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SummaryValue SecuredActivityOnchain costsData postedLivenessMilestones & IncidentsRisk summaryRisk analysisStageData availabilityState validationUpgrades & GovernanceUpdatesOperatorWithdrawalsOther considerationsPermissionsSmart contracts

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Zircuit

There are impactful changes and part of the information might be outdated.

Critical contracts can be upgraded by an EOA which could result in the loss of all funds.

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About

Zircuit is a universal rollup. It is based on the Optimism Bedrock architecture, employing AI to identify and stop malicious transactions at the sequencer level.

  • Total Value SecuredTVS
    $12.54 M15.1%
  • Past day UOPSDaily UOPS
    0.535.35%
  • Gas token
    ETH
  • Type
    Other
  • Purpose
    Universal
  • Chain ID
    48900

    • Tokens breakdown

    Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure
    Explore more in Discovery UI

    Badges

    About

    Zircuit is a universal rollup. It is based on the Optimism Bedrock architecture, employing AI to identify and stop malicious transactions at the sequencer level.

    Why is the project listed in others?

    The proof system isn't fully functional

    Consequence: projects without a proper proof system fully rely on single entities to safely update the state. A malicious proposer can finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds.

    Learn more about the recategorisation here.

    Value Secured

    CompareView TVS breakdown
    Total
    Canonically BridgedCanonically Bridged ValueCanonical
    Natively MintedNatively Minted TokensNative
    Externally BridgedExternally Bridged ValueExternal
    ETH & derivatives
    Stablecoins
    BTC & derivatives
    Other
    View TVS breakdown
    Compare with other projects

    Activity

    Compare
    Past Day UOPS
    Past Day Ops count
    Max. UOPS
    Past day UOPS/TPS Ratio
    Compare with other projects

    Onchain costs

    Compare

    The section shows the operating costs that L2s pay to Ethereum.

    Total cost
    Avg cost per L2 UOP
    Avg cost per day
    Compare with other projects

    Data posted

    Compare

    This section shows how much data the project publishes to its data-availability (DA) layer over time. The project currently posts data to; previously it posted toEthereumEthereum.

    Data posted
    Avg size per day
    Avg size per L2 UOP
    Compare with other projects

    Liveness

    This section shows how "live" the project's operators are by displaying how frequently they submit transactions of the selected type. It also highlights anomalies - significant deviations from their typical schedule.

    No ongoing anomalies detected
    Avg. tx data subs. interval
    Avg. proof subs. interval
    Avg. state updates interval
    Past 30 days anomalies
    100% normal uptime

    Milestones & Incidents

    Migrated to Conduit fault proofs

    2026 Aug 4th

    Zircuit migrates to a standard OP Stack PermissionedDisputeGame deployment via Conduit.

    Learn more

    Proof system migrated to SP1

    2025 Aug 25th

    Zircuit deprecates its in-house proof systemThe infrastructure that allows projects to verify their state transitions. It is composed by onchain verifiers and offchain provers. The main two flavors are optimistic and ZK proof systems, but they can be combined in a hybrid model. In general though, if a system is able to accept state roots optimistically, even if it has a ZK component, it is considered an optimistic proof system. in favor of SP1.

    Learn more

    Risk summary

    The fault proof systemThe infrastructure that allows projects to verify their state transitions. It is composed by onchain verifiers and offchain provers. The main two flavors are optimistic and ZK proof systems, but they can be combined in a hybrid model. In general though, if a system is able to accept state roots optimistically, even if it has a ZK component, it is considered an optimistic proof system. is deployed but is not functional. The chain ID is not included in the superchain registry snapshot embedded in the op-program release that the dispute games commit to, causing the dispute game to panic during execution. Security relies entirely on the permissioned proposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block. and challengers.

    Funds can be stolen if

    1. a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL),
    2. no whitelisted challenger disputes an invalid state root before the challenge window expires (CRITICAL).

    MEV can be extracted if

    1. the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

    Risk analysis

    Critical contracts can be upgraded by an EOA which could result in the loss of all funds.
    The fault proof systemThe infrastructure that allows projects to verify their state transitions. It is composed by onchain verifiers and offchain provers. The main two flavors are optimistic and ZK proof systems, but they can be combined in a hybrid model. In general though, if a system is able to accept state roots optimistically, even if it has a ZK component, it is considered an optimistic proof system. is deployed but is not functional. The chain ID is not included in the superchain registry snapshot embedded in the op-program release that the dispute games commit to, causing the dispute game to panic during execution. Security relies entirely on the permissioned proposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block. and challengers.
    Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure
    Sequencer failure
    Self sequence

    In the event of a sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project’s chain by sending them to L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development.. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.

    State validation
    Fraud proofs (INT)

    Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. Only one entity is currently allowed to propose and submit challenges, as only permissioned games are currently allowed.

    Data availability
    Onchain

    All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development..

    Exit window
    None

    There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.

    Proposer failure
    Cannot withdraw

    Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. on L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development., so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.

    Stage

    Zircuit
    Zircuit is not even a
    Stage 0
    project.
    Learn more about Stages
    Please keep in mind that these stages do not reflect project security, this is an opinionated assessment of project maturity based on subjective criteria, created with a goal of incentivizing projects to push toward better decentralization. Each team may have taken different paths to achieve this goal.

    Data availability

    All data required for proofs is published on chain

    All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobsThe data that a rollup publishes to its L1/data availability (DA) layer. They consist of the L2 transactions that are rolled up, along with some metadata. Blobs are introduced as a new transaction type within Ethereum with EIP-4844, and has rollup scaling specifically in mind. Blobs persist on Ethereum’s Beacon Chain ephemerally. or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.

    1. Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs
    2. BatchInbox - address
    3. OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function
    Learn more about the DA layer here: Ethereum logoEthereum

    State validation

    Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by permissioned operators only. If a state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. passes the challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled., it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.

    State root proposals

    Proposers submit state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the create function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.0 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proofAlso referred to as a fault proof, it is the construction of an assertion that fraud was perpetrated on an optimistic rollup. More concretely, that an invalid state transition took place according to the protocol rules. The submitter of a fraud proof would expect a reward from the optimistic rollup protocol for helping maintain the integrity of the system.. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled. has passed and it is not countered.

    • Funds can be stolen if no whitelisted challenger disputes an invalid state root before the challenge window expires (CRITICAL).

    1. OP stack specification: Fault Dispute Game
    Challenges

    Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 0.00 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the defend or attack functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with full concurrency. Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 3d 12h. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see freeloader claims), an inherited clock with too little time remaining is generally extended by 3h. The extension is 6h when the next claim is immediately before split depth 30, and 1d 3h (the standard extension plus the 1d oracle challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled.) immediately before the last depth. Along a full-depth path, cumulative extensions can therefore add up to 10d 3h. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers’ stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step proverAn entity that generates the cryptographic proof to convince the verifier that the statement is true. In a ZK-Rollup, the prover generates the ZK (validity) proof to submit to the verifier contract. contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks (Spearbit 5.1.3).

    1. Fraud Proof Wars: OPFP

    Upgrades & Governance

    Past upgrades

    The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.

    Count of upgrades
    80
    Last upgrade
    1mo 7d ago
    Avg upgrade interval
    2mo 6d

    Updates

    2026 August 26, 12:26 UTC
    22changes

    OP-stack storage surgery performed on L1StandardBridge: https://tools.l2beat.com/decoder-new/?hash=0xa2c6d7a895f7793beb83cd3f0734b427fea4982e2ed35044555c52bf3a8a8a23&data=AwA that manually overwritten bridge storage slots. Until Aug 4, 2026, Zircuit ran a modified bridge implementation that never maintained the OP-stack deposits accounting, after the migration to standard OP-stack contracts correct escrow balances had to be set for the following 12 tokens: ZRC, WETH, WBTC, USDT, USDC, weETH, weETHs, mETH, LsETH, FBTC, LBTC, GUD. This was verifeid by reproducing corresponding storage slots and comparing with the values in the transaction above. Also, updated conduit ms and verified sources for L1Block contract on zircuit.

    OP-stack storage surgery performed on L1StandardBridge: https://tools.l2beat.com/decoder-new/?hash=0xa2c6d7a895f7793beb83cd3f0734b427fea4982e2ed35044555c52bf3a8a8a23&data=AwA that manually overwritten bridge storage slots.

    Until Aug 4, 2026, Zircuit ran a modified bridge implementation that never maintained the OP-stack deposits accounting, after the migration to standard OP-stack contracts correct escrow balances had to be set for the following 12 tokens: ZRC, WETH, WBTC, USDT, USDC, weETH, weETHs, mETH, LsETH, FBTC, LBTC, GUD. This was verifeid by reproducing corresponding storage slots and comparing with the values in the transaction above.

    Also, updated conduit ms and verified sources for L1Block contract on zircuit.

    contract L1StandardBridge (eth:0x386B76D9cA5F5Fb150B6BFB35CF5379B22B26dd8) [opstack/L1StandardBridge] {
    +++ description: The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.
    values.$pastUpgrades.16:
    + ["2026-08-22T11:12:35.000Z","0xa2c6d7a895f7793beb83cd3f0734b427fea4982e2ed35044555c52bf3a8a8a23",["eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.17:
    + ["2026-08-22T11:12:35.000Z","0xa2c6d7a895f7793beb83cd3f0734b427fea4982e2ed35044555c52bf3a8a8a23",["eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 16
    + 18
    }
    contract Conduit Multisig 1 (eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746) [GnosisSafe] {
    +++ description: None
    values.$members.0:
    + "eth:0x9402c42dB162d5a0927c032136f40Cc9C71853F2"
    values.multisigThreshold:
    - "4 of 10 (40%)"
    + "4 of 11 (36%)"
    }

    New and verified contracts

    contract L1Block (zircuit:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000015) [opstack/Layer2/L1Block] {
    +++ description: Simple contract that returns information about the latest L1 block, which is derived permissionlessly from the L1 chain.
    unverified:
    - true
    values.$pastUpgrades.0:
    - ["2025-05-12T16:00:01.000Z","0xe992e00998b34075506d2726a274db07a62af6cdd9d527bfda9128114603cfbd",["zircuit:0xFf256497D61dcd71a9e9Ff43967C13fdE1F72D12"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 2
    + 1
    values.baseFeeScalar:
    + 7600
    values.batcherHash:
    + "0x000000000000000000000000cf8225801df6ef90ad3bc86808f574403a309de8"
    values.DEPOSITOR_ACCOUNT:
    + "zircuit:0xDeaDDEaDDeAdDeAdDEAdDEaddeAddEAdDEAd0001"
    values.gasPayingToken:
    + {"addr_":"zircuit:0xEeeeeEeeeEeEeeEeEeEeeEEEeeeeEeeeeeeeEEeE","decimals_":18}
    values.gasPayingTokenName:
    + "Ether"
    values.gasPayingTokenSymbol:
    + "ETH"
    values.isCustomGasToken:
    + false
    values.l1FeeOverhead:
    + 0
    values.l1FeeScalar:
    + 0
    values.version:
    + "1.6.1"
    implementationNames.zircuit:0xe95F7EdfB4cbf87eD14d94913448d89282513d66:
    - ""
    + "L1Block"
    template:
    + "opstack/Layer2/L1Block"
    sourceHashes:
    + ["0x58e0fa3818df29fbb7de4e09a8c62f8952335a4ac32e30256ae72fd9681d7b50","0xba1197cf8ad03c23a68877c7bad92c7d43c0348aa7b03d38f36a17acb35a942e"]
    description:
    + "Simple contract that returns information about the latest L1 block, which is derived permissionlessly from the L1 chain."
    }
    2026 August 19, 09:58 UTC
    High severity
    8changes

    SuperchainConfig implementation upgraded v2.4.0 → v2.4.2 (diff) via a StorageSetter step in one transaction. Guardian unchanged (Conduit Multisig 1).

    SuperchainConfig implementation upgraded v2.4.0 → v2.4.2 (diff) via a StorageSetter step in one transaction. Guardian unchanged (Conduit Multisig 1).

    contract SuperchainConfig (eth:0x097f99768A0a4a0A81bAbbCB1ea18193bA9D53cC) [opstack/SuperchainConfigFake_expiry] {
    +++ description: This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3mo 1d if left untouched.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x5fb525d1572fb90d060d122143b915059cbff39e0298b345857fd4267d7f6b28"
    + "0x2cd597b7305a446a1df355e6909cbd75fe38aa045faf4876a8e5496eebc1734f"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957"
    + "eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550"
    values.$pastUpgrades.8:
    + ["2026-08-13T13:32:47.000Z","0x2c62c31e4108c24123b9f5b3c26a87e5ec6b4fc3b85163c7257edb523316f9db",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.9:
    + ["2026-08-13T13:32:47.000Z","0x2c62c31e4108c24123b9f5b3c26a87e5ec6b4fc3b85163c7257edb523316f9db",["eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 8
    + 10
    values.version:
    - "2.4.0"
    + "2.4.2"
    implementationNames.eth:0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957:
    - "SuperchainConfig"
    implementationNames.eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550:
    + "SuperchainConfig"
    }
    2026 August 12, 10:29 UTC
    High severity
    198changes

    HIGH SEVERITY. Full migration off Zircuit's custom OP-stack fork onto a standard OP-stack fault-proof deployment, via 6 batched upgrade txs 2026-08-04 13:31-14:16 UTC. Matches Zircuit's public Conduit RaaS migration announced 2026-07-02. Checked $pastUpgrades for a bounce/rollback pattern: none found, intermediate hops are Optimism's shared StorageSetter contract used transiently within each batch tx. Admin control moved from Zircuit's own two multisigs (both deleted) to Conduit's shared multisig (4-of-10): zero signer overlap with the old multisigs, and already admin on ~25 other Conduit-hosted L2Beat projects. Now owner of SystemConfig, guardian of OptimismPortal2, owner of ProxyAdmin. superchainConfig now points to Conduit's shared SuperchainConfigFake expiry (used by 11 other tracked projects). Old escape hatch removed entirely: L2OutputOracle, ResolverRegistry, local SuperchainConfig fork, and both SP1 verifiers are gone (permissionless exit via merkle proof/resolver after 1mo of no state updates no longer exists). Replaced by standard fault-proof stack: DisputeGameFactory, PermissionedDisputeGame (proposer+challenger permissioned, not yet open), AnchorStateRegistry, MIPS, PreimageOracle, DelayedWETH. proofMaturityDelaySeconds 604800 (7d), disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds 302400 (3.5d). Version jumps: OptimismPortal2 2.2.0 - 5.1.1, SystemConfig 1.12.0 - 3.11.0, L1CrossDomainMessenger 2.4.0 - 2.11.0, L1StandardBridge 2.3.0 - 2.8.0, L1ERC721Bridge 2.2.0 - 2.9.0. L1Block predeploy on L2 shows unverified: Zircuit's block explorer switched from Blockscout to Conduit's native explorer (explorer.zircuit.com). Confirmed via Conduit's own contract-verification API that this predeploy has no source match there yet - a real gap on the new explorer, not an L2Beat-side flake. Diff (OptimismPortal2): https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xF7209f5471628aC5f68FE4ae98Feb7f02E0f40Be/eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202 Diff (SystemConfig): https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xaFD10586f3F2cB2aD34E8196563424a3a93EbE9F/eth:0x2fA28989fc559836E9d66dFf3010C7F7f41c65ED

    HIGH SEVERITY. Full migration off Zircuit’s custom OP-stack fork onto a standard OP-stack fault-proof deployment, via 6 batched upgrade txs 2026-08-04 13:31-14:16 UTC. Matches Zircuit’s public Conduit RaaS migration announced 2026-07-02. Checked $pastUpgrades for a bounce/rollback pattern: none found, intermediate hops are Optimism’s shared StorageSetter contract used transiently within each batch tx.

    Admin control moved from Zircuit’s own two multisigs (both deleted) to Conduit’s shared multisig (4-of-10): zero signer overlap with the old multisigs, and already admin on ~25 other Conduit-hosted L2Beat projects. Now owner of SystemConfig, guardian of OptimismPortal2, owner of ProxyAdmin. superchainConfig now points to Conduit’s shared SuperchainConfigFake_expiry (used by 11 other tracked projects).

    Old escape hatch removed entirely: L2OutputOracle, ResolverRegistry, local SuperchainConfig fork, and both SP1 verifiers are gone (permissionless exit via merkle proof/resolver after 1mo of no state updates no longer exists). Replaced by standard fault-proof stack: DisputeGameFactory, PermissionedDisputeGame (proposer+challenger permissioned, not yet open), AnchorStateRegistry, MIPS, PreimageOracle, DelayedWETH. proofMaturityDelaySeconds 604800 (7d), disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds 302400 (3.5d).

    Version jumps: OptimismPortal2 2.2.0 -> 5.1.1, SystemConfig 1.12.0 -> 3.11.0, L1CrossDomainMessenger 2.4.0 -> 2.11.0, L1StandardBridge 2.3.0 -> 2.8.0, L1ERC721Bridge 2.2.0 -> 2.9.0.

    L1Block predeploy on L2 shows unverified: Zircuit’s block explorer switched from Blockscout to Conduit’s native explorer (explorer.zircuit.com). Confirmed via Conduit’s own contract-verification API that this predeploy has no source match there yet - a real gap on the new explorer, not an L2Beat-side flake.

    Diff (OptimismPortal2): https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xF7209f5471628aC5f68FE4ae98Feb7f02E0f40Be/eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202 Diff (SystemConfig): https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xaFD10586f3F2cB2aD34E8196563424a3a93EbE9F/eth:0x2fA28989fc559836E9d66dFf3010C7F7f41c65ED

    - Status: DELETED
    contract SP1Verifier (eth:0x0459d576A6223fEeA177Fb3DF53C9c77BF84C459) [succinct/SP1Verifier]
    +++ description: Verifier contract for SP1 proofs (v5.0.0).
    contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0x17bfAfA932d2e23Bd9B909Fd5B4D2e2a27043fb1) [opstack/OptimismPortal2] {
    +++ description: The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame.
    name:
    - "OptimismPortal"
    + "OptimismPortal2"
    template:
    - "opstack/zircuit/OptimismPortal"
    + "opstack/OptimismPortal2"
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x75b3a40d24df23769d05a5f3bb0461a19038ca999e7d7a3bb9e1ea2579b405d6"
    + "0x3e7e2cb08ba995795937c9c2e8ea9d0e4d2e2de852f389055073384d5f79c59d"
    description:
    - "The main entry point to deposit funds from the host chain to this chain. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. This fork of the standard OP stack contract allows for permissionless 'escaping' of assets with merkle proofs or a resolver if there were no state updates for a time defined by the eth:0x92Ef6Af472b39F1b363da45E35530c24619245A4."
    + "The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame."
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0xF7209f5471628aC5f68FE4ae98Feb7f02E0f40Be"
    + "eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202"
    values.$pastUpgrades.8:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:31:59.000Z","0xe697fe2a042f60a3fb3f835e122e209bab529a36fe66bfc77af79dbb1bebdfa4",["eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.9:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:31:59.000Z","0xe697fe2a042f60a3fb3f835e122e209bab529a36fe66bfc77af79dbb1bebdfa4",["eth:0x2D778797049FE9259d947D1ED8e5442226dFB589"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.10:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:48:35.000Z","0x3fb4739c3ce4edcab46b84c2438e7d1f86b85e7e57970a7eaf6b6de11dda6080",["eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.11:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:48:35.000Z","0x3fb4739c3ce4edcab46b84c2438e7d1f86b85e7e57970a7eaf6b6de11dda6080",["eth:0xe2F826324b2faf99E513D16D266c3F80aE87832B"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.12:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:59:35.000Z","0xfb6124f237aaaccedd1f8d1298ae5f3b19871f7af18bd4c791a818487cc199de",["eth:0x2D7e764a0D9919e16983a46595CfA81fc34fa7Cd"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.13:
    + ["2026-08-04T14:04:47.000Z","0xf7628d3121b7e3f4dcd11e06791a07e8ffa71753962baadc04c62944d412a006",["eth:0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.14:
    + ["2026-08-04T14:11:35.000Z","0xf7dd2207111f0f269b7cdfa8a7fa703b664585513bc113e0d2c8bc7ce9eb355f",["eth:0x381E729FF983FA4BCEd820e7b922d79bF653B999"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.15:
    + ["2026-08-04T14:16:11.000Z","0xeb6b35d861c5b232c47bc0e604f0834975876f80181776e46cb486f7a398cf03",["eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 8
    + 16
    values.guardian:
    - "eth:0x2c0B27F7C8F083B539557a0bA787041BF22DB276"
    + "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746"
    values.l2Oracle:
    - "eth:0x92Ef6Af472b39F1b363da45E35530c24619245A4"
    values.resolverRegistry:
    - "eth:0x6c89104690452AD7e209f0ab72287C2561d5cF0E"
    values.superchainConfig:
    - "eth:0x745393Cc03b5fE668ECd52c0E625f59aAD6D3Da0"
    + "eth:0x097f99768A0a4a0A81bAbbCB1ea18193bA9D53cC"
    values.version:
    - "2.2.0"
    + "5.1.1"
    values.anchorStateRegistry:
    + "eth:0x2613d77fFBE105CA861D526061dC3ef191E17051"
    values.disputeGameFactory:
    + "eth:0x6b9e81504e961a9CDf81A06e916720fb4c273e90"
    values.disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds:
    + 302400
    values.ethLockbox:
    + "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
    values.initVersion:
    + 3
    values.proofMaturityDelaySeconds:
    + 604800
    values.proxyAdmin:
    + "eth:0x5B1Ef673d9c316b3eE9Ed3B4E3cC84952bfC5257"
    values.proxyAdminOwner:
    + "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746"
    values.RespectedGameString:
    + "PermissionedDisputeGame"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.respectedGameType:
    + 1
    values.respectedGameTypeUpdatedAt:
    + 1785852695
    implementationNames.eth:0xF7209f5471628aC5f68FE4ae98Feb7f02E0f40Be:
    - "OptimismPortal"
    implementationNames.eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202:
    + "OptimismPortal2"
    fieldMeta:
    + {"respectedGameType":{"severity":"HIGH"},"paused":{"severity":"HIGH","description":"Whether the contract is paused or not. Determined by the SuperchainConfig contract PAUSED_SLOT. Here it pauses withdrawals. If this is paused, also the L1CrossDomainMessenger and ERC-20, ERC-721 deposits are paused."}}
    usedTypes:
    + [{"typeCaster":"Mapping","arg":{"0":"FaultDisputeGame","1":"PermissionedDisputeGame","8":"FaultDisputeGame","621":"AggregateVerifier","1337":"KailuaGame"}}]
    }
    contract L1CrossDomainMessenger (eth:0x2a721cBE81a128be0F01040e3353c3805A5EA091) [opstack/L1CrossDomainMessenger] {
    +++ description: Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0xe784f0244cc07b370089b601090cc4c3c7469c9fdd2a281bfa13b438c1b88e0d"
    + "0x1f2c13ad1144ce6548e578b834c33b0d65b1564aeb0d5c708ed4e7fb50535cc6"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0xA5B66A9FBCE3d57dA2b3Bd764d0a05B95052f73F"
    + "eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0"
    values.$pastUpgrades.2:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:31:59.000Z","0xe697fe2a042f60a3fb3f835e122e209bab529a36fe66bfc77af79dbb1bebdfa4",["eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.3:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:31:59.000Z","0xe697fe2a042f60a3fb3f835e122e209bab529a36fe66bfc77af79dbb1bebdfa4",["eth:0xD3494713A5cfaD3F5359379DfA074E2Ac8C6Fd65"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.4:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:40:47.000Z","0x2b72943b3cf73e5f4dade0cc6edd2f78bc2cb3f518df2872cf6fd69aea924cc0",["eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.5:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:40:47.000Z","0x2b72943b3cf73e5f4dade0cc6edd2f78bc2cb3f518df2872cf6fd69aea924cc0",["eth:0xD3494713A5cfaD3F5359379DfA074E2Ac8C6Fd65"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.6:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:59:35.000Z","0xfb6124f237aaaccedd1f8d1298ae5f3b19871f7af18bd4c791a818487cc199de",["eth:0x3eA6084748ED1b2A9B5D4426181F1ad8C93F6231"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.7:
    + ["2026-08-04T14:04:47.000Z","0xf7628d3121b7e3f4dcd11e06791a07e8ffa71753962baadc04c62944d412a006",["eth:0x5D5a095665886119693F0B41d8DFeE78da033e8B"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.8:
    + ["2026-08-04T14:11:35.000Z","0xf7dd2207111f0f269b7cdfa8a7fa703b664585513bc113e0d2c8bc7ce9eb355f",["eth:0x22D12E0FAebD62d429514A65EBAe32dd316c12D6"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.9:
    + ["2026-08-04T14:16:11.000Z","0xeb6b35d861c5b232c47bc0e604f0834975876f80181776e46cb486f7a398cf03",["eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 2
    + 10
    values.superchainConfig:
    - "eth:0x745393Cc03b5fE668ECd52c0E625f59aAD6D3Da0"
    + "eth:0x097f99768A0a4a0A81bAbbCB1ea18193bA9D53cC"
    values.version:
    - "2.4.0"
    + "2.11.0"
    values.initVersion:
    + 3
    values.proxyAdmin:
    + "eth:0x5B1Ef673d9c316b3eE9Ed3B4E3cC84952bfC5257"
    values.proxyAdminOwner:
    + "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746"
    values.systemConfig:
    + "eth:0x30F82a1Ca89226E8b8815d6EbB728e3b18a428ff"
    implementationNames.eth:0xA5B66A9FBCE3d57dA2b3Bd764d0a05B95052f73F:
    - "L1CrossDomainMessenger"
    implementationNames.eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0:
    + "L1CrossDomainMessenger"
    }
    - Status: DELETED
    contract Zircuit Multisig 2 (eth:0x2c0B27F7C8F083B539557a0bA787041BF22DB276) [GnosisSafe]
    +++ description: None
    contract SystemConfig (eth:0x30F82a1Ca89226E8b8815d6EbB728e3b18a428ff) [opstack/SystemConfig] {
    +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x3773dd699ed2a94c92b617c9e76c0191f58b9de68e2605999d076e287869e165"
    + "0xaa1b3bedab4e63198240e9dea4503f0e615e4d18a545961c9f11b72143279fbc"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0xaFD10586f3F2cB2aD34E8196563424a3a93EbE9F"
    + "eth:0x2fA28989fc559836E9d66dFf3010C7F7f41c65ED"
    values.$pastUpgrades.4:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:31:59.000Z","0xe697fe2a042f60a3fb3f835e122e209bab529a36fe66bfc77af79dbb1bebdfa4",["eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.5:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:31:59.000Z","0xe697fe2a042f60a3fb3f835e122e209bab529a36fe66bfc77af79dbb1bebdfa4",["eth:0xba2492e52F45651B60B8B38d4Ea5E2390C64Ffb1"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.6:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:40:47.000Z","0x2b72943b3cf73e5f4dade0cc6edd2f78bc2cb3f518df2872cf6fd69aea924cc0",["eth:0xAB9d6cB7A427c0765163A7f45BB91cAfe5f2D375"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.7:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:48:35.000Z","0x3fb4739c3ce4edcab46b84c2438e7d1f86b85e7e57970a7eaf6b6de11dda6080",["eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.8:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:48:35.000Z","0x3fb4739c3ce4edcab46b84c2438e7d1f86b85e7e57970a7eaf6b6de11dda6080",["eth:0xAB9d6cB7A427c0765163A7f45BB91cAfe5f2D375"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.9:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:59:35.000Z","0xfb6124f237aaaccedd1f8d1298ae5f3b19871f7af18bd4c791a818487cc199de",["eth:0x760C48C62A85045A6B69f07F4a9f22868659CbCc"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.10:
    + ["2026-08-04T14:04:47.000Z","0xf7628d3121b7e3f4dcd11e06791a07e8ffa71753962baadc04c62944d412a006",["eth:0x340f923E5c7cbB2171146f64169EC9d5a9FfE647"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.11:
    + ["2026-08-04T14:11:35.000Z","0xf7dd2207111f0f269b7cdfa8a7fa703b664585513bc113e0d2c8bc7ce9eb355f",["eth:0x2bFE4A5Bd5A41e9d848d843ebCDFa15954e9A557"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.12:
    + ["2026-08-04T14:16:11.000Z","0xeb6b35d861c5b232c47bc0e604f0834975876f80181776e46cb486f7a398cf03",["eth:0x2fA28989fc559836E9d66dFf3010C7F7f41c65ED"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 4
    + 13
    values.basefeeScalar:
    - 1368
    + 7600
    values.batcherHash:
    - "eth:0xAF1E4f6a47af647F87C0Ec814d8032C4a4bFF145"
    + "eth:0xCf8225801DF6Ef90aD3bc86808F574403A309de8"
    values.blobbasefeeScalar:
    - 810949
    + 862000
    +++ description: volatility param: lower denominator -> quicker fee changes on L2
    values.eip1559Denominator:
    - 0
    + 50
    values.eip1559Elasticity:
    - 0
    + 6
    values.L2_OUTPUT_ORACLE_SLOT:
    - "0xe52a667f71ec761b9b381c7b76ca9b852adf7e8905da0e0ad49986a0a6871815"
    values.l2OutputOracle:
    - "eth:0x92Ef6Af472b39F1b363da45E35530c24619245A4"
    values.minimumGasLimit:
    - 7000000
    + 21000000
    values.operatorFeeConstant:
    - 360000000000
    + 0
    values.operatorFeeScalar:
    - 4200000000
    + 0
    values.OSAKA_TX_MAX_GAS:
    - 16777216
    values.owner:
    - "eth:0xC463EaC02572CC964D43D2414023E2c6B62bAF38"
    + "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746"
    values.resourceConfig.maxResourceLimit:
    - 6000000
    + 20000000
    values.resourceConfig._spacer:
    - 8
    values.unsafeBlockSigner:
    - "eth:0xAE8f771E297AAbfDE7ff35a33FB6D558f4E0a679"
    + "eth:0x0037e8264020bF2B3e6f57B529e07347f76F2D55"
    values.version:
    - "1.12.0"
    + "3.11.0"
    values.daFootprintGasScalar:
    + 0
    values.disputeGameFactory:
    + "eth:0x6b9e81504e961a9CDf81A06e916720fb4c273e90"
    values.getAddresses:
    + {"l1CrossDomainMessenger":"eth:0x2a721cBE81a128be0F01040e3353c3805A5EA091","l1ERC721Bridge":"eth:0x994eEb321F9cD79B077a5455fC248c77f30Dd244","l1StandardBridge":"eth:0x386B76D9cA5F5Fb150B6BFB35CF5379B22B26dd8","optimismPortal":"eth:0x17bfAfA932d2e23Bd9B909Fd5B4D2e2a27043fb1","optimismMintableERC20Factory":"eth:0xc77ece87C91C44AFb5f19638f9a0F75b5d90E932"}
    values.guardian:
    + "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746"
    values.initVersion:
    + 3
    values.l2ChainId:
    + 48900
    values.maximumGasLimit:
    + 500000000
    values.minBaseFee:
    + 0
    values.paused:
    + false
    values.proxyAdmin:
    + "eth:0x5B1Ef673d9c316b3eE9Ed3B4E3cC84952bfC5257"
    values.proxyAdminOwner:
    + "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746"
    values.superchainConfig:
    + "eth:0x097f99768A0a4a0A81bAbbCB1ea18193bA9D53cC"
    implementationNames.eth:0xaFD10586f3F2cB2aD34E8196563424a3a93EbE9F:
    - "SystemConfig"
    implementationNames.eth:0x2fA28989fc559836E9d66dFf3010C7F7f41c65ED:
    + "SystemConfig"
    }
    contract L1StandardBridge (eth:0x386B76D9cA5F5Fb150B6BFB35CF5379B22B26dd8) [opstack/L1StandardBridge] {
    +++ description: The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.
    template:
    - "opstack/zircuit/L1StandardBridge"
    + "opstack/L1StandardBridge"
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x2324f7b9f352cb131178a3853eb2383e5c82923461c55e76d14c23fd231664f9"
    + "0xcacd38e7b52353ad3463da40b7e7a29b028f95500a82590d2b8f8ffd26b83f6d"
    description:
    - "The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from the host chain to this chain. This fork of the standard OP stack contract allows for permissionless 'escaping' of assets with merkle proofs or a resolver if there were no state updates for a configurable time."
    + "The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain."
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0x25DF2d6DDCa09C0f9Fce19373896be075F4f7d98"
    + "eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A"
    values.$pastUpgrades.8:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:31:59.000Z","0xe697fe2a042f60a3fb3f835e122e209bab529a36fe66bfc77af79dbb1bebdfa4",["eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.9:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:31:59.000Z","0xe697fe2a042f60a3fb3f835e122e209bab529a36fe66bfc77af79dbb1bebdfa4",["eth:0x64B5a5Ed26DCb17370Ff4d33a8D503f0fbD06CfF"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.10:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:40:47.000Z","0x2b72943b3cf73e5f4dade0cc6edd2f78bc2cb3f518df2872cf6fd69aea924cc0",["eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.11:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:40:47.000Z","0x2b72943b3cf73e5f4dade0cc6edd2f78bc2cb3f518df2872cf6fd69aea924cc0",["eth:0x64B5a5Ed26DCb17370Ff4d33a8D503f0fbD06CfF"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.12:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:59:35.000Z","0xfb6124f237aaaccedd1f8d1298ae5f3b19871f7af18bd4c791a818487cc199de",["eth:0x78972E88Ab8BBB517a36cAea23b931BAB58AD3c6"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.13:
    + ["2026-08-04T14:04:47.000Z","0xf7628d3121b7e3f4dcd11e06791a07e8ffa71753962baadc04c62944d412a006",["eth:0x0b09ba359A106C9ea3b181CBc5F394570c7d2a7A"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.14:
    + ["2026-08-04T14:11:35.000Z","0xf7dd2207111f0f269b7cdfa8a7fa703b664585513bc113e0d2c8bc7ce9eb355f",["eth:0xe32B192fb1DcA88fCB1C56B3ACb429e32238aDCb"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.15:
    + ["2026-08-04T14:16:11.000Z","0xeb6b35d861c5b232c47bc0e604f0834975876f80181776e46cb486f7a398cf03",["eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 8
    + 16
    values.accessController:
    - "eth:0x745393Cc03b5fE668ECd52c0E625f59aAD6D3Da0"
    values.superchainConfig:
    - "eth:0x745393Cc03b5fE668ECd52c0E625f59aAD6D3Da0"
    + "eth:0x097f99768A0a4a0A81bAbbCB1ea18193bA9D53cC"
    values.version:
    - "2.3.0"
    + "2.8.0"
    values.initVersion:
    + 3
    values.l2TokenBridge:
    + "eth:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000010"
    values.proxyAdmin:
    + "eth:0x5B1Ef673d9c316b3eE9Ed3B4E3cC84952bfC5257"
    values.proxyAdminOwner:
    + "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746"
    values.systemConfig:
    + "eth:0x30F82a1Ca89226E8b8815d6EbB728e3b18a428ff"
    implementationNames.eth:0x25DF2d6DDCa09C0f9Fce19373896be075F4f7d98:
    - "L1StandardBridge"
    implementationNames.eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A:
    + "L1StandardBridge"
    }
    - Status: DELETED
    contract SP1Verifier (eth:0x50ACFBEdecf4cbe350E1a86fC6f03a821772f1e5) [succinct/SP1Verifier]
    +++ description: Verifier contract for SP1 proofs (v5.0.0).
    contract ProxyAdmin (eth:0x5B1Ef673d9c316b3eE9Ed3B4E3cC84952bfC5257) [global/ProxyAdmin] {
    +++ description: None
    values.owner:
    - "eth:0xC463EaC02572CC964D43D2414023E2c6B62bAF38"
    + "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746"
    directlyReceivedPermissions.1:
    + {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x2613d77fFBE105CA861D526061dC3ef191E17051","role":"admin"}
    directlyReceivedPermissions.4:
    - {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x6c89104690452AD7e209f0ab72287C2561d5cF0E","role":"admin"}
    directlyReceivedPermissions.5.from:
    - "eth:0x745393Cc03b5fE668ECd52c0E625f59aAD6D3Da0"
    + "eth:0x6b9e81504e961a9CDf81A06e916720fb4c273e90"
    directlyReceivedPermissions.6.from:
    - "eth:0x92Ef6Af472b39F1b363da45E35530c24619245A4"
    + "eth:0x798d82222eC87C6B76aeF659A490e1ab9f7f9162"
    }
    - Status: DELETED
    contract ResolverRegistry (eth:0x6c89104690452AD7e209f0ab72287C2561d5cF0E) [opstack/zircuit/ResolverRegistry]
    +++ description: Registers 'resolvers' which are allowed to supply authoritative data for blockchain balances to support escapes without merkle proofs from e.g. DeFi smart contracts on L2. A resolver can either be registered directly by the respective contract on L2 or by its deployer from L1, using deterministic deployment derivation.
    - Status: DELETED
    contract ZircuitSuperchainConfig (eth:0x745393Cc03b5fE668ECd52c0E625f59aAD6D3Da0) [opstack/zircuit/SuperchainConfig]
    +++ description: This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages the `PAUSED_SLOT`, a boolean value indicating whether the local chain is paused, and access control for configuring actors who can pause and unpause the system.
    - Status: DELETED
    contract L2OutputOracle (eth:0x92Ef6Af472b39F1b363da45E35530c24619245A4) [opstack/zircuit/L2OutputOracle_SP1_nokeepalive]
    +++ description: Entrypoint for permissioned proposers to propose new L2 outputs (state roots). New proposals have to be accompanied by a zk-SNARK proof of a correct state transition. Users can 'escape' their funds after 1mo of no state updates by supplying merkle proofs or using a resolver.
    contract L1ERC721Bridge (eth:0x994eEb321F9cD79B077a5455fC248c77f30Dd244) [opstack/L1ERC721Bridge] {
    +++ description: Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0xeebc391f228960e573a84b61884f39e3f4d64ad3a105cb7974f641c4a737954e"
    + "0x1f65fda230b6d0df44e466b06418b2e12a401ef82c07521ad18d2f4ae6c70fb2"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0xDF129ECFc63Af454F62b69d03C0f0E21e69bcDAb"
    + "eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9"
    values.$pastUpgrades.2:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:31:59.000Z","0xe697fe2a042f60a3fb3f835e122e209bab529a36fe66bfc77af79dbb1bebdfa4",["eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.3:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:31:59.000Z","0xe697fe2a042f60a3fb3f835e122e209bab529a36fe66bfc77af79dbb1bebdfa4",["eth:0xAE2AF01232a6c4a4d3012C5eC5b1b35059caF10d"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.4:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:40:47.000Z","0x2b72943b3cf73e5f4dade0cc6edd2f78bc2cb3f518df2872cf6fd69aea924cc0",["eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.5:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:40:47.000Z","0x2b72943b3cf73e5f4dade0cc6edd2f78bc2cb3f518df2872cf6fd69aea924cc0",["eth:0xAE2AF01232a6c4a4d3012C5eC5b1b35059caF10d"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.6:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:59:35.000Z","0xfb6124f237aaaccedd1f8d1298ae5f3b19871f7af18bd4c791a818487cc199de",["eth:0x276d3730f219f7ec22274f7263180b8452B46d47"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.7:
    + ["2026-08-04T14:04:47.000Z","0xf7628d3121b7e3f4dcd11e06791a07e8ffa71753962baadc04c62944d412a006",["eth:0x7aE1d3BD877a4C5CA257404ce26BE93A02C98013"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.8:
    + ["2026-08-04T14:11:35.000Z","0xf7dd2207111f0f269b7cdfa8a7fa703b664585513bc113e0d2c8bc7ce9eb355f",["eth:0x7f1d12fB2911EB095278085f721e644C1f675696"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.9:
    + ["2026-08-04T14:16:11.000Z","0xeb6b35d861c5b232c47bc0e604f0834975876f80181776e46cb486f7a398cf03",["eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 2
    + 10
    values.superchainConfig:
    - "eth:0x745393Cc03b5fE668ECd52c0E625f59aAD6D3Da0"
    + "eth:0x097f99768A0a4a0A81bAbbCB1ea18193bA9D53cC"
    values.version:
    - "2.2.0"
    + "2.9.0"
    values.initVersion:
    + 3
    values.proxyAdmin:
    + "eth:0x5B1Ef673d9c316b3eE9Ed3B4E3cC84952bfC5257"
    values.proxyAdminOwner:
    + "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746"
    values.systemConfig:
    + "eth:0x30F82a1Ca89226E8b8815d6EbB728e3b18a428ff"
    implementationNames.eth:0xDF129ECFc63Af454F62b69d03C0f0E21e69bcDAb:
    - "L1ERC721Bridge"
    implementationNames.eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9:
    + "L1ERC721Bridge"
    }
    - Status: DELETED
    contract SP1MockVerifierWithHash (eth:0xb4bd9A37998576C2FfD863b6dc9E0124021B8739) [N/A]
    +++ description: None
    - Status: DELETED
    contract Zircuit Multisig 1 (eth:0xC463EaC02572CC964D43D2414023E2c6B62bAF38) [GnosisSafe]
    +++ description: None
    contract OptimismMintableERC20Factory (eth:0xc77ece87C91C44AFb5f19638f9a0F75b5d90E932) [opstack/OptimismMintableERC20Factory] {
    +++ description: A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it's deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain's representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x8fa0103a7f0708fce3badff106e2d615501b3405658422802ee59b7d9f9e5472"
    + "0x307d4cb83e682629880fe9bb874a188805e3b93cb11a2cbf80095975f1e5b04e"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0xf885DA6A3B4c93905b02f36f9a13680922A554b0"
    + "eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB"
    values.$pastUpgrades.1:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:31:59.000Z","0xe697fe2a042f60a3fb3f835e122e209bab529a36fe66bfc77af79dbb1bebdfa4",["eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.2:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:31:59.000Z","0xe697fe2a042f60a3fb3f835e122e209bab529a36fe66bfc77af79dbb1bebdfa4",["eth:0xE01efbeb1089D1d1dB9c6c8b135C934C0734c846"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.3:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:40:47.000Z","0x2b72943b3cf73e5f4dade0cc6edd2f78bc2cb3f518df2872cf6fd69aea924cc0",["eth:0xE01efbeb1089D1d1dB9c6c8b135C934C0734c846"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.4:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:59:35.000Z","0xfb6124f237aaaccedd1f8d1298ae5f3b19871f7af18bd4c791a818487cc199de",["eth:0x5493f4677A186f64805fe7317D6993ba4863988F"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.5:
    + ["2026-08-04T14:16:11.000Z","0xeb6b35d861c5b232c47bc0e604f0834975876f80181776e46cb486f7a398cf03",["eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 1
    + 6
    values.version:
    - "1.9.0"
    + "1.10.2"
    implementationNames.eth:0xf885DA6A3B4c93905b02f36f9a13680922A554b0:
    - "OptimismMintableERC20Factory"
    implementationNames.eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB:
    + "OptimismMintableERC20Factory"
    }
    - Status: DELETED
    contract SP1VerifierGateway (eth:0xf35A4088eA0231C44B9DB52D25c0E9E2fEe31f67) [succinct/SP1VerifierGateway]
    +++ description: This contract is the router for zk proof verification. It stores the mapping between identifiers and the address of onchain verifier contracts, routing each identifier to the corresponding verifier contract.
    contract L1Block (zircuit:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000015) [N/A] {
    +++ description: None
    template:
    - "opstack/Layer2/L1Block_depositExclusions"
    sourceHashes:
    - ["0x58e0fa3818df29fbb7de4e09a8c62f8952335a4ac32e30256ae72fd9681d7b50","0xbb69c5830d6e822e4bf9c51ad08b5ade53450cf808a5cabc8665f40e5c6d7c1a"]
    description:
    - "Simple contract that returns information about the latest L1 block, which is derived permissionlessly from the L1 chain. This version though also contains a storage slot for `depositExclusions`."
    values.$implementation:
    - "zircuit:0xFf256497D61dcd71a9e9Ff43967C13fdE1F72D12"
    + "zircuit:0xe95F7EdfB4cbf87eD14d94913448d89282513d66"
    values.$pastUpgrades.1:
    + ["2026-08-04T14:50:01.000Z","0xd89e381f4e17d7226144ae90c4efef010f4f085afb76b191add65dcf51aef089",["zircuit:0xe95F7EdfB4cbf87eD14d94913448d89282513d66"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 1
    + 2
    values.basefee:
    - 129016686
    values.baseFeeScalar:
    - 1368
    values.batcherHash:
    - "0x000000000000000000000000af1e4f6a47af647f87c0ec814d8032c4a4bff145"
    values.blobBaseFee:
    - 6234620
    values.blobBaseFeeScalar:
    - 810949
    values.depositExclusions:
    - "0x"
    values.DEPOSITOR_ACCOUNT:
    - "zircuit:0xDeaDDEaDDeAdDeAdDEAdDEaddeAddEAdDEAd0001"
    values.hash:
    - "0x1cfd2189d2e946c9d3da809f0e22666602b7d2b84dcf08793f293371c9ad5f6a"
    values.l1FeeOverhead:
    - 0
    values.l1FeeScalar:
    - 0
    values.number:
    - 25645265
    values.operatorFeeConstant:
    - 360000000000
    values.operatorFeeScalar:
    - 4200000000
    values.sequenceNumber:
    - 5
    values.timestamp:
    - 1785409595
    values.version:
    - "1.3.0"
    implementationNames.zircuit:0xFf256497D61dcd71a9e9Ff43967C13fdE1F72D12:
    - "L1Block"
    implementationNames.zircuit:0xe95F7EdfB4cbf87eD14d94913448d89282513d66:
    + ""
    unverified:
    + true
    }
    contract ProxyAdmin (zircuit:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018) [global/ProxyAdmin] {
    +++ description: None
    values.owner:
    - "zircuit:0xC463EaC02572CC964D43D2414023E2c6B62bAF38"
    + "zircuit:0x5b5A62275DF8c60A80D3a25FAeC5aA7De116b857"
    }
    - Status: DELETED
    contract GnosisSafe (zircuit:0xC463EaC02572CC964D43D2414023E2c6B62bAF38) [GnosisSafe]
    +++ description: None
    + Status: CREATED
    contract SuperchainConfig (eth:0x097f99768A0a4a0A81bAbbCB1ea18193bA9D53cC) [opstack/SuperchainConfigFake_expiry]
    +++ description: This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3mo 1d if left untouched.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract PreimageOracle (eth:0x1fb8cdFc6831fc866Ed9C51aF8817Da5c287aDD3) [opstack/PreimageOracle]
    +++ description: The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract AnchorStateRegistry (eth:0x2613d77fFBE105CA861D526061dC3ef191E17051) [opstack/AnchorStateRegistry_post13]
    +++ description: Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract Conduit Multisig 1 (eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746) [GnosisSafe]
    +++ description: None
    + Status: CREATED
    contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0x4F80B390aF3b49dda96134DA1ac905b05e816496) [opstack/PermissionedDisputeGame]
    +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract MIPS (eth:0x6463dEE3828677F6270d83d45408044fc5eDB908) [opstack/MIPS]
    +++ description: The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0x6b9e81504e961a9CDf81A06e916720fb4c273e90) [opstack/DisputeGameFactory]
    +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract DelayedWETH (eth:0x798d82222eC87C6B76aeF659A490e1ab9f7f9162) [opstack/DelayedWETH]
    +++ description: Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract ProxyAdmin (eth:0xb4899FF43Ae727B1E9CB19AC44660e4A43Fad0b5) [global/ProxyAdmin]
    +++ description: None
    2026 July 30, 11:07 UTC
    1change

    Zircuit Multisig 2 rotated one signer ( 0x3880...8679 - 0xf5B2...c1ae ); threshold remains 2/5.

    Zircuit Multisig 2 rotated one signer (0x3880...8679 -> 0xf5B2...c1ae); threshold remains 2/5.

    contract Zircuit Multisig 2 (eth:0x2c0B27F7C8F083B539557a0bA787041BF22DB276) [GnosisSafe] {
    +++ description: None
    values.$members.4:
    - "eth:0x38809210f69ed6204E276d2Be6b15cd530698679"
    + "eth:0xf5B2C0bfA18561d5374EAcc5FFfA3E39B049c1ae"
    }
    2026 June 02, 11:15 UTC
    4changes

    Zircuit Multisig 1 rotated two signers ( $members[0] and $members[5] ).

    Zircuit Multisig 1 rotated two signers ($members[0] and $members[5]).

    contract Zircuit Multisig 1 (eth:0xC463EaC02572CC964D43D2414023E2c6B62bAF38) [GnosisSafe] {
    +++ description: None
    values.$members.0:
    - "eth:0xaAf347c2381369cA0bE97320413E3C04f8561f7e"
    + "eth:0xf1829C83C227d3cc30a4204B091A7865AbCD0419"
    values.$members.5:
    - "eth:0x38809210f69ed6204E276d2Be6b15cd530698679"
    + "eth:0xf5B2C0bfA18561d5374EAcc5FFfA3E39B049c1ae"
    }
    contract GnosisSafe (zircuit:0xC463EaC02572CC964D43D2414023E2c6B62bAF38) [GnosisSafe] {
    +++ description: None
    values.$members.0:
    - "zircuit:0xaAf347c2381369cA0bE97320413E3C04f8561f7e"
    + "zircuit:0xf1829C83C227d3cc30a4204B091A7865AbCD0419"
    values.$members.5:
    - "zircuit:0x38809210f69ed6204E276d2Be6b15cd530698679"
    + "zircuit:0xf5B2C0bfA18561d5374EAcc5FFfA3E39B049c1ae"
    }

    Operator

    The system has a centralized operator

    The operatorAn operator is the entity charged with managing a rollup and progressing its state. A rollup operator can be a centralized sequencer, proposer, prover, challenger, pauser of admin that is able to perform upgrades. is the only entity that can propose blocksAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over.. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.

    • MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

    Users can force any transaction

    Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.

    1. Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs
    2. OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function

    Withdrawals

    Regular exits

    The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlementThe mechanism with which the execution of rollup blocks and the resultant state is verified and possible disputes are resolved. In the context of rollups or other modular blockchains, it often refers to the proof system used--validity (ZK) or fraud proofs, or a combination thereof. Sometimes it will refer to this mechanism along with where the mechanism's outputs are ultimately published and verified, as in Ethereum being a settlement layer by verifying the proofs and allowing for withdrawals., but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled. of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.

    1. OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function
    2. OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function

    Forced messaging

    If the user experiences censorship from the operatorAn operator is the entity charged with managing a rollup and progressing its state. A rollup operator can be a centralized sequencer, proposer, prover, challenger, pauser of admin that is able to perform upgrades. with regular L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups.->L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.

    1. Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain

    Other considerations

    EVM compatible smart contracts are supported

    OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM EquivalenceA perfect degree of compatibility; where one system or concept is indistinguishable from another in the domain being compared. In the context of rollups, it generally refers to the proximity to the EVM and to Ethereum architecture. model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. can be deployed on L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups..

    1. Introducing EVM Equivalence

    Permissions

    A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions
    Go to Disco
    Disco UI Banner
    Disco UI BannerExplore in Disco

    Ethereum

    Actors:

    EOA 10xCf82…9de8
    • Can interact with SystemConfig
      • Allowed to commit transactions from the current layer to the host chain
    EOA 20x2d14…97eE
    • Can interact with PermissionedDisputeGame
      • Allowed to post new state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. of the current layer to the host chain
    There are impactful changes to the following permissions, and part of the information might be outdated.
    Conduit Multisig 10x4a49…A746

    A Multisig with 4/11 threshold.

    • Can upgrade with no delay
      • SuperchainConfig
      • OptimismPortal2
      • AnchorStateRegistry
      • L1CrossDomainMessenger
      • SystemConfig
      • L1StandardBridge
      • DisputeGameFactory
      • DelayedWETH
      • L1ERC721Bridge
      • OptimismMintableERC20Factory
    • Can interact with SuperchainConfig
      • Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof systemThe infrastructure that allows projects to verify their state transitions. It is composed by onchain verifiers and offchain provers. The main two flavors are optimistic and ZK proof systems, but they can be combined in a hybrid model. In general though, if a system is able to accept state roots optimistically, even if it has a ZK component, it is considered an optimistic proof system., the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionlessAnyone willing should be able to join and leave the network at any time, without causing significant disturbance to the network or being detrimental to the party in question. No single entity should have the power to allowlist or blocklist participants.)
    • Can interact with SystemConfig
      • it can update the preconfer address, the batch submitter (SequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs.) address and the gasA virtual fuel used to execute smart contracts on a rollup. The EVM (or other VM within the rollup) uses an accounting mechanism to correspond the consumption of gas to the consumption of computing resources, and to limit the consumption of computing resources. configuration of the system
    • Can interact with PermissionedDisputeGame
      • Allowed to challenge or delete state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. proposed by a ProposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block.

    Participants (11):

    0x9402…53F20xcdC9…48530xA9FC…8d090x6BB4…83A60x2103…911c0x8117…E7Ac0xA073…bda20xF331…647D0xa0C6…90380xefCf…dD5C0x4D80…5BAe
    Used in:

    Zircuit

    Actors:

    EOA 30x5b5A…b857
    • Can upgrade with no delay
      • L1Block
      • ProxyAdmin

    Smart contracts

    A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions
    Go to Disco
    Disco UI Banner
    Disco UI BannerExplore in Disco
    Note: Contracts presented in this section had their implementations updated since the last time our team looked at this project. The information presented may be inaccurate.
    A diagram of the smart contract architecture
    A diagram of the smart contract architecture

    Ethereum

    SuperchainConfig0x097f…53cCImplementation (Upgradable)Admin

    This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3mo 1d if left untouched.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
      • guardian: Conduit Multisig 1
    Can be upgraded by:
    Conduit Multisig 1 with no delay
    Proxy used in:
    Implementation used in:
    PreimageOracle0x1fb8…aDD3

    The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. for a dispute game.

    Implementation used in:
    PermissionedDisputeGame0x4F80…6496

    Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block. and challenger.

    • Roles:
      • challenger: Conduit Multisig 1
      • proposer: EOA 2
    ProxyAdmin0x5B1E…5257
    • Roles:
      • owner: Conduit Multisig 1
    MIPS0x6463…B908

    The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.

    Implementation used in:
    DelayedWETH0x798d…9162Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
    Can be upgraded by:
    Conduit Multisig 1 with no delay
    Implementation used in:
    L1ERC20TokenBridge
    Escrow
    0x912C…6C79Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Escrow for custom external tokens that use the canonical bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. for messaging but are governed externally.

    The following tokens are included in the value secured calculation:
    wstETH token logo
    ProxyAdmin0xb489…d0b5
    • Roles:
      • owner: Conduit Multisig 1
    Implementation used in:
    There are impactful changes to the following contracts, and part of the information might be outdated.
    OptimismPortal2
    Escrow
    0x17bf…3fb1Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. to L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups.. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
    The following tokens are included in the value secured calculation:
    ETH token logo
    Can be upgraded by:
    Conduit Multisig 1 with no delay
    Implementation used in:
    SystemConfig0x30F8…28ffImplementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Contains configuration parameters such as the SequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. address, gas limitThe maximum amount of gas a transaction or block may consume. on this chain and the unsafe blockAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over. signer address.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
      • batcherHash: EOA 1
      • owner: Conduit Multisig 1
    Can be upgraded by:
    Conduit Multisig 1 with no delay
    Implementation used in:
    DisputeGameFactory0x6b9e…3e90Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. and eventually challenge them.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
    Can be upgraded by:
    Conduit Multisig 1 with no delay
    Implementation used in:
    L1CrossDomainMessenger0x2a72…A091Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain’s epoch gas limitThe maximum amount of gas a transaction or block may consume., it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
    Can be upgraded by:
    Conduit Multisig 1 with no delay
    Implementation used in:
    L1StandardBridge
    Escrow
    0x386B…6dd8Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1

    All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation.

    Can be upgraded by:
    Conduit Multisig 1 with no delay
    Implementation used in:
    L1ERC721Bridge0x994e…d244Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Used to bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
    Can be upgraded by:
    Conduit Multisig 1 with no delay
    Implementation used in:
    AnchorStateRegistry0x2613…7051Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Contains the latest confirmed state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
    Can be upgraded by:
    Conduit Multisig 1 with no delay
    Implementation used in:
    OptimismMintableERC20Factory0xc77e…E932Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the networkA constellation of nodes (peers) that communicate via a peer-to-peer protocol, for example, in propagating transactions and blocks to other nodes. it’s deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain’s representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
    Can be upgraded by:
    Conduit Multisig 1 with no delay
    Implementation used in:

    Zircuit

    There are impactful changes to the following contracts, and part of the information might be outdated.
    L1Block0x4200…0015Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Simple contract that returns information about the latest L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. blockAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over., which is derived permissionlessly from the L1 chain.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately EOA 3
    Can be upgraded by:
    EOA 3 with no delay
    ProxyAdmin0x4200…0018Implementation (Upgradable)Admin
    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately EOA 3
      • owner: EOA 3
    Can be upgraded by:
    EOA 3 with no delay

    The current deployment carries some associated risks:

    • Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).