OP Mainnet

Volume and flows

Explore Interop

15/26Chains

+10

43/43Protocols

+38

Chain stats

Transfer size

Under $100

$100-$1K

$1K-$10K

$10K-$100K

Over $100K

Transfer type distribution

Explore Interop

Activity

Compare

Past Day UOPS

Past Day Ops count

Max. UOPS

Past day UOPS/TPS Ratio

Onchain costs

Compare

The section shows the operating costs that L2s pay to Ethereum.

Total cost

Avg cost per L2 UOP

Avg cost per day

Data posted

Compare

This section shows how much data the project publishes to its data-availability (DA) layer over time. The project currently posts data toEthereum.

Data posted

Avg size per day

Avg size per L2 UOP

OpFoundationUpgradeSafe Optimism Security Council

This section shows how "live" the project's operators are by displaying how frequently they submit transactions of the selected type. It also highlights anomalies - significant deviations from their typical schedule.

No ongoing anomalies detected

Avg. tx data subs. interval

Avg. state updates interval

Past 30 days anomalies

100% normal uptime

Milestones & Incidents

Upgrade 17 - Jovian Hardfork and Fusaka Readiness

2025 Nov 25th

A protocol upgrade improving fee mechanisms and preparing the OP Stack for the Fusaka hardfork.

Learn more

Upgrade #16 Interop Contracts + Upgrades to Cannon

2025 Jul 14th

Optimism readies Superchain interop and boosts security, scale, and Cannon.

Learn more

Risk summary

Funds can be stolen if

a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. Both regular and emergency upgrades must be approved by both the Security Council and the Foundation. There is no delay on regular upgrades.

MEV can be extracted if

the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

Risk analysis

Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure

Sequencer failure

Self sequence

In the event of a sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project’s chain by sending them to L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development.. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.

State validation

Fraud proofs (INT)

Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.

Data availability

Onchain

All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development..

Exit window

None

There is no exit windowThe amount of time that users have to exit a system before an unwanted upgrade. It takes into account upgrade delays, forced transaction delays and other time factors. To be considered Stage 1, a rollup needs to have an exit window of at least 7d if upgrades are initiated by a permissioned actor less decentralized than a Security Council. For Stage 2, a rollup needs at least 30d in all cases outside of onchain provable bugs. for users to exit in case of unwanted upgrades as they are initiated by the Security CouncilA Security Council is a sufficiently decentralized set of members that is able to upgrade a system. A properly set up Security Council consists of at least 8 members with a threshold greater than 75%. What 'sufficiently decentralized' means is fundamentally subjective and L2BEAT evaluates each case individually. A Security Council is allowed to instantly upgrade Stage 1 rollups. with instant upgrade power and without proper notice.

Proposer failure

Self propose

Anyone can be a ProposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block. and propose new roots to the L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge..

Stage

OP Mainnet is a

Stage 1

Optimistic Rollup.

The project passes the walkaway test: users can exit in the presence of malicious operators even if the Security Council disappears.

Learn more about Stages

Please keep in mind that these stages do not reflect project security, this is an opinionated assessment of project maturity based on subjective criteria, created with a goal of incentivizing projects to push toward better decentralization. Each team may have taken different paths to achieve this goal.

Data availability

All data required for proofs is published on chain

All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobsThe data that a rollup publishes to its L1/data availability (DA) layer. They consist of the L2 transactions that are rolled up, along with some metadata. Blobs are introduced as a new transaction type within Ethereum with EIP-4844, and has rollup scaling specifically in mind. Blobs persist on Ethereum’s Beacon Chain ephemerally. or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.

Learn more about the DA layer here:

Ethereum

State derivation

Node software

The rollupA blockchain that inherits consensus and data availability from another blockchain called L1. Rollups enable trust minimized bridges with the base layer via proof systems, either optimistic or zero-knowledge. A rollup without a bridge, or without considering the bridge, is called a sovereign rollup. nodeA software client that participates in the network. is composed of two software components: op-node, implementing consensusAn agreement on the latest and correct state of a blockchain. Unlike L1 blockchains which coordinate participating nodes with consensus rules, rollups rely on L1s for reaching consensus by checking the state of the rollup smart contract deployed thereon. related logic, and op-geth, implementing execution logic. The configuration file can be found here.

Compression scheme

Data batches are compressed using the zlib algorithm with best compression level.

Genesis state

Since OP Mainnet has migrated from the OVM to Bedrock, a nodeA software client that participates in the network. must be synced using a data directory that can be found here. To reproduce the migration itself, see this guide.

Data format

The format specification of SequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs.’s data batches can be found here.

State validation

Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by anyone who has sufficient funds. If a state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. passes the challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled., it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.

State root proposals

Proposers submit state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the create function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.08 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proofAlso referred to as a fault proof, it is the construction of an assertion that fraud was perpetrated on an optimistic rollup. More concretely, that an invalid state transition took place according to the protocol rules. The submitter of a fraud proof would expect a reward from the optimistic rollup protocol for helping maintain the integrity of the system.. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled. has passed and it is not countered.

OP stack specification: Fault Dispute Game

Challenges

Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 691.23 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the defend or attack functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with full concurrency. Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 3d 12h. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see freeloader claims), an inherited clock with too little time remaining is generally extended by 3h. The extension is 6h when the next claim is immediately before split depth 30, and 1d 3h (the standard extension plus the 1d oracle challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled.) immediately before the last depth. Along a full-depth path, cumulative extensions can therefore add up to 10d 3h. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers’ stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step proverAn entity that generates the cryptographic proof to convince the verifier that the statement is true. In a ZK-Rollup, the prover generates the ZK (validity) proof to submit to the verifier contract. contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks (Spearbit 5.1.3).

Fraud Proof Wars: OPFP

Program Hashes

Name	Hash	Repository	Verification	Used in

	0x0337...9025	Github

Upgrades & Governance

A diagram of the upgrades and governance

All contracts are upgradable by the SuperchainProxyAdmin which is controlled by a 2/2 multisig composed by the Optimism Foundation and a Security CouncilA Security Council is a sufficiently decentralized set of members that is able to upgrade a system. A properly set up Security Council consists of at least 8 members with a threshold greater than 75%. What 'sufficiently decentralized' means is fundamentally subjective and L2BEAT evaluates each case individually. A Security Council is allowed to instantly upgrade Stage 1 rollups.. The Guardian role is assigned to the Security Council multisig, with a Safe Module that limits the Optimism Foundation to act through it to stop withdrawals in the whole Superchain or specific individual chains. Each pause automatically expires after 3 months if not extended or unpaused by the Security Council. The Security Council can remove the module if the Foundation becomes malicious. The single SequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. actor can be modified by the OpFoundationOperationsSafe via the SystemConfig contract. The SuperchainProxyAdminOwner can recover dispute bonds in case of bugs that would distribute them incorrectly.

At the moment, for regular upgrades, the DAO signals its intent by voting on upgrade proposals, but has no direct control over the upgrade process.

Governance profile

Security Council

Composition	10/13 — Gnosis Safe with cohorts of 7 + 6, 12-month staggered terms. Token-House-elected via Agora with Optimism Foundation eligibility screening (KYC/AML, geographic and organisational diversity).
Members public	Entities only — elected entity names are public; 1:1 entity-to-address mapping deliberately not published (Foundation privacy policy). Current Cohort A (Feb 2026 – Feb 2027): Agora, Velodrome, Cyfrin, pablito.eth, Mariano, Uniswap Foundation, Emiliano. Cohort B’s initial slate (Feb 2025): L2BEAT, OP Labs PBC, Coinbase Technologies, Test in Prod, Ink Foundation/Kraken, World Foundation.
Charter	Security Council Charter v0.1 — defines 75% threshold, emergency response, Token House removal, LivenessModule failsafe (control reverts to Foundation Upgrade Safe if signers drop below 8).
Can bypass DAO?	Yes — emergency response measures may be taken without specific Governance approval (Charter v0.1). The SC + Foundation Upgrade Safe (2/2 SuperchainProxyAdminOwner) hold the actual upgrade keys and can execute at any time.
DAO can override SC?	Veto, plus member removal — Token House and Citizens’ House can veto DAB-approved upgrades during the 7-day veto window (subject to participation thresholds). Token House can remove SC members by simple majority within one voting cycle (≤3 weeks) for Code of Conduct violations. LivenessModule auto-removes signers inactive ≥3 months 8 days; if signer count drops below 8, control reverts to the Foundation Upgrade Safe.

Upgrades

Normal upgrade path	Technical review by the 7-member elected Developer Advisory Board (DAB, 5/7 quorum for approval) → release on Sepolia → 7-day veto window during which Token House and/or Citizens’ House can veto a DAB-approved upgrade or override a DAB rejection if participation thresholds are met (17% with two groups, 14% with three, 11% with four) → if not vetoed, SC + Foundation Upgrade Safe (2/2 SuperchainProxyAdminOwner) co-sign the L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. transaction → execute. Maintenance upgrades use a shortened path. Live since Aug 1, 2025.
Emergency upgrade path	SC + Foundation Upgrade Safe (2/2), instant — “may preemptively address actual or anticipated bugs, defects, or stability issues without specific Governance approval” (Charter v0.1). No DAB review, no veto window. Mandatory after-the-fact public retrospective.
Exit window	None — upgrades take effect as soon as they are co-signed by the 2/2 SuperchainProxyAdminOwner, with no onchain delay or prior notice, so users cannot exit ahead of an unwanted upgrade.

Token governance

Governance token	`OP` — ~4.29B initial supply, up to 2%/yr inflation (cap fixed in the Operating Manual; changes require a 76% Inflation proposal). 1 OP = 1 vote, delegated.
Voting venue	Agora for binding on-chain Token House votes. Snapshot for Citizens’ House signaling, Protocol Upgrade vetoes, and some Reflection Period votes. Forum stage: gov.optimism.io.
Proposal threshold	No OP minimum — submission requires explicit approval from 4 of the top-100 delegates on the discussion thread (Operating Manual). Citizens’ House analog: 4 Citizens. Foundation-initiated proposals require no approvals. Note: protocol upgrades since Aug 2025 originate from the DAB rather than the Token House.
Quorum	30% for Token House proposals. Veto-window participation thresholds for protocol upgrades: 17% (two groups voting), 14% (three groups), 11% (four groups).
Execution model	DAB-gated approval + 2/2 Safe signs — DAB approves, veto window passes, then SC + Foundation Upgrade Safe co-sign the L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. transaction. Token House and Citizens’ House signal/veto on-chain via Agora and Snapshot but do not directly trigger the L1 state change. No permissionlessAnyone willing should be able to join and leave the network at any time, without causing significant disturbance to the network or being detrimental to the party in question. No single entity should have the power to allowlist or blocklist participants. `execute()`.

Past upgrades

The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.

Count of upgrades

112

Last upgrade

2mo 24d ago

Avg upgrade interval

4mo 12d

Updates

2026 September 10, 12:45 UTC

1change

Optimism Security Council: Member rotated.

	contract Optimism Security Council (eth:0xc2819DC788505Aac350142A7A707BF9D03E3Bd03) [GnosisSafe] {
	+++ description: None
	values.$members.9:
-	"eth:0x0aA384EB2fedD2741277A0f72909A0d7275575D7"
+	"eth:0xd91530dB01c60C6B3b824707D33fb0771aB85930"
	}

2026 July 17, 10:10 UTC

4changes

OpFoundation shared Safes (UpgradeSafe + OperationsSafe): 2 members rotated.

	contract OpFoundationUpgradeSafe (eth:0x847B5c174615B1B7fDF770882256e2D3E95b9D92) [GnosisSafe] {
	+++ description: None
	values.$members.0:
-	"eth:0x6419F81580343DF023E68715C6e269aFb00a2cc7"
+	"eth:0xf1EfbdC2C0BDC4554E0f1639D7fe88cD870a4639"
	values.$members.3:
-	"eth:0xBF93D4d727F7Ba1F753E1124C3e532dCb04Ea2c8"
+	"eth:0x7F1D4FE689B73B628285454667B93cfd09409f27"
	}

	contract OpFoundationOperationsSafe (eth:0x9BA6e03D8B90dE867373Db8cF1A58d2F7F006b3A) [GnosisSafe] {
	+++ description: None
	values.$members.0:
-	"eth:0x6419F81580343DF023E68715C6e269aFb00a2cc7"
+	"eth:0xf1EfbdC2C0BDC4554E0f1639D7fe88cD870a4639"
	values.$members.3:
-	"eth:0xBF93D4d727F7Ba1F753E1124C3e532dCb04Ea2c8"
+	"eth:0x7F1D4FE689B73B628285454667B93cfd09409f27"
	}

2026 July 14, 10:10 UTC

High severity

167changes

Karst hardfork (Upgrade 19b, op-contracts/v7.0.0) L2 activation on 2026-07-08 16:00:01 UTC. The final implementation addresses are deterministic and identical to the other Superchain chains (e.g. Ink). Most predeploys now inherit ProxyAdminOwnedBase , which lets a contract read its proxy's ProxyAdmin and ProxyAdmin owner on-chain so privileged functions can be gated to them. On the initializable ones — both bridges, both mintable factories, L2CrossDomainMessenger and every FeeVault — the constructor calls disableInitializers() and initialize() is restricted to the ProxyAdmin or its owner (the SuperchainProxyAdminOwner). L1Block is not initializable but inherits the same base and gates its new setFeature setter the same way. Custom gas token support was removed from L2StandardBridge and L2CrossDomainMessenger. The gasPayingToken() override is gone, and withdraw() / withdrawTo() no longer revert on custom gas token chains. OP Mainnet pays gas in ETH, so behaviour is unchanged. L2ProxyAdmin (1.0.0) adds upgradePredeploys(address) , which delegatecalls the L2ContractsManager. FeeVault configuration (recipient, minimum withdrawal amount, withdrawal network) moved from constructor immutables to storage set by initialize() , and is now mutable post-deployment via setRecipient , setMinWithdrawalAmount and setWithdrawalNetwork — each gated to the ProxyAdmin owner. Previously these values were fixed at deployment; the SuperchainProxyAdminOwner can now change them. This also applies to OperatorFeeVault. BaseFeeVault and L1FeeVault are byte-identical and now share implementation 0xf7bed7215EEF1003fac426682Cf2edeb958569f7 . GasPriceOracle stayed at 1.6.0 with unchanged source; only its implementation address moved. Version changes and implementation diffs: - L2CrossDomainMessenger 1.4.0 - 2.2.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/oeth:0xC0d3c0d3c0D3c0D3C0d3C0D3C0D3c0d3c0d30007/oeth:0x250AF3f400cf8Aac8D410c90f1ba3968dD87DF96 - L2StandardBridge 1.1.0 - 1.13.2: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/oeth:0xC0d3c0d3c0D3c0d3C0D3c0D3C0d3C0D3C0D30010/oeth:0xAE9ed42f43a3ee45c3A9dEf8ae6B48cBb58Ed1a1 - SequencerFeeVault 1.1.0 - 1.6.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/oeth:0xC0D3C0d3c0d3c0d3C0D3c0d3C0D3c0d3c0D30011/oeth:0xb178cdAa8336f25624A63C049EdB5AF7ca36C2dA - OptimismMintableERC20Factory 1.1.0 - 1.11.0: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/oeth:0xc0D3c0d3C0d3c0d3c0D3c0d3c0D3c0D3c0D30012/oeth:0xAF87f2Fd347aCb94656f9F715B4f2409B98e75b9 - L2ERC721Bridge 1.1.0 - 1.10.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/oeth:0xC0D3c0d3c0d3c0d3c0D3C0d3C0D3C0D3c0d30014/oeth:0x716eAd0Cf3e7FF86A02D4F8cb41a6D14922fA833 - L1Block 1.7.0 - 1.9.0: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/oeth:0x3Ba4007f5C922FBb33C454B41ea7a1f11E83df2C/oeth:0x6a97C5D55A21265326150Efe12FC30Fb21cbff56 - L2ToL1MessagePasser 1.0.0 - 1.2.0: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/oeth:0xC0D3C0d3C0d3c0d3C0d3C0D3c0D3c0d3c0D30016/oeth:0x27E51B2254433A3284D9ba73Ea551C397DB2a124 - OptimismMintableERC721Factory 1.2.0 - 1.5.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/oeth:0xc0d3C0d3C0d3C0d3C0d3c0d3C0D3C0d3C0D30017/oeth:0xf43862B9d814BB4504158CecCB0b74b31265e4eE - L2ProxyAdmin ProxyAdmin - L2ProxyAdmin 1.0.0: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/oeth:0xC0d3C0D3c0d3C0d3c0d3c0D3C0D3C0d3C0D30018/oeth:0x893c2CEEb71D38514daF67728d3Ff1b213FC4B5F - BaseFeeVault 1.1.0 - 1.6.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/oeth:0xC0d3c0D3c0d3C0D3C0D3C0d3c0D3C0D3c0d30019/oeth:0xf7bed7215EEF1003fac426682Cf2edeb958569f7 - L1FeeVault 1.1.0 - 1.6.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/oeth:0xc0D3c0D3C0d3c0d3c0d3C0d3c0d3C0d3C0D3001A/oeth:0xf7bed7215EEF1003fac426682Cf2edeb958569f7 - OperatorFeeVault 1.0.0 - 1.1.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/oeth:0x4fa2Be8cd41504037F1838BcE3bCC93bC68Ff537/oeth:0xEddf416c7159387cc6DF3015700F79Cfb8911373 - SchemaRegistry 1.0.1 - 1.3.1-beta.2: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/oeth:0x6232208d66bAc2305b46b4Cb6BCB3857B298DF13/oeth:0x70DE55BC0bfBC52C5D0CCA1DA5816c2428886A34 - EAS 1.0.1 - 1.4.1-beta.3: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/oeth:0x4E0275Ea5a89e7a3c1B58411379D1a0eDdc5b088/oeth:0xbEc660b456B84A081E90aF29BE43385BDa5bF7b6 - GasPriceOracle 1.6.0 (source unchanged): https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/oeth:0x4f1db3c6AbD250ba86E0928471A8F7DB3AFd88F1/oeth:0x547d0fba434877D7237d511cF87FABe2ee26b152 Unrelated to Karst: a member of the SafeL2 at 0x3F3Cd78Ef9Bd85961C0729E6BbB11E94Ca6f61D2 was rotated.

Karst hardfork (Upgrade 19b, op-contracts/v7.0.0) L2 activation on 2026-07-08 16:00:01 UTC.

The final implementation addresses are deterministic and identical to the other Superchain chains (e.g. Ink).

Most predeploys now inherit ProxyAdminOwnedBase, which lets a contract read its proxy’s ProxyAdmin and ProxyAdmin owner on-chain so privileged functions can be gated to them. On the initializable ones — both bridges, both mintable factories, L2CrossDomainMessenger and every FeeVault — the constructor calls _disableInitializers() and initialize() is restricted to the ProxyAdmin or its owner (the SuperchainProxyAdminOwner). L1Block is not initializable but inherits the same base and gates its new setFeature setter the same way.

Custom gas token support was removed from L2StandardBridge and L2CrossDomainMessenger. The gasPayingToken() override is gone, and withdraw() / withdrawTo() no longer revert on custom gas token chains. OP Mainnet pays gas in ETH, so behaviour is unchanged.

L2ProxyAdmin (1.0.0) adds upgradePredeploys(address), which delegatecalls the L2ContractsManager.

FeeVault configuration (recipient, minimum withdrawal amount, withdrawal network) moved from constructor immutables to storage set by initialize(), and is now mutable post-deployment via setRecipient, setMinWithdrawalAmount and setWithdrawalNetwork — each gated to the ProxyAdmin owner. Previously these values were fixed at deployment; the SuperchainProxyAdminOwner can now change them. This also applies to OperatorFeeVault. BaseFeeVault and L1FeeVault are byte-identical and now share implementation 0xf7bed7215EEF1003fac426682Cf2edeb958569f7.

GasPriceOracle stayed at 1.6.0 with unchanged source; only its implementation address moved.

Version changes and implementation diffs:

L2CrossDomainMessenger 1.4.0 -> 2.2.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/oeth:0xC0d3c0d3c0D3c0D3C0d3C0D3C0D3c0d3c0d30007/oeth:0x250AF3f400cf8Aac8D410c90f1ba3968dD87DF96
L2StandardBridge 1.1.0 -> 1.13.2: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/oeth:0xC0d3c0d3c0D3c0d3C0D3c0D3C0d3C0D3C0D30010/oeth:0xAE9ed42f43a3ee45c3A9dEf8ae6B48cBb58Ed1a1
SequencerFeeVault 1.1.0 -> 1.6.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/oeth:0xC0D3C0d3c0d3c0d3C0D3c0d3C0D3c0d3c0D30011/oeth:0xb178cdAa8336f25624A63C049EdB5AF7ca36C2dA
OptimismMintableERC20Factory 1.1.0 -> 1.11.0: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/oeth:0xc0D3c0d3C0d3c0d3c0D3c0d3c0D3c0D3c0D30012/oeth:0xAF87f2Fd347aCb94656f9F715B4f2409B98e75b9
L2ERC721Bridge 1.1.0 -> 1.10.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/oeth:0xC0D3c0d3c0d3c0d3c0D3C0d3C0D3C0D3c0d30014/oeth:0x716eAd0Cf3e7FF86A02D4F8cb41a6D14922fA833
L1Block 1.7.0 -> 1.9.0: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/oeth:0x3Ba4007f5C922FBb33C454B41ea7a1f11E83df2C/oeth:0x6a97C5D55A21265326150Efe12FC30Fb21cbff56
L2ToL1MessagePasser 1.0.0 -> 1.2.0: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/oeth:0xC0D3C0d3C0d3c0d3C0d3C0D3c0D3c0d3c0D30016/oeth:0x27E51B2254433A3284D9ba73Ea551C397DB2a124
OptimismMintableERC721Factory 1.2.0 -> 1.5.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/oeth:0xc0d3C0d3C0d3C0d3C0d3c0d3C0D3C0d3C0D30017/oeth:0xf43862B9d814BB4504158CecCB0b74b31265e4eE
L2ProxyAdmin ProxyAdmin -> L2ProxyAdmin 1.0.0: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/oeth:0xC0d3C0D3c0d3C0d3c0d3c0D3C0D3C0d3C0D30018/oeth:0x893c2CEEb71D38514daF67728d3Ff1b213FC4B5F
BaseFeeVault 1.1.0 -> 1.6.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/oeth:0xC0d3c0D3c0d3C0D3C0D3C0d3c0D3C0D3c0d30019/oeth:0xf7bed7215EEF1003fac426682Cf2edeb958569f7
L1FeeVault 1.1.0 -> 1.6.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/oeth:0xc0D3c0D3C0d3c0d3c0d3C0d3c0d3C0d3C0D3001A/oeth:0xf7bed7215EEF1003fac426682Cf2edeb958569f7
OperatorFeeVault 1.0.0 -> 1.1.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/oeth:0x4fa2Be8cd41504037F1838BcE3bCC93bC68Ff537/oeth:0xEddf416c7159387cc6DF3015700F79Cfb8911373
SchemaRegistry 1.0.1 -> 1.3.1-beta.2: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/oeth:0x6232208d66bAc2305b46b4Cb6BCB3857B298DF13/oeth:0x70DE55BC0bfBC52C5D0CCA1DA5816c2428886A34
EAS 1.0.1 -> 1.4.1-beta.3: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/oeth:0x4E0275Ea5a89e7a3c1B58411379D1a0eDdc5b088/oeth:0xbEc660b456B84A081E90aF29BE43385BDa5bF7b6
GasPriceOracle 1.6.0 (source unchanged): https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/oeth:0x4f1db3c6AbD250ba86E0928471A8F7DB3AFd88F1/oeth:0x547d0fba434877D7237d511cF87FABe2ee26b152

Unrelated to Karst: a member of the SafeL2 at 0x3F3Cd78Ef9Bd85961C0729E6BbB11E94Ca6f61D2 was rotated.

	contract SafeL2 (oeth:0x3F3Cd78Ef9Bd85961C0729E6BbB11E94Ca6f61D2) [GnosisSafe] {
	+++ description: None
	values.$members.7:
-	"oeth:0x6419F81580343DF023E68715C6e269aFb00a2cc7"
+	"oeth:0x7F1D4FE689B73B628285454667B93cfd09409f27"
	}

	contract L2CrossDomainMessenger (oeth:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000007) [opstack/Layer2/L2CrossDomainMessenger] {
	+++ description: The L2CrossDomainMessenger (L2xDM) contract sends messages from L2 to L1, and relays messages from L1 onto L2 with a system tx. In the event that a message sent from L2 to L1 is rejected for exceeding the L1 gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0xc976dd7891ac59d37603c7648ea8e3a566365094a242d169a646ebfed971bab8"
+	"0x9e9ae8aec73e808e50f80bced53c3a020588eed516b310a10397596869dcd3b1"
	values.$implementation:
-	"oeth:0xC0d3c0d3c0D3c0D3C0d3C0D3C0D3c0d3c0d30007"
+	"oeth:0x250AF3f400cf8Aac8D410c90f1ba3968dD87DF96"
	values.$pastUpgrades.0:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["oeth:0x2A5A3eabB9Fd571A3Af0299eebdF8EaafE29a914"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.1:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["oeth:0x250AF3f400cf8Aac8D410c90f1ba3968dD87DF96"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	0
+	2
	values.version:
-	"1.4.0"
+	"2.2.1"
	values.ENCODING_OVERHEAD:
+	260
	values.FLOOR_CALLDATA_OVERHEAD:
+	40
	values.otherMessenger:
+	"oeth:0x25ace71c97B33Cc4729CF772ae268934F7ab5fA1"
	values.paused:
+	false
	values.proxyAdmin:
+	"oeth:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
	values.proxyAdminOwner:
+	"oeth:0x6B1BAE59D09fCcbdDB6C6cceb07B7279367C4E3b"
	values.TX_BASE_GAS:
+	21000
	implementationNames.oeth:0xC0d3c0d3c0D3c0D3C0d3C0D3C0D3c0d3c0d30007:
-	"L2CrossDomainMessenger"
	implementationNames.oeth:0x250AF3f400cf8Aac8D410c90f1ba3968dD87DF96:
+	"L2CrossDomainMessenger"
	}

	contract GasPriceOracle (oeth:0x420000000000000000000000000000000000000F) [opstack/Layer2/GasPriceOracle] {
	+++ description: Provides the current gas price for L2 transactions.
	values.$implementation:
-	"oeth:0x4f1db3c6AbD250ba86E0928471A8F7DB3AFd88F1"
+	"oeth:0x547d0fba434877D7237d511cF87FABe2ee26b152"
	values.$pastUpgrades.4:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["oeth:0x547d0fba434877D7237d511cF87FABe2ee26b152"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	4
+	5
	implementationNames.oeth:0x4f1db3c6AbD250ba86E0928471A8F7DB3AFd88F1:
-	"GasPriceOracle"
	implementationNames.oeth:0x547d0fba434877D7237d511cF87FABe2ee26b152:
+	"GasPriceOracle"
	}

	contract L2StandardBridge (oeth:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000010) [opstack/Layer2/L2StandardBridge] {
	+++ description: The L2StandardBridge contract is the main entry point to deposit or withdraw ERC20 tokens from L2 to L1. This contract can store any token.
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0x4354fe0c1ae65beab0a93e37ea50f3964a7d5e51a2f4a33c98cb041a1d18d32c"
+	"0xf6ef848ca1cf88e27b5e3bb5e01b91ef79f302e5daad8ba5206c4dc60027d312"
	values.$implementation:
-	"oeth:0xC0d3c0d3c0D3c0d3C0D3c0D3C0d3C0D3C0D30010"
+	"oeth:0xAE9ed42f43a3ee45c3A9dEf8ae6B48cBb58Ed1a1"
	values.$pastUpgrades.0:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["oeth:0x2A5A3eabB9Fd571A3Af0299eebdF8EaafE29a914"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.1:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["oeth:0xAE9ed42f43a3ee45c3A9dEf8ae6B48cBb58Ed1a1"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	0
+	2
	values.version:
-	"1.1.0"
+	"1.13.2"
	values.otherBridge:
+	"oeth:0x99C9fc46f92E8a1c0deC1b1747d010903E884bE1"
	values.paused:
+	false
	values.proxyAdmin:
+	"oeth:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
	values.proxyAdminOwner:
+	"oeth:0x6B1BAE59D09fCcbdDB6C6cceb07B7279367C4E3b"
	implementationNames.oeth:0xC0d3c0d3c0D3c0d3C0D3c0D3C0d3C0D3C0D30010:
-	"L2StandardBridge"
	implementationNames.oeth:0xAE9ed42f43a3ee45c3A9dEf8ae6B48cBb58Ed1a1:
+	"L2StandardBridge"
	}

	contract SequencerFeeVault (oeth:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000011) [opstack/Layer2/SequencerFeeVault] {
	+++ description: Collects the sequencer fees, which are withdrawable to the FeesCollector on L1.
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0x0441c14992309acc9ee49b32ded90950f349d5d4ab52d9d4f3380bbfb12d9957"
+	"0xb45389729a8fffa7650568cd2922e482d03d3ed57b35f4819650d11174d9237a"
	values.$implementation:
-	"oeth:0xC0D3C0d3c0d3c0d3C0D3c0d3C0D3c0d3c0D30011"
+	"oeth:0xb178cdAa8336f25624A63C049EdB5AF7ca36C2dA"
	values.$pastUpgrades.0:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["oeth:0x2A5A3eabB9Fd571A3Af0299eebdF8EaafE29a914"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.1:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["oeth:0xb178cdAa8336f25624A63C049EdB5AF7ca36C2dA"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	0
+	2
	values.version:
-	"1.1.0"
+	"1.6.1"
	values.minWithdrawalAmount:
+	"10000000000000000000"
	values.proxyAdmin:
+	"oeth:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
	values.proxyAdminOwner:
+	"oeth:0x6B1BAE59D09fCcbdDB6C6cceb07B7279367C4E3b"
	values.recipient:
+	"oeth:0xa3d596EAfaB6B13Ab18D40FaE1A962700C84ADEa"
	values.WITHDRAWAL_NETWORK:
+	0
	values.withdrawalNetwork:
+	0
	implementationNames.oeth:0xC0D3C0d3c0d3c0d3C0D3c0d3C0D3c0d3c0D30011:
-	"SequencerFeeVault"
	implementationNames.oeth:0xb178cdAa8336f25624A63C049EdB5AF7ca36C2dA:
+	"SequencerFeeVault"
	}

	contract OptimismMintableERC20Factory (oeth:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000012) [opstack/OptimismMintableERC20Factory] {
	+++ description: A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it's deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain's representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.
	template:
-	"opstack/Layer2/OptimismMintableERC20Factory"
+	"opstack/OptimismMintableERC20Factory"
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0xb2fc6f2e6343ad65e6ad1c34dcc5eeb708cc17ebdaeba5635ee74568f976ad26"
+	"0x11b0ed6f15cabf613492a8d54c55304a17cf60f4fd94a655d7e720d4556906d0"
	description:
-	"Factory contract to create bridge compliant ERC20 IOU token representations of bridged L1 ERC20 tokens."
+	"A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it's deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain's representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa."
	values.$implementation:
-	"oeth:0xc0D3c0d3C0d3c0d3c0D3c0d3c0D3c0D3c0D30012"
+	"oeth:0xAF87f2Fd347aCb94656f9F715B4f2409B98e75b9"
	values.$pastUpgrades.0:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["oeth:0x2A5A3eabB9Fd571A3Af0299eebdF8EaafE29a914"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.1:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["oeth:0xAF87f2Fd347aCb94656f9F715B4f2409B98e75b9"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	0
+	2
	values.version:
-	"1.1.0"
+	"1.11.0"
	values.bridge:
+	"oeth:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000010"
	values.proxyAdmin:
+	"oeth:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
	values.proxyAdminOwner:
+	"oeth:0x6B1BAE59D09fCcbdDB6C6cceb07B7279367C4E3b"
	implementationNames.oeth:0xc0D3c0d3C0d3c0d3c0D3c0d3c0D3c0D3c0D30012:
-	"OptimismMintableERC20Factory"
	implementationNames.oeth:0xAF87f2Fd347aCb94656f9F715B4f2409B98e75b9:
+	"OptimismMintableERC20Factory"
	}

	contract L2ERC721Bridge (oeth:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000014) [opstack/Layer2/L2ERC721Bridge] {
	+++ description: The L2ERC721Bridge contract is the main entry point to deposit or withdraw ERC721 tokens from L2 to L1. This contract can store any token.
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0xe7457c0a0e9e7ba45f45fb369ff94f8a3613c4bb9083999a6eb18eaf6a077cdd"
+	"0x0d8059378487e33161e0b838f622400642360f1e311eba8c7b8fbdb504aeee1e"
	values.$implementation:
-	"oeth:0xC0D3c0d3c0d3c0d3c0D3C0d3C0D3C0D3c0d30014"
+	"oeth:0x716eAd0Cf3e7FF86A02D4F8cb41a6D14922fA833"
	values.$pastUpgrades.1:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["oeth:0x2A5A3eabB9Fd571A3Af0299eebdF8EaafE29a914"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.2:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["oeth:0x716eAd0Cf3e7FF86A02D4F8cb41a6D14922fA833"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	1
+	3
	values.version:
-	"1.1.0"
+	"1.10.1"
	values.paused:
+	false
	values.proxyAdmin:
+	"oeth:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
	values.proxyAdminOwner:
+	"oeth:0x6B1BAE59D09fCcbdDB6C6cceb07B7279367C4E3b"
	implementationNames.oeth:0xC0D3c0d3c0d3c0d3c0D3C0d3C0D3C0D3c0d30014:
-	"L2ERC721Bridge"
	implementationNames.oeth:0x716eAd0Cf3e7FF86A02D4F8cb41a6D14922fA833:
+	"L2ERC721Bridge"
	}

	contract L1Block (oeth:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000015) [opstack/Layer2/L1Block] {
	+++ description: Simple contract that returns information about the latest L1 block, which is derived permissionlessly from the L1 chain.
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0x399e57fff478211b47d61c5acb60592a4df8ffa5716959a1a6ee2ccabc44915e"
+	"0xca6401a4032def95df36b0d432052526888ef8a396f7e4fc37cdda3690932646"
	values.$implementation:
-	"oeth:0x3Ba4007f5C922FBb33C454B41ea7a1f11E83df2C"
+	"oeth:0x6a97C5D55A21265326150Efe12FC30Fb21cbff56"
	values.$pastUpgrades.3:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["oeth:0x6a97C5D55A21265326150Efe12FC30Fb21cbff56"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	3
+	4
	values.version:
-	"1.7.0"
+	"1.9.0"
	values.proxyAdmin:
+	"oeth:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
	values.proxyAdminOwner:
+	"oeth:0x6B1BAE59D09fCcbdDB6C6cceb07B7279367C4E3b"
	implementationNames.oeth:0x3Ba4007f5C922FBb33C454B41ea7a1f11E83df2C:
-	"L1Block"
	implementationNames.oeth:0x6a97C5D55A21265326150Efe12FC30Fb21cbff56:
+	"L1Block"
	}

	contract L2ToL1MessagePasser (oeth:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000016) [opstack/Layer2/L2ToL1MessagePasser] {
	+++ description: Contract used internally by the L2CrossDomainMessenger to send messages to L1, including withdrawals. It can also be used directly as a low-level interface.
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0xa8bdac224f506426db48b13c4933c57cbe3d88178a3499712638d559204c5eaa"
+	"0xb5be3cf9878e914d0b7feef281dbcc2b72d7c7e9106e44a7dfd516d48de8a62a"
	values.$implementation:
-	"oeth:0xC0D3C0d3C0d3c0d3C0d3C0D3c0D3c0d3c0D30016"
+	"oeth:0x27E51B2254433A3284D9ba73Ea551C397DB2a124"
	values.$pastUpgrades.0:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["oeth:0x27E51B2254433A3284D9ba73Ea551C397DB2a124"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	0
+	1
	values.version:
-	"1.0.0"
+	"1.2.0"
	implementationNames.oeth:0xC0D3C0d3C0d3c0d3C0d3C0D3c0D3c0d3c0D30016:
-	"L2ToL1MessagePasser"
	implementationNames.oeth:0x27E51B2254433A3284D9ba73Ea551C397DB2a124:
+	"L2ToL1MessagePasser"
	}

	contract OptimismMintableERC721Factory (oeth:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000017) [opstack/Layer2/OptimismMintableERC721Factory] {
	+++ description: Factory contract to create bridge compliant ERC721 IOU token representations of bridged L1 ERC721 tokens.
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0x889f9ffc10090c8df747b3523aa4fde7bcc0aade333f7ddabece6b3f005a2e80"
+	"0xf4fd8df9e9191098f5647a3568864aee248b011c092313bf392b57a4b0f43268"
	values.$implementation:
-	"oeth:0xc0d3C0d3C0d3C0d3C0d3c0d3C0D3C0d3C0D30017"
+	"oeth:0xf43862B9d814BB4504158CecCB0b74b31265e4eE"
	values.$pastUpgrades.0:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["oeth:0x2A5A3eabB9Fd571A3Af0299eebdF8EaafE29a914"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.1:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["oeth:0xf43862B9d814BB4504158CecCB0b74b31265e4eE"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	0
+	2
	values.version:
-	"1.2.0"
+	"1.5.1"
	values.bridge:
+	"oeth:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000014"
	values.proxyAdmin:
+	"oeth:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
	values.proxyAdminOwner:
+	"oeth:0x6B1BAE59D09fCcbdDB6C6cceb07B7279367C4E3b"
	values.remoteChainID:
+	1
	implementationNames.oeth:0xc0d3C0d3C0d3C0d3C0d3c0d3C0D3C0d3C0D30017:
-	"OptimismMintableERC721Factory"
	implementationNames.oeth:0xf43862B9d814BB4504158CecCB0b74b31265e4eE:
+	"OptimismMintableERC721Factory"
	}

	contract L2ProxyAdmin (oeth:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018) [opstack/Layer2/L2ProxyAdmin_karst] {
	+++ description: Administration contract for the L2 predeploy proxies. Adds upgradePredeploys(address), which can only be called by the system depositor account and delegatecalls an L2ContractsManager to upgrade every predeploy in a single network upgrade transaction.
	name:
-	"ProxyAdmin"
+	"L2ProxyAdmin"
	template:
-	"global/ProxyAdmin"
+	"opstack/Layer2/L2ProxyAdmin_karst"
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0x96d2f0fa1bd83ebd61ba6a2351c64c7fda7aa580b11ea67bb6bf4338e5c28512"
+	"0xc9307181d90f9b86ff913d1c365245cfb8622929939cbff0389acf7f428ddc4b"
	values.$implementation:
-	"oeth:0xC0d3C0D3c0d3C0d3c0d3c0D3C0D3C0d3C0D30018"
+	"oeth:0x893c2CEEb71D38514daF67728d3Ff1b213FC4B5F"
	values.$pastUpgrades.0:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0x48aa8d6a9d281bf0eaa204e895acdfe0ba38640c34f6d133b2f4ecb879f5c72c",["oeth:0x893c2CEEb71D38514daF67728d3Ff1b213FC4B5F"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.1:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["oeth:0x893c2CEEb71D38514daF67728d3Ff1b213FC4B5F"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	0
+	2
	values.version:
+	"1.0.0"
	implementationNames.oeth:0xC0d3C0D3c0d3C0d3c0d3c0D3C0D3C0d3C0D30018:
-	"ProxyAdmin"
	implementationNames.oeth:0x893c2CEEb71D38514daF67728d3Ff1b213FC4B5F:
+	"L2ProxyAdmin"
	description:
+	"Administration contract for the L2 predeploy proxies. Adds upgradePredeploys(address), which can only be called by the system depositor account and delegatecalls an L2ContractsManager to upgrade every predeploy in a single network upgrade transaction."
	}

	contract BaseFeeVault (oeth:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000019) [opstack/Layer2/BaseFeeVault_karst] {
	+++ description: Collects EIP-1559 base fees, which are withdrawable to the FeesCollector on L1.
	template:
-	"opstack/Layer2/BaseFeeVault"
+	"opstack/Layer2/BaseFeeVault_karst"
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0xa4fbbae0f482b898d87c15326c29fdeaa7ad5371f679bbaa0dc95b0866325cab"
+	"0xf7b9f825b6af20abb355da09822d54e6e3fa7243439293826bd7271f87747775"
	values.$implementation:
-	"oeth:0xC0d3c0D3c0d3C0D3C0D3C0d3c0D3C0D3c0d30019"
+	"oeth:0xf7bed7215EEF1003fac426682Cf2edeb958569f7"
	values.$pastUpgrades.0:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["oeth:0x2A5A3eabB9Fd571A3Af0299eebdF8EaafE29a914"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.1:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["oeth:0xf7bed7215EEF1003fac426682Cf2edeb958569f7"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	0
+	2
	values.version:
-	"1.1.0"
+	"1.6.1"
	values.minWithdrawalAmount:
+	"10000000000000000000"
	values.proxyAdmin:
+	"oeth:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
	values.proxyAdminOwner:
+	"oeth:0x6B1BAE59D09fCcbdDB6C6cceb07B7279367C4E3b"
	values.recipient:
+	"oeth:0xa3d596EAfaB6B13Ab18D40FaE1A962700C84ADEa"
	values.WITHDRAWAL_NETWORK:
+	0
	values.withdrawalNetwork:
+	0
	implementationNames.oeth:0xC0d3c0D3c0d3C0D3C0D3C0d3c0D3C0D3c0d30019:
-	"BaseFeeVault"
	implementationNames.oeth:0xf7bed7215EEF1003fac426682Cf2edeb958569f7:
+	"BaseFeeVault"
	}

	contract L1FeeVault (oeth:0x420000000000000000000000000000000000001A) [opstack/Layer2/L1FeeVault_karst] {
	+++ description: Collects the L1 portion of the L2 transaction fees, which are withdrawable to the FeesCollector on L1.
	template:
-	"opstack/Layer2/L1FeeVault"
+	"opstack/Layer2/L1FeeVault_karst"
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0x09853f7c7e9d53511d9bcb729b4b53f1b00b56183056dd353d2cd640d9407d82"
+	"0xf7b9f825b6af20abb355da09822d54e6e3fa7243439293826bd7271f87747775"
	values.$implementation:
-	"oeth:0xc0D3c0D3C0d3c0d3c0d3C0d3c0d3C0d3C0D3001A"
+	"oeth:0xf7bed7215EEF1003fac426682Cf2edeb958569f7"
	values.$pastUpgrades.0:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["oeth:0x2A5A3eabB9Fd571A3Af0299eebdF8EaafE29a914"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.1:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["oeth:0xf7bed7215EEF1003fac426682Cf2edeb958569f7"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	0
+	2
	values.version:
-	"1.1.0"
+	"1.6.1"
	values.minWithdrawalAmount:
+	"10000000000000000000"
	values.proxyAdmin:
+	"oeth:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
	values.proxyAdminOwner:
+	"oeth:0x6B1BAE59D09fCcbdDB6C6cceb07B7279367C4E3b"
	values.recipient:
+	"oeth:0xa3d596EAfaB6B13Ab18D40FaE1A962700C84ADEa"
	values.WITHDRAWAL_NETWORK:
+	0
	values.withdrawalNetwork:
+	0
	implementationNames.oeth:0xc0D3c0D3C0d3c0d3c0d3C0d3c0d3C0d3C0D3001A:
-	"L1FeeVault"
	implementationNames.oeth:0xf7bed7215EEF1003fac426682Cf2edeb958569f7:
+	"BaseFeeVault"
	}

	contract OperatorFeeVault (oeth:0x420000000000000000000000000000000000001b) [opstack/Layer2/OperatorFeeVault] {
	+++ description: Holds the 'operator fees' for the L2 network, which are part of the L2 fees that users pay.
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0x8ee929b67fce68f8daf1dac67514e5e05678a9f554e8d6e676fa28fe81874844"
+	"0x0ba9b644913957c9f60eda0ab433da4523bb2437156e4dd8dadca627c884ba2a"
	values.$implementation:
-	"oeth:0x4fa2Be8cd41504037F1838BcE3bCC93bC68Ff537"
+	"oeth:0xEddf416c7159387cc6DF3015700F79Cfb8911373"
	values.$pastUpgrades.1:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["oeth:0x2A5A3eabB9Fd571A3Af0299eebdF8EaafE29a914"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.2:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["oeth:0xEddf416c7159387cc6DF3015700F79Cfb8911373"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	1
+	3
	values.version:
-	"1.0.0"
+	"1.1.1"
	values.proxyAdmin:
+	"oeth:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
	values.proxyAdminOwner:
+	"oeth:0x6B1BAE59D09fCcbdDB6C6cceb07B7279367C4E3b"
	implementationNames.oeth:0x4fa2Be8cd41504037F1838BcE3bCC93bC68Ff537:
-	"OperatorFeeVault"
	implementationNames.oeth:0xEddf416c7159387cc6DF3015700F79Cfb8911373:
+	"OperatorFeeVault"
	}

	contract SchemaRegistry (oeth:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000020) [opstack/Layer2/SchemaRegistry] {
	+++ description: Contracts to register schemas for the Ethereum Attestation Service (EAS).
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0xc94799f3b35c3dedb3578da655614d2690e56477b3e176966113bbf06888e05d"
+	"0xe2a60db541c987ffa9a6ed73b9100c7f62f2574966a20c903a73a8f730c7dfcc"
	values.$implementation:
-	"oeth:0x6232208d66bAc2305b46b4Cb6BCB3857B298DF13"
+	"oeth:0x70DE55BC0bfBC52C5D0CCA1DA5816c2428886A34"
	values.$pastUpgrades.1:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["oeth:0x70DE55BC0bfBC52C5D0CCA1DA5816c2428886A34"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	1
+	2
	values.version:
-	"1.0.1"
+	"1.3.1-beta.2"
	implementationNames.oeth:0x6232208d66bAc2305b46b4Cb6BCB3857B298DF13:
-	"SchemaRegistry"
	implementationNames.oeth:0x70DE55BC0bfBC52C5D0CCA1DA5816c2428886A34:
+	"SchemaRegistry"
	}

	contract EAS (oeth:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000021) [opstack/Layer2/EAS] {
	+++ description: Contract containing the main logic for the Ethereum Attestation Service (EAS).
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0x22dcc9bc6d8b0463159f8a96f6f2ee61c897a8ae5e1b684e38e74e2b25b48e66"
+	"0x16924e7d7c1a311d6c9da93c6bf8bc7bd5454a0efde4d6e365e66c87ef4a0951"
	values.$implementation:
-	"oeth:0x4E0275Ea5a89e7a3c1B58411379D1a0eDdc5b088"
+	"oeth:0xbEc660b456B84A081E90aF29BE43385BDa5bF7b6"
	values.$pastUpgrades.1:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["oeth:0xbEc660b456B84A081E90aF29BE43385BDa5bF7b6"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	1
+	2
	values.getAttestTypeHash:
-	"0xdbfdf8dc2b135c26253e00d5b6cbe6f20457e003fd526d97cea183883570de61"
+	"0xfeb2925a02bae3dae48d424a0437a2b6ac939aa9230ddc55a1a76f065d988076"
	values.getDomainSeparator:
-	"0xd963157246e3d9bacafb6121ee5c596e8048baf5c3814c1b9fa094fdc4d6aed1"
+	"0x12909de2583872a9cb6474f44ae7f84a355ed273fda804f81a9594c3fa6220e9"
	values.getRevokeTypeHash:
-	"0xa98d02348410c9c76735e0d0bb1396f4015ac2bb9615f9c2611d19d7a8a99650"
+	"0xb5d556f07587ec0f08cf386545cc4362c702a001650c2058002615ee5c9d1e75"
	values.version:
-	"1.0.1"
+	"1.4.1-beta.3"
	implementationNames.oeth:0x4E0275Ea5a89e7a3c1B58411379D1a0eDdc5b088:
-	"EAS"
	implementationNames.oeth:0xbEc660b456B84A081E90aF29BE43385BDa5bF7b6:
+	"EAS"
	}

2026 June 30, 20:16 UTC

High severity

139changes

Upgrade 19b "Karst" (op-contracts/v7.0.0), executed 2026-06-25 via the new OPContractsManagerV2 ( 0x9Ce712Ff84E02659846dc6450BB9b7642fE8bE5D , v7.1.17). Respected game type changed 0 → 8 (CANNON → CANNON KONA): the permissionless fault proof now runs the Rust kona-client on the Cannon VM instead of op-program. Trust model is unchanged (still permissionless fault proofs). Implementation upgrades: - OptimismPortal2 v5.2.0 → v5.6.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x97cEbbf8959e2A5476fbe9B98A21806Ec234609B/eth:0xe89F13c5ee4033B2D3cD76C9d6958eFBfe26D3C2 - SystemConfig v3.13.1 → v3.14.2 (adds lastUsedOPCM / OPCM SLOT): https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xd392c27B84b1cA776528F2704BC67B82a62132d2/eth:0x42Ad0173051225Ac784100e9acD43349707F4db9 - DisputeGameFactory → v1.6.1 Creator Pattern (per-type gameImpls, gameArgs): https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xc040F392E52Cb6970CA8E110c280fE24E07C5e2c/eth:0x72B971717E088B59F26d4236BE222ADB6ACD393b - AnchorStateRegistry → v3.9.0, now post-U16 (holds respectedGameType + blacklistDisputeGame): https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x36398155Cd17cfe804F69b233eDDA800DD4D5aA5/eth:0x8F40Cc98D694AB986F026C5383A181FCc9B6B281 - L1CrossDomainMessenger: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0/eth:0x59D497530b00062f40950ba8EaB88868bf7F86f0 - L1StandardBridge: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A/eth:0xB37a11AadF167B2F0b8dD85372De4bC66CD4A891 - L1ERC721Bridge: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9/eth:0x9F164f1d02A81e06D639E55F65a87f0070E3Cb2e - ETHLockbox: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x784d2F03593A42A6E4676A012762F18775ecbBe6/eth:0xb3A24DB07038b51962026329B62E7a965d56A6ad - OptimismMintableERC20Factory: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB/eth:0xaAbEA75Da509fA518Fd8a91Eae4BE5813B829b12 - SuperchainConfig (shared): https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957/eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550 A new OPContractsManager ( 0x9Ce712Ff84E02659846dc6450BB9b7642fE8bE5D ) is the upgrade mechanism used for this release; upgrade authority remains with the SuperchainProxyAdminOwner. The active proof program is the kona-client prestate 0x0337ecb3604c0b40c352e0c7711beb17a212d583f4fe956fd8d66e29ad5f9025 .

Upgrade 19b “Karst” (op-contracts/v7.0.0), executed 2026-06-25 via the new OPContractsManagerV2 (0x9Ce712Ff84E02659846dc6450BB9b7642fE8bE5D, v7.1.17).

Respected game type changed 0 → 8 (CANNON → CANNON_KONA): the permissionless fault proof now runs the Rust kona-client on the Cannon VM instead of op-program. Trust model is unchanged (still permissionless fault proofs).

Implementation upgrades:

OptimismPortal2 v5.2.0 → v5.6.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x97cEbbf8959e2A5476fbe9B98A21806Ec234609B/eth:0xe89F13c5ee4033B2D3cD76C9d6958eFBfe26D3C2
SystemConfig v3.13.1 → v3.14.2 (adds lastUsedOPCM / OPCM_SLOT): https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xd392c27B84b1cA776528F2704BC67B82a62132d2/eth:0x42Ad0173051225Ac784100e9acD43349707F4db9
DisputeGameFactory → v1.6.1 Creator Pattern (per-type gameImpls, gameArgs): https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xc040F392E52Cb6970CA8E110c280fE24E07C5e2c/eth:0x72B971717E088B59F26d4236BE222ADB6ACD393b
AnchorStateRegistry → v3.9.0, now post-U16 (holds respectedGameType + blacklistDisputeGame): https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x36398155Cd17cfe804F69b233eDDA800DD4D5aA5/eth:0x8F40Cc98D694AB986F026C5383A181FCc9B6B281
L1CrossDomainMessenger: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0/eth:0x59D497530b00062f40950ba8EaB88868bf7F86f0
L1StandardBridge: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A/eth:0xB37a11AadF167B2F0b8dD85372De4bC66CD4A891
L1ERC721Bridge: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9/eth:0x9F164f1d02A81e06D639E55F65a87f0070E3Cb2e
ETHLockbox: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x784d2F03593A42A6E4676A012762F18775ecbBe6/eth:0xb3A24DB07038b51962026329B62E7a965d56A6ad
OptimismMintableERC20Factory: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB/eth:0xaAbEA75Da509fA518Fd8a91Eae4BE5813B829b12
SuperchainConfig (shared): https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957/eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550

A new OPContractsManager (0x9Ce712Ff84E02659846dc6450BB9b7642fE8bE5D) is the upgrade mechanism used for this release; upgrade authority remains with the SuperchainProxyAdminOwner. The active proof program is the kona-client prestate 0x0337ecb3604c0b40c352e0c7711beb17a212d583f4fe956fd8d66e29ad5f9025.

-	Status: DELETED
	contract PreimageOracle (eth:0x1fb8cdFc6831fc866Ed9C51aF8817Da5c287aDD3) [opstack/PreimageOracle]
	+++ description: The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game.

	contract SystemConfig (eth:0x229047fed2591dbec1eF1118d64F7aF3dB9EB290) [opstack/SystemConfig] {
	+++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address.
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0x703fe68eeb3d5454a8ef012933846f1ff1433fc2df39c0c94f2a550d8325f085"
+	"0x3d8e7cdbbdbf274bba0a11a060b01d5a50e3a478683af9ec079874d1758576d6"
	values.$implementation:
-	"eth:0xd392c27B84b1cA776528F2704BC67B82a62132d2"
+	"eth:0x42Ad0173051225Ac784100e9acD43349707F4db9"
	values.$pastUpgrades.15:
+	["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.16:
+	["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0x42Ad0173051225Ac784100e9acD43349707F4db9"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	15
+	17
	values.batchInbox:
-	"eth:0xFF00000000000000000000000000000000000010"
+	"eth:0x00c65A7bB8d6351C1Cf70C95A316CC6A92839c98"
	values.delayedWETH:
-	"eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
+	"eth:0x1B6DBF05EaF22d4E70dC993e8a19dd9F3dcb3162"
	values.getAddresses.delayedWETH:
-	"eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
+	"eth:0x1B6DBF05EaF22d4E70dC993e8a19dd9F3dcb3162"
	values.getAddresses.opcm:
+	"eth:0x9Ce712Ff84E02659846dc6450BB9b7642fE8bE5D"
	values.version:
-	"3.13.1"
+	"3.14.2"
	values.lastUsedOPCM:
+	"eth:0x9Ce712Ff84E02659846dc6450BB9b7642fE8bE5D"
	values.lastUsedOPCMVersion:
+	"7.1.17"
	values.OPCM_SLOT:
+	"0x99f45962df4bc30de8d4c3c6d1ffc0f100edce16e80c7a5768b6d55ca463ff42"
	implementationNames.eth:0xd392c27B84b1cA776528F2704BC67B82a62132d2:
-	"SystemConfig"
	implementationNames.eth:0x42Ad0173051225Ac784100e9acD43349707F4db9:
+	"SystemConfig"
	}

	contract AnchorStateRegistry (eth:0x23B2C62946350F4246f9f9D027e071f0264FD113) [opstack/AnchorStateRegistry_post20] {
	+++ description: Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. This variant stores respectedGameType, retirementTimestamp, and disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds locally and drops the legacy *FromGame fields, since the AggregateVerifier model does not expose vm()/weth()/absolutePrestate() on its game implementation.
	template:
-	"opstack/AnchorStateRegistry_post13"
+	"opstack/AnchorStateRegistry_post20"
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0xfdabc8b9b4db9b7aa78227b26e936abaf24f058502b96e8d9a293d49b1e89b47"
+	"0x10f64124093daab87c84d97148854054f9622bf86e09e98d496f123be3368122"
	description:
-	"Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the FaultDisputeGame."
+	"Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. This variant stores respectedGameType, retirementTimestamp, and disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds locally and drops the legacy *FromGame fields, since the AggregateVerifier model does not expose vm()/weth()/absolutePrestate() on its game implementation."
	values.$implementation:
-	"eth:0x36398155Cd17cfe804F69b233eDDA800DD4D5aA5"
+	"eth:0x8F40Cc98D694AB986F026C5383A181FCc9B6B281"
	values.$pastUpgrades.3:
+	["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.4:
+	["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0x8F40Cc98D694AB986F026C5383A181FCc9B6B281"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	3
+	5
	values.absolutePrestateFromGame:
-	"0x033c000916b4a88cfffeceddd6cf0f4be3897a89195941e5a7c3f8209b4dbb6e"
	values.challengePeriodFromOracle:
-	86400
	values.oracleFromVm:
-	"eth:0x1fb8cdFc6831fc866Ed9C51aF8817Da5c287aDD3"
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.respectedGameType:
-	0
+	8
	values.version:
-	"3.7.0"
+	"3.9.0"
	values.vmFromGame:
-	"eth:0x6463dEE3828677F6270d83d45408044fc5eDB908"
	values.wethFromGame:
-	"eth:0xD061AB95069987868768818cc1248705351e2D0e"
	fieldMeta.retirementTimestamp:
+	{"severity":"HIGH"}
	fieldMeta.disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds:
+	{"severity":"HIGH"}
	implementationNames.eth:0x36398155Cd17cfe804F69b233eDDA800DD4D5aA5:
-	"AnchorStateRegistry"
	implementationNames.eth:0x8F40Cc98D694AB986F026C5383A181FCc9B6B281:
+	"AnchorStateRegistry"
	usedTypes.0.arg.621:
+	"AggregateVerifier"
	}

	contract L1CrossDomainMessenger (eth:0x25ace71c97B33Cc4729CF772ae268934F7ab5fA1) [opstack/L1CrossDomainMessenger] {
	+++ description: Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function.
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0x1f2c13ad1144ce6548e578b834c33b0d65b1564aeb0d5c708ed4e7fb50535cc6"
+	"0x694050f95b40e6d92ee91ca0f60acb9c4a74d1b0325c33fd4bd7445fde90e806"
	values.$implementation:
-	"eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0"
+	"eth:0x59D497530b00062f40950ba8EaB88868bf7F86f0"
	values.$pastUpgrades.16:
+	["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.17:
+	["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0x59D497530b00062f40950ba8EaB88868bf7F86f0"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	16
+	18
	values.version:
-	"2.11.0"
+	"2.11.1"
	implementationNames.eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0:
-	"L1CrossDomainMessenger"
	implementationNames.eth:0x59D497530b00062f40950ba8EaB88868bf7F86f0:
+	"L1CrossDomainMessenger"
	}

	contract ETHLockbox (eth:0x322b47Ff1FA8D5611F761e3E275C45B71b294D43) [opstack/ETHLockbox] {
	+++ description: A simple escrow contract storing ETH for the canonical bridge.
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0x330c0ee4ca969ca3a1deda35d8ce83d1861361088ef0b4b8efe0ec23b4f24c19"
+	"0x99fabdfb3d8ef02962877763f6f3c7ec26d39e15e700fa854a040321a79f61ec"
	values.$implementation:
-	"eth:0x784d2F03593A42A6E4676A012762F18775ecbBe6"
+	"eth:0xb3A24DB07038b51962026329B62E7a965d56A6ad"
	values.$pastUpgrades.1:
+	["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.2:
+	["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0xb3A24DB07038b51962026329B62E7a965d56A6ad"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	1
+	3
	values.version:
-	"1.2.0"
+	"1.3.1"
	implementationNames.eth:0x784d2F03593A42A6E4676A012762F18775ecbBe6:
-	"ETHLockbox"
	implementationNames.eth:0xb3A24DB07038b51962026329B62E7a965d56A6ad:
+	"ETHLockbox"
	}

	contract SuperchainProxyAdmin (eth:0x543bA4AADBAb8f9025686Bd03993043599c6fB04) [global/ProxyAdmin] {
	+++ description: None
	directlyReceivedPermissions.1:
+	{"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x1B6DBF05EaF22d4E70dC993e8a19dd9F3dcb3162","role":"admin"}
	directlyReceivedPermissions.10:
-	{"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xD061AB95069987868768818cc1248705351e2D0e","role":"admin"}
	directlyReceivedPermissions.11:
-	{"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xe03F4d1D0E6B8b18b97198598b3f792E57BA17d4","role":"admin"}
	}

-	Status: DELETED
	contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0x58bf355C5d4EdFc723eF89d99582ECCfd143266A) [opstack/PermissionedDisputeGame]
	+++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger.

	contract SuperchainProxyAdminOwner (eth:0x5a0Aae59D09fccBdDb6C6CcEB07B7279367C3d2A) [GnosisSafe] {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.1:
+	{"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x1B6DBF05EaF22d4E70dC993e8a19dd9F3dcb3162","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x543bA4AADBAb8f9025686Bd03993043599c6fB04"}]}
	receivedPermissions.10:
-	{"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xD061AB95069987868768818cc1248705351e2D0e","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x543bA4AADBAb8f9025686Bd03993043599c6fB04"}]}
	receivedPermissions.11:
-	{"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xe03F4d1D0E6B8b18b97198598b3f792E57BA17d4","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x543bA4AADBAb8f9025686Bd03993043599c6fB04"}]}
	}

	contract L1ERC721Bridge (eth:0x5a7749f83b81B301cAb5f48EB8516B986DAef23D) [opstack/L1ERC721Bridge] {
	+++ description: Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0x1f65fda230b6d0df44e466b06418b2e12a401ef82c07521ad18d2f4ae6c70fb2"
+	"0xc5ed62b03fb7c1340609ace7ebb0c5bf8d43b1814b1ab4f10863bfa21d13b90b"
	values.$implementation:
-	"eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9"
+	"eth:0x9F164f1d02A81e06D639E55F65a87f0070E3Cb2e"
	values.$pastUpgrades.12:
+	["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.13:
+	["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0x9F164f1d02A81e06D639E55F65a87f0070E3Cb2e"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	12
+	14
	values.version:
-	"2.9.0"
+	"2.9.1"
	implementationNames.eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9:
-	"L1ERC721Bridge"
	implementationNames.eth:0x9F164f1d02A81e06D639E55F65a87f0070E3Cb2e:
+	"L1ERC721Bridge"
	}

-	Status: DELETED
	contract MIPS (eth:0x6463dEE3828677F6270d83d45408044fc5eDB908) [opstack/MIPS]
	+++ description: The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.

-	Status: DELETED
	contract FaultDisputeGame (eth:0x6dDBa09bc4cCB0D6Ca9Fc5350580f74165707499) [opstack/FaultDisputeGame]
	+++ description: Logic of the dispute game. When a state root is proposed, a dispute game contract is deployed. Challengers can use such contracts to challenge the proposed state root.

	contract OptimismMintableERC20Factory (eth:0x75505a97BD334E7BD3C476893285569C4136Fa0F) [opstack/OptimismMintableERC20Factory] {
	+++ description: A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it's deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain's representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0x307d4cb83e682629880fe9bb874a188805e3b93cb11a2cbf80095975f1e5b04e"
+	"0x11b0ed6f15cabf613492a8d54c55304a17cf60f4fd94a655d7e720d4556906d0"
	values.$implementation:
-	"eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB"
+	"eth:0xaAbEA75Da509fA518Fd8a91Eae4BE5813B829b12"
	values.$pastUpgrades.8:
+	["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.9:
+	["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0xaAbEA75Da509fA518Fd8a91Eae4BE5813B829b12"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	8
+	10
	values.version:
-	"1.10.2"
+	"1.11.0"
	values.proxyAdmin:
+	"eth:0x543bA4AADBAb8f9025686Bd03993043599c6fB04"
	values.proxyAdminOwner:
+	"eth:0x5a0Aae59D09fccBdDb6C6CcEB07B7279367C3d2A"
	implementationNames.eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB:
-	"OptimismMintableERC20Factory"
	implementationNames.eth:0xaAbEA75Da509fA518Fd8a91Eae4BE5813B829b12:
+	"OptimismMintableERC20Factory"
	}

	contract SuperchainConfig (eth:0x95703e0982140D16f8ebA6d158FccEde42f04a4C) [opstack/SuperchainConfig_expiry] {
	+++ description: Used to manage global configuration values for multiple OP Chains within a single Superchain network. The SuperchainConfig contract manages individual pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3 months if left untouched.
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0x5fb525d1572fb90d060d122143b915059cbff39e0298b345857fd4267d7f6b28"
+	"0x2cd597b7305a446a1df355e6909cbd75fe38aa045faf4876a8e5496eebc1734f"
	values.$implementation:
-	"eth:0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957"
+	"eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550"
	values.$pastUpgrades.6:
+	["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.7:
+	["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	6
+	8
	values.version:
-	"2.4.0"
+	"2.4.2"
	implementationNames.eth:0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957:
-	"SuperchainConfig"
	implementationNames.eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550:
+	"SuperchainConfig"
	}

	contract L1StandardBridge (eth:0x99C9fc46f92E8a1c0deC1b1747d010903E884bE1) [opstack/L1StandardBridge] {
	+++ description: The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0xcacd38e7b52353ad3463da40b7e7a29b028f95500a82590d2b8f8ffd26b83f6d"
+	"0x6469155800e1489607c8fa062550a362dfa8978885df4714ca4653e5f3d25b0c"
	values.$implementation:
-	"eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A"
+	"eth:0xB37a11AadF167B2F0b8dD85372De4bC66CD4A891"
	values.version:
-	"2.8.0"
+	"2.8.2"
	implementationNames.eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A:
-	"L1StandardBridge"
	implementationNames.eth:0xB37a11AadF167B2F0b8dD85372De4bC66CD4A891:
+	"L1StandardBridge"
	}

	contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0xbEb5Fc579115071764c7423A4f12eDde41f106Ed) [opstack/OptimismPortal2] {
	+++ description: The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the FaultDisputeGame.
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0x7883f2d27d696b1fa6259a97c561d651493c2c1324e9646e04dba10adcfd8a21"
+	"0xe1df4caf26d9a0735bd53eeb020546840bd2f2fd4d0d9e2519f873306b5e19b1"
	values.$implementation:
-	"eth:0x97cEbbf8959e2A5476fbe9B98A21806Ec234609B"
+	"eth:0xe89F13c5ee4033B2D3cD76C9d6958eFBfe26D3C2"
	values.$pastUpgrades.13:
+	["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.14:
+	["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0xe89F13c5ee4033B2D3cD76C9d6958eFBfe26D3C2"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	13
+	15
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.respectedGameType:
-	0
+	8
	values.version:
-	"5.2.0"
+	"5.6.1"
	implementationNames.eth:0x97cEbbf8959e2A5476fbe9B98A21806Ec234609B:
-	"OptimismPortal2"
	implementationNames.eth:0xe89F13c5ee4033B2D3cD76C9d6958eFBfe26D3C2:
+	"OptimismPortal2"
	}

-	Status: DELETED
	contract DelayedWETH (eth:0xD061AB95069987868768818cc1248705351e2D0e) [opstack/DelayedWETH]
	+++ description: Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.

-	Status: DELETED
	contract DelayedWETH (eth:0xe03F4d1D0E6B8b18b97198598b3f792E57BA17d4) [opstack/DelayedWETH]
	+++ description: Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.

	contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0xe5965Ab5962eDc7477C8520243A95517CD252fA9) [opstack/DisputeGameFactory_v2] {
	+++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. This variant exposes per-type reads only; the legacy array views (gameImpls[], initBonds[]) were removed in the new implementation.
	template:
-	"opstack/DisputeGameFactory"
+	"opstack/DisputeGameFactory_v2"
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0x8f21dbc160582c568a2a925ddad1b2bb889a9f72bac2067c6e72d43b662ef538"
+	"0x8912e655e26f51d4384fc950df847ae65bccf1f5ec5458642402f385c3dadf78"
	description:
-	"The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them."
+	"The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. This variant exposes per-type reads only; the legacy array views (gameImpls[], initBonds[]) were removed in the new implementation."
	values.$implementation:
-	"eth:0xc040F392E52Cb6970CA8E110c280fE24E07C5e2c"
+	"eth:0x72B971717E088B59F26d4236BE222ADB6ACD393b"
	values.$pastUpgrades.6:
+	["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.7:
+	["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0x72B971717E088B59F26d4236BE222ADB6ACD393b"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	6
+	8
	values.game2000:
-	"eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
	values.gameImpls.0:
-	"eth:0x6dDBa09bc4cCB0D6Ca9Fc5350580f74165707499"
+	"eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
	values.gameImpls.1:
-	"eth:0x58bf355C5d4EdFc723eF89d99582ECCfd143266A"
+	"eth:0xe1dFFCBE4e22B813F26d2106D943C102e7cAb87e"
	values.initBonds.0:
-	"80000000000000000"
+	0
	values.version:
-	"1.4.0"
+	"1.6.1"
	values.wethFromDGF:
-	"eth:0xe03F4d1D0E6B8b18b97198598b3f792E57BA17d4"
+	"eth:0x1B6DBF05EaF22d4E70dC993e8a19dd9F3dcb3162"
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.game0:
+	"eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.game1:
+	"eth:0xe1dFFCBE4e22B813F26d2106D943C102e7cAb87e"
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.game621:
+	"eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.game8:
+	"eth:0x2DDA3584b51eF5236f7726Dea5A0FB6B3cA94AeC"
	values.game8Args:
+	"0x0337ecb3604c0b40c352e0c7711beb17a212d583f4fe956fd8d66e29ad5f9025acc005dcd857b401e4732e6f7837135a22825cfa23b2c62946350f4246f9f9d027e071f0264fd1131b6dbf05eaf22d4e70dc993e8a19dd9f3dcb3162000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000a"
	values.game8Vm:
+	"eth:0xaCc005DCd857B401e4732E6F7837135A22825cfA"
	values.initBondGame0:
+	0
	values.initBondGame1:
+	"80000000000000000"
	values.initBondGame621:
+	0
	values.initBondGame8:
+	"80000000000000000"
	fieldMeta.gameImpls:
-	{"severity":"HIGH"}
	fieldMeta.game2000:
-	{"severity":"HIGH"}
	fieldMeta.game621:
+	{"severity":"HIGH"}
	fieldMeta.game0:
+	{"severity":"HIGH"}
	fieldMeta.game1:
+	{"severity":"HIGH"}
	fieldMeta.game8:
+	{"severity":"HIGH"}
	implementationNames.eth:0xc040F392E52Cb6970CA8E110c280fE24E07C5e2c:
-	"DisputeGameFactory"
	implementationNames.eth:0x72B971717E088B59F26d4236BE222ADB6ACD393b:
+	"DisputeGameFactory"
	usedTypes.0:
+	{"typeCaster":"SliceAddress","arg":{"offset":32}}
	}

+	Status: CREATED
	contract DelayedWETH (eth:0x1B6DBF05EaF22d4E70dC993e8a19dd9F3dcb3162) [opstack/DelayedWETH]
	+++ description: Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract PreimageOracle (eth:0x1E1d73536A081Ef2F355d29794547a9770Aeb1E0) [opstack/PreimageOracle]
	+++ description: The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract FaultDisputeGame (eth:0x2DDA3584b51eF5236f7726Dea5A0FB6B3cA94AeC) [opstack/FaultDisputeGame]
	+++ description: Logic of the dispute game. When a state root is proposed, a dispute game contract is deployed. Challengers can use such contracts to challenge the proposed state root.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract MIPS (eth:0xaCc005DCd857B401e4732E6F7837135A22825cfA) [opstack/MIPS]
	+++ description: The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0xe1dFFCBE4e22B813F26d2106D943C102e7cAb87e) [opstack/PermissionedDisputeGame]
	+++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger.

2026 May 15, 13:30 UTC

4changes

Scheduled signer-key rotation on shared OP Stack governance contracts (no threshold or permission changes): - DeputyPauseModule ( 0x76fC2F971FB355D0453cF9F64d3F9E4f640E1754 ): deputy rotated from 0x352f1defB49718e7Ea411687E850aA8d6299F7aC to 0x2fA150379bF32b6d79Eeb4ff9bD280E76049a87c . Executed via superchain-ops eth/052; the DeputyPauseModule spec specifies that this is a regular rotation. - OpFoundationUpgradeSafe and OpFoundationOperationsSafe: Member rotated.

Scheduled signer-key rotation on shared OP Stack governance contracts (no threshold or permission changes):

DeputyPauseModule (0x76fC2F971FB355D0453cF9F64d3F9E4f640E1754): deputy rotated from 0x352f1defB49718e7Ea411687E850aA8d6299F7aC to 0x2fA150379bF32b6d79Eeb4ff9bD280E76049a87c. Executed via superchain-ops eth/052; the DeputyPauseModule spec specifies that this is a regular rotation.
OpFoundationUpgradeSafe and OpFoundationOperationsSafe: Member rotated.

	contract DeputyPauseModule (eth:0x76fC2F971FB355D0453cF9F64d3F9E4f640E1754) [opstack/DeputyPauseModule] {
	+++ description: Allows eth:0x2fA150379bF32b6d79Eeb4ff9bD280E76049a87c, called the deputy pauser, to act on behalf of the eth:0x847B5c174615B1B7fDF770882256e2D3E95b9D92 if set as its Safe module.
	description:
-	"Allows eth:0x352f1defB49718e7Ea411687E850aA8d6299F7aC, called the deputy pauser, to act on behalf of the eth:0x847B5c174615B1B7fDF770882256e2D3E95b9D92 if set as its Safe module."
+	"Allows eth:0x2fA150379bF32b6d79Eeb4ff9bD280E76049a87c, called the deputy pauser, to act on behalf of the eth:0x847B5c174615B1B7fDF770882256e2D3E95b9D92 if set as its Safe module."
	values.deputy:
-	"eth:0x352f1defB49718e7Ea411687E850aA8d6299F7aC"
+	"eth:0x2fA150379bF32b6d79Eeb4ff9bD280E76049a87c"
	}

	contract OpFoundationUpgradeSafe (eth:0x847B5c174615B1B7fDF770882256e2D3E95b9D92) [GnosisSafe] {
	+++ description: None
	values.$members.6:
-	"eth:0xc222ab08333109243B1f4E2a80e3D0A190714AB5"
+	"eth:0xa2A58E31C03C59e34ab4d996d811DA0C035BfDea"
	}

	contract OpFoundationOperationsSafe (eth:0x9BA6e03D8B90dE867373Db8cF1A58d2F7F006b3A) [GnosisSafe] {
	+++ description: None
	values.$members.6:
-	"eth:0xc222ab08333109243B1f4E2a80e3D0A190714AB5"
+	"eth:0xa2A58E31C03C59e34ab4d996d811DA0C035BfDea"
	}

Operator

The system has a centralized operator

The operatorAn operator is the entity charged with managing a rollup and progressing its state. A rollup operator can be a centralized sequencer, proposer, prover, challenger, pauser of admin that is able to perform upgrades. is the only entity that can propose blocksAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over.. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.

MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

Users can force any transaction

Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.

Sequencing

Transactions are ordered by a centralized sequencer

OP Mainnet uses a single centralized sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. for fast confirmations. Users can bypass it with one Ethereum transaction to the OptimismPortal. RollupA blockchain that inherits consensus and data availability from another blockchain called L1. Rollups enable trust minimized bridges with the base layer via proof systems, either optimistic or zero-knowledge. A rollup without a bridge, or without considering the bridge, is called a sovereign rollup. nodes derive the deposited transaction from Ethereum, including it after at most one sequencing window.

Centralized sequencing spec sheet
Trusted preconfirmation	2 s L2 block time
Trusted ordering	Fee order per Flashblock
Sequencer	Raft HA
Real-time censorship resistance
Forced inclusion	1 L1 tx: portal deposit
Inclusion delay	3,600 L1 blocks
Inclusion mechanics	Address alias
Exit delay	12h inclusion + 20d 15h state
Exit economics	Favors attacker 1.09×

Censorship resistance

The centralized sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. provides no real-time censorship resistance. The Ethereum deposit path provides eventual censorship resistance, assuming the deposit is included on Ethereum.

Withdrawals

Regular exits

The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlementThe mechanism with which the execution of rollup blocks and the resultant state is verified and possible disputes are resolved. In the context of rollups or other modular blockchains, it often refers to the proof system used--validity (ZK) or fraud proofs, or a combination thereof. Sometimes it will refer to this mechanism along with where the mechanism's outputs are ultimately published and verified, as in Ethereum being a settlement layer by verifying the proofs and allowing for withdrawals., but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled. of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.

Forced messaging

If the user experiences censorship from the operatorAn operator is the entity charged with managing a rollup and progressing its state. A rollup operator can be a centralized sequencer, proposer, prover, challenger, pauser of admin that is able to perform upgrades. with regular L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups.->L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.

Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain

Other considerations

EVM compatible smart contracts are supported

OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM EquivalenceA perfect degree of compatibility; where one system or concept is indistinguishable from another in the domain being compared. In the context of rollups, it generally refers to the proximity to the EVM and to Ethereum architecture. model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. can be deployed on L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups..

Introducing EVM Equivalence

Permissions

A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions

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Ethereum

Actors:

SuperchainProxyAdminOwner0x5a0A…3d2A

A Multisig with 2/2 threshold.

Can upgrade with no delay
- DelayedWETH SuperchainProxyAdmin
- SystemConfig SuperchainProxyAdmin
- AnchorStateRegistry SuperchainProxyAdmin
- L1CrossDomainMessenger SuperchainProxyAdmin
- ETHLockbox SuperchainProxyAdmin
- L1ERC721Bridge SuperchainProxyAdmin
- OptimismMintableERC20Factory SuperchainProxyAdmin
- SuperchainConfig SuperchainProxyAdmin
- L1StandardBridge SuperchainProxyAdmin
- OptimismPortal2 SuperchainProxyAdmin
- DisputeGameFactory SuperchainProxyAdmin
Can interact with AddressManager
- set and change address mappings SuperchainProxyAdmin
Can interact with DisputeGameFactory
- set the dispute game implementation and initial bond for any game type

Participants (2):

Used in:

OpFoundationUpgradeSafe0x847B…9D92

A Multisig with 5/7 threshold. It uses the following modules: SaferSafes (A Gnosis Safe module combining LivenessModule and TimelockGuard. Provides livenessLiveness refers to the ability of a system to respond to requests and to process them in a timely manner. In the context of L2s, it refers to the ability of settling transactions, proofs and state roots to the base layer. checks where a fallback owner can challenge and take over if Safe owners are unresponsive, plus optional timelock delays for transaction scheduling). Member of SuperchainProxyAdminOwner.

Can interact with SystemConfig
- it can update the preconfer address, the batch submitter (SequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs.) address and the gasA virtual fuel used to execute smart contracts on a rollup. The EVM (or other VM within the rollup) uses an accounting mechanism to correspond the consumption of gas to the consumption of computing resources, and to limit the consumption of computing resources. configuration of the system
Can interact with SuperchainConfig
- Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof systemThe infrastructure that allows projects to verify their state transitions. It is composed by onchain verifiers and offchain provers. The main two flavors are optimistic and ZK proof systems, but they can be combined in a hybrid model. In general though, if a system is able to accept state roots optimistically, even if it has a ZK component, it is considered an optimistic proof system., the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionlessAnyone willing should be able to join and leave the network at any time, without causing significant disturbance to the network or being detrimental to the party in question. No single entity should have the power to allowlist or blocklist participants.) LivenessModule if the number of Optimism Security CouncilA Security Council is a sufficiently decentralized set of members that is able to upgrade a system. A properly set up Security Council consists of at least 8 members with a threshold greater than 75%. What 'sufficiently decentralized' means is fundamentally subjective and L2BEAT evaluates each case individually. A Security Council is allowed to instantly upgrade Stage 1 rollups. members falls below 8 → Optimism Security Council → Optimism Guardian Multisig

Participants (7):

0xf1Ef…4639 0x3041…1623 0xC2Db…6dF5 0x7F1D…9f27 0x4D01…6d15 0x69ac…Fd02 0xa2A5…fDea

Used in:

SaferSafes0xA844…483a

A Gnosis Safe module combining LivenessModule and TimelockGuard. Provides livenessLiveness refers to the ability of a system to respond to requests and to process them in a timely manner. In the context of L2s, it refers to the ability of settling transactions, proofs and state roots to the base layer. checks where a fallback owner can challenge and take over if Safe owners are unresponsive, plus optional timelock delays for transaction scheduling.

Can interact with SystemConfig
- it can update the preconfer address, the batch submitter (SequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs.) address and the gasA virtual fuel used to execute smart contracts on a rollup. The EVM (or other VM within the rollup) uses an accounting mechanism to correspond the consumption of gas to the consumption of computing resources, and to limit the consumption of computing resources. configuration of the system OpFoundationUpgradeSafe
Can interact with SuperchainConfig
- Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof systemThe infrastructure that allows projects to verify their state transitions. It is composed by onchain verifiers and offchain provers. The main two flavors are optimistic and ZK proof systems, but they can be combined in a hybrid model. In general though, if a system is able to accept state roots optimistically, even if it has a ZK component, it is considered an optimistic proof system., the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionlessAnyone willing should be able to join and leave the network at any time, without causing significant disturbance to the network or being detrimental to the party in question. No single entity should have the power to allowlist or blocklist participants.) OpFoundationUpgradeSafe → LivenessModule if the number of Optimism Security CouncilA Security Council is a sufficiently decentralized set of members that is able to upgrade a system. A properly set up Security Council consists of at least 8 members with a threshold greater than 75%. What 'sufficiently decentralized' means is fundamentally subjective and L2BEAT evaluates each case individually. A Security Council is allowed to instantly upgrade Stage 1 rollups. members falls below 8 → Optimism Security Council → Optimism Guardian Multisig

Used in:

Optimism Security Council0xc281…Bd03

A Multisig with 10/13 threshold. It uses the following modules: LivenessModule (used to remove members inactive for 3mo 8d while making sure that the threshold remains above 75%. If the number of members falls below 8, the OpFoundationUpgradeSafe takes ownership of the multisig). Member of Optimism Guardian Multisig, SuperchainProxyAdminOwner.

Can interact with SuperchainConfig
- Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof systemThe infrastructure that allows projects to verify their state transitions. It is composed by onchain verifiers and offchain provers. The main two flavors are optimistic and ZK proof systems, but they can be combined in a hybrid model. In general though, if a system is able to accept state roots optimistically, even if it has a ZK component, it is considered an optimistic proof system., the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionlessAnyone willing should be able to join and leave the network at any time, without causing significant disturbance to the network or being detrimental to the party in question. No single entity should have the power to allowlist or blocklist participants.) Optimism Guardian Multisig

Participants (13):

0xE61F…76aE 0x652B…cB5f 0x5c1f…7a81 0x4A73…e61E 0x3A53…aa94 0xEF9A…877c 0x6323…c865 0xd5b7…aC90 0x7ed8…9E39 0xd915…5930 0x0a87…efE6 0xbfA0…E0d9 0xcbC7…7eA6

Used in:

Security Council members - Optimism Collective Governance Forum

LivenessGuard0x2442…4a25

Modular contract to be used together with the LivenessModule. Tracks livenessLiveness refers to the ability of a system to respond to requests and to process them in a timely manner. In the context of L2s, it refers to the ability of settling transactions, proofs and state roots to the base layer. / activity of Safe owners.

Can interact with LivenessModule
- can remove members of Optimism Security CouncilA Security Council is a sufficiently decentralized set of members that is able to upgrade a system. A properly set up Security Council consists of at least 8 members with a threshold greater than 75%. What 'sufficiently decentralized' means is fundamentally subjective and L2BEAT evaluates each case individually. A Security Council is allowed to instantly upgrade Stage 1 rollups. inactive for 3mo 8d

Used in:

Optimism Guardian Multisig0x09f7…dAf2

A Multisig with 1/1 threshold. It uses the following modules: DeputyPauseModule (Allows 0x2fA150379bF32b6d79Eeb4ff9bD280E76049a87c, called the deputy pauser, to act on behalf of the OpFoundationUpgradeSafe if set as its Safe module).

Participants (1):

Optimism Security Council

Used in:

OpFoundationOperationsSafe0x9BA6…6b3A

Participants (7):

0xf1Ef…4639 0x3041…1623 0xC2Db…6dF5 0x7F1D…9f27 0x4D01…6d15 0x69ac…Fd02 0xa2A5…fDea

Used in:

EOA 10x6887…2985

Can interact with SystemConfig
- Allowed to commit transactions from the current layer to the host chain

Optimism EOA 10x2fA1…a87c

Can interact with SuperchainConfig
- Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof systemThe infrastructure that allows projects to verify their state transitions. It is composed by onchain verifiers and offchain provers. The main two flavors are optimistic and ZK proof systems, but they can be combined in a hybrid model. In general though, if a system is able to accept state roots optimistically, even if it has a ZK component, it is considered an optimistic proof system., the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionlessAnyone willing should be able to join and leave the network at any time, without causing significant disturbance to the network or being detrimental to the party in question. No single entity should have the power to allowlist or blocklist participants.) DeputyPauseModule though restricted to the SuperchainConfig’s pause() function → Optimism Guardian Multisig

Used in:

OP Mainnet

Actors:

SafeL20x3F3C…61D2

A Multisig with 6/9 threshold. It uses the following modules: SaferSafes. Member of MintManagerOwner.

Can interact with MintManager
- can mint OP up to the hardcoded inflation cap MintManagerOwner

Participants (9):

0xb8CF…6Cb4 0x510A…f926 0x23d8…b102 0x2eFd…62A5 0xDD08…77c1 0xB243…e24C 0xa564…3104 0x7F1D…9f27 0xe414…51ea

MintManager0x5C4e…1005

Controls the OP inflation rate, which is currently hardcoded to 2% annually.

Can interact with OPToken
- can mint OP tokens

SaferSafes0xA844…483a

Can interact with MintManager
- can mint OP up to the hardcoded inflation cap SafeL2 → MintManagerOwner

MintManagerOwner0x2A82…3a26

A Multisig with 1/1 threshold.

Participants (1):

SafeL2

SuperchainProxyAdminOwner - L2 Alias0x6B1B…4E3b

Can upgrade with no delay
- DeployerWhitelist L2ProxyAdmin
- L2CrossDomainMessenger L2ProxyAdmin
- GasPriceOracle L2ProxyAdmin
- L2StandardBridge L2ProxyAdmin
- SequencerFeeVault L2ProxyAdmin
- OptimismMintableERC20Factory L2ProxyAdmin
- L1BlockNumber L2ProxyAdmin
- L2ERC721Bridge L2ProxyAdmin
- L1Block L2ProxyAdmin
- L2ToL1MessagePasser L2ProxyAdmin
- OptimismMintableERC721Factory L2ProxyAdmin
- L2ProxyAdmin L2ProxyAdmin
- BaseFeeVault L2ProxyAdmin
- L1FeeVault L2ProxyAdmin
- OperatorFeeVault L2ProxyAdmin
- SchemaRegistry L2ProxyAdmin
- EAS L2ProxyAdmin

Smart contracts

A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions

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Note: Contracts presented in this section had their implementations updated since the last time our team looked at this project. The information presented may be inaccurate.

A diagram of the smart contract architecture

Ethereum

L1StandardBridge

Escrow

0x99C9…4bE1 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.

Roles:
- admin: SuperchainProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner

All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation.

Can be upgraded by:

0x7694…5dE6 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Implementation used in:

LivenessModule0x0454…a748

used to remove members inactive for 3mo 8d while making sure that the threshold remains above 75%. If the number of members falls below 8, the OpFoundationUpgradeSafe takes ownership of the multisig

Roles:
- fallbackOwner: OpFoundationUpgradeSafe if the number of Optimism Security CouncilA Security Council is a sufficiently decentralized set of members that is able to upgrade a system. A properly set up Security Council consists of at least 8 members with a threshold greater than 75%. What 'sufficiently decentralized' means is fundamentally subjective and L2BEAT evaluates each case individually. A Security Council is allowed to instantly upgrade Stage 1 rollups. members falls below 8
- livenessGuard: LivenessGuard

Implementation used in:

L1DAITokenBridge0x10E6…5f2F

Custom Gateway for DAI deposits via canonical messaging. Deposited DAI is forwarded to a Vault contract.

PreimageOracle0x1E1d…b1E0

The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. for a dispute game.

Implementation used in:

FaultDisputeGame0x2DDA…4AeC

Logic of the dispute game. When a state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. is proposed, a dispute game contract is deployed. Challengers can use such contracts to challenge the proposed state root.

Implementation used in:

L1DAIEscrow

Escrow

0x4671…6C65

Stores DAI deposited from the attached L1DAITokenBridge.

The following tokens are included in the value secured calculation:

SuperchainProxyAdmin0x543b…fB04

Roles:
- owner: SuperchainProxyAdminOwner

Implementation used in:

SynthetixBridgeEscrow

Escrow

0x5Fd7…eF9f

Synthetix-governed custom escrow for SNX bridged via canonical messaging. Its additional trust assumptions put it outside the ossification perimeter.

The following tokens are included in the value secured calculation:

wstETHEscrow

Escrow

Lido custom escrow for wstETH tokens that uses the canonical bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. for messaging but is governed externally.

The following tokens are included in the value secured calculation:

DeputyPauseModule0x76fC…1754

Allows 0x2fA150379bF32b6d79Eeb4ff9bD280E76049a87c, called the deputy pauser, to act on behalf of the OpFoundationUpgradeSafe if set as its Safe module.

Roles:
- deputy: Optimism EOA 1 though restricted to the SuperchainConfig’s pause() function

Implementation used in:

FeesCollector0xa3d5…ADEa Implementation (Upgradable)

Collecting sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs., base- and L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. fees from L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups..

MIPS0xaCc0…5cfA

The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.

Implementation used in:

PermissionedDisputeGame0xe1dF…b87e

Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block. and challenger.

Implementation used in:

There are impactful changes to the following contracts, and part of the information might be outdated.

SystemConfig0x2290…B290 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Contains configuration parameters such as the SequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. address, gas limitThe maximum amount of gas a transaction or block may consume. on this chain and the unsafe blockAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over. signer address.

Roles:
- admin: SuperchainProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner
- batcherHash: EOA 1
- owner: OpFoundationUpgradeSafe; ultimately SaferSafes

Can be upgraded by:

Implementation used in:

OptimismPortal20xbEb5…06Ed Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. to L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups.. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the FaultDisputeGame.

Roles:
- admin: SuperchainProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner

Can be upgraded by:

Implementation used in:

DisputeGameFactory0xe596…2fA9 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. and eventually challenge them. This variant exposes per-type reads only; the legacy array views (gameImpls[], initBonds[]) were removed in the new implementation.

Roles:
- admin: SuperchainProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner
- owner: SuperchainProxyAdminOwner

Can be upgraded by:

Implementation used in:

SuperchainConfig0x9570…4a4C Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Used to manage global configuration values for multiple OP Chains within a single Superchain networkA constellation of nodes (peers) that communicate via a peer-to-peer protocol, for example, in propagating transactions and blocks to other nodes.. The SuperchainConfig contract manages individual pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3 months if left untouched.

Roles:
- admin: SuperchainProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner
- guardian: Optimism Guardian Multisig; ultimately OpFoundationUpgradeSafe, Optimism EOA 1, Optimism Security CouncilA Security Council is a sufficiently decentralized set of members that is able to upgrade a system. A properly set up Security Council consists of at least 8 members with a threshold greater than 75%. What 'sufficiently decentralized' means is fundamentally subjective and L2BEAT evaluates each case individually. A Security Council is allowed to instantly upgrade Stage 1 rollups., SaferSafes

Can be upgraded by:

Proxy used in:

Implementation used in:

L1CrossDomainMessenger0x25ac…5fA1 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain’s epoch gas limitThe maximum amount of gas a transaction or block may consume., it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.

Roles:
- admin: SuperchainProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner

Can be upgraded by:

Implementation used in:

L1ERC721Bridge0x5a77…f23D Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Used to bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.

Roles:
- admin: SuperchainProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner

Can be upgraded by:

Implementation used in:

DelayedWETH0x1B6D…3162 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.

Roles:
- admin: SuperchainProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner

Can be upgraded by:

Implementation used in:

AnchorStateRegistry0x23B2…D113 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Contains the latest confirmed state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. This variant stores respectedGameType, retirementTimestamp, and disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds locally and drops the legacy *FromGame fields, since the AggregateVerifier model does not expose vm()/weth()/absolutePrestate() on its game implementation.

Roles:
- admin: SuperchainProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner

Can be upgraded by:

0x322b…4D43 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Implementation used in:

ETHLockbox

Escrow

A simple escrow contract storing ETH for the canonical bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge..

Roles:
- admin: SuperchainProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner

The following tokens are included in the value secured calculation:

Can be upgraded by:

Implementation used in:

OptimismMintableERC20Factory0x7550…Fa0F Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the networkA constellation of nodes (peers) that communicate via a peer-to-peer protocol, for example, in propagating transactions and blocks to other nodes. it’s deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain’s representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.

Roles:
- admin: SuperchainProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner

Can be upgraded by:

Implementation used in:

OP Mainnet

DeployerWhitelist0x4200…0002 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Legacy contract that was originally used to act as a whitelist of addresses allowed to the Optimism networkA constellation of nodes (peers) that communicate via a peer-to-peer protocol, for example, in propagating transactions and blocks to other nodes.. Fully unused and deprecated since the Bedrock upgrade.

Roles:
- admin: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner - L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. Alias

Can be upgraded by:

L2CrossDomainMessenger0x4200…0007 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

The L2CrossDomainMessenger (L2xDM) contract sends messages from L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. to L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development., and relays messages from L1 onto L2 with a system tx. In the event that a message sent from L2 to L1 is rejected for exceeding the L1 gas limitThe maximum amount of gas a transaction or block may consume., it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.

Roles:
- admin: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner - L2 Alias

Can be upgraded by:

GasPriceOracle0x4200…000F Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Provides the current gas pricePrice of one unit of gas specified in a transaction. The token used to pay for gas is usually Ether, but rollups can use other custom tokens. for L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. transactions.

Roles:
- admin: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner - L2 Alias

Can be upgraded by:

L2StandardBridge0x4200…0010 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

The L2StandardBridge contract is the main entry point to deposit or withdraw ERC20 tokens from L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. to L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development.. This contract can store any token.

Roles:
- admin: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner - L2 Alias

Can be upgraded by:

SequencerFeeVault0x4200…0011 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Collects the sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. fees, which are withdrawable to the FeesCollector on L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development..

Roles:
- admin: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner - L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. Alias

Can be upgraded by:

OptimismMintableERC20Factory0x4200…0012 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Roles:
- admin: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner - L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. Alias

Can be upgraded by:

L1BlockNumber0x4200…0013 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Simple contract that returns the latest L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. blockAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over. number.

Roles:
- admin: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner - L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. Alias

Can be upgraded by:

L2ERC721Bridge0x4200…0014 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

The L2ERC721Bridge contract is the main entry point to deposit or withdraw ERC721 tokens from L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. to L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development.. This contract can store any token.

Roles:
- admin: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner - L2 Alias

Can be upgraded by:

L1Block0x4200…0015 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Simple contract that returns information about the latest L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. blockAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over., which is derived permissionlessly from the L1 chain.

Roles:
- admin: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner - L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. Alias

Can be upgraded by:

L2ToL1MessagePasser0x4200…0016 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Contract used internally by the L2CrossDomainMessenger to send messages to L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development., including withdrawals. It can also be used directly as a low-level interface.

Roles:
- admin: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner - L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. Alias

Can be upgraded by:

OptimismMintableERC721Factory0x4200…0017 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Factory contract to create bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. compliant ERC721 IOU token representations of bridged L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. ERC721 tokens.

Roles:
- admin: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner - L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. Alias

Can be upgraded by:

L2ProxyAdmin0x4200…0018 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Administration contract for the L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. predeploy proxies. Adds upgradePredeploys(address), which can only be called by the system depositor account and delegatecalls an L2ContractsManager to upgrade every predeploy in a single networkA constellation of nodes (peers) that communicate via a peer-to-peer protocol, for example, in propagating transactions and blocks to other nodes. upgrade transaction.

Roles:
- admin: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner - L2 Alias
- owner: SuperchainProxyAdminOwner - L2 Alias

Can be upgraded by:

BaseFeeVault0x4200…0019 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Collects EIP-1559 base fees, which are withdrawable to the FeesCollector on L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development..

Roles:
- admin: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner - L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. Alias

Can be upgraded by:

L1FeeVault0x4200…001A Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Collects the L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. portion of the L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. transaction fees, which are withdrawable to the FeesCollector on L1.

Roles:
- admin: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner - L2 Alias

Can be upgraded by:

OperatorFeeVault0x4200…001b Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Holds the ‘operatorAn operator is the entity charged with managing a rollup and progressing its state. A rollup operator can be a centralized sequencer, proposer, prover, challenger, pauser of admin that is able to perform upgrades. fees’ for the L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. networkA constellation of nodes (peers) that communicate via a peer-to-peer protocol, for example, in propagating transactions and blocks to other nodes., which are part of the L2 fees that users pay.

Roles:
- admin: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner - L2 Alias

Can be upgraded by:

SchemaRegistry0x4200…0020 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Contracts to register schemas for the Ethereum Attestation Service (EAS).

Roles:
- admin: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner - L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. Alias

Can be upgraded by:

EAS0x4200…0021 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Contract containing the main logic for the Ethereum Attestation Service (EAS).

Roles:
- admin: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner - L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. Alias

Can be upgraded by: