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Starknet is a ZK rollup that uses STARK proofs to securely scale Ethereum and Ethereum blobs for data availability. Starknet is also actively engaged in bringing Bitcoin users the same scale, UX, and liquidity through a variety of products and programs.
Starknet is a ZK rollup that uses STARK proofs to securely scale Ethereum and Ethereum blobs for data availability. Starknet is also actively engaged in bringing Bitcoin users the same scale, UX, and liquidity through a variety of products and programs.
2025 Jun 12 — 2026 Jun 12
The section shows the operating costs that L2s pay to Ethereum.
2025 Jun 12 — 2026 Jun 12
This section shows how much data the project publishes to its data-availability (DA) layer over time. The project currently posts data to
Ethereum.
2025 Jun 12 — 2026 Jun 12
This section shows how "live" the project's operators are by displaying how frequently they submit transactions of the selected type. It also highlights anomalies - significant deviations from their typical schedule.
2026 May 13 — Jun 12
Starknet reverts 18mins of history
2026 Jan 5th
Starknet experienced an outage during which block production was halted.
Users can submit transactions to an L1 map, but can’t force them. When users “complain” that their transaction is stuck on L1 and not picked up by the sequencer, the Security Council minority can bypass the sequencer by posting a state root that includes it.
STARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness.
All of the data (SD = state diffs) needed for proof construction is published onchain.
Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L1 and go through a 8d delay. In case users are censored, the Security Council minority can be alerted to enforce censorship resistance by submitting a new state root. This process is assumed to take 1d, leaving users 7d to exit.
There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.
Only the whitelisted proposer can update state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen. The Security Council minority can be alerted to enforce censorship resistance because they are a permissioned Operator.
State diffs are publish onchain as blob or calldata on every state update. The state diffs contain information on every contact whose storage was updated, and additional information on contract deployments. From diffs full system state can be recovered. Contracts’ code is not published on L1, but can be trustlessly verified if available elsewhere.
Starknet uses stateful compression since v0.13.4.
There is no non-empty genesis state.
The data format has been updated with different versions, and the full specification can be found here.
Each update to the system state must be accompanied by a ZK proof that ensures that the new state was derived by correctly applying a series of valid user transactions to the previous state. These proofs are then verified on Ethereum by a smart contract.
Each update to the system state must be accompanied by a ZK proof that ensures that the new state was derived by correctly applying a series of valid user transactions to the previous state. These proofs are then verified on Ethereum by a smart contract.
Name | Hash | Repository | Verification | Used in | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
273300...7702 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
257150...8294 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
344285...1079 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
235884...3330 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
378893...4778 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
989994...0176 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
348018...5714 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
303597...6711 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
358503...1237 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
160268...8631 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
110431...7907 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Starknet state transition function could be proven with unverified ZK programs (bootloaders) on older versions of verifiers. Compliance with the rules of L2 STF can not be independently verified without the sources of these programs.

The Starknet zk Rollup shares its SHARP verifier with other StarkEx and SN Stack Layer 2s. Governance of the main Starknet rollup contract and its core bridge escrows (ETHBridge, STRKBridge) is currently split between the 9/12 Security Council with instant upgrade capability and the 2/4 Starkware Multisig 2 who can upgrade with a 8d delay. The former Multisig also governs most other bridge escrows with instant upgradeability. The shared SHARP verifier used for state validation can be changed by the 2/4 SHARP Multisig with and a 8d delay, affecting all rollups like Starknet that are sharing it.
The Operator role in the Starknet contract is permissioned to update the state of the Starknet rollup by supplying valid (zk) state transition proofs. Since this role is not permissionless, Starknet implements a StarknetSCMinorityMultisig with the Operator role, which allows a 3/12 minority of the StarknetSecurityCouncil to enforce censorship resistance by including transactions that are not included by regular Operators.
All bridge escrows allow enabling a withdrawal throttle of 5% of the locked funds per 24h period. Enabling it is permissioned to a Multisig while disabling it in the core bridge escrows (STRKBridge, ETHBridge) can be done by a 3/12 minority of the Security Council.
The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.
Starknet v0.14.2 upgrade: https://x.com/StarkWareLtd/status/2046232501887062448. Upgraded Rollup contract with minimal diff: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x2793010E6711Acd5C46ed17f2183a9d58db71e04/eth:0x9961D34D3baE6914635c882e8FE382e14E0F172A (mainly added safety checks on L1 - L2 msg hash computation). Also upgraded aggregation and starknet os programs: sources are here https://github.com/starkware-libs/sequencer/tree/c294a8ba263834d45cf525217d8700f5de24a260/crates/apollo starknet os program/src/cairo/starkware/starknet/core.
Starknet v0.14.2 upgrade: https://x.com/StarkWareLtd/status/2046232501887062448.
Upgraded Rollup contract with minimal diff: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x2793010E6711Acd5C46ed17f2183a9d58db71e04/eth:0x9961D34D3baE6914635c882e8FE382e14E0F172A (mainly added safety checks on L1 -> L2 msg hash computation).
Also upgraded aggregation and starknet os programs: sources are here https://github.com/starkware-libs/sequencer/tree/c294a8ba263834d45cf525217d8700f5de24a260/crates/apollo_starknet_os_program/src/cairo/starkware/starknet/core.
| contract Starknet (eth:0xc662c410C0ECf747543f5bA90660f6ABeBD9C8c4) { | |
| +++ description: Central rollup contract. Receives (verified) state roots from the Sequencer, allows users to consume L2 -> L1 messages and send L1 -> L2 messages. Critical configuration values for the L2's logic are defined here by various governance roles. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x8074e96abc7cacf654908c0111c69027cf599f3b67332f3680c5de768a2d6dfe" |
| + | "0x4ebd3e71fba7928b1daa4cdd93a1081aa0b578578cc8e6aada6a3b86b057fcb5" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x2793010E6711Acd5C46ed17f2183a9d58db71e04" |
| + | "eth:0x9961D34D3baE6914635c882e8FE382e14E0F172A" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.10: | |
| + | ["2026-04-20T11:53:35.000Z","0xb2fd817ea47d39435e0b08825964bcb0b2ae08ebc4c5a47954f9b169235ed1c1",["eth:0x9961D34D3baE6914635c882e8FE382e14E0F172A"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 10 |
| + | 11 |
| values.aggregatorHashMapped: | |
| - | "1701025211190912681772481128523426351562426117847395998223683709327746845867" |
| + | "2571508110958925737463010241874806654058743535666147712534445437599630018294" |
| values.aggregatorProgramHash: | |
| - | "1701025211190912681772481128523426351562426117847395998223683709327746845867" |
| + | "2571508110958925737463010241874806654058743535666147712534445437599630018294" |
| values.identify: | |
| - | "StarkWare_Starknet_2025_10" |
| + | "StarkWare_Starknet_2026_11" |
| values.implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x2793010E6711Acd5C46ed17f2183a9d58db71e04" |
| + | "eth:0x9961D34D3baE6914635c882e8FE382e14E0F172A" |
| +++ description: The L2 programHash which is a hash of the L2 state machine logic. Liveness config MUST be changed in the .ts as soon as this is updated. | |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.programHash: | |
| - | "918745833886511857768061986591752808672496300091957204265383861063635175685" |
| + | "2733003247060056328192560178934419513655729851806095615814023997114795707702" |
| values.programHashHistory.13: | |
| + | "918745833886511857768061986591752808672496300091957204265383861063635175685" |
| values.programHashMapped: | |
| - | "918745833886511857768061986591752808672496300091957204265383861063635175685" |
| + | "2733003247060056328192560178934419513655729851806095615814023997114795707702" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x2793010E6711Acd5C46ed17f2183a9d58db71e04: | |
| - | "Starknet" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x9961D34D3baE6914635c882e8FE382e14E0F172A: | |
| + | "Starknet" |
| } |
Added new EOA to be a security agent for ETH and STRK bridge (can enable withdrawal limit).
Added new EOA to be a security agent for ETH and STRK bridge (can enable withdrawal limit).
| contract ETHBridge (eth:0xae0Ee0A63A2cE6BaeEFFE56e7714FB4EFE48D419) { | |
| +++ description: Standard Starkware canonical bridge escrow for ETH. Withdrawals can be throttled to 5% of the locked funds per 24 hours. | |
| values.accessControl.SECURITY_AGENT.members.1: | |
| + | "eth:0x4032bE860716F6e4488CBc9f1505E26E2FA3C2c2" |
| values.secAgentAC.1: | |
| + | "eth:0x4032bE860716F6e4488CBc9f1505E26E2FA3C2c2" |
| } |
| contract STRKBridge (eth:0xcE5485Cfb26914C5dcE00B9BAF0580364daFC7a4) { | |
| +++ description: Standard Starkware bridge escrow (single token). Withdrawals can be throttled to 5% of the locked funds per 24 hours. | |
| values.accessControl.SECURITY_AGENT.members.1: | |
| + | "eth:0x4032bE860716F6e4488CBc9f1505E26E2FA3C2c2" |
| values.secAgentAC.1: | |
| + | "eth:0x4032bE860716F6e4488CBc9f1505E26E2FA3C2c2" |
| } |
Halted WBTC and SolvBTC bridges, sweeped tokens to respective clearing addresses. See this tweet: https://x.com/starknet/status/2012177863353815198.
Halted WBTC and SolvBTC bridges, sweeped tokens to respective clearing addresses. See this tweet: https://x.com/starknet/status/2012177863353815198.
| contract Starkware Multisig 2 (eth:0x015277f49d5dD035A5F3Ce34aD5eBfDBaCA0C6Ec) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| receivedPermissions.27.delay: | |
| - | 259200 |
| } |
| contract WBTCBridge (eth:0x283751A21eafBFcD52297820D27C1f1963D9b5b4) { | |
| +++ description: Haltable version of the Starkware Multibridge escrow. Withdrawals can be throttled to 5% of the locked funds per 24 hours for each token individually. Deposits for a particular token can be halted by app governor, halt must be finalized in the second transaction that also sweeps all funds into a clrearing address. There is no logic to resume bridging after the halt. | |
| template: | |
| - | "starknet/StarknetERC20Bridge" |
| + | "starknet/StarknetMultiBridge_haltable" |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x8f135fc371babc0f7b9fd3b63668e1c35eed87f3dedd2416ebe0e7a118c4fd0a" |
| + | "0x75f2a8488acf6abb9e13f53441969f226aebd93a943aae7e6051a2cbfea0b7d0" |
| description: | |
| - | "Standard Starkware bridge escrow (single token). Withdrawals can be throttled to 5% of the locked funds per 24 hours." |
| + | "Haltable version of the Starkware Multibridge escrow. Withdrawals can be throttled to 5% of the locked funds per 24 hours for each token individually. Deposits for a particular token can be halted by app governor, halt must be finalized in the second transaction that also sweeps all funds into a clrearing address. There is no logic to resume bridging after the halt." |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x6ad74D4B79A06A492C288eF66Ef868Dd981fdC85" |
| + | "eth:0xE0D1fab527A85D955d4c05323250367E61bA3f18" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.8: | |
| + | ["2026-01-19T15:01:23.000Z","0xdb7a4f9c3e38994d167d6943b6b7f247972ac3c7564febba428a407cf0e89e5b",["eth:0xE0D1fab527A85D955d4c05323250367E61bA3f18"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 8 |
| + | 9 |
| values.bridgedToken: | |
| - | "eth:0x2260FAC5E5542a773Aa44fBCfeDf7C193bc2C599" |
| values.depositStatus: | |
| - | "active" |
| values.getUpgradeActivationDelay: | |
| - | 259200 |
| + | 0 |
| values.identify: | |
| - | "StarkWare_StarknetERC20Bridge_2.0_5" |
| + | "StarkWare_StarknetTokenBridge_2.0_6-halt" |
| values.implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x6ad74D4B79A06A492C288eF66Ef868Dd981fdC85" |
| + | "eth:0xE0D1fab527A85D955d4c05323250367E61bA3f18" |
| values.maxTotalBalance: | |
| - | "115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007913129639935" |
| values.StarkWareProxy_upgradeDelay: | |
| - | 259200 |
| + | 0 |
| +++ description: empty: withdrawals are not limited, `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000455448` (or respective `bridgedToken` address): withdrawals are limited. | |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.withdrawalLimitStatus: | |
| - | "inactive" |
| + | [] |
| values.cleareanceAddress: | |
| + | "eth:0x0555E30da8f98308EdB960aa94C0Db47230d2B9c" |
| values.getL2Bridge: | |
| + | "3475252094465534150446669812792040965529065299943233505330779571674053440258" |
| +++ description: The maximum total escrow balance per token (can limit deposits) is listed here if modified. | |
| values.maxTotalTokenBalance: | |
| + | {} |
| +++ description: Bridge halt was completed for these tokens. | |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.tokenHaltCompleted: | |
| + | ["eth:0x2260FAC5E5542a773Aa44fBCfeDf7C193bc2C599"] |
| +++ description: Bridge halt was signalled for these tokens. | |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.tokenHaltSignalled: | |
| + | ["eth:0x2260FAC5E5542a773Aa44fBCfeDf7C193bc2C599"] |
| fieldMeta.$admin.description: | |
| - | "NOT the same as the `GOVERNANCE_ADMIN` access control role (see implementation) but managed by it." |
| + | "Same as UPGRADE_ADMIN role and managed by `GOVERNANCE_ADMIN` access control role (see implementation)." |
| fieldMeta.withdrawalLimitStatus.description: | |
| - | "inactive: withdrawals are not limited, any number: withdrawals are limited and the number is the intraday allowance that is left." |
| + | "empty: withdrawals are not limited, `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000455448` (or respective `bridgedToken` address): withdrawals are limited." |
| fieldMeta.maxTotalBalance: | |
| - | {"description":"The maximum total balance that can be locked in the bridge."} |
| fieldMeta.depositStatus: | |
| - | {"severity":"HIGH","description":"Token status managed by the Manager. Only affects deposits."} |
| fieldMeta.maxTotalTokenBalance: | |
| + | {"description":"The maximum total escrow balance per token (can limit deposits) is listed here if modified."} |
| fieldMeta.tokenHaltSignalled: | |
| + | {"severity":"HIGH","description":"Bridge halt was signalled for these tokens."} |
| fieldMeta.tokenHaltCompleted: | |
| + | {"severity":"HIGH","description":"Bridge halt was completed for these tokens."} |
| implementationNames.eth:0x6ad74D4B79A06A492C288eF66Ef868Dd981fdC85: | |
| - | "StarknetERC20Bridge" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xE0D1fab527A85D955d4c05323250367E61bA3f18: | |
| + | "StarknetTokenBridge" |
| usedTypes: | |
| - | [{"typeCaster":"Mapping","arg":{"115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007913129639935":"inactive"}},{"typeCaster":"Mapping","arg":{"0":"unknown","1":"pending","2":"active","3":"deactivated"}}] |
| } |
| contract SolvBTCBridge (eth:0xA86b9b9c58d4f786F8ea89356c9c9Dde9432Ab10) { | |
| +++ description: Haltable version of the Starkware Multibridge escrow. Withdrawals can be throttled to 5% of the locked funds per 24 hours for each token individually. Deposits for a particular token can be halted by app governor, halt must be finalized in the second transaction that also sweeps all funds into a clrearing address. There is no logic to resume bridging after the halt. | |
| template: | |
| - | "starknet/StarknetMultiBridge" |
| + | "starknet/StarknetMultiBridge_haltable" |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x066d78e6d7d8dd603e76a970521e74980c0853d848c55f014c7867ecac8be211" |
| + | "0x75f2a8488acf6abb9e13f53441969f226aebd93a943aae7e6051a2cbfea0b7d0" |
| description: | |
| - | "Starkware Multibridge escrow. Withdrawals can be throttled to 5% of the locked funds per 24 hours for each token individually." |
| + | "Haltable version of the Starkware Multibridge escrow. Withdrawals can be throttled to 5% of the locked funds per 24 hours for each token individually. Deposits for a particular token can be halted by app governor, halt must be finalized in the second transaction that also sweeps all funds into a clrearing address. There is no logic to resume bridging after the halt." |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0xf39d314C5aD7DC88958116dfA7d5ac095d563Aff" |
| + | "eth:0x205Fef0daB48D83CbA6888C5F050FeE36C4762B7" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.3: | |
| + | ["2026-01-19T14:07:59.000Z","0xa0ae9228abd03f1701caf995520b4ad4f9998bf46376e5f8cea39a24d0ee461a",["eth:0x205Fef0daB48D83CbA6888C5F050FeE36C4762B7"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 3 |
| + | 4 |
| values.identify: | |
| - | "StarkWare_StarknetTokenBridge_2.0_6" |
| + | "StarkWare_StarknetTokenBridge_2.0_6-halt" |
| values.implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0xf39d314C5aD7DC88958116dfA7d5ac095d563Aff" |
| + | "eth:0x205Fef0daB48D83CbA6888C5F050FeE36C4762B7" |
| values.cleareanceAddress: | |
| + | "eth:0xd6FD2d2B18207a3b1A3d45C1ccA8c5624Ca82041" |
| +++ description: Bridge halt was completed for these tokens. | |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.tokenHaltCompleted: | |
| + | ["eth:0x7A56E1C57C7475CCf742a1832B028F0456652F97"] |
| +++ description: Bridge halt was signalled for these tokens. | |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.tokenHaltSignalled: | |
| + | ["eth:0x7A56E1C57C7475CCf742a1832B028F0456652F97"] |
| fieldMeta.tokenHaltSignalled: | |
| + | {"severity":"HIGH","description":"Bridge halt was signalled for these tokens."} |
| fieldMeta.tokenHaltCompleted: | |
| + | {"severity":"HIGH","description":"Bridge halt was completed for these tokens."} |
| implementationNames.eth:0xf39d314C5aD7DC88958116dfA7d5ac095d563Aff: | |
| - | "StarknetTokenBridge" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x205Fef0daB48D83CbA6888C5F050FeE36C4762B7: | |
| + | "StarknetTokenBridge" |
| } |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract Safe (eth:0xd6FD2d2B18207a3b1A3d45C1ccA8c5624Ca82041) | |
| +++ description: None |
Added Starkware multisig as app governor and app admin to WBTC bridge. Upgraded SolvBTCBridge twice, second upgrade returned implementation to the initial version, the intermediate implementation is haltable but was not halted afai can see: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xf39d314C5aD7DC88958116dfA7d5ac095d563Aff/eth:0x205Fef0daB48D83CbA6888C5F050FeE36C4762B7.
Added Starkware multisig as app governor and app admin to WBTC bridge. Upgraded SolvBTCBridge twice, second upgrade returned implementation to the initial version, the intermediate implementation is haltable but was not halted afai can see: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xf39d314C5aD7DC88958116dfA7d5ac095d563Aff/eth:0x205Fef0daB48D83CbA6888C5F050FeE36C4762B7.
| contract WBTCBridge (eth:0x283751A21eafBFcD52297820D27C1f1963D9b5b4) { | |
| +++ description: Standard Starkware bridge escrow (single token). Withdrawals can be throttled to 5% of the locked funds per 24 hours. | |
| values.accessControl.APP_GOVERNOR.members.0: | |
| + | "eth:0x015277f49d5dD035A5F3Ce34aD5eBfDBaCA0C6Ec" |
| values.accessControl.APP_ROLE_ADMIN.members.0: | |
| + | "eth:0x015277f49d5dD035A5F3Ce34aD5eBfDBaCA0C6Ec" |
| } |
| contract SolvBTCBridge (eth:0xA86b9b9c58d4f786F8ea89356c9c9Dde9432Ab10) { | |
| +++ description: Starkware Multibridge escrow. Withdrawals can be throttled to 5% of the locked funds per 24 hours for each token individually. | |
| values.$pastUpgrades.1: | |
| + | ["2026-01-15T16:06:23.000Z","0x27532d9c2db25f9d053fe4246f83a8c719a0d0b000a9d0e9f1e7dae1e05f287a",["eth:0x205Fef0daB48D83CbA6888C5F050FeE36C4762B7"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.2: | |
| + | ["2026-01-15T16:08:35.000Z","0x787522b1ecf6f59d77fdd6278cf3d92f7b28cc292264e5f7ae9ef93c1344d587",["eth:0xf39d314C5aD7DC88958116dfA7d5ac095d563Aff"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 1 |
| + | 3 |
| } |
Updated Starknet OS and Aggregator programs.
Updated Starknet OS and Aggregator programs.
| contract Starknet (eth:0xc662c410C0ECf747543f5bA90660f6ABeBD9C8c4) { | |
| +++ description: Central rollup contract. Receives (verified) state roots from the Sequencer, allows users to consume L2 -> L1 messages and send L1 -> L2 messages. Critical configuration values for the L2's logic are defined here by various governance roles. | |
| values.aggregatorHashMapped: | |
| - | "Starknet Aggregator (since v0.14.0)" |
| + | "1701025211190912681772481128523426351562426117847395998223683709327746845867" |
| values.aggregatorProgramHash: | |
| - | "760308386675154762009993173725077399730170358078020153308029499928875469870" |
| + | "1701025211190912681772481128523426351562426117847395998223683709327746845867" |
| +++ description: The L2 programHash which is a hash of the L2 state machine logic. Liveness config MUST be changed in the .ts as soon as this is updated. | |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.programHash: | |
| - | "793595346346724189681221050719974054861327641387231526786912662354259445535" |
| + | "918745833886511857768061986591752808672496300091957204265383861063635175685" |
| values.programHashHistory.12: | |
| + | "793595346346724189681221050719974054861327641387231526786912662354259445535" |
| values.programHashMapped: | |
| - | "StarkNet OS (since v0.14.0)" |
| + | "918745833886511857768061986591752808672496300091957204265383861063635175685" |
| } |
MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
There is no general mechanism to force the sequencer to include the transaction.
Users can be censored if the operator refuses to include their transactions.
There is no generic escape hatch mechanism as Starknet cannot be forced by users into a frozen state. Note that a freezing mechanism on L2, to be secure, requires anti-censorship protection.

A Multisig with 2/4 threshold.
A Multisig with 9/12 threshold.
A Multisig with 2/6 threshold.
A Multisig with 2/4 threshold.
A Multisig with 3/12 threshold.
Acts as a central contract to manage StarkGate bridge escrows (add new ones, deactivate existing, change configs) when given the Manager role from the respective escrows.
A Multisig with 1/3 threshold.
A Multisig with 3/5 threshold.
Member of Starkware Multisig 4.


Central rollup contract. Receives (verified) state roots from the Sequencer, allows users to consume L2 -> L1 messages and send L1 -> L2 messages. Critical configuration values for the L2’s logic are defined here by various governance roles.
Upgradable call proxy contract through which the SHARPVerifier can be called. A call proxy does not delegatecall and the storage context remains at the target contract. It allows SHARP Multisig to change the otherwise immutable verifier contract with 8d delay.
Shared Starkware SHARP verifier used collectively by Starknet and other SN stack and StarkEx projects. It receives STARK proofs from the Prover and verifies the integrity of the offchain execution including a correctly computed state root which is part of the Program Output.
Shared Starkware SHARP verifier used collectively by Starknet and other SN stack and StarkEx projects. It receives STARK proofs from the Prover and verifies the integrity of the offchain execution including a correctly computed state root which is part of the Program Output.
A simple Timelock contract with an immutable delay of 8d. The owner (Starkware Multisig 1) can queue transactions.
Standard Starkware canonical bridge escrow for ETH. Withdrawals can be throttled to 5% of the locked funds per 24 hours.

Custom (and immutable) entry point contract and escrow for users depositing LORDS to via StarkGate to the L2.

A simple registry that maps tokens to their StarkGate escrows. It also keeps a list of tokens that are blocked from being added to StarkGate.
Haltable version of the Starkware Multibridge escrow. Withdrawals can be throttled to 5% of the locked funds per 24 hours for each token individually. Deposits for a particular token can be halted by app governor, halt must be finalized in the second transaction that also sweeps all funds into a clrearing address. There is no logic to resume bridging after the halt.

Standard Starkware bridge escrow (single token). Withdrawals can be throttled to 5% of the locked funds per 24 hours.

Gateway contract that is the user entrypoint to deposit DAI to a custom escrow to bridge via StarkGate.
Standard Starkware bridge escrow (single token). Withdrawals can be throttled to 5% of the locked funds per 24 hours.

Standard Starkware bridge escrow (single token). Withdrawals can be throttled to 5% of the locked funds per 24 hours.

Standard Starkware bridge escrow (single token). Withdrawals can be throttled to 5% of the locked funds per 24 hours.

Standard Starkware bridge escrow (single token). Withdrawals can be throttled to 5% of the locked funds per 24 hours.

Standard Starkware bridge escrow (single token). Withdrawals can be throttled to 5% of the locked funds per 24 hours.
Standard Starkware bridge escrow (single token). Withdrawals can be throttled to 5% of the locked funds per 24 hours.

Starkware Multibridge escrow. Withdrawals can be throttled to 5% of the locked funds per 24 hours for each token individually.



Standard Starkware bridge escrow (single token). Withdrawals can be throttled to 5% of the locked funds per 24 hours.
Standard Starkware bridge escrow (single token). Withdrawals can be throttled to 5% of the locked funds per 24 hours.

Simple escrow that accepts tokens and allows to configure permissioned addresses that can access the tokens.

Starkware Multibridge escrow. Withdrawals can be throttled to 5% of the locked funds per 24 hours for each token individually.

Haltable version of the Starkware Multibridge escrow. Withdrawals can be throttled to 5% of the locked funds per 24 hours for each token individually. Deposits for a particular token can be halted by app governor, halt must be finalized in the second transaction that also sweeps all funds into a clrearing address. There is no logic to resume bridging after the halt.

Standard Starkware bridge escrow (single token). Withdrawals can be throttled to 5% of the locked funds per 24 hours.

Auxiliary to the SHARPVerifier contract: Verified ‘memory fact pages’ get stored here. This is important as it registers all necessary onchain data produced by the verifier.
The current deployment carries some associated risks:
Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).
Name | Hash | Repository | Verification | Used in | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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273300...7702 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
257150...8294 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
344285...1079 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
235884...3330 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
378893...4778 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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348018...5714 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
303597...6711 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
358503...1237 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
160268...8631 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
110431...7907 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Starknet state transition function could be proven with unverified ZK programs (bootloaders) on older versions of verifiers. Compliance with the rules of L2 STF can not be independently verified without the sources of these programs.