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Ink is an Optimistic Rollup built with the OP Stack by Kraken exchange.
Ink is an Optimistic Rollup built with the OP Stack by Kraken exchange.
2025 Aug 19 — 2026 Aug 19
The section shows the operating costs that L2s pay to Ethereum.
2025 Aug 19 — 2026 Aug 19
This section shows how much data the project publishes to its data-availability (DA) layer over time. The project currently posts data to; previously it posted to
Ethereum.
2025 Aug 19 — 2026 Aug 19
This section shows how "live" the project's operators are by displaying how frequently they submit transactions of the selected type. It also highlights anomalies - significant deviations from their typical schedule.
2026 Jul 20 — Aug 19
All liveness anomalies detected for this project in the last 30 days, helping you review recent downtime and availability issues.
No State updates were performed for 12h (from 2026 Jul 28, 14:32 UTC until 2026 Jul 29, 02:32 UTC). These typically occur every 6h 6m on average.
Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.
All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.
There is no exit window for users to exit in case of unwanted upgrades as they are initiated by the Security Council with instant upgrade power and without proper notice.
All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.

Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by anyone who has sufficient funds. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.
Proposers submit state roots as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the create function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.08 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge period has passed and it is not countered.
Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state roots using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 691.43 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the defend or attack functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with full concurrency. Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 3d 12h. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see freeloader claims), if a clock gets inherited with less than 3h, it generally gets extended by 3h with the exception of 6h right before depth 30, and 1d right before the last depth. The maximum clock extension that a top level claim can get is therefore 10d. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers’ stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step prover contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks (Spearbit 5.1.3).
Name | Hash | Repository | Verification | Used in | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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0x0337...9025 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.
DisputeGameFactory: the proposer key was rotated. L1FeeVault: the recipient changed to a new address and the minimum withdrawal dropped from 2 ETH to 0.15 ETH. This vault collects only the L1 data-fee component of L2 transaction fees; the BaseFeeVault and SequencerFeeVault still pay out to the previous recipient at the 2 ETH threshold.
DisputeGameFactory: the proposer key was rotated. L1FeeVault: the recipient changed to a new address and the minimum withdrawal dropped from 2 ETH to 0.15 ETH. This vault collects only the L1 data-fee component of L2 transaction fees; the BaseFeeVault and SequencerFeeVault still pay out to the previous recipient at the 2 ETH threshold.
| contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0x10d7B35078d3baabB96Dd45a9143B94be65b12CD) [opstack/DisputeGameFactory_v2] { | |
| +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. This variant exposes per-type reads only; the legacy array views (gameImpls[], initBonds[]) were removed in the new implementation. | |
| values.proposerFromDGF: | |
| - | "eth:0x65436ddCbc026F34118954F229f7F132b696b3B4" |
| + | "eth:0x3832bfbeF03173E4C49a00ec0DD178817A02D177" |
| } |
| contract L1FeeVault (ink:0x420000000000000000000000000000000000001A) [opstack/Layer2/L1FeeVault_karst] { | |
| +++ description: Collects the L1 portion of the L2 transaction fees, which are withdrawable to the FeesCollector on L1. | |
| values.MIN_WITHDRAWAL_AMOUNT: | |
| - | "2000000000000000000" |
| + | "150000000000000000" |
| values.minWithdrawalAmount: | |
| - | "2000000000000000000" |
| + | "150000000000000000" |
| values.recipient: | |
| - | "ink:0xa6f0F94C13C4255231958079E7331694205F6c93" |
| + | "ink:0x1eB630b2e7409597D462dd5f3D21E305FC56B8C9" |
| values.RECIPIENT: | |
| - | "ink:0xa6f0F94C13C4255231958079E7331694205F6c93" |
| + | "ink:0x1eB630b2e7409597D462dd5f3D21E305FC56B8C9" |
| } |
SystemConfig batch submitter and unsafe block signer rotated. L1Block now mirrors the new batcher hash on L2.
SystemConfig batch submitter and unsafe block signer rotated. L1Block now mirrors the new batcher hash on L2.
| contract SystemConfig (eth:0x62C0a111929fA32ceC2F76aDba54C16aFb6E8364) [opstack/SystemConfig] { | |
| +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address. | |
| values.batcherHash: | |
| - | "eth:0x500d7Ea63CF2E501dadaA5feeC1FC19FE2Aa72Ac" |
| + | "eth:0x6db6161fC5662450E801398Bad62dD9921216B98" |
| values.unsafeBlockSigner: | |
| - | "eth:0x7D056B99AA2021864c42E25B4F8cE3BdEAc9463C" |
| + | "eth:0x7b322282DF45E537E5de76D60E1432Db3cF3F8E1" |
| } |
| contract L1Block (ink:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000015) [opstack/Layer2/L1Block] { | |
| +++ description: Simple contract that returns information about the latest L1 block, which is derived permissionlessly from the L1 chain. | |
| values.batcherHash: | |
| - | "0x000000000000000000000000500d7ea63cf2e501dadaa5feec1fc19fe2aa72ac" |
| + | "0x0000000000000000000000006db6161fc5662450e801398bad62dd9921216b98" |
| } |
SystemConfig owner transferred from the Gelato Multisig to the OpFoundationOperationsSafe ( 0x9BA6…6b3A ). Ink's sequencer address, batch-submitter address, and gas config are now controlled by OP Foundation instead of Gelato.
SystemConfig owner transferred from the Gelato Multisig to the OpFoundationOperationsSafe (0x9BA6…6b3A). Ink’s sequencer address, batch-submitter address, and gas config are now controlled by OP Foundation instead of Gelato.
| contract SystemConfig (eth:0x62C0a111929fA32ceC2F76aDba54C16aFb6E8364) [opstack/SystemConfig] { | |
| +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address. | |
| values.owner: | |
| - | "eth:0xBeA2Bc852a160B8547273660E22F4F08C2fa9Bbb" |
| + | "eth:0x9BA6e03D8B90dE867373Db8cF1A58d2F7F006b3A" |
| } |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| EOA (eth:0x6a0A93Cd6d6FB7a36bF6234ef4650Bf9474e7682) | |
| +++ description: None |
| contract OpFoundationOperationsSafe (eth:0x9BA6e03D8B90dE867373Db8cF1A58d2F7F006b3A) [GnosisSafe] { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| receivedPermissions: | |
| + | [{"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x62C0a111929fA32ceC2F76aDba54C16aFb6E8364","description":"it can update the preconfer address, the batch submitter (Sequencer) address and the gas configuration of the system.","role":".owner"}] |
| } |
| contract SaferSafes (eth:0xA8447329e52F64AED2bFc9E7a2506F7D369f483a) [gnosisSafeModules/SaferSafes] { | |
| +++ description: A Gnosis Safe module combining LivenessModule and TimelockGuard. Provides liveness checks where a fallback owner can challenge and take over if Safe owners are unresponsive, plus optional timelock delays for transaction scheduling. | |
| receivedPermissions.0: | |
| + | {"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x62C0a111929fA32ceC2F76aDba54C16aFb6E8364","description":"it can update the preconfer address, the batch submitter (Sequencer) address and the gas configuration of the system.","role":".owner","via":[{"address":"eth:0x9BA6e03D8B90dE867373Db8cF1A58d2F7F006b3A"}]} |
| } |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract Gelato Multisig (eth:0xBeA2Bc852a160B8547273660E22F4F08C2fa9Bbb) [GnosisSafe] | |
| +++ description: None |
OpFoundation shared Safes (UpgradeSafe + OperationsSafe): 2 members rotated.
OpFoundation shared Safes (UpgradeSafe + OperationsSafe): 2 members rotated.
| contract OpFoundationUpgradeSafe (eth:0x847B5c174615B1B7fDF770882256e2D3E95b9D92) [GnosisSafe] { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| values.$members.0: | |
| - | "eth:0x6419F81580343DF023E68715C6e269aFb00a2cc7" |
| + | "eth:0xf1EfbdC2C0BDC4554E0f1639D7fe88cD870a4639" |
| values.$members.3: | |
| - | "eth:0xBF93D4d727F7Ba1F753E1124C3e532dCb04Ea2c8" |
| + | "eth:0x7F1D4FE689B73B628285454667B93cfd09409f27" |
| } |
| contract OpFoundationOperationsSafe (eth:0x9BA6e03D8B90dE867373Db8cF1A58d2F7F006b3A) [GnosisSafe] { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| values.$members.0: | |
| - | "eth:0x6419F81580343DF023E68715C6e269aFb00a2cc7" |
| + | "eth:0xf1EfbdC2C0BDC4554E0f1639D7fe88cD870a4639" |
| values.$members.3: | |
| - | "eth:0xBF93D4d727F7Ba1F753E1124C3e532dCb04Ea2c8" |
| + | "eth:0x7F1D4FE689B73B628285454667B93cfd09409f27" |
| } |
Karst hardfork (Upgrade 19b, op-contracts/v7.0.0) L2 activation on 2026-07-08 16:00:01 UTC. Most predeploys now inherit ProxyAdminOwnedBase , which lets a contract read its proxy's ProxyAdmin and ProxyAdmin owner on-chain so privileged functions can be gated to them. On the initializable ones — both bridges, both mintable factories, L2CrossDomainMessenger and every FeeVault — the constructor calls disableInitializers() and initialize() is restricted to the ProxyAdmin or its owner (the SuperchainProxyAdminOwner). L1Block is not initializable but inherits the same base and gates its new setFeature setter the same way. Custom gas token support was removed from L2StandardBridge and L2CrossDomainMessenger. The gasPayingToken() override is gone, and withdraw() / withdrawTo() no longer revert on custom gas token chains. Ink pays gas in ETH, so behaviour is unchanged. L2ProxyAdmin (1.0.0) adds upgradePredeploys(address) , which delegatecalls the L2ContractsManager. FeeVault configuration (recipient, minimum withdrawal amount, withdrawal network) moved from constructor immutables to storage set by initialize() , and is now mutable post-deployment via setRecipient , setMinWithdrawalAmount and setWithdrawalNetwork — each gated to the ProxyAdmin owner. Previously these values were fixed at deployment; the SuperchainProxyAdminOwner can now change them. BaseFeeVault and L1FeeVault are byte-identical and now share implementation 0xf7bed7215EEF1003fac426682Cf2edeb958569f7 . GasPriceOracle stayed at 1.6.0 with unchanged source; only its implementation address moved. Version changes and implementation diffs: - L2CrossDomainMessenger 2.1.1-beta.1 - 2.2.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/ink:0xC0d3c0d3c0D3c0D3C0d3C0D3C0D3c0d3c0d30007/ink:0x250AF3f400cf8Aac8D410c90f1ba3968dD87DF96 - L2StandardBridge 1.11.1-beta.1 - 1.13.2: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/ink:0xC0d3c0d3c0D3c0d3C0D3c0D3C0d3C0D3C0D30010/ink:0xAE9ed42f43a3ee45c3A9dEf8ae6B48cBb58Ed1a1 - SequencerFeeVault 1.5.0-beta.2 - 1.6.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/ink:0xC0D3C0d3c0d3c0d3C0D3c0d3C0D3c0d3c0D30011/ink:0xb178cdAa8336f25624A63C049EdB5AF7ca36C2dA - OptimismMintableERC20Factory 1.10.1-beta.2 - 1.11.0: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/ink:0xc0D3c0d3C0d3c0d3c0D3c0d3c0D3c0D3c0D30012/ink:0xAF87f2Fd347aCb94656f9F715B4f2409B98e75b9 - L2ERC721Bridge 1.7.1-beta.2 - 1.10.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/ink:0xC0D3c0d3c0d3c0d3c0D3C0d3C0D3C0D3c0d30014/ink:0x716eAd0Cf3e7FF86A02D4F8cb41a6D14922fA833 - L1Block 1.7.0 - 1.9.0: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/ink:0x3Ba4007f5C922FBb33C454B41ea7a1f11E83df2C/ink:0x6a97C5D55A21265326150Efe12FC30Fb21cbff56 - L2ToL1MessagePasser 1.1.1-beta.1 - 1.2.0: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/ink:0xC0D3C0d3C0d3c0d3C0d3C0D3c0D3c0d3c0D30016/ink:0x27E51B2254433A3284D9ba73Ea551C397DB2a124 - OptimismMintableERC721Factory 1.4.1-beta.1 - 1.5.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/ink:0xc0d3C0d3C0d3C0d3C0d3c0d3C0D3C0d3C0D30017/ink:0xf43862B9d814BB4504158CecCB0b74b31265e4eE - ProxyAdmin - L2ProxyAdmin 1.0.0: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/ink:0xC0d3C0D3c0d3C0d3c0d3c0D3C0D3C0d3C0D30018/ink:0x893c2CEEb71D38514daF67728d3Ff1b213FC4B5F - BaseFeeVault 1.5.0-beta.2 - 1.6.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/ink:0xC0d3c0D3c0d3C0D3C0D3C0d3c0D3C0D3c0d30019/ink:0xf7bed7215EEF1003fac426682Cf2edeb958569f7 - L1FeeVault 1.5.0-beta.2 - 1.6.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/ink:0xc0D3c0D3C0d3c0d3c0d3C0d3c0d3C0d3C0D3001A/ink:0xf7bed7215EEF1003fac426682Cf2edeb958569f7 - GasPriceOracle 1.6.0 (source unchanged): https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/ink:0x4f1db3c6AbD250ba86E0928471A8F7DB3AFd88F1/ink:0x547d0fba434877D7237d511cF87FABe2ee26b152 - SchemaRegistry 1.3.1-beta.1 - 1.3.1-beta.2: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/ink:0xc0d3c0d3c0d3C0d3c0d3C0D3C0D3c0d3C0D30020/ink:0x70DE55BC0bfBC52C5D0CCA1DA5816c2428886A34 - EAS 1.4.1-beta.1 - 1.4.1-beta.3: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/ink:0xC0D3c0D3C0d3c0D3c0D3C0D3c0D3c0d3c0d30021/ink:0xbEc660b456B84A081E90aF29BE43385BDa5bF7b6
Karst hardfork (Upgrade 19b, op-contracts/v7.0.0) L2 activation on 2026-07-08 16:00:01 UTC.
Most predeploys now inherit ProxyAdminOwnedBase, which lets a contract read its proxy’s ProxyAdmin and ProxyAdmin owner on-chain so privileged functions can be gated to them. On the initializable ones — both bridges, both mintable factories, L2CrossDomainMessenger and every FeeVault — the constructor calls _disableInitializers() and initialize() is restricted to the ProxyAdmin or its owner (the SuperchainProxyAdminOwner). L1Block is not initializable but inherits the same base and gates its new setFeature setter the same way.
Custom gas token support was removed from L2StandardBridge and L2CrossDomainMessenger. The gasPayingToken() override is gone, and withdraw() / withdrawTo() no longer revert on custom gas token chains. Ink pays gas in ETH, so behaviour is unchanged.
L2ProxyAdmin (1.0.0) adds upgradePredeploys(address), which delegatecalls the L2ContractsManager.
FeeVault configuration (recipient, minimum withdrawal amount, withdrawal network) moved from constructor immutables to storage set by initialize(), and is now mutable post-deployment via setRecipient, setMinWithdrawalAmount and setWithdrawalNetwork — each gated to the ProxyAdmin owner. Previously these values were fixed at deployment; the SuperchainProxyAdminOwner can now change them. BaseFeeVault and L1FeeVault are byte-identical and now share implementation 0xf7bed7215EEF1003fac426682Cf2edeb958569f7.
GasPriceOracle stayed at 1.6.0 with unchanged source; only its implementation address moved.
Version changes and implementation diffs:
| contract L2CrossDomainMessenger (ink:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000007) [opstack/Layer2/L2CrossDomainMessenger] { | |
| +++ description: The L2CrossDomainMessenger (L2xDM) contract sends messages from L2 to L1, and relays messages from L1 onto L2 with a system tx. In the event that a message sent from L2 to L1 is rejected for exceeding the L1 gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x1ef37a50dbdd57f7019208b81019e52087cb92379f963e1ec092bd3eb81ec978" |
| + | "0x9e9ae8aec73e808e50f80bced53c3a020588eed516b310a10397596869dcd3b1" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "ink:0xC0d3c0d3c0D3c0D3C0d3C0D3C0D3c0d3c0d30007" |
| + | "ink:0x250AF3f400cf8Aac8D410c90f1ba3968dD87DF96" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.0: | |
| + | ["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["ink:0x2A5A3eabB9Fd571A3Af0299eebdF8EaafE29a914"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.1: | |
| + | ["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["ink:0x250AF3f400cf8Aac8D410c90f1ba3968dD87DF96"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 0 |
| + | 2 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.1.1-beta.1" |
| + | "2.2.1" |
| values.ENCODING_OVERHEAD: | |
| + | 260 |
| values.FLOOR_CALLDATA_OVERHEAD: | |
| + | 40 |
| values.proxyAdmin: | |
| + | "ink:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| + | "ink:0x6B1BAE59D09fCcbdDB6C6cceb07B7279367C4E3b" |
| values.TX_BASE_GAS: | |
| + | 21000 |
| implementationNames.ink:0xC0d3c0d3c0D3c0D3C0d3C0D3C0D3c0d3c0d30007: | |
| - | "L2CrossDomainMessenger" |
| implementationNames.ink:0x250AF3f400cf8Aac8D410c90f1ba3968dD87DF96: | |
| + | "L2CrossDomainMessenger" |
| } |
| contract GasPriceOracle (ink:0x420000000000000000000000000000000000000F) [opstack/Layer2/GasPriceOracle] { | |
| +++ description: Provides the current gas price for L2 transactions. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x2a3c7909036a30543d4aaa8e9501caab6f998a671d40cc3822f89c6239e6b8ab" |
| + | "0x2a5cf70e1712c3e8ae9596f3b71055e47fa8d83c7e248050853c903ee70cb139" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "ink:0x4f1db3c6AbD250ba86E0928471A8F7DB3AFd88F1" |
| + | "ink:0x547d0fba434877D7237d511cF87FABe2ee26b152" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.2: | |
| + | ["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["ink:0x547d0fba434877D7237d511cF87FABe2ee26b152"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 2 |
| + | 3 |
| implementationNames.ink:0x4f1db3c6AbD250ba86E0928471A8F7DB3AFd88F1: | |
| - | "GasPriceOracle" |
| implementationNames.ink:0x547d0fba434877D7237d511cF87FABe2ee26b152: | |
| + | "GasPriceOracle" |
| } |
| contract L2StandardBridge (ink:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000010) [opstack/Layer2/L2StandardBridge] { | |
| +++ description: The L2StandardBridge contract is the main entry point to deposit or withdraw ERC20 tokens from L2 to L1. This contract can store any token. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0xe528a1a655ef22d36419f53488f5b31752c4ecc2efea627fc6be5b0d63fa5069" |
| + | "0xf6ef848ca1cf88e27b5e3bb5e01b91ef79f302e5daad8ba5206c4dc60027d312" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "ink:0xC0d3c0d3c0D3c0d3C0D3c0D3C0d3C0D3C0D30010" |
| + | "ink:0xAE9ed42f43a3ee45c3A9dEf8ae6B48cBb58Ed1a1" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.0: | |
| + | ["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["ink:0x2A5A3eabB9Fd571A3Af0299eebdF8EaafE29a914"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.1: | |
| + | ["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["ink:0xAE9ed42f43a3ee45c3A9dEf8ae6B48cBb58Ed1a1"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 0 |
| + | 2 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "1.11.1-beta.1" |
| + | "1.13.2" |
| values.proxyAdmin: | |
| + | "ink:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| + | "ink:0x6B1BAE59D09fCcbdDB6C6cceb07B7279367C4E3b" |
| implementationNames.ink:0xC0d3c0d3c0D3c0d3C0D3c0D3C0d3C0D3C0D30010: | |
| - | "L2StandardBridge" |
| implementationNames.ink:0xAE9ed42f43a3ee45c3A9dEf8ae6B48cBb58Ed1a1: | |
| + | "L2StandardBridge" |
| } |
| contract SequencerFeeVault (ink:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000011) [opstack/Layer2/SequencerFeeVault] { | |
| +++ description: Collects the sequencer fees, which are withdrawable to the FeesCollector on L1. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x509425b10b7bc736a2d76eb9fe3bc5951124e88ef3e4752a0a314d33690041d2" |
| + | "0xb45389729a8fffa7650568cd2922e482d03d3ed57b35f4819650d11174d9237a" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "ink:0xC0D3C0d3c0d3c0d3C0D3c0d3C0D3c0d3c0D30011" |
| + | "ink:0xb178cdAa8336f25624A63C049EdB5AF7ca36C2dA" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.0: | |
| + | ["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["ink:0x2A5A3eabB9Fd571A3Af0299eebdF8EaafE29a914"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.1: | |
| + | ["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["ink:0xb178cdAa8336f25624A63C049EdB5AF7ca36C2dA"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 0 |
| + | 2 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "1.5.0-beta.2" |
| + | "1.6.1" |
| values.proxyAdmin: | |
| + | "ink:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| + | "ink:0x6B1BAE59D09fCcbdDB6C6cceb07B7279367C4E3b" |
| implementationNames.ink:0xC0D3C0d3c0d3c0d3C0D3c0d3C0D3c0d3c0D30011: | |
| - | "SequencerFeeVault" |
| implementationNames.ink:0xb178cdAa8336f25624A63C049EdB5AF7ca36C2dA: | |
| + | "SequencerFeeVault" |
| } |
| contract OptimismMintableERC20Factory (ink:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000012) [opstack/OptimismMintableERC20Factory] { | |
| +++ description: A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it's deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain's representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa. | |
| template: | |
| - | "opstack/Layer2/OptimismMintableERC20Factory" |
| + | "opstack/OptimismMintableERC20Factory" |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x106f86d507a55d0f26e3683c910a71a9804d75ced3a4bb374e6a78978462274b" |
| + | "0x11b0ed6f15cabf613492a8d54c55304a17cf60f4fd94a655d7e720d4556906d0" |
| description: | |
| - | "Factory contract to create bridge compliant ERC20 IOU token representations of bridged L1 ERC20 tokens." |
| + | "A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it's deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain's representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa." |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "ink:0xc0D3c0d3C0d3c0d3c0D3c0d3c0D3c0D3c0D30012" |
| + | "ink:0xAF87f2Fd347aCb94656f9F715B4f2409B98e75b9" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.0: | |
| + | ["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["ink:0x2A5A3eabB9Fd571A3Af0299eebdF8EaafE29a914"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.1: | |
| + | ["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["ink:0xAF87f2Fd347aCb94656f9F715B4f2409B98e75b9"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 0 |
| + | 2 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "1.10.1-beta.2" |
| + | "1.11.0" |
| values.proxyAdmin: | |
| + | "ink:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| + | "ink:0x6B1BAE59D09fCcbdDB6C6cceb07B7279367C4E3b" |
| implementationNames.ink:0xc0D3c0d3C0d3c0d3c0D3c0d3c0D3c0D3c0D30012: | |
| - | "OptimismMintableERC20Factory" |
| implementationNames.ink:0xAF87f2Fd347aCb94656f9F715B4f2409B98e75b9: | |
| + | "OptimismMintableERC20Factory" |
| } |
| contract L2ERC721Bridge (ink:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000014) [opstack/Layer2/L2ERC721Bridge] { | |
| +++ description: The L2ERC721Bridge contract is the main entry point to deposit or withdraw ERC721 tokens from L2 to L1. This contract can store any token. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x271f936ec1986057d9043b9961aa266e87908766814bdde8071f19a9de7484be" |
| + | "0x0d8059378487e33161e0b838f622400642360f1e311eba8c7b8fbdb504aeee1e" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "ink:0xC0D3c0d3c0d3c0d3c0D3C0d3C0D3C0D3c0d30014" |
| + | "ink:0x716eAd0Cf3e7FF86A02D4F8cb41a6D14922fA833" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.0: | |
| + | ["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["ink:0x2A5A3eabB9Fd571A3Af0299eebdF8EaafE29a914"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.1: | |
| + | ["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["ink:0x716eAd0Cf3e7FF86A02D4F8cb41a6D14922fA833"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 0 |
| + | 2 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "1.7.1-beta.2" |
| + | "1.10.1" |
| values.proxyAdmin: | |
| + | "ink:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| + | "ink:0x6B1BAE59D09fCcbdDB6C6cceb07B7279367C4E3b" |
| implementationNames.ink:0xC0D3c0d3c0d3c0d3c0D3C0d3C0D3C0D3c0d30014: | |
| - | "L2ERC721Bridge" |
| implementationNames.ink:0x716eAd0Cf3e7FF86A02D4F8cb41a6D14922fA833: | |
| + | "L2ERC721Bridge" |
| } |
| contract L1Block (ink:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000015) [opstack/Layer2/L1Block] { | |
| +++ description: Simple contract that returns information about the latest L1 block, which is derived permissionlessly from the L1 chain. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x399e57fff478211b47d61c5acb60592a4df8ffa5716959a1a6ee2ccabc44915e" |
| + | "0xca6401a4032def95df36b0d432052526888ef8a396f7e4fc37cdda3690932646" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "ink:0x3Ba4007f5C922FBb33C454B41ea7a1f11E83df2C" |
| + | "ink:0x6a97C5D55A21265326150Efe12FC30Fb21cbff56" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.2: | |
| + | ["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["ink:0x6a97C5D55A21265326150Efe12FC30Fb21cbff56"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 2 |
| + | 3 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "1.7.0" |
| + | "1.9.0" |
| values.proxyAdmin: | |
| + | "ink:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| + | "ink:0x6B1BAE59D09fCcbdDB6C6cceb07B7279367C4E3b" |
| implementationNames.ink:0x3Ba4007f5C922FBb33C454B41ea7a1f11E83df2C: | |
| - | "L1Block" |
| implementationNames.ink:0x6a97C5D55A21265326150Efe12FC30Fb21cbff56: | |
| + | "L1Block" |
| } |
| contract L2ToL1MessagePasser (ink:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000016) [opstack/Layer2/L2ToL1MessagePasser] { | |
| +++ description: Contract used internally by the L2CrossDomainMessenger to send messages to L1, including withdrawals. It can also be used directly as a low-level interface. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x1e27889ae9ce2358b6248afde8e8b6f7c4ccf0b308a9d9ecb629369ce110ea23" |
| + | "0xb5be3cf9878e914d0b7feef281dbcc2b72d7c7e9106e44a7dfd516d48de8a62a" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "ink:0xC0D3C0d3C0d3c0d3C0d3C0D3c0D3c0d3c0D30016" |
| + | "ink:0x27E51B2254433A3284D9ba73Ea551C397DB2a124" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.0: | |
| + | ["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["ink:0x27E51B2254433A3284D9ba73Ea551C397DB2a124"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 0 |
| + | 1 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "1.1.1-beta.1" |
| + | "1.2.0" |
| implementationNames.ink:0xC0D3C0d3C0d3c0d3C0d3C0D3c0D3c0d3c0D30016: | |
| - | "L2ToL1MessagePasser" |
| implementationNames.ink:0x27E51B2254433A3284D9ba73Ea551C397DB2a124: | |
| + | "L2ToL1MessagePasser" |
| } |
| contract OptimismMintableERC721Factory (ink:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000017) [opstack/Layer2/OptimismMintableERC721Factory] { | |
| +++ description: Factory contract to create bridge compliant ERC721 IOU token representations of bridged L1 ERC721 tokens. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0xec1bfae18ba5717949a6969cb01d743511c076e7bc6c78ed2c2b63232b97cc57" |
| + | "0xf4fd8df9e9191098f5647a3568864aee248b011c092313bf392b57a4b0f43268" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "ink:0xc0d3C0d3C0d3C0d3C0d3c0d3C0D3C0d3C0D30017" |
| + | "ink:0xf43862B9d814BB4504158CecCB0b74b31265e4eE" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.0: | |
| + | ["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["ink:0x2A5A3eabB9Fd571A3Af0299eebdF8EaafE29a914"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.1: | |
| + | ["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["ink:0xf43862B9d814BB4504158CecCB0b74b31265e4eE"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 0 |
| + | 2 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "1.4.1-beta.1" |
| + | "1.5.1" |
| values.bridge: | |
| + | "ink:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000014" |
| values.proxyAdmin: | |
| + | "ink:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| + | "ink:0x6B1BAE59D09fCcbdDB6C6cceb07B7279367C4E3b" |
| values.remoteChainID: | |
| + | 1 |
| implementationNames.ink:0xc0d3C0d3C0d3C0d3C0d3c0d3C0D3C0d3C0D30017: | |
| - | "OptimismMintableERC721Factory" |
| implementationNames.ink:0xf43862B9d814BB4504158CecCB0b74b31265e4eE: | |
| + | "OptimismMintableERC721Factory" |
| } |
| contract L2ProxyAdmin (ink:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018) [opstack/Layer2/L2ProxyAdmin_karst] { | |
| +++ description: Administration contract for the L2 predeploy proxies. Adds upgradePredeploys(address), which can only be called by the system depositor account and delegatecalls an L2ContractsManager to upgrade every predeploy in a single network upgrade transaction. | |
| template: | |
| - | "opstack/Layer2/L2ProxyAdmin" |
| + | "opstack/Layer2/L2ProxyAdmin_karst" |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x5685f6e3015a6b9a257228bb8ef3c33efb233627bc5c81b7005670a10a37bd47" |
| + | "0xc9307181d90f9b86ff913d1c365245cfb8622929939cbff0389acf7f428ddc4b" |
| description: | |
| - | "Administration contract for other contract proxies." |
| + | "Administration contract for the L2 predeploy proxies. Adds upgradePredeploys(address), which can only be called by the system depositor account and delegatecalls an L2ContractsManager to upgrade every predeploy in a single network upgrade transaction." |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "ink:0xC0d3C0D3c0d3C0d3c0d3c0D3C0D3C0d3C0D30018" |
| + | "ink:0x893c2CEEb71D38514daF67728d3Ff1b213FC4B5F" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.0: | |
| + | ["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0x48aa8d6a9d281bf0eaa204e895acdfe0ba38640c34f6d133b2f4ecb879f5c72c",["ink:0x893c2CEEb71D38514daF67728d3Ff1b213FC4B5F"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.1: | |
| + | ["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["ink:0x893c2CEEb71D38514daF67728d3Ff1b213FC4B5F"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 0 |
| + | 2 |
| values.version: | |
| + | "1.0.0" |
| implementationNames.ink:0xC0d3C0D3c0d3C0d3c0d3c0D3C0D3C0d3C0D30018: | |
| - | "ProxyAdmin" |
| implementationNames.ink:0x893c2CEEb71D38514daF67728d3Ff1b213FC4B5F: | |
| + | "L2ProxyAdmin" |
| } |
| contract BaseFeeVault (ink:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000019) [opstack/Layer2/BaseFeeVault_karst] { | |
| +++ description: Collects EIP-1559 base fees, which are withdrawable to the FeesCollector on L1. | |
| template: | |
| - | "opstack/Layer2/BaseFeeVault" |
| + | "opstack/Layer2/BaseFeeVault_karst" |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x3d0a3be0a8f45817aa732f9e2f00e95db42726fa0335aa511b97c1a4cdecd4b7" |
| + | "0xf7b9f825b6af20abb355da09822d54e6e3fa7243439293826bd7271f87747775" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "ink:0xC0d3c0D3c0d3C0D3C0D3C0d3c0D3C0D3c0d30019" |
| + | "ink:0xf7bed7215EEF1003fac426682Cf2edeb958569f7" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.0: | |
| + | ["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["ink:0x2A5A3eabB9Fd571A3Af0299eebdF8EaafE29a914"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.1: | |
| + | ["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["ink:0xf7bed7215EEF1003fac426682Cf2edeb958569f7"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 0 |
| + | 2 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "1.5.0-beta.2" |
| + | "1.6.1" |
| values.proxyAdmin: | |
| + | "ink:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| + | "ink:0x6B1BAE59D09fCcbdDB6C6cceb07B7279367C4E3b" |
| implementationNames.ink:0xC0d3c0D3c0d3C0D3C0D3C0d3c0D3C0D3c0d30019: | |
| - | "BaseFeeVault" |
| implementationNames.ink:0xf7bed7215EEF1003fac426682Cf2edeb958569f7: | |
| + | "BaseFeeVault" |
| } |
| contract L1FeeVault (ink:0x420000000000000000000000000000000000001A) [opstack/Layer2/L1FeeVault_karst] { | |
| +++ description: Collects the L1 portion of the L2 transaction fees, which are withdrawable to the FeesCollector on L1. | |
| name: | |
| - | "BaseFeeVault" |
| + | "L1FeeVault" |
| template: | |
| - | "opstack/Layer2/BaseFeeVault" |
| + | "opstack/Layer2/L1FeeVault_karst" |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x3d0a3be0a8f45817aa732f9e2f00e95db42726fa0335aa511b97c1a4cdecd4b7" |
| + | "0xf7b9f825b6af20abb355da09822d54e6e3fa7243439293826bd7271f87747775" |
| description: | |
| - | "Collects EIP-1559 base fees, which are withdrawable to the FeesCollector on L1." |
| + | "Collects the L1 portion of the L2 transaction fees, which are withdrawable to the FeesCollector on L1." |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "ink:0xc0D3c0D3C0d3c0d3c0d3C0d3c0d3C0d3C0D3001A" |
| + | "ink:0xf7bed7215EEF1003fac426682Cf2edeb958569f7" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.0: | |
| + | ["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["ink:0x2A5A3eabB9Fd571A3Af0299eebdF8EaafE29a914"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.1: | |
| + | ["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["ink:0xf7bed7215EEF1003fac426682Cf2edeb958569f7"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 0 |
| + | 2 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "1.5.0-beta.2" |
| + | "1.6.1" |
| values.proxyAdmin: | |
| + | "ink:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| + | "ink:0x6B1BAE59D09fCcbdDB6C6cceb07B7279367C4E3b" |
| implementationNames.ink:0xc0D3c0D3C0d3c0d3c0d3C0d3c0d3C0d3C0D3001A: | |
| - | "BaseFeeVault" |
| implementationNames.ink:0xf7bed7215EEF1003fac426682Cf2edeb958569f7: | |
| + | "BaseFeeVault" |
| } |
| contract SchemaRegistry (ink:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000020) [opstack/Layer2/SchemaRegistry] { | |
| +++ description: Contracts to register schemas for the Ethereum Attestation Service (EAS). | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x184ad3273d7e257c9f1b138ecff33286528599eae858abc182fdc3068060af90" |
| + | "0xe2a60db541c987ffa9a6ed73b9100c7f62f2574966a20c903a73a8f730c7dfcc" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "ink:0xc0d3c0d3c0d3C0d3c0d3C0D3C0D3c0d3C0D30020" |
| + | "ink:0x70DE55BC0bfBC52C5D0CCA1DA5816c2428886A34" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.0: | |
| + | ["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["ink:0x70DE55BC0bfBC52C5D0CCA1DA5816c2428886A34"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 0 |
| + | 1 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "1.3.1-beta.1" |
| + | "1.3.1-beta.2" |
| implementationNames.ink:0xc0d3c0d3c0d3C0d3c0d3C0D3C0D3c0d3C0D30020: | |
| - | "SchemaRegistry" |
| implementationNames.ink:0x70DE55BC0bfBC52C5D0CCA1DA5816c2428886A34: | |
| + | "SchemaRegistry" |
| } |
| contract EAS (ink:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000021) [opstack/Layer2/EAS] { | |
| +++ description: Contract containing the main logic for the Ethereum Attestation Service (EAS). | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0xa445fc3be07624967bd4cb9792e42018303744e20dc788527e19f17d83b6373d" |
| + | "0xd39abb26f6acde3141075c8398a29b17974750e1651a038fcf5647d6cd8c5215" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "ink:0xC0D3c0D3C0d3c0D3c0D3C0D3c0D3c0d3c0d30021" |
| + | "ink:0xbEc660b456B84A081E90aF29BE43385BDa5bF7b6" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.0: | |
| + | ["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["ink:0xbEc660b456B84A081E90aF29BE43385BDa5bF7b6"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 0 |
| + | 1 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "1.4.1-beta.1" |
| + | "1.4.1-beta.3" |
| implementationNames.ink:0xC0D3c0D3C0d3c0D3c0D3C0D3c0D3c0d3c0d30021: | |
| - | "EAS" |
| implementationNames.ink:0xbEc660b456B84A081E90aF29BE43385BDa5bF7b6: | |
| + | "EAS" |
| } |
MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.
The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.
If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.
OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.

A Multisig with 2/2 threshold.
A Gnosis Safe module combining LivenessModule and TimelockGuard. Provides liveness checks where a fallback owner can challenge and take over if Safe owners are unresponsive, plus optional timelock delays for transaction scheduling.
A Multisig with 5/7 threshold. It uses the following modules: SaferSafes (A Gnosis Safe module combining LivenessModule and TimelockGuard. Provides liveness checks where a fallback owner can challenge and take over if Safe owners are unresponsive, plus optional timelock delays for transaction scheduling).
A Multisig with 5/7 threshold. It uses the following modules: SaferSafes (A Gnosis Safe module combining LivenessModule and TimelockGuard. Provides liveness checks where a fallback owner can challenge and take over if Safe owners are unresponsive, plus optional timelock delays for transaction scheduling). Member of SuperchainProxyAdminOwner.
A Multisig with 10/13 threshold. It uses the following modules: LivenessModule (used to remove members inactive for 3mo 8d while making sure that the threshold remains above 75%. If the number of members falls below 8, the OpFoundationUpgradeSafe takes ownership of the multisig). Member of Optimism Guardian Multisig, SuperchainProxyAdminOwner.
Participants (13):
0xE61F…76aE0x652B…cB5f0x5c1f…7a810x4A73…e61E0x3A53…aa940xEF9A…877c0x6323…c8650xd5b7…aC900x7ed8…9E390x0aA3…75D70x0a87…efE60xbfA0…E0d90xcbC7…7eA6Modular contract to be used together with the LivenessModule. Tracks liveness / activity of Safe owners.
A Multisig with 1/1 threshold. It uses the following modules: DeputyPauseModule (Allows 0x2fA150379bF32b6d79Eeb4ff9bD280E76049a87c, called the deputy pauser, to act on behalf of the OpFoundationUpgradeSafe if set as its Safe module).
Participants (1):
Optimism Security Councilpause() function → Optimism Guardian Multisig

The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. This variant exposes per-type reads only; the legacy array views (gameImpls[], initBonds[]) were removed in the new implementation.
Used to manage global configuration values for multiple OP Chains within a single Superchain network. The SuperchainConfig contract manages individual pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3 months if left untouched.
Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.
Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain’s epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.
The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.
All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation.
used to remove members inactive for 3mo 8d while making sure that the threshold remains above 75%. If the number of members falls below 8, the OpFoundationUpgradeSafe takes ownership of the multisig
The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game.
Logic of the dispute game. When a state root is proposed, a dispute game contract is deployed. Challengers can use such contracts to challenge the proposed state root.
Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.
Allows 0x2fA150379bF32b6d79Eeb4ff9bD280E76049a87c, called the deputy pauser, to act on behalf of the OpFoundationUpgradeSafe if set as its Safe module.
pause() functionA helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it’s deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain’s representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.
The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.
A simple escrow contract storing ETH for the canonical bridge.

Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger.
Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. This variant stores respectedGameType, retirementTimestamp, and disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds locally and drops the legacy *FromGame fields, since the AggregateVerifier model does not expose vm()/weth()/absolutePrestate() on its game implementation.
The L2CrossDomainMessenger (L2xDM) contract sends messages from L2 to L1, and relays messages from L1 onto L2 with a system tx. In the event that a message sent from L2 to L1 is rejected for exceeding the L1 gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.
A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it’s deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain’s representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.
Contract used internally by the L2CrossDomainMessenger to send messages to L1, including withdrawals. It can also be used directly as a low-level interface.
Administration contract for the L2 predeploy proxies. Adds upgradePredeploys(address), which can only be called by the system depositor account and delegatecalls an L2ContractsManager to upgrade every predeploy in a single network upgrade transaction.
Collects EIP-1559 base fees, which are withdrawable to the FeesCollector on L1.
Contracts to register schemas for the Ethereum Attestation Service (EAS).
Contract containing the main logic for the Ethereum Attestation Service (EAS).
The current deployment carries some associated risks:
Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. Both regular and emergency upgrades must be approved by both the Security Council and the Foundation. There is no delay on regular upgrades.
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