Search
Search for projects by name or address
Sorare
Critical contracts can be upgraded by an EOA which could result in the loss of all funds.
Badges
About
Sorare is a global fantasy football game where you can play with officially licensed digital cards.
Badges
About
Sorare is a global fantasy football game where you can play with officially licensed digital cards.
2021 Jul 15 — 2026 Jul 16
Sorare StarkEx deprecation
2026 Jun 1st
Sorare finalizes its migration to Solana by sunsetting its StarkEx L2 contract.
Mainnet Launch
2021 Jul 26th
Layer 2 scaling solution powered by Starkware, is live on Ethereum.
Funds can be stolen if
Funds can be lost if
Users can be censored if
MEV can be extracted if
STARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness.
Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 2/4 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.
There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.
Users are able to trustlessly exit by submitting a Merkle proof of funds. NFTs will be minted on L1 to exit.
Set of parties responsible for signing and attesting to the availability of data.
There are no onchain assets at risk of being slashed in case of a data withholding attack, and the committee members are not publicly known.
There is no fraud detection mechanism in place. A data withholding attack can only be detected by nodes downloading the full data from the DA layer.
The committee does not meet basic security standards, either due to insufficient size, lack of member diversity, or poorly defined threshold parameters. The system lacks an effective DA bridge and it is reliant on the assumption of an honest sequencer, creating significant risks to data integrity and availability.
Anyone can relay data availability commitments to the DA bridge. In case of current relayer failure, users can collect attestations from committee members and propose new data availability commitments to the DA bridge.
Architecture
The Starkware application utilizes a data availability solution that relies on a Committee Service to ensure data persistence. This architecture comprises the following components:
- Availability Gateway: The primary interface provided by the operator for committee members to access new batch information and submit signed availability claims.
- Data Availability Committee (DAC): A group of nodes responsible for storing state data associated with each Merkle root and attesting to data availability by signing claims.
- Data Batches: Collections of transactions processed in batches that update the state of accounts, resulting in a new Merkle root representing the updated state.
Committee members run services that interact with the Availability Gateway to obtain information about new batches and submit their signed availability claims. Each batch includes a unique batch_id, a reference to a previous batch, and a list of account updates. Committee members combine this information with data from the reference batch to compute the new state and verify the Merkle root.
When the operator produces a new batch, it must be signed by a minimum number of committee members—as defined by the application’s configuration—for it to be accepted onchain. This includes all members designated as mandatory signers. If the operator attempts to submit a batch without the required signatures, it will be rejected, thereby ensuring that data remains available and consistent.
Committee members are expected to maintain a database that stores the data associated with each batch, making use of storage solutions with a replication factor of at least 2.
DA Bridge Architecture
The DA commitments are posted to the destination chain, using the Committee Verifier contract as a DA bridge. The DA commitment consists of a data hash of the transaction batch the Committee has signed off on and a concatenation of ec-signatures by signatories.
The Committee Verifier contract verifies the signatures and the data hash and if the required threshold of Committee members has signed off on the data, the hash is stored as a registeredFact in the StarkEx contract. In a separate transaction, the operator calls the updateState() function on the StarkEx contract to update the state. Before the state update is accepted, the StarkEx contract verifies the transaction public inputs by calling the isValid() function, which verifies the hash derived from state update inputs matches the hash stored by the Committee Verifier contract.
Funds can be lost if a malicious committee signs a data availability attestation for an unavailable transaction batch.
Each update to the system state must be accompanied by a ZK proof that ensures that the new state was derived by correctly applying a series of valid user transactions to the previous state. These proofs are then verified on Ethereum by a smart contract. The system state is represented using Merkle roots.
Program Hashes
Name | Hash | Repository | Verification | Used in | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
317490...6957 | Code unknown | None | | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
342795...2024 |     Projects used inSearch for projects used in | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
344285...1079 | Projects used inSearch for projects used in | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
235884...3330 | Projects used inSearch for projects used in | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
254986...4351 | Code unknown | None | Projects used inSearch for projects used in | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
234451...4732 | Code unknown | None | Projects used inSearch for projects used in | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Past upgrades
The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.
2026 June 05, 07:57 UTC23changesFroze Sorare rollup contract. Upgraded Sorare diamond facets. Verifiers facet: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xfbea22FeB369DB10C0d3a2aAa8F4939E76815f12/eth:0xA67821bC089B4374e8D62475526E7e84f09Da086: - Refactored governance - Reduced UNFREEZE DELAY (the time after which the rollup may be unfrozen after it froze) from 1 year to 1 day - Added adminFreeze 9994 function that allows governor to freeze the rollup TokensAndRamping facet: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x2Dbc18A3ac126abE1fF90A83Bbc3947ff7912Afb/eth:0xb97394B55b4807a835619EDbCC6aF6b1d3C71e98: - Added support for mintable ERC 1155 - Added withdrawWithFee 10 function that allows withdrawing ETH even when rollup is frozen. User authorizes a withdrawal with a signature passed in calldata, and pays a withdrawal fee. - Added withdrawWithFeeToBaseBank function that allows withdrawing ETH directly to Base L2, otherwise works similarly to the previous function.
Froze Sorare rollup contract.
Upgraded Sorare diamond facets.
Verifiers facet: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xfbea22FeB369DB10C0d3a2aAa8F4939E76815f12/eth:0xA67821bC089B4374e8D62475526E7e84f09Da086:
- Refactored governance
- Reduced
UNFREEZE_DELAY(the time after which the rollup may be unfrozen after it froze) from 1 year to 1 day - Added
adminFreeze_9994function that allows governor to freeze the rollup
TokensAndRamping facet: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x2Dbc18A3ac126abE1fF90A83Bbc3947ff7912Afb/eth:0xb97394B55b4807a835619EDbCC6aF6b1d3C71e98:
- Added support for mintable ERC 1155
- Added
withdrawWithFee_10function that allows withdrawing ETH even when rollup is frozen. User authorizes a withdrawal with a signature passed in calldata, and pays a withdrawal fee. - Added
withdrawWithFeeToBaseBankfunction that allows withdrawing ETH directly to Base L2, otherwise works similarly to the previous function.
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract OrderRegistry (eth:0x518c4A79a1102eEDc987005CA8cE6B87Ca14dDf8) [starkex/OrderRegistry] | |
| +++ description: Helper contract for registering limit orders from L1. |
| contract StarkExchange (eth:0xF5C9F957705bea56a7e806943f98F7777B995826) [starkex/StarkExchange_Frozen] { | |
| +++ description: Central Validium contract. Receives (verified) state roots from the Operator, allows users to consume L2 -> L1 messages and send L1 -> L2 messages. Critical configuration values for the L2's logic are defined here by various governance roles. | |
| template: | |
| - | "starkex/StarkExchange" |
| + | "starkex/StarkExchange_Frozen" |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x9b28596a715350d61f719241f35d6ee159c111c93c05da1d4804157142ee790c" |
| + | "0x0843c70dcca99b2fde3a18013b0af9af358e90066af9d8a2d3754785eb0ff2a0" |
| values.$implementation.1: | |
| - | "eth:0xfbea22FeB369DB10C0d3a2aAa8F4939E76815f12" |
| + | "eth:0xA67821bC089B4374e8D62475526E7e84f09Da086" |
| values.$implementation.2: | |
| - | "eth:0x2Dbc18A3ac126abE1fF90A83Bbc3947ff7912Afb" |
| + | "eth:0xb97394B55b4807a835619EDbCC6aF6b1d3C71e98" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.12: | |
| + | ["2026-05-31T10:22:59.000Z","0xfd3455fd60677c360679dc601a13283ad26f7f618c9c67db9a52b9d7d42d5014",["eth:0xdF2f24751F7e84ccDCD39e7b49904FAB0Fb0f583","eth:0xA67821bC089B4374e8D62475526E7e84f09Da086","eth:0xb97394B55b4807a835619EDbCC6aF6b1d3C71e98","eth:0x67e198743BC19fa4757720eDd0e769f8291e1F1D","eth:0x613ee54C54D5548627064B4D648942bF3648f376","eth:0xb2ED005D0278179001a49a9969BB22BA8e98f31F","eth:0xB5353268d8d4D711a92cb838F8fEDFC2A66E50Db"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 12 |
| + | 13 |
| values.defaultVaultWithdrawalLock: | |
| - | 0 |
| values.isFrozen: | |
| - | false |
| + | true |
| values.orderRegistryAddress: | |
| - | "eth:0x518c4A79a1102eEDc987005CA8cE6B87Ca14dDf8" |
| values.tokenAdmins: | |
| - | ["eth:0xA5dAd8339d9279c2F16d02F2e903AB4B79a72815","eth:0x7F6d06eCd94bD899872cd2768e41B7d33EC13e19"] |
| values.UNFREEZE_DELAY: | |
| - | 31536000 |
| + | 3600 |
| implementationNames.eth:0xfbea22FeB369DB10C0d3a2aAa8F4939E76815f12: | |
| - | "AllVerifiers" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x2Dbc18A3ac126abE1fF90A83Bbc3947ff7912Afb: | |
| - | "TokensAndRamping" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xA67821bC089B4374e8D62475526E7e84f09Da086: | |
| + | "AllVerifiers" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xb97394B55b4807a835619EDbCC6aF6b1d3C71e98: | |
| + | "TokensAndRamping" |
| } |
2026 May 04, 10:45 UTC2changesVerifier upgrade finalized, it is now actively used.
Verifier upgrade finalized, it is now actively used.
| contract GpsFactRegistryAdapter (eth:0xbcc17446B99465fF01E6816d9bcb2d8b1D7cEdB1) { | |
| +++ description: Adapter between the core contract and the eth:0x47312450B3Ac8b5b8e247a6bB6d523e7605bDb60. Stores the Cairo programHash (`3174901404014912024702042974619036870715605532092680335571201877913899936957`). | |
| values.hasRegisteredFact: | |
| - | false |
| + | true |
| } |
2026 April 30, 10:53 UTC11changesReduced upgrade delay to zero. Verifier automatically changed hasRegisteredFact flag, indicating that verifier upgrade is not finalized yet.
Reduced upgrade delay to zero. Verifier automatically changed hasRegisteredFact flag, indicating that verifier upgrade is not finalized yet.
| EOA (eth:0x5918481F777dBe437De249492B90AffB4e655de4) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| receivedPermissions.2.delay: | |
| - | 1209600 |
| } |
| contract GpsFactRegistryAdapter (eth:0xbcc17446B99465fF01E6816d9bcb2d8b1D7cEdB1) { | |
| +++ description: Adapter between the core contract and the eth:0x47312450B3Ac8b5b8e247a6bB6d523e7605bDb60. Stores the Cairo programHash (`3174901404014912024702042974619036870715605532092680335571201877913899936957`). | |
| values.hasRegisteredFact: | |
| - | true |
| + | false |
| } |
| contract SorareAdminMultisig (eth:0xCc928977e4a75d25099e7DA7B6Fd79Dac2f9fD2B) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| receivedPermissions.2.delay: | |
| - | 1209600 |
| } |
| contract StarkExchange (eth:0xF5C9F957705bea56a7e806943f98F7777B995826) { | |
| +++ description: Central Validium contract. Receives (verified) state roots from the Operator, allows users to consume L2 -> L1 messages and send L1 -> L2 messages. Critical configuration values for the L2's logic are defined here by various governance roles. | |
| values.$pastUpgrades.11: | |
| + | ["2026-04-28T11:42:11.000Z","0x8133c660c29139f3afcfa0d694829a8e16d5473e74704be6b0aa06869cf329d8",["eth:0xdF2f24751F7e84ccDCD39e7b49904FAB0Fb0f583","eth:0xfbea22FeB369DB10C0d3a2aAa8F4939E76815f12","eth:0x2Dbc18A3ac126abE1fF90A83Bbc3947ff7912Afb","eth:0x67e198743BC19fa4757720eDd0e769f8291e1F1D","eth:0x613ee54C54D5548627064B4D648942bF3648f376","eth:0xb2ED005D0278179001a49a9969BB22BA8e98f31F","eth:0xB5353268d8d4D711a92cb838F8fEDFC2A66E50Db"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 11 |
| + | 12 |
| values.getUpgradeActivationDelay: | |
| - | 1209600 |
| + | 0 |
| values.StarkWareDiamond_upgradeDelay: | |
| - | 1209600 |
| + | 0 |
| } |
2025 September 02, 12:41 UTC2changesChanged admin multisig. Added mapping from Starknet.
Changed admin multisig. Added mapping from Starknet.
| contract SorareAdminMultisig (eth:0xCc928977e4a75d25099e7DA7B6Fd79Dac2f9fD2B) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| values.$members.1: | |
| - | "eth:0xd38831Bcb40bdEE0577Ee064112Fa77a38cAd3F8" |
| + | "eth:0xaDB26E60FA6e326B9Ee444D886B4B62EC7FA38fc" |
| } |
The system has a centralized operator
MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
Users can force exit the system
Force exit allows the users to escape censorship by withdrawing their funds. The system allows users to force the withdrawal of funds by submitting a request directly to the contract onchain. The request must be served within a defined time period. If this does not happen, the system will halt regular operation and permit trustless withdrawal of funds.
Users can be censored if the operator refuses to include their transactions. However, there exists a mechanism to independently exit the system.
Regular exit
The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is settled the funds become available for withdrawal on L1. ZK proofs are required to settle blocks. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. When withdrawing NFTs they are minted on L1.
Forced exit
If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular exit they can submit their withdrawal requests directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular exit.
Emergency exit
If the enough time deadline passes and the forced exit is still ignored the user can put the system into a frozen state, disallowing further state updates. In that case everybody can withdraw by submitting a merkle proof of their funds with their L1 transaction.
Ethereum
Actors:
A Multisig with 2/4 threshold.
- Can upgrade with 8d delay
- SHARPVerifierCallProxy - acting directly with 8d delay
- Can interact with SHARPVerifierCallProxy
- Administer the CallProxy’s
GOVERNANCE_ADMINand role-admin hierarchy. This AccessControl role is separate from the outer proxy governor that schedules implementation upgrades - Grant and revoke application roles, including the
APP_GOVERNORrole that controls caller-specific fallback routes - Route fallback calls from specific callers to a still-active registry in the default verifier’s reference chain. This principally determines which verifier and bootloader configuration processes their proof submissions; the proxy’s explicit
isValidentry point always queries the default target
- Administer the CallProxy’s
A Multisig with 2/3 threshold.
- Can upgrade with no delay
- StarkExchange
- Can interact with StarkExchange
- Can upgrade with no delay
- StarkExchange
- Can interact with StarkExchange
- Can interact with StarkExchange
- Permissioned to regularly update the state roots of the L2 on L1. Each state update must have been proven via the SHARP verifier and contains commitments to the data that is itself kept offchain
Ethereum
Data Availability Committee (DAC) contract verifying and storing data availability claims from DAC Members (via a multisignature check). The threshold of valid signatures is 2.
Central Validium contract. Receives (verified) state roots from the Operator, allows users to consume L2 -> L1 messages and send L1 -> L2 messages. Critical configuration values for the L2’s logic are defined here by various governance roles.
- Roles:
- admin: EOA 1, SorareAdminMultisig
- operators: EOA 2, EOA 3
Permissionless commitment calculator and registry used by the Solidity STARK verifiers. Anyone may submit a public-memory page and interaction elements; the contract computes its hash and cumulative product and registers the fact key committing to them, which the CPU verifier must bind to the proof. It is part of the proof verifier, not an application-level program registry. A malicious or nonconforming implementation can break public-memory soundness; binding to a different honest registry generally causes a liveness failure instead.
Upgradeable call router through which Starknet and other applications access SHARP fact registries. It uses call, not delegatecall, so facts and immutable verifier configuration remain at each target registry. The explicit isValid entry point always queries the default target. Other calls handled by the fallback, principally proof submissions, can be routed per caller to a still-active registry in the default target’s reference chain. The default target can be replaced by SHARP Multisig after 8d.
- Roles:
- admin: SHARP Multisig
- appGovernor: SHARP Multisig
- appRoleAdmin: SHARP Multisig
- governanceAdmin: SHARP Multisig
Immutable GPS statement verifier shared by Starknet and other StarkWare systems. It verifies a STARK proof of the exact Cairo bootloader stored onchain, forces the bootloader configuration into public memory, and registers a fact for every bootloader task. A fact is also considered valid when it exists in the time-limited reference fact registry.
Immutable GPS statement verifier shared by Starknet and other StarkWare systems. It verifies a STARK proof of the exact Cairo bootloader stored onchain, forces the bootloader configuration into public memory, and registers a fact for every bootloader task. A fact is also considered valid when it exists in the time-limited reference fact registry.
Immutable GPS statement verifier shared by Starknet and other StarkWare systems. It verifies a STARK proof of the exact Cairo bootloader stored onchain, forces the bootloader configuration into public memory, and registers a fact for every bootloader task. A fact is also considered valid when it exists in the time-limited reference fact registry.
Permissionless commitment calculator and registry used by the Solidity STARK verifiers. Anyone may submit a public-memory page and interaction elements; the contract computes its hash and cumulative product and registers the fact key committing to them, which the CPU verifier must bind to the proof. It is part of the proof verifier, not an application-level program registry. A malicious or nonconforming implementation can break public-memory soundness; binding to a different honest registry generally causes a liveness failure instead.
Immutable GPS statement verifier shared by Starknet and other StarkWare systems. It verifies a STARK proof of the exact Cairo bootloader stored onchain, forces the bootloader configuration into public memory, and registers a fact for every bootloader task. A fact is also considered valid when it exists in the time-limited reference fact registry.
Adapter between the core contract and the SHARPVerifierCallProxy. Stores the Cairo programHash (3174901404014912024702042974619036870715605532092680335571201877913899936957).
The current deployment carries some associated risks:
Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).
Program Hashes
Name | Hash | Repository | Verification | Used in | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
317490...6957 | Code unknown | None | | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
342795...2024 | Projects used inSearch for projects used in | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
344285...1079 | Projects used inSearch for projects used in | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
235884...3330 | Projects used inSearch for projects used in | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
254986...4351 | Code unknown | None | Projects used inSearch for projects used in | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
234451...4732 | Code unknown | None | Projects used inSearch for projects used in | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||