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SummaryValue SecuredActivityOnchain costsData postedLivenessMilestones & IncidentsRisk summaryRisk analysisStageData availabilityState derivationState validationUpgrades & GovernanceOssification & UpdatesOperatorWithdrawalsOther considerationsPermissionsSmart contracts

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BOB

1 recent update

There are impactful changes and part of the information might be outdated.

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About

BOB (Build on Bitcoin) is an OP Stack rollup that aims to natively support the Bitcoin stack. The current implementation supports a variety of canonical and external bridging for BTC-related assets and a tBTC-v2 LightRelay smart contract for verifying...

  • Total Value SecuredTVS
    $76.47 M2.23%
  • Past day UOPSDaily UOPS
    0.0258.1%
  • Gas token
    ETH
  • Type
    Other
  • Purposes
    Universal, Bitcoin DApps
  • Chain ID
    60808

    • Tokens breakdown

    Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure
    Explore more in Discovery UI

    Badges

    About

    BOB (Build on Bitcoin) is an OP Stack rollup that aims to natively support the Bitcoin stack. The current implementation supports a variety of canonical and external bridging for BTC-related assets and a tBTC-v2 LightRelay smart contract for verifying...

    Why is the project listed in others?

    The proof system isn't fully functional

    Consequence: projects without a proper proof system fully rely on single entities to safely update the state. A malicious proposer can finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds.

    Learn more about the recategorisation here.

    Value Secured

    CompareView TVS breakdown
    Total
    Canonically BridgedCanonically Bridged ValueCanonical
    Natively MintedNatively Minted TokensNative
    Externally BridgedExternally Bridged ValueExternal
    ETH & derivatives
    Stablecoins
    BTC & derivatives
    Other
    View TVS breakdown
    Compare with other projects

    Activity

    Compare
    Past Day UOPS
    Past Day Ops count
    Max. UOPS
    Past day UOPS/TPS Ratio
    Compare with other projects

    Onchain costs

    Compare

    The section shows the operating costs that L2s pay to Ethereum.

    Total cost
    Avg cost per L2 UOP
    Avg cost per day
    Compare with other projects

    Data posted

    Compare

    This section shows how much data the project publishes to Ethereum over time. It leaves out data posted to other data-availability (DA) layers. The project currently posts data toEthereumEthereum.

    Data posted
    Avg size per day
    Avg size per L2 UOP
    Compare with other projects

    Liveness

    This section shows how "live" the project's operators are by displaying how frequently they submit transactions of the selected type. It also highlights anomalies - significant deviations from their typical schedule.

    No ongoing anomalies detected
    Avg. tx data subs. interval
    Avg. state updates interval
    Past 30 days anomalies
    98% normal uptime

    Last 30 day anomalies

    All liveness anomalies detected for this project in the last 30 days, helping you review recent downtime and availability issues.

    No Tx data submissions were performed for 2h 59m (from 2026 Oct 07, 16:37 UTC until 2026 Oct 07, 19:36 UTC). These typically occur every 1h 14m on average.

    No Tx data submissions were performed for 2h 59m (from 2026 Oct 07, 13:37 UTC until 2026 Oct 07, 16:37 UTC). These typically occur every 1h 14m on average.

    No Tx data submissions were performed for 2h 59m (from 2026 Oct 07, 10:38 UTC until 2026 Oct 07, 13:37 UTC). These typically occur every 1h 14m on average.

    No Tx data submissions were performed for 2h 59m (from 2026 Oct 07, 07:38 UTC until 2026 Oct 07, 10:38 UTC). These typically occur every 1h 14m on average.

    Milestones & Incidents

    Withdrawals fall back to the permissioned game

    2026 Sep 16th

    Guardian moves the respected game type back to the PermissionedDisputeGame; Kailua proposals stop.

    Learn more

    Kona derivation bug

    2025 Dec 5th

    To fix a bug in the Kona derivation, the proof systemThe infrastructure that allows projects to verify their state transitions. It is composed by onchain verifiers and offchain provers. The main two flavors are optimistic and ZK proof systems, but they can be combined in a hybrid model. In general though, if a system is able to accept state roots optimistically, even if it has a ZK component, it is considered an optimistic proof system. is updated and a state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. manually resolved.

    Learn more

    Risk summary

    The fault proof systemThe infrastructure that allows projects to verify their state transitions. It is composed by onchain verifiers and offchain provers. The main two flavors are optimistic and ZK proof systems, but they can be combined in a hybrid model. In general though, if a system is able to accept state roots optimistically, even if it has a ZK component, it is considered an optimistic proof system. is deployed but is not functional. The dispute game commits to an op-program release that predates the Jovian hardfork active on the chain, so it cannot derive current blocksAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over. and no dispute can be resolved correctly by execution. Security relies entirely on the permissioned proposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block. and challengers.

    Funds can be stolen if

    1. a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL),
    2. no whitelisted challenger disputes an invalid state root before the challenge window expires (CRITICAL).

    MEV can be extracted if

    1. the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

    Risk analysis

    The fault proof systemThe infrastructure that allows projects to verify their state transitions. It is composed by onchain verifiers and offchain provers. The main two flavors are optimistic and ZK proof systems, but they can be combined in a hybrid model. In general though, if a system is able to accept state roots optimistically, even if it has a ZK component, it is considered an optimistic proof system. is deployed but is not functional. The dispute game commits to an op-program release that predates the Jovian hardfork active on the chain, so it cannot derive current blocksAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over. and no dispute can be resolved correctly by execution. Security relies entirely on the permissioned proposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block. and challengers.
    Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure
    Sequencer failure
    Self sequence

    In the event of a sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project’s chain by sending them to L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development.. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.

    State validation
    Fraud proofs (INT)

    Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. Only one entity is currently allowed to propose and submit challenges, as only permissioned games are currently allowed.

    Data availability
    Onchain

    All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development..

    Exit window
    None

    There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.

    Proposer failure
    Cannot withdraw

    Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. on L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development., so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.

    Stage

    BOB
    BOB is not even a
    Stage 0
    project.
    Learn more about Stages
    Please keep in mind that these stages do not reflect project security, this is an opinionated assessment of project maturity based on subjective criteria, created with a goal of incentivizing projects to push toward better decentralization. Each team may have taken different paths to achieve this goal.

    Data availability

    All data required for proofs is published on chain

    All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobsThe data that a rollup publishes to its L1/data availability (DA) layer. They consist of the L2 transactions that are rolled up, along with some metadata. Blobs are introduced as a new transaction type within Ethereum with EIP-4844, and has rollup scaling specifically in mind. Blobs persist on Ethereum’s Beacon Chain ephemerally. or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.

    1. Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs
    2. BatchInbox - address
    3. OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function
    Learn more about the DA layer here: Ethereum logoEthereum

    State derivation

    Node software

    The rollupA blockchain that inherits consensus and data availability from another blockchain called L1. Rollups enable trust minimized bridges with the base layer via proof systems, either optimistic or zero-knowledge. A rollup without a bridge, or without considering the bridge, is called a sovereign rollup. nodeA software client that participates in the network. is composed of two software components: op-node, implementing consensusAn agreement on the latest and correct state of a blockchain. Unlike L1 blockchains which coordinate participating nodes with consensus rules, rollups rely on L1s for reaching consensus by checking the state of the rollup smart contract deployed thereon. related logic, and op-geth, implementing execution logic. The configuration file can be found here.

    Compression scheme

    Data batches are compressed using the zlib algorithm with best compression level.

    Genesis state

    The genesis file can be found here.

    Data format

    The format specification of SequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs.’s data batches can be found here.

    State validation

    Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by permissioned operators only. If a state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. passes the challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled., it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.

    State root proposals

    Proposers submit state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the create function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.0 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proofAlso referred to as a fault proof, it is the construction of an assertion that fraud was perpetrated on an optimistic rollup. More concretely, that an invalid state transition took place according to the protocol rules. The submitter of a fraud proof would expect a reward from the optimistic rollup protocol for helping maintain the integrity of the system.. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled. has passed and it is not countered.

    • Funds can be stolen if no whitelisted challenger disputes an invalid state root before the challenge window expires (CRITICAL).

    1. OP stack specification: Fault Dispute Game
    Challenges

    Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 0.00 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the defend or attack functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with full concurrency. Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 12h. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see freeloader claims), an inherited clock with too little time remaining is generally extended by 25m 43s. The extension is 51m 26s when the next claim is immediately before split depth 30, and 3h 51m (the standard extension plus the 3h 25m oracle challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled.) immediately before the last depth. Along a full-depth path, cumulative extensions can therefore add up to 1d 10h. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers’ stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step proverAn entity that generates the cryptographic proof to convince the verifier that the statement is true. In a ZK-Rollup, the prover generates the ZK (validity) proof to submit to the verifier contract. contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks (Spearbit 5.1.3).

    1. Fraud Proof Wars: OPFP

    Program Hashes

    Name
    Hash
    Repository
    Verification
    Used in
    0x0368...94b6
    Github
    BOB logoAevo logoOrderly Network logoNillion logoPhala logo

    Projects used in

    Search for projects used in

    Upgrades & Governance

    Past upgrades

    The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.

    Count of upgrades
    72
    Last upgrade
    1mo 4d ago
    Avg upgrade interval
    2mo 13d

    Ossification & Updates

    Ossification

    Contracts our research team classifies as critical form the project's critical perimeter. Its clock starts at the ossification genesis, and every critical change resets it (changes within 24 hours count as one). The ossification score is the share of recorded code-bug exploits whose exploited code was younger than this perimeter is today. Battle-tested exposure is the value secured, summed over that unchanged period.

    Ossification %
    50since 2026 Sep 16
    TVS & changes (1Y)
    Battle-tested exposure
    $358.59 K·years
    Critical changes / year
    7.9across 14 contracts
    Exit window

    Discovery updates

    2026 October 14, 08:17 UTC
    8changes

    RISC Zero verifier owner Safe: ownership transfer of the five RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStops to an EOA started ( pendingOwner ), and Proposer, Executor and Canceller role grants to the same EOA scheduled on the TimelockController, 3d delay.

    RISC Zero verifier owner Safe: ownership transfer of the five RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStops to an EOA started (pendingOwner), and Proposer, Executor and Canceller role grants to the same EOA scheduled on the TimelockController, 3d delay.

    contract TimelockController (eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711) [global/TimelockController] {
    +++ description: A timelock with access control. The current minimum delay is 3d.
    +++ description: since the RiscZeroVerifierRouter does not emit events on verifier changes, we watch the single upstream permissioned address.
    values.callsScheduled.21:
    + {"id":"0xb88d38cc5995760c99a754e1fef6919fc7ee643d4de92b098d916b906b359910","index":0,"target":"eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711","value":0,"data":"0x2f2ff15db09aa5aeb3702cfd50b6b62bc4532604938f21248a27a1d5ca736082b6819cc1000000000000000000000000f616a4f81857cfee54a4a049ec187172574bd412","predecessor":"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","delay":259200}
    +++ description: since the RiscZeroVerifierRouter does not emit events on verifier changes, we watch the single upstream permissioned address.
    values.callsScheduled.22:
    + {"id":"0xb88d38cc5995760c99a754e1fef6919fc7ee643d4de92b098d916b906b359910","index":1,"target":"eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711","value":0,"data":"0x2f2ff15dd8aa0f3194971a2a116679f7c2090f6939c8d4e01a2a8d7e41d55e5351469e63000000000000000000000000f616a4f81857cfee54a4a049ec187172574bd412","predecessor":"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","delay":259200}
    +++ description: since the RiscZeroVerifierRouter does not emit events on verifier changes, we watch the single upstream permissioned address.
    values.callsScheduled.23:
    + {"id":"0xb88d38cc5995760c99a754e1fef6919fc7ee643d4de92b098d916b906b359910","index":2,"target":"eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711","value":0,"data":"0x2f2ff15dfd643c72710c63c0180259aba6b2d05451e3591a24e58b62239378085726f783000000000000000000000000f616a4f81857cfee54a4a049ec187172574bd412","predecessor":"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","delay":259200}
    }
    contract RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop (eth:0x1efDd13f831ceeEa14940806705A53D3211CD698) [risc0/RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop] {
    +++ description: A verifier wrapper for the eth:0xafB31f5b70623CDF4b20Ada3f7230916A5A79df9 that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.
    values.pendingOwner:
    - "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
    + "eth:0xF616A4f81857CFEe54A4A049Ec187172574bd412"
    }
    contract RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop (eth:0x68dC2cB4e61774873971c499D9b239ec5Ac540E3) [risc0/RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop] {
    +++ description: A verifier wrapper for the eth:0x20ff7C2Cf391a5F096A2Cc181cb41916680f8E97 that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.
    values.pendingOwner:
    - "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
    + "eth:0xF616A4f81857CFEe54A4A049Ec187172574bd412"
    }
    contract RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop (eth:0x844D5f01161E3559d36f23d0Aa9E9620949aF782) [risc0/RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop] {
    +++ description: A verifier wrapper for the eth:0x5005aBa3DFf7C940fcc1e48DccCAD611a80eEB85 that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.
    values.pendingOwner:
    - "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
    + "eth:0xF616A4f81857CFEe54A4A049Ec187172574bd412"
    }
    contract RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop (eth:0x9F9994Eb4Cb5200198FEfb470f8b50301662e696) [risc0/RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop] {
    +++ description: A verifier wrapper for the eth:0x2a098988600d87650Fb061FfAff08B97149Fa84D that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.
    values.pendingOwner:
    - "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
    + "eth:0xF616A4f81857CFEe54A4A049Ec187172574bd412"
    }
    contract RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop (eth:0xDa8f3de6fBBdb261Ac771B813a578A7aBdA6B2b1) [risc0/RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop] {
    +++ description: A verifier wrapper for the eth:0x54aCE3ED46529B4d4F3770C8Bad5dDC48717B9bF that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.
    values.pendingOwner:
    - "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
    + "eth:0xF616A4f81857CFEe54A4A049Ec187172574bd412"
    }
    2026 October 09, 08:11 UTC
    3changes

    RISC Zero verifier owner Safe: member rotated, threshold 3/5 → 2/5.

    RISC Zero verifier owner Safe: member rotated, threshold 3/5 → 2/5.

    contract Safe (eth:0x2E5bcc9959dB5F5016F830E47943b07242CB2609) [GnosisSafe] {
    +++ description: None
    values.$members.3:
    - "eth:0xd5D43445d0227a47cA2eACCb9392352746eD9926"
    + "eth:0x9a017883e4A6BB2a6261D92D70f71107F2C39D12"
    values.$threshold:
    - 3
    + 2
    values.multisigThreshold:
    - "3 of 5 (60%)"
    + "2 of 5 (40%)"
    }
    2026 October 02, 12:41 UTC
    Critical code change
    194changes

    Upgrade 18 (op-contracts/v6.0.0) and Upgrade 19b "Karst" (op-contracts/v7.0.0), executed in one transaction on 2026-09-16 by Bob Multisig 1 via Conduit-deployed OPContractsManager (v6.0.0) and OPContractsManagerV2 (v7.1.17). respectedGameType 1337 (KailuaGame) - 1 (PermissionedDisputeGame), set in the same transaction. KailuaGame stays registered as type 1337 . Type-1 prestate: op-program v1.6.0. disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds 86400 - 43200. PermissionedDisputeGame maxClockDuration 302400 - 43200, clockExtension 10800 - 1543. PreimageOracle challengePeriod 86400 - 12343. DelayedWETH delay 302400 - 43200. SystemConfig batchInbox changed. Version changes and implementation diffs: - OptimismPortal2 5.1.1 - 5.6.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x3C877699263119022Cdaa251058c1BAc8Fc43287/eth:0x1FeD97C63C44f0cC6F861a9Ba2E8AedFE466485c - SystemConfig 3.11.0 - 3.14.2: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x2fA28989fc559836E9d66dFf3010C7F7f41c65ED/eth:0x42Ad0173051225Ac784100e9acD43349707F4db9 - DisputeGameFactory 1.3.0 - 1.6.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x74Fac1D45B98bae058F8F566201c9A81B85C7D50/eth:0x72B971717E088B59F26d4236BE222ADB6ACD393b - AnchorStateRegistry 3.5.0 - 3.9.0: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xd0216bdcC195abDF77746B6a6347CE85e2535431/eth:0x5020964201C4d65555f33FD9Bc281443d65f4C09 - L1StandardBridge 2.8.0 - 2.8.2: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A/eth:0xB37a11AadF167B2F0b8dD85372De4bC66CD4A891 - L1CrossDomainMessenger 2.11.0 - 2.11.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0/eth:0x59D497530b00062f40950ba8EaB88868bf7F86f0 - L1ERC721Bridge 2.9.0 - 2.9.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9/eth:0x9F164f1d02A81e06D639E55F65a87f0070E3Cb2e - OptimismMintableERC20Factory 1.10.2 - 1.11.0: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB/eth:0xaAbEA75Da509fA518Fd8a91Eae4BE5813B829b12 - SuperchainConfig 2.4.0 - 2.4.2: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957/eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550 - PermissionedDisputeGame 1.8.0 - 2.4.0: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x15F80920C8Fec136e2A804E04f26203FF8dAd19A/eth:0x642d1cc835a81c738313EBe85ED61979a44897bF - MIPS 1.9.0 - 1.10.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x6463dEE3828677F6270d83d45408044fc5eDB908/eth:0xb6B6342ff75b4213cBF101c135f1fC33695acc13 - PreimageOracle 1.1.4 - 1.1.5: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x1fb8cdFc6831fc866Ed9C51aF8817Da5c287aDD3/eth:0x70A3e3112467E177585eF070B63521c9368F9aA1 - DelayedWETH 1.5.0 - 1.5.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x33Dadc2d1aA9BB613A7AE6B28425eA00D44c6998/eth:0xebC3681418136F7A9f6cB4B074B1B19fc85879e1

    Upgrade 18 (op-contracts/v6.0.0) and Upgrade 19b “Karst” (op-contracts/v7.0.0), executed in one transaction on 2026-09-16 by Bob Multisig 1 via Conduit-deployed OPContractsManager (v6.0.0) and OPContractsManagerV2 (v7.1.17).

    respectedGameType 1337 (KailuaGame) -> 1 (PermissionedDisputeGame), set in the same transaction. KailuaGame stays registered as type 1337. Type-1 prestate: op-program v1.6.0.

    disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds 86400 -> 43200. PermissionedDisputeGame maxClockDuration 302400 -> 43200, clockExtension 10800 -> 1543. PreimageOracle challengePeriod 86400 -> 12343. DelayedWETH delay 302400 -> 43200.

    SystemConfig batchInbox changed.

    Version changes and implementation diffs:

    • OptimismPortal2 5.1.1 -> 5.6.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x3C877699263119022Cdaa251058c1BAc8Fc43287/eth:0x1FeD97C63C44f0cC6F861a9Ba2E8AedFE466485c
    • SystemConfig 3.11.0 -> 3.14.2: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x2fA28989fc559836E9d66dFf3010C7F7f41c65ED/eth:0x42Ad0173051225Ac784100e9acD43349707F4db9
    • DisputeGameFactory 1.3.0 -> 1.6.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x74Fac1D45B98bae058F8F566201c9A81B85C7D50/eth:0x72B971717E088B59F26d4236BE222ADB6ACD393b
    • AnchorStateRegistry 3.5.0 -> 3.9.0: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xd0216bdcC195abDF77746B6a6347CE85e2535431/eth:0x5020964201C4d65555f33FD9Bc281443d65f4C09
    • L1StandardBridge 2.8.0 -> 2.8.2: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A/eth:0xB37a11AadF167B2F0b8dD85372De4bC66CD4A891
    • L1CrossDomainMessenger 2.11.0 -> 2.11.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0/eth:0x59D497530b00062f40950ba8EaB88868bf7F86f0
    • L1ERC721Bridge 2.9.0 -> 2.9.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9/eth:0x9F164f1d02A81e06D639E55F65a87f0070E3Cb2e
    • OptimismMintableERC20Factory 1.10.2 -> 1.11.0: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB/eth:0xaAbEA75Da509fA518Fd8a91Eae4BE5813B829b12
    • SuperchainConfig 2.4.0 -> 2.4.2: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957/eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550
    • PermissionedDisputeGame 1.8.0 -> 2.4.0: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x15F80920C8Fec136e2A804E04f26203FF8dAd19A/eth:0x642d1cc835a81c738313EBe85ED61979a44897bF
    • MIPS 1.9.0 -> 1.10.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x6463dEE3828677F6270d83d45408044fc5eDB908/eth:0xb6B6342ff75b4213cBF101c135f1fC33695acc13
    • PreimageOracle 1.1.4 -> 1.1.5: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x1fb8cdFc6831fc866Ed9C51aF8817Da5c287aDD3/eth:0x70A3e3112467E177585eF070B63521c9368F9aA1
    • DelayedWETH 1.5.0 -> 1.5.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x33Dadc2d1aA9BB613A7AE6B28425eA00D44c6998/eth:0xebC3681418136F7A9f6cB4B074B1B19fc85879e1
    contract ProxyAdmin (eth:0x0d9f416260598313Be6FDf6B010f2FbC34957Cd0) [global/ProxyAdmin] {
    +++ description: None
    directlyReceivedPermissions.1.from:
    - "eth:0x1A08BA77CB95184Ea0C31e56f199Db068eb6B35d"
    + "eth:0x048D0cfF3F0729117F44da6494Dbf4d78e593D95"
    }
    - Status: DELETED
    contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0x15F80920C8Fec136e2A804E04f26203FF8dAd19A) [opstack/PermissionedDisputeGame]
    +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger.
    - Status: DELETED
    contract DelayedWETH (eth:0x1A08BA77CB95184Ea0C31e56f199Db068eb6B35d) [opstack/DelayedWETH]
    +++ description: Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.
    - Status: DELETED
    contract PreimageOracle (eth:0x1fb8cdFc6831fc866Ed9C51aF8817Da5c287aDD3) [opstack/PreimageOracle]
    +++ description: The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game.
    contract L1StandardBridge (eth:0x3F6cE1b36e5120BBc59D0cFe8A5aC8b6464ac1f7) [opstack/L1StandardBridge] {
    +++ description: The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0xcacd38e7b52353ad3463da40b7e7a29b028f95500a82590d2b8f8ffd26b83f6d"
    + "0x6469155800e1489607c8fa062550a362dfa8978885df4714ca4653e5f3d25b0c"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A"
    + "eth:0xB37a11AadF167B2F0b8dD85372De4bC66CD4A891"
    values.version:
    - "2.8.0"
    + "2.8.2"
    implementationNames.eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A:
    - "L1StandardBridge"
    implementationNames.eth:0xB37a11AadF167B2F0b8dD85372De4bC66CD4A891:
    + "L1StandardBridge"
    }
    contract OptimismMintableERC20Factory (eth:0x5557408ab14013ce9Dbb300dE0D87D386BB09cb6) [opstack/OptimismMintableERC20Factory] {
    +++ description: A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it's deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain's representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x307d4cb83e682629880fe9bb874a188805e3b93cb11a2cbf80095975f1e5b04e"
    + "0x11b0ed6f15cabf613492a8d54c55304a17cf60f4fd94a655d7e720d4556906d0"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB"
    + "eth:0xaAbEA75Da509fA518Fd8a91Eae4BE5813B829b12"
    values.$pastUpgrades.6:
    + ["2026-09-16T08:23:23.000Z","0x6f54452af0caf09baf9e3c24b167cc850901088082dff2a244a5c39b1dee3bc7",["eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.7:
    + ["2026-09-16T08:23:23.000Z","0x6f54452af0caf09baf9e3c24b167cc850901088082dff2a244a5c39b1dee3bc7",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.8:
    + ["2026-09-16T08:23:23.000Z","0x6f54452af0caf09baf9e3c24b167cc850901088082dff2a244a5c39b1dee3bc7",["eth:0xaAbEA75Da509fA518Fd8a91Eae4BE5813B829b12"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 6
    + 9
    values.version:
    - "1.10.2"
    + "1.11.0"
    values.proxyAdmin:
    + "eth:0x0d9f416260598313Be6FDf6B010f2FbC34957Cd0"
    values.proxyAdminOwner:
    + "eth:0xC91482A96e9c2A104d9298D1980eCCf8C4dc764E"
    implementationNames.eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB:
    - "OptimismMintableERC20Factory"
    implementationNames.eth:0xaAbEA75Da509fA518Fd8a91Eae4BE5813B829b12:
    + "OptimismMintableERC20Factory"
    }
    contract L1ERC721Bridge (eth:0x5fF93263D5181b2A826f8c51d54BC0da2d20D50a) [opstack/L1ERC721Bridge] {
    +++ description: Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x1f65fda230b6d0df44e466b06418b2e12a401ef82c07521ad18d2f4ae6c70fb2"
    + "0xc5ed62b03fb7c1340609ace7ebb0c5bf8d43b1814b1ab4f10863bfa21d13b90b"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9"
    + "eth:0x9F164f1d02A81e06D639E55F65a87f0070E3Cb2e"
    values.$pastUpgrades.9:
    + ["2026-09-16T08:23:23.000Z","0x6f54452af0caf09baf9e3c24b167cc850901088082dff2a244a5c39b1dee3bc7",["eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.10:
    + ["2026-09-16T08:23:23.000Z","0x6f54452af0caf09baf9e3c24b167cc850901088082dff2a244a5c39b1dee3bc7",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.11:
    + ["2026-09-16T08:23:23.000Z","0x6f54452af0caf09baf9e3c24b167cc850901088082dff2a244a5c39b1dee3bc7",["eth:0x9F164f1d02A81e06D639E55F65a87f0070E3Cb2e"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 9
    + 12
    values.version:
    - "2.9.0"
    + "2.9.1"
    implementationNames.eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9:
    - "L1ERC721Bridge"
    implementationNames.eth:0x9F164f1d02A81e06D639E55F65a87f0070E3Cb2e:
    + "L1ERC721Bridge"
    }
    - Status: DELETED
    contract MIPS (eth:0x6463dEE3828677F6270d83d45408044fc5eDB908) [opstack/MIPS]
    +++ description: The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.
    EOA (eth:0x7cB1022D30b9860C36b243E7B181A1d46f618C69) {
    +++ description: None
    receivedPermissions.0:
    + {"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x96123dbFC3253185B594c6a7472EE5A21E9B1079","description":"Allowed to post new state roots of the current layer to the host chain.","role":".proposerFromDGF"}
    }
    contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0x8AdeE124447435fE03e3CD24dF3f4cAE32E65a3E) [opstack/OptimismPortal2] {
    +++ description: The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x3e7e2cb08ba995795937c9c2e8ea9d0e4d2e2de852f389055073384d5f79c59d"
    + "0xe1df4caf26d9a0735bd53eeb020546840bd2f2fd4d0d9e2519f873306b5e19b1"
    description:
    - "The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the KailuaGame."
    + "The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame."
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0x3C877699263119022Cdaa251058c1BAc8Fc43287"
    + "eth:0x1FeD97C63C44f0cC6F861a9Ba2E8AedFE466485c"
    values.$pastUpgrades.11:
    + ["2026-09-16T08:23:23.000Z","0x6f54452af0caf09baf9e3c24b167cc850901088082dff2a244a5c39b1dee3bc7",["eth:0x01868AC54B28257A06Aa0BcDB397447F7B896F7F"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.12:
    + ["2026-09-16T08:23:23.000Z","0x6f54452af0caf09baf9e3c24b167cc850901088082dff2a244a5c39b1dee3bc7",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.13:
    + ["2026-09-16T08:23:23.000Z","0x6f54452af0caf09baf9e3c24b167cc850901088082dff2a244a5c39b1dee3bc7",["eth:0x1FeD97C63C44f0cC6F861a9Ba2E8AedFE466485c"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 11
    + 14
    values.disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds:
    - 86400
    + 43200
    values.RespectedGameString:
    - "KailuaGame"
    + "PermissionedDisputeGame"
    values.respectedGameType:
    - 1337
    + 1
    values.version:
    - "5.1.1"
    + "5.6.1"
    implementationNames.eth:0x3C877699263119022Cdaa251058c1BAc8Fc43287:
    - "OptimismPortal2"
    implementationNames.eth:0x1FeD97C63C44f0cC6F861a9Ba2E8AedFE466485c:
    + "OptimismPortal2"
    }
    contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0x96123dbFC3253185B594c6a7472EE5A21E9B1079) [opstack/DisputeGameFactory_v2] {
    +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. This variant exposes per-type reads only; the legacy array views (gameImpls[], initBonds[]) were removed in the new implementation.
    template:
    - "opstack/DisputeGameFactory"
    + "opstack/DisputeGameFactory_v2"
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x7daf6049672fd2ab7dc8dd3b6287e1d0a40958346c5e2857c4616a73dcac4da6"
    + "0x8912e655e26f51d4384fc950df847ae65bccf1f5ec5458642402f385c3dadf78"
    description:
    - "The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them."
    + "The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. This variant exposes per-type reads only; the legacy array views (gameImpls[], initBonds[]) were removed in the new implementation."
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0x74Fac1D45B98bae058F8F566201c9A81B85C7D50"
    + "eth:0x72B971717E088B59F26d4236BE222ADB6ACD393b"
    values.$pastUpgrades.4:
    + ["2026-09-16T08:23:23.000Z","0x6f54452af0caf09baf9e3c24b167cc850901088082dff2a244a5c39b1dee3bc7",["eth:0xc040F392E52Cb6970CA8E110c280fE24E07C5e2c"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.5:
    + ["2026-09-16T08:23:23.000Z","0x6f54452af0caf09baf9e3c24b167cc850901088082dff2a244a5c39b1dee3bc7",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.6:
    + ["2026-09-16T08:23:23.000Z","0x6f54452af0caf09baf9e3c24b167cc850901088082dff2a244a5c39b1dee3bc7",["eth:0x72B971717E088B59F26d4236BE222ADB6ACD393b"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 4
    + 7
    values.challengerFromDGF:
    - "UNRESOLVED"
    + "eth:0xC91482A96e9c2A104d9298D1980eCCf8C4dc764E"
    values.game2000:
    - "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
    values.gameImpls:
    - ["eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000","eth:0x15F80920C8Fec136e2A804E04f26203FF8dAd19A","eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000","eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000","eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000","eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000","eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"]
    values.initBonds:
    - [0,0,0,0,0]
    values.permissionedGameArgs:
    - "0x"
    + "0x03682932cec7ce0a3874b19675a6bbc923054a7b321efc7d3835187b172494b6b6b6342ff75b4213cbf101c135f1fc33695acc13c9ac21acd8696b64270716528bf83630ea7a293c048d0cff3f0729117f44da6494dbf4d78e593d95000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000ed887cb1022d30b9860c36b243e7b181a1d46f618c69c91482a96e9c2a104d9298d1980eccf8c4dc764e"
    values.proposerFromDGF:
    - "UNRESOLVED"
    + "eth:0x7cB1022D30b9860C36b243E7B181A1d46f618C69"
    values.version:
    - "1.3.0"
    + "1.6.1"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.wethFromDGF:
    - "UNRESOLVED"
    + "eth:0x048D0cfF3F0729117F44da6494Dbf4d78e593D95"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.absolutePrestateFromDGF:
    + "0x03682932cec7ce0a3874b19675a6bbc923054a7b321efc7d3835187b172494b6"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.anchorStateRegistryFromDGF:
    + "eth:0xC9AC21AcD8696B64270716528bF83630Ea7a293c"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.chainIdFromDGF:
    + 60808
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.game0:
    + "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.game1:
    + "eth:0x642d1cc835a81c738313EBe85ED61979a44897bF"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.game5:
    + "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.game5AnchorStateRegistry:
    + "UNRESOLVED"
    values.game5Args:
    + "0x"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.game5Proposer:
    + "UNRESOLVED"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.game621:
    + "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.game8:
    + "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.game8AbsolutePrestate:
    + "UNRESOLVED"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.game8AnchorStateRegistry:
    + "UNRESOLVED"
    values.game8Args:
    + "0x"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.game8ChainId:
    + "UNRESOLVED"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.game8Vm:
    + "UNRESOLVED"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.game8Weth:
    + "UNRESOLVED"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.game9:
    + "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.game9AbsolutePrestate:
    + "UNRESOLVED"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.game9AnchorStateRegistry:
    + "UNRESOLVED"
    values.game9Args:
    + "0x"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.game9Vm:
    + "UNRESOLVED"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.game9Weth:
    + "UNRESOLVED"
    values.initBondGame0:
    + 0
    values.initBondGame1:
    + 0
    values.initBondGame5:
    + 0
    values.initBondGame621:
    + 0
    values.initBondGame8:
    + 0
    values.initBondGame9:
    + 0
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.vmFromDGF:
    + "eth:0xb6B6342ff75b4213cBF101c135f1fC33695acc13"
    fieldMeta.$admin:
    - {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.owner:
    - {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.gameImpls:
    - {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.game2000:
    - {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.game621:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.game0:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.game1:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.game8:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.game9:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.game5:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.absolutePrestateFromDGF:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.vmFromDGF:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.game8AbsolutePrestate:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.game8Vm:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.game8AnchorStateRegistry:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.game8Weth:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.game8ChainId:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.game9AbsolutePrestate:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.game9Vm:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.game9AnchorStateRegistry:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.game9Weth:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.game5AnchorStateRegistry:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.game5Proposer:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.anchorStateRegistryFromDGF:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.chainIdFromDGF:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    implementationNames.eth:0x74Fac1D45B98bae058F8F566201c9A81B85C7D50:
    - "DisputeGameFactory"
    implementationNames.eth:0x72B971717E088B59F26d4236BE222ADB6ACD393b:
    + "DisputeGameFactory"
    usedTypes.0:
    + {"typeCaster":"SliceBytes32","arg":{"offset":0}}
    usedTypes.1:
    + {"typeCaster":"SliceAddress","arg":{"offset":32}}
    usedTypes.2:
    + {"typeCaster":"SliceAddress","arg":{"offset":32}}
    usedTypes.3:
    + {"typeCaster":"SliceAddress","arg":{"offset":52}}
    usedTypes.4:
    + {"typeCaster":"SliceAddress","arg":{"offset":72}}
    usedTypes.5:
    + {"typeCaster":"SliceUint256","arg":{"offset":92}}
    usedTypes.6:
    + {"typeCaster":"SliceAddress","arg":{"offset":0}}
    usedTypes.7:
    + {"typeCaster":"SliceAddress","arg":{"offset":20}}
    usedTypes.2:
    - {"typeCaster":"SliceAddress","arg":{"offset":72}}
    }
    contract SystemConfig (eth:0xACB886b75D76d1c8d9248cFdDfA09b70C71c5393) [opstack/SystemConfig] {
    +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0xaa1b3bedab4e63198240e9dea4503f0e615e4d18a545961c9f11b72143279fbc"
    + "0x3d8e7cdbbdbf274bba0a11a060b01d5a50e3a478683af9ec079874d1758576d6"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0x2fA28989fc559836E9d66dFf3010C7F7f41c65ED"
    + "eth:0x42Ad0173051225Ac784100e9acD43349707F4db9"
    values.$pastUpgrades.10:
    + ["2026-09-16T08:23:23.000Z","0x6f54452af0caf09baf9e3c24b167cc850901088082dff2a244a5c39b1dee3bc7",["eth:0xd392c27B84b1cA776528F2704BC67B82a62132d2"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.11:
    + ["2026-09-16T08:23:23.000Z","0x6f54452af0caf09baf9e3c24b167cc850901088082dff2a244a5c39b1dee3bc7",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.12:
    + ["2026-09-16T08:23:23.000Z","0x6f54452af0caf09baf9e3c24b167cc850901088082dff2a244a5c39b1dee3bc7",["eth:0x42Ad0173051225Ac784100e9acD43349707F4db9"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 10
    + 13
    values.batchInbox:
    - "eth:0x3A75346f81302aAc0333FB5DCDD407e12A6CfA83"
    + "eth:0x008e0E9215d6bDb44A351ce5b8b8037A274f055B"
    values.getAddresses.delayedWETH:
    + "eth:0x048D0cfF3F0729117F44da6494Dbf4d78e593D95"
    values.getAddresses.opcm:
    + "eth:0x60Fb77F80B8319b6BDae875BCc29E2e37627F8d3"
    values.version:
    - "3.11.0"
    + "3.14.2"
    values.DELAYED_WETH_SLOT:
    + "0x51547f31a231e1007dca33017faa3da20d959b95087c588a7768bfb922fd58ff"
    values.delayedWETH:
    + "eth:0x048D0cfF3F0729117F44da6494Dbf4d78e593D95"
    values.isCustomGasToken:
    + false
    values.lastUsedOPCM:
    + "eth:0x60Fb77F80B8319b6BDae875BCc29E2e37627F8d3"
    values.lastUsedOPCMVersion:
    + "7.1.17"
    values.OPCM_SLOT:
    + "0x99f45962df4bc30de8d4c3c6d1ffc0f100edce16e80c7a5768b6d55ca463ff42"
    implementationNames.eth:0x2fA28989fc559836E9d66dFf3010C7F7f41c65ED:
    - "SystemConfig"
    implementationNames.eth:0x42Ad0173051225Ac784100e9acD43349707F4db9:
    + "SystemConfig"
    }
    contract Bob Multisig 1 (eth:0xC91482A96e9c2A104d9298D1980eCCf8C4dc764E) [GnosisSafe] {
    +++ description: None
    receivedPermissions.0:
    + {"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x96123dbFC3253185B594c6a7472EE5A21E9B1079","description":"Allowed to challenge or delete state roots proposed by a Proposer.","role":".challengerFromDGF"}
    receivedPermissions.4.from:
    - "eth:0x1A08BA77CB95184Ea0C31e56f199Db068eb6B35d"
    + "eth:0x048D0cfF3F0729117F44da6494Dbf4d78e593D95"
    }
    contract AnchorStateRegistry (eth:0xC9AC21AcD8696B64270716528bF83630Ea7a293c) [opstack/AnchorStateRegistry_post20] {
    +++ description: Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. This variant stores respectedGameType, retirementTimestamp, and disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds locally and drops the legacy *FromGame fields, since the AggregateVerifier model does not expose vm()/weth()/absolutePrestate() on its game implementation.
    template:
    - "opstack/AnchorStateRegistry_post13"
    + "opstack/AnchorStateRegistry_post20"
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0xf808a203af41f7932eb8e39985e56a7c75c940a260fb17d76d1003a3793281b5"
    + "0x10f64124093daab87c84d97148854054f9622bf86e09e98d496f123be3368122"
    description:
    - "Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the KailuaGame."
    + "Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. This variant stores respectedGameType, retirementTimestamp, and disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds locally and drops the legacy *FromGame fields, since the AggregateVerifier model does not expose vm()/weth()/absolutePrestate() on its game implementation."
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0xd0216bdcC195abDF77746B6a6347CE85e2535431"
    + "eth:0x5020964201C4d65555f33FD9Bc281443d65f4C09"
    values.$pastUpgrades.2:
    + ["2026-09-16T08:23:23.000Z","0x6f54452af0caf09baf9e3c24b167cc850901088082dff2a244a5c39b1dee3bc7",["eth:0xF458DB6Bb82D2Ffa697E8877872d4d114BC51B5C"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.3:
    + ["2026-09-16T08:23:23.000Z","0x6f54452af0caf09baf9e3c24b167cc850901088082dff2a244a5c39b1dee3bc7",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.4:
    + ["2026-09-16T08:23:23.000Z","0x6f54452af0caf09baf9e3c24b167cc850901088082dff2a244a5c39b1dee3bc7",["eth:0x5020964201C4d65555f33FD9Bc281443d65f4C09"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 2
    + 5
    values.absolutePrestateFromGame:
    - "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
    values.challengePeriodFromOracle:
    - "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
    values.disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds:
    - 86400
    + 43200
    values.oracleFromVm:
    - "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
    values.RespectedGameString:
    - "KailuaGame"
    + "PermissionedDisputeGame"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.respectedGameType:
    - 1337
    + 1
    values.version:
    - "3.5.0"
    + "3.9.0"
    values.vmFromGame:
    - "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
    values.wethFromGame:
    - "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.blacklistedGames:
    + []
    values.getStartingAnchorRoot:
    + {"root":"0xdead000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","l2SequenceNumber":0}
    fieldMeta.$admin:
    - {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.disputeGameFactory:
    - {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.systemConfig:
    - {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.blacklistedGames:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    implementationNames.eth:0xd0216bdcC195abDF77746B6a6347CE85e2535431:
    - "AnchorStateRegistry"
    implementationNames.eth:0x5020964201C4d65555f33FD9Bc281443d65f4C09:
    + "AnchorStateRegistry"
    usedTypes.0.arg.621:
    + "AggregateVerifier"
    usedTypes.0.arg.8:
    + "FaultDisputeGame"
    }
    contract L1CrossDomainMessenger (eth:0xE3d981643b806FB8030CDB677D6E60892E547EdA) [opstack/L1CrossDomainMessenger] {
    +++ description: Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x1f2c13ad1144ce6548e578b834c33b0d65b1564aeb0d5c708ed4e7fb50535cc6"
    + "0x694050f95b40e6d92ee91ca0f60acb9c4a74d1b0325c33fd4bd7445fde90e806"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0"
    + "eth:0x59D497530b00062f40950ba8EaB88868bf7F86f0"
    values.$pastUpgrades.10:
    + ["2026-09-16T08:23:23.000Z","0x6f54452af0caf09baf9e3c24b167cc850901088082dff2a244a5c39b1dee3bc7",["eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.11:
    + ["2026-09-16T08:23:23.000Z","0x6f54452af0caf09baf9e3c24b167cc850901088082dff2a244a5c39b1dee3bc7",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.12:
    + ["2026-09-16T08:23:23.000Z","0x6f54452af0caf09baf9e3c24b167cc850901088082dff2a244a5c39b1dee3bc7",["eth:0x59D497530b00062f40950ba8EaB88868bf7F86f0"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 10
    + 13
    values.version:
    - "2.11.0"
    + "2.11.1"
    implementationNames.eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0:
    - "L1CrossDomainMessenger"
    implementationNames.eth:0x59D497530b00062f40950ba8EaB88868bf7F86f0:
    + "L1CrossDomainMessenger"
    }
    contract SuperchainConfig (eth:0xE925205ad05D8d612Ac205C4941CCd61Fc965C46) [opstack/SuperchainConfigFake_expiry] {
    +++ description: This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3mo 1d if left untouched.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x5fb525d1572fb90d060d122143b915059cbff39e0298b345857fd4267d7f6b28"
    + "0x2cd597b7305a446a1df355e6909cbd75fe38aa045faf4876a8e5496eebc1734f"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957"
    + "eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550"
    values.$pastUpgrades.3:
    + ["2026-09-16T08:23:23.000Z","0x6f54452af0caf09baf9e3c24b167cc850901088082dff2a244a5c39b1dee3bc7",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.4:
    + ["2026-09-16T08:23:23.000Z","0x6f54452af0caf09baf9e3c24b167cc850901088082dff2a244a5c39b1dee3bc7",["eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 3
    + 5
    values.version:
    - "2.4.0"
    + "2.4.2"
    implementationNames.eth:0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957:
    - "SuperchainConfig"
    implementationNames.eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550:
    + "SuperchainConfig"
    }
    + Status: CREATED
    contract DelayedWETH (eth:0x048D0cfF3F0729117F44da6494Dbf4d78e593D95) [opstack/DelayedWETH]
    +++ description: Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0x642d1cc835a81c738313EBe85ED61979a44897bF) [opstack/PermissionedDisputeGame]
    +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract PreimageOracle (eth:0x70A3e3112467E177585eF070B63521c9368F9aA1) [opstack/PreimageOracle]
    +++ description: The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract MIPS (eth:0xb6B6342ff75b4213cBF101c135f1fC33695acc13) [opstack/MIPS]
    +++ description: The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.
    2026 July 08, 08:22 UTC
    High severity
    8changes

    Upgraded Kailua to v1.3.0 release, program hash reproduced. Also rotated ms member.

    Upgraded Kailua to v1.3.0 release, program hash reproduced. Also rotated ms member.

    contract KailuaVerifier (eth:0xa23bf38299bbCbAA01b9ea8a1d3412D9f405b97d) [N/A] {
    +++ description: None
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0xF59DA245d3D69E5432Afd05008E8D332C1bfAb4e"
    + "eth:0xC9934Db60031aDd319d008f8d643E3b723f28e43"
    values.$pastUpgrades.1:
    + ["2026-07-08T07:35:47.000Z","0x211cae5e55a0b57029752e11536fb7a4175d8059cb9d4ec37ca7e50d635809dd",["eth:0xC9934Db60031aDd319d008f8d643E3b723f28e43"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 1
    + 2
    values.FPVM_IMAGE_ID:
    - "0x3768ea4f0e0d940f69c4cc5bd39a9e2772bfe3cb57818ce526bbe68033ee5934"
    + "0xb2e2b1513e80ea1e8f998e51bf8e7754eec21dbd0463e0b6b115165ba6bac2bf"
    values.ROLLUP_CONFIG_HASH:
    - "0x8afe7ad42347f5d9f9ad307825d14a39630504005cb998d5132dcd0d0485d64d"
    + "0x56ed6a78ed98a992a16a46513ee4ee496a86302a96d0f2bcee133c21351cd681"
    implementationNames.eth:0xF59DA245d3D69E5432Afd05008E8D332C1bfAb4e:
    - "KailuaVerifier"
    implementationNames.eth:0xC9934Db60031aDd319d008f8d643E3b723f28e43:
    + "KailuaVerifier"
    }
    contract Bob Multisig 1 (eth:0xC91482A96e9c2A104d9298D1980eCCf8C4dc764E) [GnosisSafe] {
    +++ description: None
    values.$members.4:
    - "eth:0x3840f487A17A41100DD1Bf0946c34f132a57Fd5f"
    + "eth:0xefCf0c8faFB425997870f845e26fC6cA6EE6dD5C"
    }
    2026 July 03, 09:58 UTC
    Critical state change
    43changes

    Upgrade to Kailua v1.2.0. - Vanguard advantage activated: previously 0s (disabled), now 1mo with a designated vanguard ( 0x7cB1022D… ). The vanguard can delay the first child proposal of each parent tournament by up to a month; sibling proposals stay permissionless (v1.2.0 retains the childCount() == 1 gate). - KailuaGame impl rotated (diff) — now holds a direct KAILUA VERIFIER reference (read once from the treasury at construction) and calls the verifier for proof checking. The vanguard gate is unchanged ( assignVanguard , vanguardAdvantage , childCount() == 1 ), but tournament payout economics were reworked (see below). - KailuaTreasury rotated (diff) — drops the RISC ZERO VERIFIER , FPVM IMAGE ID , and ROLLUP CONFIG HASH immutables (moved to KailuaVerifier) and holds a KAILUA VERIFIER reference instead. - KailuaVerifier (new in v1.2.0) — proxy-wrapped, holds the proof config that used to sit on KailuaTreasury, and replaces the previous RiscZeroVerifierRouter + emergency-stop path. Adds optional fault-proof permits: a prover can lock collateral to reserve an exclusive window for collecting the fault-proof reward (anti-front-run). On bob the permit window is effectively off ( PERMIT DELAY=0 , PERMIT DURATION=1 → 1-second active window); fault-proof submission remains permissionless. - Tournament payout economics reworked (independent of the vanguard gate). Slashed participation bonds now split 1/3 prover / 1/3 winner / 1/3 burn ( ELIMINATION SPLIT DENOM=3 , PROVER NUM=1 , WINNER NUM=1 ) accrued via eliminationRewards / winnerSharesByParent and claimed with claimEliminationRewards() , replacing the old full-bond claimEliminationBonds(uint256) / eliminations[] mechanic. And KailuaGame.getPayoutRecipient now routes the fault-proof reward through KAILUA VERIFIER.faultProofPermitBeneficiary before falling back to the fault/validity prover (inert on bob given the 1-second permit window). - New FPVM image ID deployed alongside the v1.2.0 contracts.

    Upgrade to Kailua v1.2.0.

    • Vanguard advantage activated: previously 0s (disabled), now 1mo with a designated vanguard (0x7cB1022D…). The vanguard can delay the first child proposal of each parent tournament by up to a month; sibling proposals stay permissionless (v1.2.0 retains the childCount() == 1 gate).
    • KailuaGame impl rotated (diff) — now holds a direct KAILUA_VERIFIER reference (read once from the treasury at construction) and calls the verifier for proof checking. The vanguard gate is unchanged (assignVanguard, vanguardAdvantage, childCount() == 1), but tournament payout economics were reworked (see below).
    • KailuaTreasury rotated (diff) — drops the RISC_ZERO_VERIFIER, FPVM_IMAGE_ID, and ROLLUP_CONFIG_HASH immutables (moved to KailuaVerifier) and holds a KAILUA_VERIFIER reference instead.
    • KailuaVerifier (new in v1.2.0) — proxy-wrapped, holds the proof config that used to sit on KailuaTreasury, and replaces the previous RiscZeroVerifierRouter + emergency-stop path. Adds optional fault-proof permits: a prover can lock collateral to reserve an exclusive window for collecting the fault-proof reward (anti-front-run). On bob the permit window is effectively off (PERMIT_DELAY=0, PERMIT_DURATION=1 → 1-second active window); fault-proof submission remains permissionless.
    • Tournament payout economics reworked (independent of the vanguard gate). Slashed participation bonds now split 1/3 prover / 1/3 winner / 1/3 burn (ELIMINATION_SPLIT_DENOM=3, PROVER_NUM=1, WINNER_NUM=1) accrued via eliminationRewards / winnerSharesByParent and claimed with claimEliminationRewards(), replacing the old full-bond claimEliminationBonds(uint256) / eliminations[] mechanic. And KailuaGame.getPayoutRecipient now routes the fault-proof reward through KAILUA_VERIFIER.faultProofPermitBeneficiary before falling back to the fault/validity prover (inert on bob given the 1-second permit window).
    • New FPVM image ID deployed alongside the v1.2.0 contracts.
    contract TimelockController (eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711) [global/TimelockController] {
    +++ description: A timelock with access control. The current minimum delay is 3d.
    values.accessControl.PROPOSER_ROLE.members.0:
    - "eth:0xF616A4f81857CFEe54A4A049Ec187172574bd412"
    + "eth:0x2E5bcc9959dB5F5016F830E47943b07242CB2609"
    values.accessControl.CANCELLER_ROLE.members.0:
    - "eth:0xF616A4f81857CFEe54A4A049Ec187172574bd412"
    + "eth:0x2E5bcc9959dB5F5016F830E47943b07242CB2609"
    values.accessControl.EXECUTOR_ROLE.members.0:
    - "eth:0xF616A4f81857CFEe54A4A049Ec187172574bd412"
    + "eth:0x2E5bcc9959dB5F5016F830E47943b07242CB2609"
    +++ description: since the RiscZeroVerifierRouter does not emit events on verifier changes, we watch the single upstream permissioned address.
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.callsExecuted.12:
    + {"id":"0x5fb8d6ab7b9ad6614a645faf85120306acf72c02bc66de00b027c8ec57eff377","index":0,"target":"eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711","value":0,"data":"0x2f2ff15db09aa5aeb3702cfd50b6b62bc4532604938f21248a27a1d5ca736082b6819cc10000000000000000000000002e5bcc9959db5f5016f830e47943b07242cb2609"}
    +++ description: since the RiscZeroVerifierRouter does not emit events on verifier changes, we watch the single upstream permissioned address.
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.callsExecuted.13:
    + {"id":"0x336fa76c82918a2642423bcae028021a204288e86965316b58737fb6e6a2d985","index":0,"target":"eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711","value":0,"data":"0x2f2ff15dd8aa0f3194971a2a116679f7c2090f6939c8d4e01a2a8d7e41d55e5351469e630000000000000000000000002e5bcc9959db5f5016f830e47943b07242cb2609"}
    +++ description: since the RiscZeroVerifierRouter does not emit events on verifier changes, we watch the single upstream permissioned address.
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.callsExecuted.14:
    + {"id":"0x0c0f9e544f5acb8eafdf44bbd4a1f21cde030970ad1f76c01504ff1c291f0e9d","index":0,"target":"eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711","value":0,"data":"0x2f2ff15dfd643c72710c63c0180259aba6b2d05451e3591a24e58b62239378085726f7830000000000000000000000002e5bcc9959db5f5016f830e47943b07242cb2609"}
    +++ description: since the RiscZeroVerifierRouter does not emit events on verifier changes, we watch the single upstream permissioned address.
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.callsExecuted.15:
    + {"id":"0x89a458a6781bd045d785361e429a3df71167dff9e14996fa5f98ca7c5eb9d4c3","index":0,"target":"eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711","value":0,"data":"0xd547741fb09aa5aeb3702cfd50b6b62bc4532604938f21248a27a1d5ca736082b6819cc1000000000000000000000000f616a4f81857cfee54a4a049ec187172574bd412"}
    +++ description: since the RiscZeroVerifierRouter does not emit events on verifier changes, we watch the single upstream permissioned address.
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.callsExecuted.16:
    + {"id":"0x4acc61e26f03e0270258c3fe8aec76d8ce5c80e8e100972e3091fc77c8882819","index":0,"target":"eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711","value":0,"data":"0xd547741fd8aa0f3194971a2a116679f7c2090f6939c8d4e01a2a8d7e41d55e5351469e63000000000000000000000000f616a4f81857cfee54a4a049ec187172574bd412"}
    +++ description: since the RiscZeroVerifierRouter does not emit events on verifier changes, we watch the single upstream permissioned address.
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.callsExecuted.17:
    + {"id":"0xf239631e46b22677b2b8b3b35d3780a1de298d9234c6906ce98aa3168d52cc97","index":0,"target":"eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711","value":0,"data":"0xd547741ffd643c72710c63c0180259aba6b2d05451e3591a24e58b62239378085726f783000000000000000000000000f616a4f81857cfee54a4a049ec187172574bd412"}
    +++ description: since the RiscZeroVerifierRouter does not emit events on verifier changes, we watch the single upstream permissioned address.
    values.callsScheduled.15:
    + {"id":"0x5fb8d6ab7b9ad6614a645faf85120306acf72c02bc66de00b027c8ec57eff377","index":0,"target":"eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711","value":0,"data":"0x2f2ff15db09aa5aeb3702cfd50b6b62bc4532604938f21248a27a1d5ca736082b6819cc10000000000000000000000002e5bcc9959db5f5016f830e47943b07242cb2609","predecessor":"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","delay":259200}
    +++ description: since the RiscZeroVerifierRouter does not emit events on verifier changes, we watch the single upstream permissioned address.
    values.callsScheduled.16:
    + {"id":"0x336fa76c82918a2642423bcae028021a204288e86965316b58737fb6e6a2d985","index":0,"target":"eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711","value":0,"data":"0x2f2ff15dd8aa0f3194971a2a116679f7c2090f6939c8d4e01a2a8d7e41d55e5351469e630000000000000000000000002e5bcc9959db5f5016f830e47943b07242cb2609","predecessor":"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","delay":259200}
    +++ description: since the RiscZeroVerifierRouter does not emit events on verifier changes, we watch the single upstream permissioned address.
    values.callsScheduled.17:
    + {"id":"0x0c0f9e544f5acb8eafdf44bbd4a1f21cde030970ad1f76c01504ff1c291f0e9d","index":0,"target":"eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711","value":0,"data":"0x2f2ff15dfd643c72710c63c0180259aba6b2d05451e3591a24e58b62239378085726f7830000000000000000000000002e5bcc9959db5f5016f830e47943b07242cb2609","predecessor":"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","delay":259200}
    +++ description: since the RiscZeroVerifierRouter does not emit events on verifier changes, we watch the single upstream permissioned address.
    values.callsScheduled.18:
    + {"id":"0x89a458a6781bd045d785361e429a3df71167dff9e14996fa5f98ca7c5eb9d4c3","index":0,"target":"eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711","value":0,"data":"0xd547741fb09aa5aeb3702cfd50b6b62bc4532604938f21248a27a1d5ca736082b6819cc1000000000000000000000000f616a4f81857cfee54a4a049ec187172574bd412","predecessor":"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","delay":259200}
    +++ description: since the RiscZeroVerifierRouter does not emit events on verifier changes, we watch the single upstream permissioned address.
    values.callsScheduled.19:
    + {"id":"0x4acc61e26f03e0270258c3fe8aec76d8ce5c80e8e100972e3091fc77c8882819","index":0,"target":"eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711","value":0,"data":"0xd547741fd8aa0f3194971a2a116679f7c2090f6939c8d4e01a2a8d7e41d55e5351469e63000000000000000000000000f616a4f81857cfee54a4a049ec187172574bd412","predecessor":"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","delay":259200}
    +++ description: since the RiscZeroVerifierRouter does not emit events on verifier changes, we watch the single upstream permissioned address.
    values.callsScheduled.20:
    + {"id":"0xf239631e46b22677b2b8b3b35d3780a1de298d9234c6906ce98aa3168d52cc97","index":0,"target":"eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711","value":0,"data":"0xd547741ffd643c72710c63c0180259aba6b2d05451e3591a24e58b62239378085726f783000000000000000000000000f616a4f81857cfee54a4a049ec187172574bd412","predecessor":"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","delay":259200}
    values.Canceller.0:
    - "eth:0xF616A4f81857CFEe54A4A049Ec187172574bd412"
    + "eth:0x2E5bcc9959dB5F5016F830E47943b07242CB2609"
    values.Executor.0:
    - "eth:0xF616A4f81857CFEe54A4A049Ec187172574bd412"
    + "eth:0x2E5bcc9959dB5F5016F830E47943b07242CB2609"
    values.Proposer.0:
    - "eth:0xF616A4f81857CFEe54A4A049Ec187172574bd412"
    + "eth:0x2E5bcc9959dB5F5016F830E47943b07242CB2609"
    }
    contract RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop (eth:0x1efDd13f831ceeEa14940806705A53D3211CD698) [risc0/RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop] {
    +++ description: A verifier wrapper for the eth:0xafB31f5b70623CDF4b20Ada3f7230916A5A79df9 that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.
    values.owner:
    - "eth:0xF616A4f81857CFEe54A4A049Ec187172574bd412"
    + "eth:0x2E5bcc9959dB5F5016F830E47943b07242CB2609"
    }
    - Status: DELETED
    contract KailuaGame (eth:0x4BE239c86364eD73fc244A5F50c8ccB101a492eF) [risc0/KailuaGame]
    +++ description: Implementation of the KailuaGame with type 1337. Based on this implementation, new KailuaGames are created with every new state root proposal.
    contract RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop (eth:0x68dC2cB4e61774873971c499D9b239ec5Ac540E3) [risc0/RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop] {
    +++ description: A verifier wrapper for the eth:0x20ff7C2Cf391a5F096A2Cc181cb41916680f8E97 that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.
    values.owner:
    - "eth:0xF616A4f81857CFEe54A4A049Ec187172574bd412"
    + "eth:0x2E5bcc9959dB5F5016F830E47943b07242CB2609"
    }
    EOA (eth:0x7cB1022D30b9860C36b243E7B181A1d46f618C69) {
    +++ description: None
    receivedPermissions:
    + [{"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x9937033Cc967eED9d753e31c77D2F146d002ae53","description":"propose new state roots before anyone else, giving a first-mover advantage on the optimistic clock.","role":".vanguard"}]
    }
    contract RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop (eth:0x844D5f01161E3559d36f23d0Aa9E9620949aF782) [risc0/RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop] {
    +++ description: A verifier wrapper for the eth:0x5005aBa3DFf7C940fcc1e48DccCAD611a80eEB85 that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.
    values.owner:
    - "eth:0xF616A4f81857CFEe54A4A049Ec187172574bd412"
    + "eth:0x2E5bcc9959dB5F5016F830E47943b07242CB2609"
    }
    contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0x96123dbFC3253185B594c6a7472EE5A21E9B1079) [opstack/DisputeGameFactory] {
    +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them.
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.game1337:
    - "eth:0x4BE239c86364eD73fc244A5F50c8ccB101a492eF"
    + "eth:0xD37b0BEdD9094988a31dBbB6BF77dC97269E742b"
    }
    - Status: DELETED
    contract KailuaTreasury (eth:0x9B3E1661bccAF907893B71e4016c01513ae9263C) [risc0/KailuaTreasury]
    +++ description: Entrypoint for state root proposals. Manages bonds (currently 0.5 ETH) and tournaments for the OP Kailua state validation system, wrapping the OP stack native DisputeGameFactory. The current vanguard advantage is defined here as 0s.
    contract RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop (eth:0x9F9994Eb4Cb5200198FEfb470f8b50301662e696) [risc0/RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop] {
    +++ description: A verifier wrapper for the eth:0x2a098988600d87650Fb061FfAff08B97149Fa84D that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.
    values.owner:
    - "eth:0xF616A4f81857CFEe54A4A049Ec187172574bd412"
    + "eth:0x2E5bcc9959dB5F5016F830E47943b07242CB2609"
    }
    contract Bob Multisig 1 (eth:0xC91482A96e9c2A104d9298D1980eCCf8C4dc764E) [GnosisSafe] {
    +++ description: None
    receivedPermissions.9:
    + {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xa23bf38299bbCbAA01b9ea8a1d3412D9f405b97d","role":"admin"}
    }
    contract RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop (eth:0xDa8f3de6fBBdb261Ac771B813a578A7aBdA6B2b1) [risc0/RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop] {
    +++ description: A verifier wrapper for the eth:0x54aCE3ED46529B4d4F3770C8Bad5dDC48717B9bF that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.
    values.owner:
    - "eth:0xF616A4f81857CFEe54A4A049Ec187172574bd412"
    + "eth:0x2E5bcc9959dB5F5016F830E47943b07242CB2609"
    }
    EOA (eth:0xF616A4f81857CFEe54A4A049Ec187172574bd412) {
    +++ description: None
    receivedPermissions.0:
    - {"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711","description":"cancel queued transactions.","role":".Canceller"}
    receivedPermissions.1:
    - {"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711","description":"execute transactions that are ready.","role":".Executor"}
    receivedPermissions.2:
    - {"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711","description":"manage all access control roles.","role":".defaultAdminAC","via":[{"address":"eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711","delay":259200}]}
    receivedPermissions.3:
    - {"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711","description":"propose transactions.","role":".Proposer"}
    receivedPermissions.4:
    - {"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x1efDd13f831ceeEa14940806705A53D3211CD698","description":"pause the verifier.","role":".owner"}
    receivedPermissions.6:
    - {"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x68dC2cB4e61774873971c499D9b239ec5Ac540E3","description":"pause the verifier.","role":".owner"}
    receivedPermissions.7:
    - {"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x844D5f01161E3559d36f23d0Aa9E9620949aF782","description":"pause the verifier.","role":".owner"}
    receivedPermissions.8:
    - {"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x8EaB2D97Dfce405A1692a21b3ff3A172d593D319","description":"add/remove verifiers and the selectors they are mapped to.","role":".owner","via":[{"address":"eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711","delay":259200}]}
    receivedPermissions.9:
    - {"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x9F9994Eb4Cb5200198FEfb470f8b50301662e696","description":"pause the verifier.","role":".owner"}
    receivedPermissions.10:
    - {"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0xDa8f3de6fBBdb261Ac771B813a578A7aBdA6B2b1","description":"pause the verifier.","role":".owner"}
    directlyReceivedPermissions:
    - [{"permission":"act","from":"eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711","delay":259200,"role":".Executor"}]
    }
    + Status: CREATED
    contract Safe (eth:0x2E5bcc9959dB5F5016F830E47943b07242CB2609) [GnosisSafe]
    +++ description: None
    + Status: CREATED
    contract KailuaTreasury (eth:0x9937033Cc967eED9d753e31c77D2F146d002ae53) [risc0/KailuaTreasury]
    +++ description: Entrypoint for state root proposals. Manages bonds (currently 0.5 ETH) and tournaments for the OP Kailua state validation system, wrapping the OP stack native DisputeGameFactory. The current vanguard advantage is defined here as 1mo.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract KailuaVerifier (eth:0xa23bf38299bbCbAA01b9ea8a1d3412D9f405b97d) [N/A]
    +++ description: None
    + Status: CREATED
    contract KailuaGame (eth:0xD37b0BEdD9094988a31dBbB6BF77dC97269E742b) [risc0/KailuaGame]
    +++ description: Implementation of the KailuaGame with type 1337. Based on this implementation, new KailuaGames are created with every new state root proposal.

    Operator

    The system has a centralized operator

    The operatorAn operator is the entity charged with managing a rollup and progressing its state. A rollup operator can be a centralized sequencer, proposer, prover, challenger, pauser of admin that is able to perform upgrades. is the only entity that can propose blocksAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over.. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.

    • MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

    Users can force any transaction

    Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.

    1. Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs
    2. OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function

    Withdrawals

    Regular exits

    The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. after 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlementThe mechanism with which the execution of rollup blocks and the resultant state is verified and possible disputes are resolved. In the context of rollups or other modular blockchains, it often refers to the proof system used--validity (ZK) or fraud proofs, or a combination thereof. Sometimes it will refer to this mechanism along with where the mechanism's outputs are ultimately published and verified, as in Ethereum being a settlement layer by verifying the proofs and allowing for withdrawals., but a 1d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled. of at least 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.

    1. OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function
    2. OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function

    Forced messaging

    If the user experiences censorship from the operatorAn operator is the entity charged with managing a rollup and progressing its state. A rollup operator can be a centralized sequencer, proposer, prover, challenger, pauser of admin that is able to perform upgrades. with regular L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups.->L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.

    1. Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain

    Other considerations

    EVM compatible smart contracts are supported

    OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM EquivalenceA perfect degree of compatibility; where one system or concept is indistinguishable from another in the domain being compared. In the context of rollups, it generally refers to the proximity to the EVM and to Ethereum architecture. model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. can be deployed on L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups..

    1. Introducing EVM Equivalence

    Permissions

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    Ethereum

    Actors:

    Bob Multisig 10xC914…764E

    A Multisig with 4/6 threshold.

    • Can upgrade with no delay
      • DelayedWETH
      • L1StandardBridge
      • OptimismMintableERC20Factory
      • L1ERC721Bridge
      • OptimismPortal2
      • DisputeGameFactory
      • KailuaVerifier
      • SystemConfig
      • AnchorStateRegistry
      • L1CrossDomainMessenger
      • SuperchainConfig
    • Can interact with DisputeGameFactory
      • Allowed to challenge or delete state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. proposed by a ProposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block.
      • set the dispute game implementation and initial bond for any game type
    • Can interact with SystemConfig
      • it can update the preconfer address, the batch submitter (SequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs.) address and the gasA virtual fuel used to execute smart contracts on a rollup. The EVM (or other VM within the rollup) uses an accounting mechanism to correspond the consumption of gas to the consumption of computing resources, and to limit the consumption of computing resources. configuration of the system
    • Can interact with SuperchainConfig
      • Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof systemThe infrastructure that allows projects to verify their state transitions. It is composed by onchain verifiers and offchain provers. The main two flavors are optimistic and ZK proof systems, but they can be combined in a hybrid model. In general though, if a system is able to accept state roots optimistically, even if it has a ZK component, it is considered an optimistic proof system., the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionlessAnyone willing should be able to join and leave the network at any time, without causing significant disturbance to the network or being detrimental to the party in question. No single entity should have the power to allowlist or blocklist participants.)
    • Can interact with AddressManager
      • set and change address mappings

    Participants (6):

    0x32B8…C3D70x3C30…93aB0xFB77…5BF60x8117…E7Ac0xefCf…dD5C0xA073…bda2
    Safe0x2E5b…2609

    A Multisig with 2/5 threshold.

    • Can interact with TimelockController
      • cancel queued transactions
      • execute transactions that are ready
      • manage all access control roles with 3d delay
      • propose transactions
    • Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop
      • pause the verifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover.
    • Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop
    • Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop
    • Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierRouter
      • add/remove verifiers and the selectors they are mapped to with 3d delay
    • Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop
    • Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop

    Participants (5):

    0x10B0…6A0E0x7517…BdC70xbF58…73a40x9a01…9D120xDA8e…0A01
    Used in:
    EOA 10x08F9…1D11
    • Can interact with SystemConfig
      • Allowed to commit transactions from the current layer to the host chain
    EOA 20x7cB1…8C69
    • Can interact with DisputeGameFactory
      • Allowed to post new state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. of the current layer to the host chain
    • Can interact with KailuaTreasury
      • propose new state roots before anyone else, giving a first-mover advantage on the optimistic clock
    EOA 30xF616…d412
    • Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop
      • pause the verifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover.
    Used in:

    Smart contracts

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    Note: Contracts presented in this section had their implementations updated since the last time our team looked at this project. The information presented may be inaccurate.
    A diagram of the smart contract architecture
    A diagram of the smart contract architecture

    Ethereum

    RiscZeroGroth16Verifier0x20ff…8E97

    VerifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. contract for RISC Zero Groth16A zk-SNARK proving system introduced by Groth in 2016 that proves arithmetic circuits and requires a separate trusted setup for each circuit. It allows extremely efficient proof verification. proofs (version 2.0.0-rc.3).

    Implementation used in:
    RiscZeroGroth16Verifier0x2a09…a84D

    VerifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. contract for RISC Zero Groth16A zk-SNARK proving system introduced by Groth in 2016 that proves arithmetic circuits and requires a separate trusted setup for each circuit. It allows extremely efficient proof verification. proofs (version 3.0.0).

    Implementation used in:
    RiscZeroGroth16Verifier0x54aC…B9bF

    VerifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. contract for RISC Zero Groth16A zk-SNARK proving system introduced by Groth in 2016 that proves arithmetic circuits and requires a separate trusted setup for each circuit. It allows extremely efficient proof verification. proofs (version 2.0.3).

    Implementation used in:
    OptimismPortal2
    Escrow
    0x8Ade…5a3EImplementation (Upgradable)Admin

    The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. to L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups.. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Bob Multisig 1
    The following tokens are included in the value secured calculation:
    ETH token logo
    Can be upgraded by:
    Bob Multisig 1 with no delay
    DisputeGameFactory0x9612…1079Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. and eventually challenge them. This variant exposes per-type reads only; the legacy array views (gameImpls[], initBonds[]) were removed in the new implementation.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Bob Multisig 1
      • challengerFromDGF: Bob Multisig 1
      • owner: Bob Multisig 1
      • proposerFromDGF: EOA 2
    Can be upgraded by:
    Bob Multisig 1 with no delay
    Implementation used in:
    SystemConfig0xACB8…5393Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Contains configuration parameters such as the SequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. address, gas limitThe maximum amount of gas a transaction or block may consume. on this chain and the unsafe blockAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over. signer address.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Bob Multisig 1
      • batcherHash: EOA 1
      • owner: Bob Multisig 1
    Can be upgraded by:
    Bob Multisig 1 with no delay
    Implementation used in:
    RiscZeroGroth16Verifier0xafB3…9df9

    VerifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. contract for RISC Zero Groth16A zk-SNARK proving system introduced by Groth in 2016 that proves arithmetic circuits and requires a separate trusted setup for each circuit. It allows extremely efficient proof verification. proofs (version 2.2.0).

    Implementation used in:
    RiscZeroGroth16Verifier0xf70a…E93C

    VerifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. contract for RISC Zero Groth16A zk-SNARK proving system introduced by Groth in 2016 that proves arithmetic circuits and requires a separate trusted setup for each circuit. It allows extremely efficient proof verification. proofs. This older implementation exposes control-root and selector constants but does not expose a VERSION getter.

    Implementation used in:
    SuperchainConfig0xE925…5C46Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3mo 1d if left untouched.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Bob Multisig 1
      • guardian: Bob Multisig 1
    Can be upgraded by:
    Bob Multisig 1 with no delay
    Implementation used in:
    L1StandardBridge
    Escrow
    0x3F6c…c1f7Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Bob Multisig 1

    All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation.

    Can be upgraded by:
    Bob Multisig 1 with no delay
    Implementation used in:
    L1ERC721Bridge0x5fF9…D50aImplementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Used to bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Bob Multisig 1
    Can be upgraded by:
    Bob Multisig 1 with no delay
    Implementation used in:
    L1CrossDomainMessenger0xE3d9…7EdAImplementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain’s epoch gas limitThe maximum amount of gas a transaction or block may consume., it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Bob Multisig 1
    Can be upgraded by:
    Bob Multisig 1 with no delay
    Implementation used in:
    DelayedWETH0x048D…3D95Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Bob Multisig 1
    Can be upgraded by:
    Bob Multisig 1 with no delay
    L1ERC20TokenBridge
    Escrow
    0x091d…5B72Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Escrow for custom external tokens that use the canonical bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. for messaging but are governed externally.

    The following tokens are included in the value secured calculation:
    wstETH token logo
    TimelockController0x0b14…b711

    A timelock with access control. The current minimum delay is 3d.

    • Roles:
      • canceller: Safe
      • defaultAdmin: TimelockController; ultimately Safe
      • executor: Safe
      • proposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block.: Safe
    Implementation used in:
    ProxyAdmin
    2 instances
    0x0d9f…7Cd00xa70d…3E1c
    • Roles:
      • owner: Bob Multisig 1
    RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop0x44c2…33e7

    A verifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. wrapper for the RiscZeroGroth16Verifier that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.

    • Roles:
      • owner: EOA 3
    Implementation used in:
    RiscZeroSetVerifier0x5005…EB85

    Set verifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. contract for RISC Zero proofs (version 0.9.0). It allows verifying a whole set of proofs identified with a Merkle root at once, afterwards each individual proof could be efficiently verified just by checking Merkle inclusion against the verified root.

    Implementation used in:
    OptimismMintableERC20Factory0x5557…9cb6Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the networkA constellation of nodes (peers) that communicate via a peer-to-peer protocol, for example, in propagating transactions and blocks to other nodes. it’s deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain’s representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Bob Multisig 1
    Can be upgraded by:
    Bob Multisig 1 with no delay
    Implementation used in:
    PermissionedDisputeGame0x642d…97bF

    Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block. and challenger.

    PreimageOracle0x70A3…9aA1

    The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. for a dispute game.

    RiscZeroVerifierRouter0x8EaB…D319

    A router proxy that routes to verifiers based on selectors. The mapping can be changed by a permissioned owner (TimelockController).

    • Roles:
      • owner: TimelockController; ultimately Safe
    Implementation used in:
    KailuaTreasury0x9937…ae53

    Entrypoint for state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. proposals. Manages bonds (currently 0.5 ETH) and tournaments for the OP Kailua state validation system, wrapping the OP stack native DisputeGameFactory. The current vanguard advantage is defined here as 1mo.

    • Roles:
      • vanguard: EOA 2
    KailuaVerifier0xa23b…b97dImplementation (Upgradable)Admin
    • Roles:
      • admin: Bob Multisig 1
    Can be upgraded by:
    Bob Multisig 1 with no delay
    MIPS0xb6B6…cc13

    The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.

    AnchorStateRegistry0xC9AC…293cImplementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Contains the latest confirmed state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. This variant stores respectedGameType, retirementTimestamp, and disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds locally and drops the legacy *FromGame fields, since the AggregateVerifier model does not expose vm()/weth()/absolutePrestate() on its game implementation.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Bob Multisig 1
    Can be upgraded by:
    Bob Multisig 1 with no delay
    KailuaGame0xD37b…742b

    Implementation of the KailuaGame with type 1337. Based on this implementation, new KailuaGames are created with every new state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. proposal.

    There are impactful changes to the following contracts, and part of the information might be outdated.
    RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop0x1efD…D698

    A verifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. wrapper for the RiscZeroGroth16Verifier that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.

    • Roles:
      • owner: Safe
    Implementation used in:
    RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop0x68dC…40E3

    A verifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. wrapper for the RiscZeroGroth16Verifier that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.

    • Roles:
      • owner: Safe
    Implementation used in:
    RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop0x844D…F782

    A verifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. wrapper for the RiscZeroSetVerifier that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.

    • Roles:
      • owner: Safe
    Implementation used in:
    RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop0x9F99…e696

    A verifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. wrapper for the RiscZeroGroth16Verifier that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.

    • Roles:
      • owner: Safe
    Implementation used in:
    RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop0xDa8f…B2b1

    A verifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. wrapper for the RiscZeroGroth16Verifier that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.

    • Roles:
      • owner: Safe
    Implementation used in:

    The current deployment carries some associated risks:

    • Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).

    Program Hashes

    Name
    Hash
    Repository
    Verification
    Used in
    0x0368...94b6
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