Experimental Stats (7 days)
- 20 undefined 2021 · medium.comL2 Labs Launches All-in-One Layer2 Platform ZKSpace, Featuring ZKSwap v3.0, NFTs, & Payments
- 25 Aug 2021 · medium.comZKSwap Announces Deployment of V2 on BSC Mainnet
- 23 Aug 2021 · medium.comPoS Mining is Back
- 23 Aug 2021 · medium.comZKSwap Tech Review: SKALE — An Elastic, Decentralized Sidechain Network
The ZKSpace platform consists of three main parts: a Layer 2 AMM DEX utilizing ZK-Rollups technology ZKSwap v3, a payment service called ZKSquare, and an NFT marketplace called ZKSea.
Funds can be stolen if…
Funds can be lost if…
Users can be censored if…
MEV can be extracted if…
Each update to the system state must be accompanied by a ZK Proof that ensures that the new state was derived by correctly applying a series of valid user transactions to the previous state. Once the proof is processed on the Ethereum blockchain the L2 block is instantly finalized.
Despite their production use ZK-SNARKs are still new and experimental cryptography. Cryptography has made a lot of advancements in the recent years but all cryptographic solutions rely on time to prove their security. In addition ZK-SNARKs require a trusted setup to operate.
- Funds can be stolen if the cryptography is broken or implemented incorrectly.
All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap calldata. This ensures that it will always be available when needed.
The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.
- MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
Force exit allows the users to escape censorship by withdrawing their funds. The system allows users to force the withdrawal of funds by submitting a request directly to the contract on-chain. The request must be served within a defined time period. If this does not happen, the system will halt regular operation and permit trustless withdrawal of funds.
- Users can be censored if the operator refuses to include their transactions. They can still exit the system.
The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a transaction on L2. When the block containing that transaction is proven the funds become available for withdrawal on L1. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction does not require a merkle proof.
If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular exit they can submit their withdrawal requests directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request. Once the force operation is submitted if the request is serviced the operation follows the flow of a regular exit.
If enough time passes and the forced exit is still ignored the user can put the system into Exodus Mode, disallowing further state updates. In that case everybody can withdraw by submitting a zero knowledge proof of their funds with their L1 transaction.
- Funds can be lost if the user is unable to generate the non-trivial zk proof for exodus withdraw.
The system consists of the following smart contracts:
- The main Rollup contract. Operator commits blocks, provides zkProof which is validated by the Verifier contract and process withdrawals (executes blocks). Users deposit ETH and ERC20 tokens. This contract defines the upgrade delay in the UPGRADE_NOTICE_PERIOD constant that is currently set to 8 days. This contract can store any token
- ZkSyncCommitBlock 0x49dC…01DbAdditional contract to store implementation details of the main ZkSync contract.
- ZkSyncExit 0x6A4E…06D7Additional contract to store implementation details of the main ZkSync contract.
- ZkSea 0x899A…3426Additional contract to store implementation details of the main ZkSync contract.
- Keeps a list of block producers and whitelisted tokens.
- The source code of this contract is not verified on Etherscan.
- Contract managing deposits and withdrawals of NFTs to Layer2.
- zk-SNARK Plonk Verifier.
- zk-SNARK Verifier for the escape hatch.
- UpgradeGatekeeper 0xB0C7…1390The source code of this contract is not verified on Etherscan.
The current deployment carries some associated risks:
- Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is a 8 days delay on code upgrades.
- Funds can be stolen if the source code of unverified contracts contains malicious code (CRITICAL).