Search for projects by name or address
Robinhood Chain is an Arbitrum Orbit Layer 2 operated by Robinhood, focused on tokenized real-world assets (such as stocks and ETFs) and onchain financial services including 24/7 trading, lending, and borrowing. Robinhood Chain is part of Robinhood's... broader mission to democratize access to global financial markets and to empower users and developers with modern blockchain tools.
Robinhood Chain is an Arbitrum Orbit Layer 2 operated by Robinhood, focused on tokenized real-world assets (such as stocks and ETFs) and onchain financial services including 24/7 trading, lending, and borrowing. Robinhood Chain is part of Robinhood's... broader mission to democratize access to global financial markets and to empower users and developers with modern blockchain tools.
Consequence: projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds.
Learn more about the recategorisation here.
The section shows the operating costs that L2s pay to Ethereum.
This section shows how much data the project publishes to its data-availability (DA) layer over time. The project currently posts data to
Ethereum.
This section shows how "live" the project's operators are by displaying how frequently they submit transactions of the selected type. It also highlights anomalies - significant deviations from their typical schedule.
All liveness anomalies detected for this project in the last 30 days, helping you review recent downtime and availability issues.
No Tx data submissions were performed for 5m (from 2026 Sep 11, 13:48 UTC until 2026 Sep 11, 13:53 UTC). These typically occur every 49s on average.
No Tx data submissions were performed for 5m 24s (from 2026 Sep 04, 12:42 UTC until 2026 Sep 04, 12:48 UTC). These typically occur every 49s on average.
No Tx data submissions were performed for 8m 36s (from 2026 Sep 04, 12:29 UTC until 2026 Sep 04, 12:38 UTC). These typically occur every 49s on average.
No Tx data submissions were performed for 6m 12s (from 2026 Sep 04, 09:15 UTC until 2026 Sep 04, 09:22 UTC). These typically occur every 49s on average.
No Tx data submissions were performed for 6m 12s (from 2026 Sep 02, 13:41 UTC until 2026 Sep 02, 13:47 UTC). These typically occur every 49s on average.
Mainnet launch
2026 Jul 1st
Robinhood Chain opens to the public, removing the transaction-access whitelist.
There is no guaranteed mechanism to have transactions included if the sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. is down or censoring. Although users can enqueue messages in the L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. delayed inbox and call forceInclusion on the SequencerInbox, the chain runs ArbOS 61 transaction filtering: an authorized filterer can register any transaction hashA fixed-length fingerprint of variable-size input, produced by a hash function. in the ArbFilteredTransactionsManager precompile (0x00…0074), after which the state transition function forcibly fails that transaction, including force-included ones, without delay.
Fraud proofs only allow 2 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled..
All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development..
There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.
Anyone can become a ProposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block. after 28d of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.
All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobsThe data that a rollup publishes to its L1/data availability (DA) layer. They consist of the L2 transactions that are rolled up, along with some metadata. Blobs are introduced as a new transaction type within Ethereum with EIP-4844, and has rollup scaling specifically in mind. Blobs persist on Ethereum’s Beacon Chain ephemerally. or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.

Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by a set of whitelisted validatorsIn the context of L2s, a Validator is an actor that validates the correctness of state transitions. For optimistic rollups this corresponds to challengers, and for ZK rollups this corresponds to the onchain verifier. If a state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. passes the challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled., it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.
ValidatorsIn the context of L2s, a Validator is an actor that validates the correctness of state transitions. For optimistic rollups this corresponds to challengers, and for ZK rollups this corresponds to the onchain verifier propose state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. as children of a previous state root. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. State roots are referred to as “assertions” within the contracts. Each chain of assertions only requires one stake, and validators staked on assertions with a child are considered inactive and can either move their stake to a new nodeA software client that participates in the network. or withdraw it. The function used to propose a new assertion is the stakeOnNewAssertion function. The stake is currently set to 1.0 ETH, and it can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proofAlso referred to as a fault proof, it is the construction of an assertion that fraud was perpetrated on an optimistic rollup. More concretely, that an invalid state transition took place according to the protocol rules. The submitter of a fraud proof would expect a reward from the optimistic rollup protocol for helping maintain the integrity of the system.. The protocol allows such funds to be trustlessly pooled together if necessary. New nodes cannot be created faster than the minimum assertion period, currently set to 15m. An assertion without “rivals” can be confirmed after the challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled. has passed, currently set to 6d 8h. If a rival is present, then it is checked that the assertion is the winner in the challenge protocol.
Funds can be stolen if no whitelisted challenger disputes an invalid state root before the challenge window expires (CRITICAL).
A challenge can be started between two siblings, i.e. two different state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. that share the same parent, by calling the createLayerZeroEdge function in the ChallengeManager contract. Edges represent assertions, or bisected assertions, within the challenge protocol. Challenges are played via a bisection game, where asserters and challengers play together to find the first instruction of disagreement. Such instruction is then executed onchain in the WASM OneStepProver contract to determine the winner. An edge can only be bisected when rivaled. The bisection process requires no new stake as their validity is checked against a parent “history root” that contains all intermediate states. An edge can also be confirmed if itself or its descendants spend enough time being unrivaled. Such time is set to 6d 8h. If both actors play as slow as possible, the maximum time to confirm an edge is double such value, i.e. 12d 17h. Due to the complexities of maintaining the history root, the challenge protocol is divided into 3 levels, where the lowest level represents assertions over blocksAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over., the highest level represents assertions over single WASM instructions, and intermediate levels represent assertions over chunks of WASM instructions. When moving between levels, a new stake is required. Level 0 (block level) requires a stake of 0.0 ETH, level 1 requires a stake of 0.000000000000000001 ETH, level 2 requires a stake of 0.000000000000000001 ETH. The ratio between such stakes can be exploited to perform resource exhaustion attacks.
Funds can be stolen if an attacker successfully performs a resource exhaustion attack.
Name | Hash | Repository | Verification | Used in | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
0xc10c...dc97 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.
Stopped tracking the tokenized stocks and their AccessControlsRegistry: they are apps on top of the chain, not chain infrastructure. Removes 0xd060…9EEC and 0xe10b…1b00 from initialAddresses, which also clears the EOA upgrade warning. RollupProxy arbOsFromWmRoot now resolves to ArbOS v61; SafeL2 0x3A0C…7a1C became verified.
Stopped tracking the tokenized stocks and their AccessControlsRegistry: they are apps on top of the chain, not chain infrastructure. Removes 0xd060…9EEC and 0xe10b…1b00 from initialAddresses, which also clears the EOA upgrade warning. RollupProxy arbOsFromWmRoot now resolves to ArbOS v61; SafeL2 0x3A0C…7a1C became verified.
| contract ArbFilteredTransactionsManager (robinhood:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000074) [N/A] { | |
| +++ description: ArbOS 61 transaction-filtering precompile. An authorized filterer registers tx hashes here; the state transition function then forcibly fails those transactions, including force-included ones, without delay. | |
| values.filteredTransactionsAdded: | |
| - | 6091 |
| + | 6092 |
| } | |
| contract SafeL2 (robinhood:0x3A0C507Cc7F8785C877359ad49d0476966d17a1C) [GnosisSafe] { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| unverified: | |
| - | true |
| sourceHashes.0: | |
| - | null |
| + | "0xfe0725afd3cf2e5fb7627005a6bcf13ef7e35f78034eed2211edbffdb6a9aab5" |
| implementationNames.robinhood:0x3A0C507Cc7F8785C877359ad49d0476966d17a1C: | |
| - | "" |
| + | "SafeProxy" |
| } | |
ArbFilteredTransactionsManager: 3 more transactions were added to the filter list. Remaining entries are config-driven permission updates, not onchain changes.
ArbFilteredTransactionsManager: 3 more transactions were added to the filter list. Remaining entries are config-driven permission updates, not onchain changes.
| contract ArbFilteredTransactionsManager (robinhood:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000074) [N/A] { | |
| +++ description: ArbOS 61 transaction-filtering precompile. An authorized filterer registers tx hashes here; the state transition function then forcibly fails those transactions, including force-included ones, without delay. | |
| values.filteredTransactionsAdded: | |
| - | 6088 |
| + | 6091 |
| } | |
ArbFilteredTransactionsManager recorded one more filtered transaction hash (6087 - 6088).
ArbFilteredTransactionsManager recorded one more filtered transaction hash (6087 -> 6088).
| contract ArbFilteredTransactionsManager (robinhood:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000074) [N/A] { | |
| +++ description: ArbOS 61 transaction-filtering precompile. An authorized filterer registers tx hashes here; the state transition function then forcibly fails those transactions, including force-included ones, without delay. | |
| values.filteredTransactionsAdded: | |
| - | 6087 |
| + | 6088 |
| } | |
Config: add rwa access control contract to the monitoring.
Config: add rwa access control contract to the monitoring.
| contract ArbFilteredTransactionsManager (robinhood:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000074) [N/A] { | |
| +++ description: ArbOS 61 transaction-filtering precompile. An authorized filterer registers tx hashes here; the state transition function then forcibly fails those transactions, including force-included ones, without delay. | |
| values.filteredTransactionsAdded: | |
| - | 6086 |
| + | 6087 |
| } | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract NVIDIA • Robinhood Token (robinhood:0xd0601CE157Db5bdC3162BbaC2a2C8aF5320D9EEC) [robinhood/rwa] | |
| +++ description: ERC-20-compatible Robinhood Stock Token logic. Transfers, approvals and permits are permissionless for addresses that are not blocked in the shared AccessControlsRegistry; there is no onchain KYC or allowlist. The registry's roles can mint, burn arbitrary holders' balances, confiscate balances even while paused or blocked, pause this token or all tokens, change metadata and the UI multiplier, and upgrade the shared beacon implementation. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract AccessControlsRegistry (robinhood:0xe10b6f6B275de231345c20D14Ab812db62151b00) [robinhood/accessControlsRegistry] | |
| +++ description: Shared access-control registry and upgrade beacon for Robinhood Stock Tokens. Its roles apply across every token implementation that points to this registry: they control upgrades, global and per-token pauses, the shared blocklist, issuance, arbitrary holder burns, metadata and UI multipliers. | |
Recent transaction-filtering increase due to a single wallet being blocked — the honeypot behind the fake "Robinhood founder seed-phrase leak". Filtered transactions rose from 278 to 6,086; none have been reversed. Added the L1 timelock ProxyAdmin (OpenZeppelin v5.0.0) to the ProxyAdmin template.
Recent transaction-filtering increase due to a single wallet being blocked — the honeypot behind the fake “Robinhood founder seed-phrase leak”. Filtered transactions rose from 278 to 6,086; none have been reversed.
Added the L1 timelock ProxyAdmin (OpenZeppelin v5.0.0) to the ProxyAdmin template.
| contract ArbFilteredTransactionsManager (robinhood:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000074) [N/A] { | |
| +++ description: ArbOS 61 transaction-filtering precompile. An authorized filterer registers tx hashes here; the state transition function then forcibly fails those transactions, including force-included ones, without delay. | |
| values.filteredTransactionsAdded: | |
| - | 278 |
| + | 6086 |
| } | |
While forcing transaction is open to anyone the system employs a privileged sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. that has priority for submitting transaction batches and ordering transactions.
MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
Users can enqueue messages in the L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. delayed inbox and, after the sequencing delay, call forceInclusion on the SequencerInbox to include them. However, the chain runs ArbOS 61 transaction filtering: an authorized filterer can register any transaction hashA fixed-length fingerprint of variable-size input, produced by a hash function. in the ArbFilteredTransactionsManager precompile (0x00…0074), after which the state transition function forcibly fails that transaction, including one force-included via L1, without delay. Force inclusion is therefore not a reliable censorship escape hatchThe facility for any user of a rollup to exit the system with their assets under any circumstance. Most relevant in rollups with a centralized proposer, wherein users do not have the ability to propose blocks, but can nonetheless exit the rollup by interacting with a smart contract on L1..
Users can be censored if the operator registers their transaction hash in the ArbFilteredTransactionsManager precompile, causing the state transition function to fail it even when it is force-included via the L1 delayed inbox.
To force transactions from the host chain, users must first enqueue “delayed” messages in the “delayed” inbox of the BridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. contract. Only authorized Inboxes are allowed to enqueue delayed messages, and the so-called Inbox contract is the one used as the entry point by calling the sendMessage or sendMessageFromOrigin functions. If the centralized sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. doesn’t process the request within some time bound, users can call the forceInclusion function on the SequencerInbox contract to include the message in the canonical chain. The time bound is defined to be the minimum between 4d and the time left in the delay buffer. The delay buffer gets replenished over time and gets consumed every time the sequencer doesn’t timely process a message. Only messages processed with a delay greater than 1634y 3mo consume the buffer. The buffer is capped at 1634y 3mo. The replenish rate is currently set at 1m every 20m. Even if the buffer is fully consumed, messages are still allowed to be delayed up to 1634y 3mo.
The user initiates L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups.->L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. messages by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the blockAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over. containing that transaction is settled, the message becomes available for processing on L1. The process of block finalization usually takes several days to complete.
Users can (eventually) exit the system by pushing the transaction on L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. and providing the corresponding state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree.. The only way to prevent such withdrawal is via an upgrade.
Arbitrum One uses Nitro technology that allows running fraud proofs by executing EVM code on top of WASM.

A Multisig with 7/8 threshold.
A timelock with access control. The current minimum delay is 7d.
A Multisig with 6/8 threshold.
A Multisig with 3/7 threshold. Member of Safe, Safe.
A Multisig with 7/8 threshold.
A Multisig with 6/8 threshold.
A Multisig with 3/7 threshold. Member of SafeL2, SafeL2.


Central contract for the project’s configuration like its execution logic hashA fixed-length fingerprint of variable-size input, produced by a hash function. (wasmModuleRoot) and addresses of the other system contracts. Entry point for Proposers creating new assertions (state commitments) and Challengers submitting fraud proofs (In the Orbit stack, these two roles are both called ValidatorsIn the context of L2s, a Validator is an actor that validates the correctness of state transitions. For optimistic rollups this corresponds to challengers, and for ZK rollups this corresponds to the onchain verifier).
Contract that implements the main challenge protocol logic of the fraud proof systemThe infrastructure that allows projects to verify their state transitions. It is composed by onchain verifiers and offchain provers. The main two flavors are optimistic and ZK proof systems, but they can be combined in a hybrid model. In general though, if a system is able to accept state roots optimistically, even if it has a ZK component, it is considered an optimistic proof system..
A sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. (registered in this contract) can submit transaction batches or commitments here.
Escrow contract for the project’s gasA virtual fuel used to execute smart contracts on a rollup. The EVM (or other VM within the rollup) uses an accounting mechanism to correspond the consumption of gas to the consumption of computing resources, and to limit the consumption of computing resources. token (can be different from ETH). Keeps a list of allowed Inboxes and Outboxes for canonical bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. messaging.

Central contract defining the access control permissions for upgrading the system contract implementations.
Facilitates sending L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. to L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. messages like depositing ETH, but does not escrow funds.
Escrows deposited ERC-20 assets for the canonical BridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge.. Upon depositing, a generic token representation will be minted at the destination. Withdrawals are initiated by the Outbox contract.
All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation.
Facilitates L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. to L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. contract calls: Messages initiated from L2 (for example withdrawal messages) eventually resolve in execution on L1.
This routing contract maps tokens to the correct escrow (gateway) to be then bridged with canonical messaging.
One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proofAlso referred to as a fault proof, it is the construction of an assertion that fraud was perpetrated on an optimistic rollup. More concretely, that an invalid state transition took place according to the protocol rules. The submitter of a fraud proof would expect a reward from the optimistic rollup protocol for helping maintain the integrity of the system., which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.
One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proofAlso referred to as a fault proof, it is the construction of an assertion that fraud was perpetrated on an optimistic rollup. More concretely, that an invalid state transition took place according to the protocol rules. The submitter of a fraud proof would expect a reward from the optimistic rollup protocol for helping maintain the integrity of the system., which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.
One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proofAlso referred to as a fault proof, it is the construction of an assertion that fraud was perpetrated on an optimistic rollup. More concretely, that an invalid state transition took place according to the protocol rules. The submitter of a fraud proof would expect a reward from the optimistic rollup protocol for helping maintain the integrity of the system., which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.
One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proofAlso referred to as a fault proof, it is the construction of an assertion that fraud was perpetrated on an optimistic rollup. More concretely, that an invalid state transition took place according to the protocol rules. The submitter of a fraud proof would expect a reward from the optimistic rollup protocol for helping maintain the integrity of the system., which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.
Helper contract sending configuration data over the bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. during the systems initialization.
One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proofAlso referred to as a fault proof, it is the construction of an assertion that fraud was perpetrated on an optimistic rollup. More concretely, that an invalid state transition took place according to the protocol rules. The submitter of a fraud proof would expect a reward from the optimistic rollup protocol for helping maintain the integrity of the system., which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.
All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation.
ArbOS chain owner (UpgradeExecutor). Manages the ArbOwner chain-owner set and the transaction-filterer set, and can upgrade ArbOS configuration without delay.
ArbOS 61 transaction-filtering precompile. An authorized filterer registers tx hashes here; the state transition function then forcibly fails those transactions, including force-included ones, without delay.
A timelock with access control. The current minimum delay is 7d.
The current deployment carries some associated risks:
Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).
Name | Hash | Repository | Verification | Used in | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
0xc10c...dc97 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||