sujlb0j99nOzsLwNTuzBiL447GCYf397vX8ZXj5i6XRg69o0xmBdhxnBZsFztAYkxNm5u7Qa6p5Ik132rB7rH9rUR3elfeq2dqcVjxqoxgJzaeirMag=="
	values.keySetUpdates:
-	2
+	3
	values.sequencerVersion:
-	"0x88"
+	"0x00"
	values.setIsBatchPosterCount:
-	3
+	5
	}

+	Status: CREATED
	contract Safe (eth:0xa4C325e25215C1fB2405EB28d81d2dFdbfC8D24C)
	+++ description: None

2025 November 28, 13:08 UTC

High severity

4changes

EOA delegated to Calibur 7702 wallet.

	EOA (eth:0xB65540bBA534E88EB4a5062D0E6519C07063b259) {
	+++ description: None
	proxyType:
-	"EOA"
+	"EIP7702 EOA"
	template:
+	"uniswap/calibur7702"
	sourceHashes:
+	["0xb3eb47d8d57eba02013e5d347d05147f7ac072ef2e5e4e1f9a5c6fbced93f8b0"]
	values:
+	{"$implementation":"eth:0x000000009B1D0aF20D8C6d0A44e162d11F9b8f00","CUSTOM_STORAGE_ROOT":"0x3b86514c5c56b21f08d8e56ab090292e07c2483b3e667a2a45849dcb71368600","domainBytes":"0xc7e4f5b2d381bdfacf8506a24542052ab4e951573cab4ce34bb1c9509c84cbbf06c015bd22b4c69690933c1058878ebdfef31f9aaae40bbe86d8a09fe1b2972c0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001000000000000000000000000b65540bba534e88eb4a5062d0e6519c07063b259000000000000000000000000000000009b1d0af20d8c6d0a44e162d11f9b8f00","domainSeparator":"0xae1ae59b43b99665a7d7de7c1ca92017a6e8c484587869daf07b2bd3a6aa0301","eip712Domain":{"fields":"0x1f","name":"Calibur","version":"1.0.0","chainId":1,"verifyingContract":"eth:0xB65540bBA534E88EB4a5062D0E6519C07063b259","salt":"0x000000000000000000000000000000009b1d0af20d8c6d0a44e162d11f9b8f00","extensions":[]},"ENTRY_POINT":"eth:0x4337084D9E255Ff0702461CF8895CE9E3b5Ff108","keyAt":[],"keyCount":0,"keyHashes":0,"namespaceAndVersion":"Uniswap.Calibur.1.0.0"}
	}

2025 August 25, 10:36 UTC

2changes

Upgrade to ArbOS v40 wasmModuleRoot.

	contract RollupProxy (0x36c6C69A6186D4475fc5c21181CD980Bd6E5e11F) {
	+++ description: Central contract for the project's configuration like its execution logic hash (`wasmModuleRoot`) and addresses of the other system contracts. Entry point for Proposers creating new Rollup Nodes (state commitments) and Challengers submitting fraud proofs (In the Orbit stack, these two roles are both held by the Validators).
	+++ description: ArbOS version derived from known wasmModuleRoots.
	values.arbOsFromWmRoot:
-	"ArbOS v32 wasmModuleRoot"
+	"ArbOS v40 wasmModuleRoot"
	+++ description: Root hash of the WASM module used for execution, like a fingerprint of the L2 logic. Can be associated with ArbOS versions.
	values.wasmModuleRoot:
-	"0x184884e1eb9fefdc158f6c8ac912bb183bf3cf83f0090317e0bc4ac5860baa39"
+	"0xdb698a2576298f25448bc092e52cf13b1e24141c997135d70f217d674bbeb69a"
	}

2025 July 15, 09:11 UTC

3changes

Gelato MS: one signer removed, one changed.

	contract Gelato Multisig (0xBeA2Bc852a160B8547273660E22F4F08C2fa9Bbb) {
	+++ description: None
	values.$members.2:
-	"eth:0xB0C2CBFfCd4C31AFFEe14993b6d48f99D285f621"
+	"eth:0x58edE8C66A15f23c61b8EadD1191FdaD904f7a87"
	values.$members.8:
-	"eth:0xf83bC4688979b13Da02CB94c76cEB169540760b5"
	values.multisigThreshold:
-	"4 of 10 (40%)"
+	"4 of 9 (44%)"
	}

Operator

The system has a centralized sequencer

While forcing transaction is open to anyone the system employs a privileged sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. that has priority for submitting transaction batches and ordering transactions.

MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

Sequencer - Arbitrum documentation

Users can force any transaction

Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly. After a delay of 4d in which a SequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. has failed to include a transaction that was directly posted to the smart contract, it can be forcefully included by anyone on the host chain, which finalizes its ordering.

Sequencing

Delayed forced transactions

To force transactions from the host chain, users must first enqueue “delayed” messages in the “delayed” inbox of the BridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. contract. Only authorized Inboxes are allowed to enqueue delayed messages, and the so-called Inbox contract is the one used as the entry point by calling the sendMessage or sendMessageFromOrigin functions. If the centralized sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. doesn’t process the request within some time bound, users can call the forceInclusion function on the SequencerInbox contract to include the message in the canonical chain. The time bound is hardcoded to be 4d.

Withdrawals

Regular messaging

The user initiates L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups.->L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. messages by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the blockAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over. containing that transaction is settled, the message becomes available for processing on L1. The process of block finalization usually takes several days to complete.

Autonomous exit

Users can (eventually) exit the system by pushing the transaction on L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. and providing the corresponding state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree.. The only way to prevent such withdrawal is via an upgrade.

Other considerations

EVM compatible smart contracts are supported

Arbitrum One uses Nitro technology that allows running fraud proofs by executing EVM code on top of WASM.

Inside Arbitrum Nitro

Permissions

A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions

Go to Disco

Explore in Disco

Ethereum

Actors:

CalderaMultisig0xa4C3…D24C

A Multisig with 3/5 threshold.

Can upgrade with no delay
- RollupProxy UpgradeExecutor
- UpgradeExecutor UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- GatewayRouter UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- ChallengeManager UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- RollupEventInbox UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- BridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- Outbox UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- ERC20Gateway UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- SequencerInbox UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- Inbox UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
Can interact with RollupProxy
- Pause and unpause and set important roles and parameters in the system contracts: Can delegate SequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. management to a BatchPosterManager address, manage data availabilityThe property of a rollup's data being reachable by any node retrieving the data that were rolled up and executed to reach the proposed state. Data availability (DA), specifically decoupling it from the rollup nodes themselves, is one of the preeminent factors which allows a rollup to scale securely. A rollup is faced with a decision of what to use as a DA layer to guarantee that any node can retrieve this data--permissionlessly under any circumstance. For this reason, using Ethereum for DA currently provides the strongest security guarantees. If data is stored somewhere other than a permissionless L1, then the project is not a rollup, but rather a validium or an optimium., DACs and the fastConfirmer role, set the Sequencer-only window, introduce an allowList to the bridge and whitelist Inboxes/Outboxes UpgradeExecutor

Participants (5):

0x6156…B7dF 0x62ea…849A 0xceB1…9E84 0x8C77…F7a2 0x8613…027A

SxNetworkMultisig0xddb9…3dFa

A Multisig with 1/1 threshold.

Participants (1):

EOA 1

EOA 10xC711…4F5c

Member of SxNetworkMultisig.

Can interact with RollupProxy
- Can finalize a state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. before the challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled. has passed. This allows withdrawing from the bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. based on the state root SxNetworkMultisig
- Can propose new state roots (called nodes) and challenge state roots on the host chain SxNetworkMultisig - or - acting directly

5 EOAs

EOA 2 EOA 3 EOA 6 EOA 7 EOA 8

Can interact with SequencerInbox
- Can submit transaction batches or commitments to the SequencerInbox contract on the host chain

4 EOAs

EOA 4 EOA 5 EOA 9 EOA 10

Can interact with RollupProxy
- Can propose new state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. (called nodes) and challenge state roots on the host chain

Smart contracts

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A diagram of the smart contract architecture

Ethereum

RollupProxy0x36c6…e11F Implementation #1 (Upgradable)Implementation #2 (Upgradable)Admin

Central contract for the project’s configuration like its execution logic hashA fixed-length fingerprint of variable-size input, produced by a hash function. (wasmModuleRoot) and addresses of the other system contracts. Entry point for Proposers creating new RollupA blockchain that inherits consensus and data availability from another blockchain called L1. Rollups enable trust minimized bridges with the base layer via proof systems, either optimistic or zero-knowledge. A rollup without a bridge, or without considering the bridge, is called a sovereign rollup. Nodes (state commitments) and Challengers submitting fraud proofs (In the Orbit stack, these two roles are both held by the ValidatorsIn the context of L2s, a Validator is an actor that validates the correctness of state transitions. For optimistic rollups this corresponds to challengers, and for ZK rollups this corresponds to the onchain verifier).

Roles:
- admin: UpgradeExecutor; ultimately CalderaMultisig
- anyTrustFastConfirmer: SxNetworkMultisig; ultimately EOA 1
- owner: UpgradeExecutor; ultimately CalderaMultisig
- validators: EOA 1, EOA 10, EOA 4, EOA 5, EOA 9, SxNetworkMultisig; ultimately EOA 1

Can be upgraded by:

CalderaMultisig with no delay

Implementation used in:

ChallengeManager0x73cf…d882 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Contract that allows challenging state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree.. Can be called through the RollupProxy by ValidatorsIn the context of L2s, a Validator is an actor that validates the correctness of state transitions. For optimistic rollups this corresponds to challengers, and for ZK rollups this corresponds to the onchain verifier or the UpgradeExecutor.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CalderaMultisig

Can be upgraded by:

CalderaMultisig with no delay

Implementation used in:

Bridge

Escrow

0xa104…5f86 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Escrow contract for the project’s gasA virtual fuel used to execute smart contracts on a rollup. The EVM (or other VM within the rollup) uses an accounting mechanism to correspond the consumption of gas to the consumption of computing resources, and to limit the consumption of computing resources. token (can be different from ETH). Keeps a list of allowed Inboxes and Outboxes for canonical bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. messaging.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CalderaMultisig

The following tokens are included in the value secured calculation:

Can be upgraded by:

CalderaMultisig with no delay

SequencerInbox0xD80a…fC0C Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

A sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. (registered in this contract) can submit transaction batches or commitments here.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CalderaMultisig
- batchPosters: EOA 2, EOA 3, EOA 6, EOA 7, EOA 8

Can be upgraded by:

CalderaMultisig with no delay

UpgradeExecutor0x44Ec…2d3a Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Central contract defining the access control permissions for upgrading the system contract implementations.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CalderaMultisig
- executors: CalderaMultisig

Can be upgraded by:

CalderaMultisig with no delay

Implementation used in:

Outbox0xB360…707d Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Facilitates L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. to L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. contract calls: Messages initiated from L2 (for example withdrawal messages) eventually resolve in execution on L1.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CalderaMultisig

Can be upgraded by:

CalderaMultisig with no delay

ERC20Gateway

Escrow

0xB496…aa91 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Escrows deposited ERC-20 assets for the canonical BridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge.. Upon depositing, a generic token representation will be minted at the destination. Withdrawals are initiated by the Outbox contract.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CalderaMultisig

All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation.

Can be upgraded by:

CalderaMultisig with no delay

Implementation used in:

Inbox0xEa83…8631 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Facilitates sending L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. to L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. messages like depositing ETH, but does not escrow funds.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CalderaMultisig

Can be upgraded by:

CalderaMultisig with no delay

GatewayRouter0x5F00…438A Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

This routing contract maps tokens to the correct escrow (gateway) to be then bridged with canonical messaging.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CalderaMultisig

Can be upgraded by:

CalderaMultisig with no delay

Implementation used in:

OneStepProverHostIo0x0003…68C4

One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proofAlso referred to as a fault proof, it is the construction of an assertion that fraud was perpetrated on an optimistic rollup. More concretely, that an invalid state transition took place according to the protocol rules. The submitter of a fraud proof would expect a reward from the optimistic rollup protocol for helping maintain the integrity of the system., which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.

Implementation used in:

OneStepProverMemory0x1cD7…D7fB

Implementation used in:

ValidatorUtils0x2b0E…66aF

This contract implements view only utilities for validatorsIn the context of L2s, a Validator is an actor that validates the correctness of state transitions. For optimistic rollups this corresponds to challengers, and for ZK rollups this corresponds to the onchain verifier.

Implementation used in:

OneStepProver00x2dCC…22b5

Implementation used in:

OneStepProofEntry0x8Faa…4DaC

Implementation used in:

RollupEventInbox0x9f10…81E3 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Helper contract sending configuration data over the bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. during the systems initialization.