Summary Value Secured Activity Milestones & Incidents Risk summary Risk analysis Stage Data availability State validation Upgrades & Governance Updates Operator Withdrawals Permissions Smart contracts

tanX

This project is archived and no longer maintained.

Critical contracts can be upgraded by an EOA which could result in the loss of all funds.

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About

tanX is a DEX powered by StarkEx technology.

Total Value SecuredTVS

$268.57 K0.45%

Past day UOPSDaily UOPS

No data

Stage

Type

Validium

Purpose

Exchange

Tokens breakdown

Value secured breakdown

0.00% with additional trust assumptions

View TVS breakdown

Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure

Explore more in Discovery UI

Badges

About

tanX is a DEX powered by StarkEx technology.

Value Secured View TVS breakdown

Exclude restricted RWA tokens

Total

Canonically BridgedCanonically Bridged ValueCanonical

Natively MintedNatively Minted TokensNative

Externally BridgedExternally Bridged ValueExternal

ETH & derivatives

Stablecoins

BTC & derivatives

Other

View TVS breakdown

Activity

Data source: StarkEx Aggregations API

2022 Jul 10 — 2026 Jul 17

Past Day UOPS

0.000.00%

Past Day Ops count

Max. UOPS

1.37

2024 Jul 11

Past day UOPS/TPS Ratio

No data

Milestones & Incidents

Mainnet Launch

2023 Apr 27th

tanX is live on mainnet.

Learn more

Risk summary

Critical contracts can be upgraded by an EOA which could result in the loss of all funds.

Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure

Sequencer failure

Force via L1

Users can force the sequencer to include a transaction by submitting a request through L1. If the sequencer censors or is down for for more than 7d, users can use the exit hatch to withdraw their funds.

State validation

Validity proofs (ST)

STARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness.

Data availability

External (DAC)

Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 2/4 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.

Exit window

None

There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.

Proposer failure

Use escape hatch

Users are able to trustlessly exit by submitting a Merkle proof of funds.

Stage

tanX is a

Stage 0

Appchain

Validium.

Learn more about Stages

Please keep in mind that these stages do not reflect project security, this is an opinionated assessment of project maturity based on subjective criteria, created with a goal of incentivizing projects to push toward better decentralization. Each team may have taken different paths to achieve this goal.

Data availability

Set of parties responsible for signing and attesting to the availability of data.

7.1

Risk analysis

Economic security

None

There are no onchain assets at risk of being slashed in case of a data withholding attack, and the committee members are not publicly known.

Fraud detection

None

There is no fraud detection mechanism in place. A data withholding attack can only be detected by nodes downloading the full data from the DA layer.

Committee security

2/4

The committee does not meet basic security standards, either due to insufficient size, lack of member diversity, or poorly defined threshold parameters. The system lacks an effective DA bridge and it is reliant on the assumption of an honest sequencer, creating significant risks to data integrity and availability.

Upgradeability

Immutable

The bridge smart contract is immutable and cannot be updated. The bridge committee security is low and cannot be improved.

Relayer failure

Self propose

Anyone can relay data availability commitments to the DA bridge. In case of current relayer failure, users can collect attestations from committee members and propose new data availability commitments to the DA bridge.

7.2

Technology

Architecture

starkex architecture

The Starkware application utilizes a data availability solution that relies on a Committee Service to ensure data persistence. This architecture comprises the following components:

Availability Gateway: The primary interface provided by the operator for committee members to access new batch information and submit signed availability claims.
Data Availability Committee (DAC): A group of nodes responsible for storing state data associated with each Merkle root and attesting to data availability by signing claims.
Data Batches: Collections of transactions processed in batches that update the state of accounts, resulting in a new Merkle root representing the updated state.

Committee members run services that interact with the Availability Gateway to obtain information about new batches and submit their signed availability claims. Each batch includes a unique batch_id, a reference to a previous batch, and a list of account updates. Committee members combine this information with data from the reference batch to compute the new state and verify the Merkle root.

When the operator produces a new batch, it must be signed by a minimum number of committee members—as defined by the application’s configuration—for it to be accepted onchain. This includes all members designated as mandatory signers. If the operator attempts to submit a batch without the required signatures, it will be rejected, thereby ensuring that data remains available and consistent.

Committee members are expected to maintain a database that stores the data associated with each batch, making use of storage solutions with a replication factor of at least 2.

DA Bridge Architecture

starkex bridge architecture

The DA commitments are posted to the destination chain, using the Committee Verifier contract as a DA bridge. The DA commitment consists of a data hash of the transaction batch the Committee has signed off on and a concatenation of ec-signatures by signatories.

The Committee Verifier contract verifies the signatures and the data hash and if the required threshold of Committee members has signed off on the data, the hash is stored as a registeredFact in the StarkEx contract. In a separate transaction, the operator calls the updateState() function on the StarkEx contract to update the state. Before the state update is accepted, the StarkEx contract verifies the transaction public inputs by calling the isValid() function, which verifies the hash derived from state update inputs matches the hash stored by the Committee Verifier contract.

Funds can be lost if a malicious committee signs a data availability attestation for an unavailable transaction batch.

StarkEx Committee Service - Source Code

State validation

Validity proofs

Each update to the system state must be accompanied by a ZK proof that ensures that the new state was derived by correctly applying a series of valid user transactions to the previous state. These proofs are then verified on Ethereum by a smart contract. The system state is represented using Merkle roots.

Enforcing Consistency on the On-Chain State - StarkEx documentation

PROVER

Stone

Trusted Setups

Onchain verifier

SHARPVerifier

Used in

Onchain verifier

SHARPVerifier

Used in

Program Hashes

Hash	Repository	Verification	Used in

168306...3513	Code unknown	None
342795...2024	Github		Projects used in Search for projects used in
344285...1079	Github		Projects used in Search for projects used in
235884...3330	Github		Projects used in Search for projects used in
254986...4351	Code unknown	None	Projects used in Search for projects used in
234451...4732	Code unknown	None	Projects used in Search for projects used in

Upgrades & Governance

Past upgrades

The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.

Count of upgrades

Last upgrade

5d 9h ago

Avg upgrade interval

6mo 19d

Updates

2026 May 04, 10:43 UTC

2changes

Verifier upgrade finalized, it is now actively used.

	contract GpsFactRegistryAdapter (eth:0x5339AB7557b3152b91A57D10B0Caf5da88Db5143) {
	+++ description: Adapter between the core contract and the eth:0x47312450B3Ac8b5b8e247a6bB6d523e7605bDb60. Stores the Cairo programHash (`16830627573509542901909952446321116535677491650708854009406762893086223513`).
	values.hasRegisteredFact:
-	false
+	true
	}

2026 April 30, 10:53 UTC

2changes

Verifier automatically changed hasRegisteredFact flag, indicating that verifier upgrade is not finalized yet.

	contract GpsFactRegistryAdapter (eth:0x5339AB7557b3152b91A57D10B0Caf5da88Db5143) {
	+++ description: Adapter between the core contract and the eth:0x47312450B3Ac8b5b8e247a6bB6d523e7605bDb60. Stores the Cairo programHash (`16830627573509542901909952446321116535677491650708854009406762893086223513`).
	values.hasRegisteredFact:
-	true
+	false
	}

2024 January 11, 12:36 UTC

7changes

Update discovery to include the multisig threshold.

Initial discovery

+	Status: CREATED
	contract StarkExchange (0x1390f521A79BaBE99b69B37154D63D431da27A07) {
	}

+	Status: CREATED
	contract SHARPVerifierGovernorMultisig (0x21F9eC47b19d95b5C2DDFB6Ae5D4F92fAdacAEc4) {
	}

+	Status: CREATED
	contract SHARPVerifierProxy (0x47312450B3Ac8b5b8e247a6bB6d523e7605bDb60) {
	}

+	Status: CREATED
	contract Committee (0x4F8B2dd49D958b6ac3e5f4705Bf1a9aDA5Bc4446) {
	}

+	Status: CREATED
	contract GpsFactRegistryAdapter (0x5339AB7557b3152b91A57D10B0Caf5da88Db5143) {
	}

+	Status: CREATED
	contract SHARPVerifier (0x6cB3EE90C50a38A0e4662bB7e7E6e40B91361BF6) {
	}

+	Status: CREATED
	contract OrderRegistry (0x806d435a82B0381bD884540c2235147c13B97fe6) {
	}

Operator

The system has a centralized operator

The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system. Typically, the Operator is the hot wallet of the StarkEx service submitting state updates for which proofs have been already submitted and verified.

MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

Operator - StarkEx documentation

Users can force exit the system

Force exit allows the users to escape censorship by withdrawing their funds. The system allows users to force the withdrawal of funds by submitting a request directly to the contract onchain. The request must be served within a defined time period. If this does not happen, the system will halt regular operation and permit trustless withdrawal of funds.

Users can be censored if the operator refuses to include their transactions. However, there exists a mechanism to independently exit the system.

Censorship Prevention - StarkEx documentation

Withdrawals

Regular exit

The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is settled the funds become available for withdrawal on L1. ZK proofs are required to settle blocks. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. When withdrawing NFTs they are minted on L1.

Withdrawal - StarkEx documentation

Forced exit

If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular exit they can submit their withdrawal requests directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular exit.

Emergency exit

If the enough time deadline passes and the forced exit is still ignored the user can put the system into a frozen state, disallowing further state updates. In that case everybody can withdraw by submitting a merkle proof of their funds with their L1 transaction.

Permissions

A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions

Go to Disco

Explore in Disco

Ethereum

Actors:

SHARP Multisig0x21F9…AEc4

A Multisig with 2/4 threshold.

Can upgrade with 8d delay
- SHARPVerifierCallProxy - acting directly with 8d delay
Can interact with SHARPVerifierCallProxy
- Administer the CallProxy’s GOVERNANCE_ADMIN and role-admin hierarchy. This AccessControl role is separate from the outer proxy governor that schedules implementation upgrades
- Grant and revoke application roles, including the APP_GOVERNOR role that controls caller-specific fallback routes
- Route fallback calls from specific callers to a still-active registry in the default verifier’s reference chain. This principally determines which verifier and bootloader configuration processes their proof submissions; the proxy’s explicit isValid entry point always queries the default target

Participants (4):

0x0405…8488 0x5923…8558 0xebc8…fD7F 0x955B…2Fec

Used in:

EOA 10x3037…1F63

Can upgrade with no delay
- StarkExchange
Can interact with StarkExchange
- manage the token admin role
- Permissioned to appoint and remove the Operator, register additional verifier and availability verifier contracts (removals are delayed), set the default vault withdrawal lock, unfreeze the exchange and manage the governor set

EOA 20x4a5e…133f

Can interact with StarkExchange
- Can regsiter new tokens for deposits and withdrawals

EOA 30xc3a2…Cf25

Can interact with StarkExchange
- Permissioned to regularly update the state roots of the L2 on L1. Each state update must have been proven via the SHARP verifier and contains commitments to the data that is itself kept offchain

Smart contracts

A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions

Go to Disco

Explore in Disco

A diagram of the smart contract architecture

Ethereum

StarkExchange

Escrow

0x1390…7A07 Implementation #1 (Upgradable)Implementation #2 (Upgradable)Implementation #3 (Upgradable)Implementation #4 (Upgradable)Implementation #5 (Upgradable)Implementation #6 (Upgradable)Implementation #7 (Upgradable)Admin

Central Validium contract. Receives (verified) state roots from the Operator, allows users to consume L2 -> L1 messages and send L1 -> L2 messages. Critical configuration values for the L2’s logic are defined here by various governance roles.

Roles:
- admin: EOA 1
- operators: EOA 3
- tokenAdmins: EOA 2

All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation.

Can be upgraded by:

EOA 1 with no delay

DACommittee0x4F8B…4446

Data Availability Committee (DAC) contract verifying and storing data availability claims from DAC Members (via a multisignature check). The threshold of valid signatures is 2.

CpuVerifierAllSolidity_2026_130x0153…2CD6

Immutable Solidity verifier for one Cairo CPU layout. It checks the STARK proof using layout-specific constraint, OODS, Merkle, FRI, and periodic-column helper contracts. The SHARP verifier can select any configured layout by cairoVerifierId.

Implementation used in:

CpuVerifierDex_2026_130x0cD0…5CdC

Implementation used in:

CairoBootloaderProgram0x2410…4A47

Stores the complete compiled Cairo outer bootloader used as the top-level program of a SHARP proof. The SHARP verifier copies these words into public memory, pinning this exact executable onchain independently of the separately committed simple, applicative, and recursive-verifier programs.

Implementation used in:

CpuVerifierRecursive_2026_130x2867…9B6B

Implementation used in:

CpuVerifierSmall_2026_130x30F3…419b

Implementation used in:

MemoryPageFactRegistry_2023_90x4086…70fA

Permissionless commitment calculator and registry used by the Solidity STARK verifiers. Anyone may submit a public-memory page and interaction elements; the contract computes its hash and cumulative product and registers the fact key committing to them, which the CPU verifier must bind to the proof. It is part of the proof verifier, not an application-level program registry. A malicious or nonconforming implementation can break public-memory soundness; binding to a different honest registry generally causes a liveness failure instead.

Implementation used in:

SHARPVerifierCallProxy0x4731…Db60 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Upgradeable call router through which Starknet and other applications access SHARP fact registries. It uses call, not delegatecall, so facts and immutable verifier configuration remain at each target registry. The explicit isValid entry point always queries the default target. Other calls handled by the fallback, principally proof submissions, can be routed per caller to a still-active registry in the default target’s reference chain. The default target can be replaced by SHARP Multisig after 8d.

Roles:
- admin: SHARP Multisig
- appGovernor: SHARP Multisig
- appRoleAdmin: SHARP Multisig
- governanceAdmin: SHARP Multisig

Can be upgraded by:

SHARP Multisig with 8d delay

Proxy used in:

SHARPVerifier0x4956…72b6

Immutable GPS statement verifier shared by Starknet and other StarkWare systems. It verifies a STARK proof of the exact Cairo bootloader stored onchain, forces the bootloader configuration into public memory, and registers a fact for every bootloader task. A fact is also considered valid when it exists in the time-limited reference fact registry.

Implementation used in:

SHARPVerifier_2026_13_10x5C1C…a9fe

Implementation used in:

CpuVerifierDexWithBitwise_2026_130x6a67…3F11

Implementation used in:

CpuVerifierStarknet_2026_130x7157…A26D

Implementation used in:

SHARPVerifier_2026_13_20x7Da1…3fF7

Implementation used in:

CpuVerifierRecursiveLargeOutput_2026_130xbe0F…AEF3

Implementation used in:

MemoryPageFactRegistry0xe583…C460

Implementation used in:

SHARPVerifier_2026_13_30xE675…b406

Implementation used in:

CpuVerifierPerpetual_2026_130xFFC7…6b44

Implementation used in:

GpsFactRegistryAdapter0x5339…5143

Adapter between the core contract and the SHARPVerifierCallProxy. Stores the Cairo programHash (16830627573509542901909952446321116535677491650708854009406762893086223513).

OrderRegistry0x806d…7fe6

Helper contract for registering limit orders from L1.

CpuFrilessVerifier0x03Fa…12e8

Implementation used in:

CpuFrilessVerifier0x2177…C214

Implementation used in:

CairoBootloaderProgram_2022_70x5d07…9dDf

Implementation used in:

CpuFrilessVerifier0x630A…f239

Implementation used in:

CpuFrilessVerifier0x78Af…c590

Implementation used in:

CpuFrilessVerifier0x8488…E57B

Implementation used in:

CpuFrilessVerifier0x9E61…Bd21

Implementation used in:

CpuFrilessVerifier0xC879…31e3

Implementation used in:

CpuFrilessVerifier0xe966…0E24

Implementation used in:

MemoryPageFactRegistry_2022_70xFD14…D1b4

Implementation used in:

The current deployment carries some associated risks:

Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).

Program Hashes

Hash	Repository	Verification	Used in

168306...3513	Code unknown	None
342795...2024	Github		Projects used in Search for projects used in
344285...1079	Github		Projects used in Search for projects used in
235884...3330	Github		Projects used in Search for projects used in
254986...4351	Code unknown	None	Projects used in Search for projects used in
234451...4732	Code unknown	None	Projects used in Search for projects used in