ZKsync Era logoZKsync Era

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About

ZKsync Era is a general-purpose ZK Rollup with full EVM compatibility.


Value Locked

$778.85 M

1.69%

Canonically Bridged
$346.70 M
Externally Bridged
$0.00
Natively Minted
$432.15 M

  • Tokens
  • Daily TPS
    1.8221.80%
  • 30D tx count
    6.14 M

  • Stage
    Stage 0
  • Type
    ZK Rollup
  • Purpose
    Universal
  • Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure

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    About

    ZKsync Era is a general-purpose ZK Rollup with full EVM compatibility.


    Value Locked
    Activity
    Onchain costs
    Milestones & Incidents

    ZKsync Protocol Upgrade v24

    2024 Jun 6th

    A protocol upgrade that introduces a shared bridge and the foundation for other ZK stack chains.

    Learn more

    ZKsync Era starts using blobs

    2024 Mar 13th

    ZKsync Era starts publishing data to blobs.

    Learn more
    Risk summary
    Withdrawals are delayed by 21h. The length of the delay can be arbitrarily set by a MultiSig.
    Risk analysis
    Withdrawals are delayed by 21h. The length of the delay can be arbitrarily set by a MultiSig.
    Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure

    Sequencer failure

    Enqueue via L1

    Users can submit transactions to an L1 queue, but can’t force them. The sequencer cannot selectively skip transactions but can stop processing the queue entirely. In other words, if the sequencer censors or is down, it is so for everyone.

    State validation

    ZK proofs

    Data availability

    On chain (SD)

    All of the data (SD = state diffs) needed for proof construction is published on chain.

    Exit window

    None

    There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.

    Proposer failure

    Cannot withdraw

    Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.

    Rollup stage
    ZKsync EraZKsync Era is a
    Stage 0
    ZK Rollup.

    Learn more about Rollup stages
    Please keep in mind that these stages do not reflect rollup security, this is an opinionated assessment of rollup maturity based on subjective criteria, created with a goal of incentivizing projects to push toward better decentralization. Each team may have taken different paths to achieve this goal.
    Technology

    Zero knowledge STARK and SNARK cryptography is used

    Despite their production use zkSTARKs and zkSNARKs proof systems are still relatively new, complex and they rely on the proper implementation of the polynomial constraints used to check validity of the Execution Trace. In addition zkSNARKs require a trusted setup to operate.

    • Funds can be lost if the proof system is implemented incorrectly.

    All data required for proofs is published on chain

    All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.

    State derivation
    Node software

    The node software is open-source, and its source code can be found here. The main node software does not rely on Layer 1 (L1) to reconstruct the state, but you can use this tool for that purpose. Currently, there is no straightforward method to inject the state into the main node, but ZKsync is actively working on a solution for this.

    Compression scheme

    Bytecodes undergo compression before deployment on Layer 1 (L1). You can find additional information on this process here.

    Genesis state

    There have been neither genesis states nor regenesis.

    Data format

    Details on data format can be found here.

    State validation

    Each update to the system state must be accompanied by a ZK proof that ensures that the new state was derived by correctly applying a series of valid user transactions to the previous state. These proofs are then verified on Ethereum by a smart contract.


    Prover Architecture

    ZKsync Era proof system Boojum can be found here and contains essential tools like the Prover, the Verifier, and other backend components. The specs of the system can be found here.

    ZK Circuits

    ZKsync Era circuits are built from Boojum and are designed to replicate the behavior of the EVM. The source code can be found here. The circuits are checked against tests that can be found here.

    • Funds can be lost if the proof system is implemented incorrectly.

    Verification Keys Generation

    SNARK verification keys can be generated and checked against the Ethereum verifier contract using this tool. The system requires a trusted setup.

    Operator

    The system has a centralized operator

    The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.

    • MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

    Users can force any transaction via L1

    If a user is censored by L2 Sequencer, they can try to force transaction via L1 queue. Right now there is no mechanism that forces L2 Sequencer to include transactions from L1 queue in an L2 block.

    • Users can be censored if the operator refuses to include their transactions.

    1. L1 - L2 interoperability - Developer's documentation
    Withdrawals

    Regular exit

    The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is proven the funds become available for withdrawal on L1. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.

    1. Withdrawing funds - ZKsync documentation

    Forced exit

    If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular exit they can submit their withdrawal requests directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages from L1, including all forced withdrawals and deposits. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular exit.

    Upgrades & Governance
    A diagram of the upgrades and governance
    A diagram of the upgrades and governance

    The Matter Labs multisig (4 / 7) is able to instantly upgrade all contracts and manage all parameters and roles. This includes upgrading the shared contracts, the ZKsync Era diamond and other ZK stack diamonds and their facets and censoring transactions or stealing locked funds. Most permissions are inherited by it being the indirect Owner of the StateTransitionManager (STM) and Governor (owner) of the Governance contract. A security council is currently not used.

    The current deployment allows for a subset of the permissions currently held by the Matter Labs Multisig to be held by a ChainAdmin role. This role can manage fees, apply predefined upgrades, censor bridge transactions, manage Validator addresses and revert batches. It cannot make arbitrary updates or access funds in the escrows. This Admin role is usually set to a ChainAdmin contract which is itself owned by the Matter Labs Multisig (Thus not affecting their full permissions).

    Other roles include:

    Validator: Proposes batches from L2 through the ValidatorTimelock, from where they can be proven and finally executed (by the Validator through the ExecutorFacet of the diamond) after a predefined delay (currently 21h). This allows for freezing the L2 chain and reverting batches within the delay if any suspicious activity was detected, but also delays finality. The ValidatorTimelock has the single Validator role in the Zk stack diamond contracts and can be set by the Matter Labs Multisig through the STM. The actual Validator actors can be added and removed by the ChainAdmin in the ValidatorTimelock contract.

    Verifier: Verifies the zk proofs that were provided by a Validator. Can be changed by calling executeUpgrade() on the AdminFacet from the STM.

    A Governance smart contract is used as the intermediary for most of the critical permissions of the Matter Labs Multisig. It includes logic for planning upgrades with parameters like transparency and/or a delay. Currently the delay is optional and not used by the multisig. The optional transparency may be used in the future to hide instant emergency upgrades by the Security Council or delay transparent (thus auditable) governance upgrades. The Governance smart contract has two roles, an Owner (Governor role in the picture, resolves to Matter Labs Multisig) role and a SecurityCouncil role.

    Permissions

    The system uses the following set of permissioned addresses:

    Matter Labs Multisig 0x4e49…7828

    This is a Gnosis Safe with 4 / 7 threshold. This MultiSig is the current central Admin for upgradeability and configuration of the rollup system and can potentially steal all funds.

    Used in:

    Those are the participants of the Matter Labs Multisig.

    ChainAdmin Owner 0x4e49…7828

    Can manage fees, apply predefined upgrades, censor bridge transactions and revert batches (Admin role).

    Used in:

    Actors that are allowed to propose, execute and revert L2 batches on L1 through the ValidatorTimelock.

    Smart contracts
    A diagram of the smart contract architecture
    A diagram of the smart contract architecture

    The system consists of the following smart contracts on the host chain (Ethereum):

    The main Rollup contract. The operator commits blocks and provides a ZK proof which is validated by the Verifier contract then processes transactions. During batch execution it processes L1 --> L2 and L2 --> L1 transactions. This contract stores the following tokens: ETH.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    Proxy used in:

    Governance 0x0b62…3F61

    Intermediary governance contract with two roles and a customizable delay. This delay is only mandatory for transactions scheduled by the Owner role and can be set by the SecurityCouncil role. The SecurityCouncil role can execute arbitrary upgrade transactions immediately. Currently the delay is set to 0s and the SecurityCouncil role is not used.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    Proxy used in:

    ChainAdmin 0x2cf3…5063

    Intermediary governance contract that has the Admin (not upgradeability admin) role for the shared contracts and for ZKsync Era.

    ValidatorTimelock 0x5D8b…d06E

    Intermediary contract between the Validators and the ZKsync Era diamond that delays block execution (ie withdrawals and other L2 --> L1 messages).

    Proxy used in:

    Verifier 0x70F3…9604

    Implements ZK proof verification logic.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    Proxy used in:

    This bridge contract escrows all ERC-20s and ETH that are deposited to ZKsync Era - and in the future - other registered ZK stack chains. This contract can store any token.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    Proxy used in:

    Sits between the single shared bridge and the StateTransitionManager(s) and relays L1 <-> L2 messages from the shared bridge or other ZK stack chains to their respective destinations.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    Proxy used in:

    Defines L2 diamond contract creation and upgrade, proof verification for the ZKsync diamond contract connected to it (and potential other L2 diamond contracts that opt in to share this logic).

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    Proxy used in:

    Value Locked is calculated based on these smart contracts and tokens:

    Shared bridge for depositing tokens to ZKsync Era and, in the future, other ZK stack chains.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    Proxy used in:

    Legacy bridge for depositing ERC20 tokens to ZKsync Era. Forwards deposits and withdrawals to the BridgeHub.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    Bridge for depositing wrapped stETH (Lido) to ZKsync Era. These deposits and withdrawals do not go through the new shared BridgeHub.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgrade delay: No delay

    The current deployment carries some associated risks:

    • Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).

    Knowledge nuggets