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SummaryValue SecuredActivityOnchain costsData postedLivenessMilestones & IncidentsRisk summaryRisk analysisStageData availabilityUpgrades & GovernanceUpdatesOperatorWithdrawalsOther considerationsPermissionsSmart contracts

Zircuit logo
Zircuit

There are impactful changes and part of the information might be outdated.

Critical contracts can be upgraded by an EOA which could result in the loss of all funds.

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About

Zircuit is a universal rollup. It is based on the Optimism Bedrock architecture, employing AI to identify and stop malicious transactions at the sequencer level.

  • Total Value SecuredTVS
    $9.15 M3.45%
  • Past day UOPSDaily UOPS
    0.530.93%
  • Gas token
    ETH
  • Type
    Other
  • Purpose
    Universal
  • Chain ID
    48900

    • Tokens breakdown

    Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure
    Explore more in Discovery UI

    Badges

    About

    Zircuit is a universal rollup. It is based on the Optimism Bedrock architecture, employing AI to identify and stop malicious transactions at the sequencer level.

    Why is the project listed in others?

    There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges

    Consequence: projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds.

    Learn more about the recategorisation here.

    Value SecuredView TVS breakdown
    Total
    Canonically BridgedCanonically Bridged ValueCanonical
    Natively MintedNatively Minted TokensNative
    Externally BridgedExternally Bridged ValueExternal
    ETH & derivatives
    Stablecoins
    BTC & derivatives
    Other
    View TVS breakdown
    Activity

    2025 Aug 19 — 2026 Aug 19

    Past Day UOPS
    0.530.93%
    Past Day Ops count
    45.53 K
    Max. UOPS
    2.14
    2024 Nov 25
    Past day UOPS/TPS Ratio
    1.00
    Onchain costs

    The section shows the operating costs that L2s pay to Ethereum.

    2025 Aug 19 — 2026 Aug 19

    Total cost
    $8.36 K
    Avg cost per L2 UOP
    $0.000477
    Avg cost per day
    $22.92
    Data posted

    This section shows how much data the project publishes to its data-availability (DA) layer over time. The project currently posts data to; previously it posted toEthereumEthereum.

    2025 Aug 19 — 2026 Aug 19

    Data posted
    4.51 GiB
    Avg size per day
    12.64 MiB
    Avg size per L2 UOP
    275.68 B
    Liveness

    This section shows how "live" the project's operators are by displaying how frequently they submit transactions of the selected type. It also highlights anomalies - significant deviations from their typical schedule.

    No ongoing anomalies detected

    2026 Jul 20 — Aug 19

    Avg. tx data subs. interval
    31 minutes
    Avg. proof subs. interval
    1 hour
    Avg. state updates interval
    1 hour
    Past 30 days anomalies
    93% normal uptime

    Last 30 day anomalies

    All liveness anomalies detected for this project in the last 30 days, helping you review recent downtime and availability issues.

    No State updates were performed for 12h (from 2026 Aug 06, 03:15 UTC until 2026 Aug 06, 15:15 UTC). These typically occur every 27m 14s on average.

    No Proof submissions were performed for 12h (from 2026 Aug 06, 03:15 UTC until 2026 Aug 06, 15:15 UTC). These typically occur every 1h 16m on average.

    No State updates were performed for 12h (from 2026 Aug 05, 15:15 UTC until 2026 Aug 06, 03:15 UTC). These typically occur every 27m 14s on average.

    No Proof submissions were performed for 12h (from 2026 Aug 05, 15:15 UTC until 2026 Aug 06, 03:15 UTC). These typically occur every 1h 16m on average.

    No State updates were performed for 12h (from 2026 Aug 05, 03:14 UTC until 2026 Aug 05, 15:15 UTC). These typically occur every 27m 14s on average.

    Milestones & Incidents

    Migrated to Conduit fault proofs

    2026 Aug 4th

    Zircuit migrates to a standard OP Stack PermissionedDisputeGame deployment via Conduit.

    Learn more

    Proof system migrated to SP1

    2025 Aug 25th

    Zircuit deprecates its in-house proof system in favor of SP1.

    Learn more
    Risk summary

    Funds can be stolen if

    1. a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL),
    2. the source code of unverified contracts contains malicious code (CRITICAL).

    Users can be censored if

    1. the operator explicitly censors their forced transaction, possible through a modification in the smart contracts.

    MEV can be extracted if

    1. the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
    Risk analysis
    Critical contracts can be upgraded by an EOA which could result in the loss of all funds.
    Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure
    Sequencer failure
    No mechanism

    There is no mechanism to have transactions be included if the sequencer is down or censoring. The L2 code has been modified to allow the sequencer to explicitly censor selected L1->L2 transactions.

    State validation
    Fraud proofs (INT)

    Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. Only one entity is currently allowed to propose and submit challenges, as only permissioned games are currently allowed.

    Data availability
    Onchain

    All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.

    Exit window
    None

    There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.

    Proposer failure
    Cannot withdraw

    Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.

    Stage
    Zircuit
    Zircuit is not even a
    Stage 0
    project.
    Learn more about Stages
    Please keep in mind that these stages do not reflect project security, this is an opinionated assessment of project maturity based on subjective criteria, created with a goal of incentivizing projects to push toward better decentralization. Each team may have taken different paths to achieve this goal.
    Data availability

    All data required for proofs is published on chain

    All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.

    1. Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs
    2. BatchInbox - address
    3. OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function
    Learn more about the DA layer here: Ethereum logoEthereum
    Upgrades & Governance

    Past upgrades

    The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.

    Count of upgrades
    76
    Last upgrade
    14d 23h ago
    Avg upgrade interval
    2mo 5d
    Updates
    2026 August 12, 10:29 UTC
    High severity
    249changes

    HIGH SEVERITY. Full migration off Zircuit's custom OP-stack fork onto a standard OP-stack fault-proof deployment, via 6 batched upgrade txs 2026-08-04 13:31-14:16 UTC. Matches Zircuit's public Conduit RaaS migration announced 2026-07-02. Checked $pastUpgrades for a bounce/rollback pattern: none found, intermediate hops are Optimism's shared StorageSetter contract used transiently within each batch tx. Admin control moved from Zircuit's own two multisigs (both deleted) to Conduit's shared multisig (4-of-10): zero signer overlap with the old multisigs, and already admin on ~25 other Conduit-hosted L2Beat projects. Now owner of SystemConfig, guardian of OptimismPortal2, owner of ProxyAdmin. superchainConfig now points to Conduit's shared SuperchainConfigFake expiry (used by 11 other tracked projects). Old escape hatch removed entirely: L2OutputOracle, ResolverRegistry, local SuperchainConfig fork, and both SP1 verifiers are gone (permissionless exit via merkle proof/resolver after 1mo of no state updates no longer exists). Replaced by standard fault-proof stack: DisputeGameFactory, PermissionedDisputeGame (proposer+challenger permissioned, not yet open), AnchorStateRegistry, MIPS, PreimageOracle, DelayedWETH. proofMaturityDelaySeconds 604800 (7d), disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds 302400 (3.5d). Version jumps: OptimismPortal2 2.2.0 - 5.1.1, SystemConfig 1.12.0 - 3.11.0, L1CrossDomainMessenger 2.4.0 - 2.11.0, L1StandardBridge 2.3.0 - 2.8.0, L1ERC721Bridge 2.2.0 - 2.9.0. L1Block predeploy on L2 shows unverified: Zircuit's block explorer switched from Blockscout to Conduit's native explorer (explorer.zircuit.com). Confirmed via Conduit's own contract-verification API that this predeploy has no source match there yet - a real gap on the new explorer, not an L2Beat-side flake. Diff (OptimismPortal2): https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xF7209f5471628aC5f68FE4ae98Feb7f02E0f40Be/eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202 Diff (SystemConfig): https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xaFD10586f3F2cB2aD34E8196563424a3a93EbE9F/eth:0x2fA28989fc559836E9d66dFf3010C7F7f41c65ED

    HIGH SEVERITY. Full migration off Zircuit’s custom OP-stack fork onto a standard OP-stack fault-proof deployment, via 6 batched upgrade txs 2026-08-04 13:31-14:16 UTC. Matches Zircuit’s public Conduit RaaS migration announced 2026-07-02. Checked $pastUpgrades for a bounce/rollback pattern: none found, intermediate hops are Optimism’s shared StorageSetter contract used transiently within each batch tx.

    Admin control moved from Zircuit’s own two multisigs (both deleted) to Conduit’s shared multisig (4-of-10): zero signer overlap with the old multisigs, and already admin on ~25 other Conduit-hosted L2Beat projects. Now owner of SystemConfig, guardian of OptimismPortal2, owner of ProxyAdmin. superchainConfig now points to Conduit’s shared SuperchainConfigFake_expiry (used by 11 other tracked projects).

    Old escape hatch removed entirely: L2OutputOracle, ResolverRegistry, local SuperchainConfig fork, and both SP1 verifiers are gone (permissionless exit via merkle proof/resolver after 1mo of no state updates no longer exists). Replaced by standard fault-proof stack: DisputeGameFactory, PermissionedDisputeGame (proposer+challenger permissioned, not yet open), AnchorStateRegistry, MIPS, PreimageOracle, DelayedWETH. proofMaturityDelaySeconds 604800 (7d), disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds 302400 (3.5d).

    Version jumps: OptimismPortal2 2.2.0 -> 5.1.1, SystemConfig 1.12.0 -> 3.11.0, L1CrossDomainMessenger 2.4.0 -> 2.11.0, L1StandardBridge 2.3.0 -> 2.8.0, L1ERC721Bridge 2.2.0 -> 2.9.0.

    L1Block predeploy on L2 shows unverified: Zircuit’s block explorer switched from Blockscout to Conduit’s native explorer (explorer.zircuit.com). Confirmed via Conduit’s own contract-verification API that this predeploy has no source match there yet - a real gap on the new explorer, not an L2Beat-side flake.

    Diff (OptimismPortal2): https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xF7209f5471628aC5f68FE4ae98Feb7f02E0f40Be/eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202 Diff (SystemConfig): https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xaFD10586f3F2cB2aD34E8196563424a3a93EbE9F/eth:0x2fA28989fc559836E9d66dFf3010C7F7f41c65ED

    - Status: DELETED
    contract SP1Verifier (eth:0x0459d576A6223fEeA177Fb3DF53C9c77BF84C459) [succinct/SP1Verifier]
    +++ description: Verifier contract for SP1 proofs (v5.0.0).
    contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0x17bfAfA932d2e23Bd9B909Fd5B4D2e2a27043fb1) [opstack/OptimismPortal2] {
    +++ description: The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame.
    name:
    - "OptimismPortal"
    + "OptimismPortal2"
    template:
    - "opstack/zircuit/OptimismPortal"
    + "opstack/OptimismPortal2"
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x75b3a40d24df23769d05a5f3bb0461a19038ca999e7d7a3bb9e1ea2579b405d6"
    + "0x3e7e2cb08ba995795937c9c2e8ea9d0e4d2e2de852f389055073384d5f79c59d"
    description:
    - "The main entry point to deposit funds from the host chain to this chain. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. This fork of the standard OP stack contract allows for permissionless 'escaping' of assets with merkle proofs or a resolver if there were no state updates for a time defined by the eth:0x92Ef6Af472b39F1b363da45E35530c24619245A4."
    + "The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame."
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0xF7209f5471628aC5f68FE4ae98Feb7f02E0f40Be"
    + "eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202"
    values.$pastUpgrades.8:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:31:59.000Z","0xe697fe2a042f60a3fb3f835e122e209bab529a36fe66bfc77af79dbb1bebdfa4",["eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.9:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:31:59.000Z","0xe697fe2a042f60a3fb3f835e122e209bab529a36fe66bfc77af79dbb1bebdfa4",["eth:0x2D778797049FE9259d947D1ED8e5442226dFB589"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.10:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:48:35.000Z","0x3fb4739c3ce4edcab46b84c2438e7d1f86b85e7e57970a7eaf6b6de11dda6080",["eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.11:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:48:35.000Z","0x3fb4739c3ce4edcab46b84c2438e7d1f86b85e7e57970a7eaf6b6de11dda6080",["eth:0xe2F826324b2faf99E513D16D266c3F80aE87832B"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.12:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:59:35.000Z","0xfb6124f237aaaccedd1f8d1298ae5f3b19871f7af18bd4c791a818487cc199de",["eth:0x2D7e764a0D9919e16983a46595CfA81fc34fa7Cd"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.13:
    + ["2026-08-04T14:04:47.000Z","0xf7628d3121b7e3f4dcd11e06791a07e8ffa71753962baadc04c62944d412a006",["eth:0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.14:
    + ["2026-08-04T14:11:35.000Z","0xf7dd2207111f0f269b7cdfa8a7fa703b664585513bc113e0d2c8bc7ce9eb355f",["eth:0x381E729FF983FA4BCEd820e7b922d79bF653B999"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.15:
    + ["2026-08-04T14:16:11.000Z","0xeb6b35d861c5b232c47bc0e604f0834975876f80181776e46cb486f7a398cf03",["eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 8
    + 16
    values.guardian:
    - "eth:0x2c0B27F7C8F083B539557a0bA787041BF22DB276"
    + "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746"
    values.l2Oracle:
    - "eth:0x92Ef6Af472b39F1b363da45E35530c24619245A4"
    values.resolverRegistry:
    - "eth:0x6c89104690452AD7e209f0ab72287C2561d5cF0E"
    values.superchainConfig:
    - "eth:0x745393Cc03b5fE668ECd52c0E625f59aAD6D3Da0"
    + "eth:0x097f99768A0a4a0A81bAbbCB1ea18193bA9D53cC"
    values.version:
    - "2.2.0"
    + "5.1.1"
    values.anchorStateRegistry:
    + "eth:0x2613d77fFBE105CA861D526061dC3ef191E17051"
    values.disputeGameFactory:
    + "eth:0x6b9e81504e961a9CDf81A06e916720fb4c273e90"
    values.disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds:
    + 302400
    values.ethLockbox:
    + "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
    values.initVersion:
    + 3
    values.proofMaturityDelaySeconds:
    + 604800
    values.proxyAdmin:
    + "eth:0x5B1Ef673d9c316b3eE9Ed3B4E3cC84952bfC5257"
    values.proxyAdminOwner:
    + "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746"
    values.RespectedGameString:
    + "PermissionedDisputeGame"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.respectedGameType:
    + 1
    values.respectedGameTypeUpdatedAt:
    + 1785852695
    implementationNames.eth:0xF7209f5471628aC5f68FE4ae98Feb7f02E0f40Be:
    - "OptimismPortal"
    implementationNames.eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202:
    + "OptimismPortal2"
    fieldMeta:
    + {"respectedGameType":{"severity":"HIGH"},"paused":{"severity":"HIGH","description":"Whether the contract is paused or not. Determined by the SuperchainConfig contract PAUSED_SLOT. Here it pauses withdrawals. If this is paused, also the L1CrossDomainMessenger and ERC-20, ERC-721 deposits are paused."}}
    usedTypes:
    + [{"typeCaster":"Mapping","arg":{"0":"FaultDisputeGame","1":"PermissionedDisputeGame","8":"FaultDisputeGame","621":"AggregateVerifier","1337":"KailuaGame"}}]
    }
    contract L1CrossDomainMessenger (eth:0x2a721cBE81a128be0F01040e3353c3805A5EA091) [opstack/L1CrossDomainMessenger] {
    +++ description: Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0xe784f0244cc07b370089b601090cc4c3c7469c9fdd2a281bfa13b438c1b88e0d"
    + "0x1f2c13ad1144ce6548e578b834c33b0d65b1564aeb0d5c708ed4e7fb50535cc6"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0xA5B66A9FBCE3d57dA2b3Bd764d0a05B95052f73F"
    + "eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0"
    values.$pastUpgrades.2:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:31:59.000Z","0xe697fe2a042f60a3fb3f835e122e209bab529a36fe66bfc77af79dbb1bebdfa4",["eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.3:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:31:59.000Z","0xe697fe2a042f60a3fb3f835e122e209bab529a36fe66bfc77af79dbb1bebdfa4",["eth:0xD3494713A5cfaD3F5359379DfA074E2Ac8C6Fd65"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.4:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:40:47.000Z","0x2b72943b3cf73e5f4dade0cc6edd2f78bc2cb3f518df2872cf6fd69aea924cc0",["eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.5:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:40:47.000Z","0x2b72943b3cf73e5f4dade0cc6edd2f78bc2cb3f518df2872cf6fd69aea924cc0",["eth:0xD3494713A5cfaD3F5359379DfA074E2Ac8C6Fd65"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.6:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:59:35.000Z","0xfb6124f237aaaccedd1f8d1298ae5f3b19871f7af18bd4c791a818487cc199de",["eth:0x3eA6084748ED1b2A9B5D4426181F1ad8C93F6231"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.7:
    + ["2026-08-04T14:04:47.000Z","0xf7628d3121b7e3f4dcd11e06791a07e8ffa71753962baadc04c62944d412a006",["eth:0x5D5a095665886119693F0B41d8DFeE78da033e8B"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.8:
    + ["2026-08-04T14:11:35.000Z","0xf7dd2207111f0f269b7cdfa8a7fa703b664585513bc113e0d2c8bc7ce9eb355f",["eth:0x22D12E0FAebD62d429514A65EBAe32dd316c12D6"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.9:
    + ["2026-08-04T14:16:11.000Z","0xeb6b35d861c5b232c47bc0e604f0834975876f80181776e46cb486f7a398cf03",["eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 2
    + 10
    values.superchainConfig:
    - "eth:0x745393Cc03b5fE668ECd52c0E625f59aAD6D3Da0"
    + "eth:0x097f99768A0a4a0A81bAbbCB1ea18193bA9D53cC"
    values.version:
    - "2.4.0"
    + "2.11.0"
    values.initVersion:
    + 3
    values.proxyAdmin:
    + "eth:0x5B1Ef673d9c316b3eE9Ed3B4E3cC84952bfC5257"
    values.proxyAdminOwner:
    + "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746"
    values.systemConfig:
    + "eth:0x30F82a1Ca89226E8b8815d6EbB728e3b18a428ff"
    implementationNames.eth:0xA5B66A9FBCE3d57dA2b3Bd764d0a05B95052f73F:
    - "L1CrossDomainMessenger"
    implementationNames.eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0:
    + "L1CrossDomainMessenger"
    }
    - Status: DELETED
    contract Zircuit Multisig 2 (eth:0x2c0B27F7C8F083B539557a0bA787041BF22DB276) [GnosisSafe]
    +++ description: None
    contract SystemConfig (eth:0x30F82a1Ca89226E8b8815d6EbB728e3b18a428ff) [opstack/SystemConfig] {
    +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x3773dd699ed2a94c92b617c9e76c0191f58b9de68e2605999d076e287869e165"
    + "0xaa1b3bedab4e63198240e9dea4503f0e615e4d18a545961c9f11b72143279fbc"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0xaFD10586f3F2cB2aD34E8196563424a3a93EbE9F"
    + "eth:0x2fA28989fc559836E9d66dFf3010C7F7f41c65ED"
    values.$pastUpgrades.4:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:31:59.000Z","0xe697fe2a042f60a3fb3f835e122e209bab529a36fe66bfc77af79dbb1bebdfa4",["eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.5:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:31:59.000Z","0xe697fe2a042f60a3fb3f835e122e209bab529a36fe66bfc77af79dbb1bebdfa4",["eth:0xba2492e52F45651B60B8B38d4Ea5E2390C64Ffb1"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.6:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:40:47.000Z","0x2b72943b3cf73e5f4dade0cc6edd2f78bc2cb3f518df2872cf6fd69aea924cc0",["eth:0xAB9d6cB7A427c0765163A7f45BB91cAfe5f2D375"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.7:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:48:35.000Z","0x3fb4739c3ce4edcab46b84c2438e7d1f86b85e7e57970a7eaf6b6de11dda6080",["eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.8:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:48:35.000Z","0x3fb4739c3ce4edcab46b84c2438e7d1f86b85e7e57970a7eaf6b6de11dda6080",["eth:0xAB9d6cB7A427c0765163A7f45BB91cAfe5f2D375"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.9:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:59:35.000Z","0xfb6124f237aaaccedd1f8d1298ae5f3b19871f7af18bd4c791a818487cc199de",["eth:0x760C48C62A85045A6B69f07F4a9f22868659CbCc"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.10:
    + ["2026-08-04T14:04:47.000Z","0xf7628d3121b7e3f4dcd11e06791a07e8ffa71753962baadc04c62944d412a006",["eth:0x340f923E5c7cbB2171146f64169EC9d5a9FfE647"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.11:
    + ["2026-08-04T14:11:35.000Z","0xf7dd2207111f0f269b7cdfa8a7fa703b664585513bc113e0d2c8bc7ce9eb355f",["eth:0x2bFE4A5Bd5A41e9d848d843ebCDFa15954e9A557"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.12:
    + ["2026-08-04T14:16:11.000Z","0xeb6b35d861c5b232c47bc0e604f0834975876f80181776e46cb486f7a398cf03",["eth:0x2fA28989fc559836E9d66dFf3010C7F7f41c65ED"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 4
    + 13
    values.basefeeScalar:
    - 1368
    + 7600
    values.batcherHash:
    - "eth:0xAF1E4f6a47af647F87C0Ec814d8032C4a4bFF145"
    + "eth:0xCf8225801DF6Ef90aD3bc86808F574403A309de8"
    values.blobbasefeeScalar:
    - 810949
    + 862000
    +++ description: volatility param: lower denominator -> quicker fee changes on L2
    values.eip1559Denominator:
    - 0
    + 50
    values.eip1559Elasticity:
    - 0
    + 6
    values.L2_OUTPUT_ORACLE_SLOT:
    - "0xe52a667f71ec761b9b381c7b76ca9b852adf7e8905da0e0ad49986a0a6871815"
    values.l2OutputOracle:
    - "eth:0x92Ef6Af472b39F1b363da45E35530c24619245A4"
    values.minimumGasLimit:
    - 7000000
    + 21000000
    values.operatorFeeConstant:
    - 360000000000
    + 0
    values.operatorFeeScalar:
    - 4200000000
    + 0
    values.OSAKA_TX_MAX_GAS:
    - 16777216
    values.owner:
    - "eth:0xC463EaC02572CC964D43D2414023E2c6B62bAF38"
    + "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746"
    values.resourceConfig.maxResourceLimit:
    - 6000000
    + 20000000
    values.resourceConfig._spacer:
    - 8
    values.unsafeBlockSigner:
    - "eth:0xAE8f771E297AAbfDE7ff35a33FB6D558f4E0a679"
    + "eth:0x0037e8264020bF2B3e6f57B529e07347f76F2D55"
    values.version:
    - "1.12.0"
    + "3.11.0"
    values.daFootprintGasScalar:
    + 0
    values.disputeGameFactory:
    + "eth:0x6b9e81504e961a9CDf81A06e916720fb4c273e90"
    values.getAddresses:
    + {"l1CrossDomainMessenger":"eth:0x2a721cBE81a128be0F01040e3353c3805A5EA091","l1ERC721Bridge":"eth:0x994eEb321F9cD79B077a5455fC248c77f30Dd244","l1StandardBridge":"eth:0x386B76D9cA5F5Fb150B6BFB35CF5379B22B26dd8","optimismPortal":"eth:0x17bfAfA932d2e23Bd9B909Fd5B4D2e2a27043fb1","optimismMintableERC20Factory":"eth:0xc77ece87C91C44AFb5f19638f9a0F75b5d90E932"}
    values.guardian:
    + "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746"
    values.initVersion:
    + 3
    values.l2ChainId:
    + 48900
    values.maximumGasLimit:
    + 500000000
    values.minBaseFee:
    + 0
    values.paused:
    + false
    values.proxyAdmin:
    + "eth:0x5B1Ef673d9c316b3eE9Ed3B4E3cC84952bfC5257"
    values.proxyAdminOwner:
    + "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746"
    values.superchainConfig:
    + "eth:0x097f99768A0a4a0A81bAbbCB1ea18193bA9D53cC"
    implementationNames.eth:0xaFD10586f3F2cB2aD34E8196563424a3a93EbE9F:
    - "SystemConfig"
    implementationNames.eth:0x2fA28989fc559836E9d66dFf3010C7F7f41c65ED:
    + "SystemConfig"
    }
    contract L1StandardBridge (eth:0x386B76D9cA5F5Fb150B6BFB35CF5379B22B26dd8) [opstack/L1StandardBridge] {
    +++ description: The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.
    template:
    - "opstack/zircuit/L1StandardBridge"
    + "opstack/L1StandardBridge"
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x2324f7b9f352cb131178a3853eb2383e5c82923461c55e76d14c23fd231664f9"
    + "0xcacd38e7b52353ad3463da40b7e7a29b028f95500a82590d2b8f8ffd26b83f6d"
    description:
    - "The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from the host chain to this chain. This fork of the standard OP stack contract allows for permissionless 'escaping' of assets with merkle proofs or a resolver if there were no state updates for a configurable time."
    + "The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain."
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0x25DF2d6DDCa09C0f9Fce19373896be075F4f7d98"
    + "eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A"
    values.$pastUpgrades.8:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:31:59.000Z","0xe697fe2a042f60a3fb3f835e122e209bab529a36fe66bfc77af79dbb1bebdfa4",["eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.9:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:31:59.000Z","0xe697fe2a042f60a3fb3f835e122e209bab529a36fe66bfc77af79dbb1bebdfa4",["eth:0x64B5a5Ed26DCb17370Ff4d33a8D503f0fbD06CfF"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.10:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:40:47.000Z","0x2b72943b3cf73e5f4dade0cc6edd2f78bc2cb3f518df2872cf6fd69aea924cc0",["eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.11:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:40:47.000Z","0x2b72943b3cf73e5f4dade0cc6edd2f78bc2cb3f518df2872cf6fd69aea924cc0",["eth:0x64B5a5Ed26DCb17370Ff4d33a8D503f0fbD06CfF"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.12:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:59:35.000Z","0xfb6124f237aaaccedd1f8d1298ae5f3b19871f7af18bd4c791a818487cc199de",["eth:0x78972E88Ab8BBB517a36cAea23b931BAB58AD3c6"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.13:
    + ["2026-08-04T14:04:47.000Z","0xf7628d3121b7e3f4dcd11e06791a07e8ffa71753962baadc04c62944d412a006",["eth:0x0b09ba359A106C9ea3b181CBc5F394570c7d2a7A"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.14:
    + ["2026-08-04T14:11:35.000Z","0xf7dd2207111f0f269b7cdfa8a7fa703b664585513bc113e0d2c8bc7ce9eb355f",["eth:0xe32B192fb1DcA88fCB1C56B3ACb429e32238aDCb"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.15:
    + ["2026-08-04T14:16:11.000Z","0xeb6b35d861c5b232c47bc0e604f0834975876f80181776e46cb486f7a398cf03",["eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 8
    + 16
    values.accessController:
    - "eth:0x745393Cc03b5fE668ECd52c0E625f59aAD6D3Da0"
    values.superchainConfig:
    - "eth:0x745393Cc03b5fE668ECd52c0E625f59aAD6D3Da0"
    + "eth:0x097f99768A0a4a0A81bAbbCB1ea18193bA9D53cC"
    values.version:
    - "2.3.0"
    + "2.8.0"
    values.initVersion:
    + 3
    values.l2TokenBridge:
    + "eth:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000010"
    values.proxyAdmin:
    + "eth:0x5B1Ef673d9c316b3eE9Ed3B4E3cC84952bfC5257"
    values.proxyAdminOwner:
    + "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746"
    values.systemConfig:
    + "eth:0x30F82a1Ca89226E8b8815d6EbB728e3b18a428ff"
    implementationNames.eth:0x25DF2d6DDCa09C0f9Fce19373896be075F4f7d98:
    - "L1StandardBridge"
    implementationNames.eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A:
    + "L1StandardBridge"
    }
    - Status: DELETED
    contract SP1Verifier (eth:0x50ACFBEdecf4cbe350E1a86fC6f03a821772f1e5) [succinct/SP1Verifier]
    +++ description: Verifier contract for SP1 proofs (v5.0.0).
    contract ProxyAdmin (eth:0x5B1Ef673d9c316b3eE9Ed3B4E3cC84952bfC5257) [global/ProxyAdmin] {
    +++ description: None
    values.owner:
    - "eth:0xC463EaC02572CC964D43D2414023E2c6B62bAF38"
    + "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746"
    directlyReceivedPermissions.1:
    + {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x2613d77fFBE105CA861D526061dC3ef191E17051","role":"admin"}
    directlyReceivedPermissions.4:
    - {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x6c89104690452AD7e209f0ab72287C2561d5cF0E","role":"admin"}
    directlyReceivedPermissions.5.from:
    - "eth:0x745393Cc03b5fE668ECd52c0E625f59aAD6D3Da0"
    + "eth:0x6b9e81504e961a9CDf81A06e916720fb4c273e90"
    directlyReceivedPermissions.6.from:
    - "eth:0x92Ef6Af472b39F1b363da45E35530c24619245A4"
    + "eth:0x798d82222eC87C6B76aeF659A490e1ab9f7f9162"
    }
    - Status: DELETED
    contract ResolverRegistry (eth:0x6c89104690452AD7e209f0ab72287C2561d5cF0E) [opstack/zircuit/ResolverRegistry]
    +++ description: Registers 'resolvers' which are allowed to supply authoritative data for blockchain balances to support escapes without merkle proofs from e.g. DeFi smart contracts on L2. A resolver can either be registered directly by the respective contract on L2 or by its deployer from L1, using deterministic deployment derivation.
    - Status: DELETED
    contract ZircuitSuperchainConfig (eth:0x745393Cc03b5fE668ECd52c0E625f59aAD6D3Da0) [opstack/zircuit/SuperchainConfig]
    +++ description: This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages the `PAUSED_SLOT`, a boolean value indicating whether the local chain is paused, and access control for configuring actors who can pause and unpause the system.
    - Status: DELETED
    contract L2OutputOracle (eth:0x92Ef6Af472b39F1b363da45E35530c24619245A4) [opstack/zircuit/L2OutputOracle_SP1_nokeepalive]
    +++ description: Entrypoint for permissioned proposers to propose new L2 outputs (state roots). New proposals have to be accompanied by a zk-SNARK proof of a correct state transition. Users can 'escape' their funds after 1mo of no state updates by supplying merkle proofs or using a resolver.
    contract L1ERC721Bridge (eth:0x994eEb321F9cD79B077a5455fC248c77f30Dd244) [opstack/L1ERC721Bridge] {
    +++ description: Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0xeebc391f228960e573a84b61884f39e3f4d64ad3a105cb7974f641c4a737954e"
    + "0x1f65fda230b6d0df44e466b06418b2e12a401ef82c07521ad18d2f4ae6c70fb2"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0xDF129ECFc63Af454F62b69d03C0f0E21e69bcDAb"
    + "eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9"
    values.$pastUpgrades.2:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:31:59.000Z","0xe697fe2a042f60a3fb3f835e122e209bab529a36fe66bfc77af79dbb1bebdfa4",["eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.3:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:31:59.000Z","0xe697fe2a042f60a3fb3f835e122e209bab529a36fe66bfc77af79dbb1bebdfa4",["eth:0xAE2AF01232a6c4a4d3012C5eC5b1b35059caF10d"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.4:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:40:47.000Z","0x2b72943b3cf73e5f4dade0cc6edd2f78bc2cb3f518df2872cf6fd69aea924cc0",["eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.5:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:40:47.000Z","0x2b72943b3cf73e5f4dade0cc6edd2f78bc2cb3f518df2872cf6fd69aea924cc0",["eth:0xAE2AF01232a6c4a4d3012C5eC5b1b35059caF10d"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.6:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:59:35.000Z","0xfb6124f237aaaccedd1f8d1298ae5f3b19871f7af18bd4c791a818487cc199de",["eth:0x276d3730f219f7ec22274f7263180b8452B46d47"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.7:
    + ["2026-08-04T14:04:47.000Z","0xf7628d3121b7e3f4dcd11e06791a07e8ffa71753962baadc04c62944d412a006",["eth:0x7aE1d3BD877a4C5CA257404ce26BE93A02C98013"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.8:
    + ["2026-08-04T14:11:35.000Z","0xf7dd2207111f0f269b7cdfa8a7fa703b664585513bc113e0d2c8bc7ce9eb355f",["eth:0x7f1d12fB2911EB095278085f721e644C1f675696"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.9:
    + ["2026-08-04T14:16:11.000Z","0xeb6b35d861c5b232c47bc0e604f0834975876f80181776e46cb486f7a398cf03",["eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 2
    + 10
    values.superchainConfig:
    - "eth:0x745393Cc03b5fE668ECd52c0E625f59aAD6D3Da0"
    + "eth:0x097f99768A0a4a0A81bAbbCB1ea18193bA9D53cC"
    values.version:
    - "2.2.0"
    + "2.9.0"
    values.initVersion:
    + 3
    values.proxyAdmin:
    + "eth:0x5B1Ef673d9c316b3eE9Ed3B4E3cC84952bfC5257"
    values.proxyAdminOwner:
    + "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746"
    values.systemConfig:
    + "eth:0x30F82a1Ca89226E8b8815d6EbB728e3b18a428ff"
    implementationNames.eth:0xDF129ECFc63Af454F62b69d03C0f0E21e69bcDAb:
    - "L1ERC721Bridge"
    implementationNames.eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9:
    + "L1ERC721Bridge"
    }
    - Status: DELETED
    contract SP1MockVerifierWithHash (eth:0xb4bd9A37998576C2FfD863b6dc9E0124021B8739) [N/A]
    +++ description: None
    - Status: DELETED
    contract Zircuit Multisig 1 (eth:0xC463EaC02572CC964D43D2414023E2c6B62bAF38) [GnosisSafe]
    +++ description: None
    contract OptimismMintableERC20Factory (eth:0xc77ece87C91C44AFb5f19638f9a0F75b5d90E932) [opstack/OptimismMintableERC20Factory] {
    +++ description: A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it's deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain's representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x8fa0103a7f0708fce3badff106e2d615501b3405658422802ee59b7d9f9e5472"
    + "0x307d4cb83e682629880fe9bb874a188805e3b93cb11a2cbf80095975f1e5b04e"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0xf885DA6A3B4c93905b02f36f9a13680922A554b0"
    + "eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB"
    values.$pastUpgrades.1:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:31:59.000Z","0xe697fe2a042f60a3fb3f835e122e209bab529a36fe66bfc77af79dbb1bebdfa4",["eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.2:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:31:59.000Z","0xe697fe2a042f60a3fb3f835e122e209bab529a36fe66bfc77af79dbb1bebdfa4",["eth:0xE01efbeb1089D1d1dB9c6c8b135C934C0734c846"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.3:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:40:47.000Z","0x2b72943b3cf73e5f4dade0cc6edd2f78bc2cb3f518df2872cf6fd69aea924cc0",["eth:0xE01efbeb1089D1d1dB9c6c8b135C934C0734c846"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.4:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:59:35.000Z","0xfb6124f237aaaccedd1f8d1298ae5f3b19871f7af18bd4c791a818487cc199de",["eth:0x5493f4677A186f64805fe7317D6993ba4863988F"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.5:
    + ["2026-08-04T14:16:11.000Z","0xeb6b35d861c5b232c47bc0e604f0834975876f80181776e46cb486f7a398cf03",["eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 1
    + 6
    values.version:
    - "1.9.0"
    + "1.10.2"
    implementationNames.eth:0xf885DA6A3B4c93905b02f36f9a13680922A554b0:
    - "OptimismMintableERC20Factory"
    implementationNames.eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB:
    + "OptimismMintableERC20Factory"
    }
    - Status: DELETED
    contract SP1VerifierGateway (eth:0xf35A4088eA0231C44B9DB52D25c0E9E2fEe31f67) [succinct/SP1VerifierGateway]
    +++ description: This contract is the router for zk proof verification. It stores the mapping between identifiers and the address of onchain verifier contracts, routing each identifier to the corresponding verifier contract.
    contract L1Block (zircuit:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000015) [N/A] {
    +++ description: None
    template:
    - "opstack/Layer2/L1Block_depositExclusions"
    sourceHashes:
    - ["0x58e0fa3818df29fbb7de4e09a8c62f8952335a4ac32e30256ae72fd9681d7b50","0xbb69c5830d6e822e4bf9c51ad08b5ade53450cf808a5cabc8665f40e5c6d7c1a"]
    description:
    - "Simple contract that returns information about the latest L1 block, which is derived permissionlessly from the L1 chain. This version though also contains a storage slot for `depositExclusions`."
    values.$implementation:
    - "zircuit:0xFf256497D61dcd71a9e9Ff43967C13fdE1F72D12"
    + "zircuit:0xe95F7EdfB4cbf87eD14d94913448d89282513d66"
    values.$pastUpgrades.1:
    + ["2026-08-04T14:50:01.000Z","0xd89e381f4e17d7226144ae90c4efef010f4f085afb76b191add65dcf51aef089",["zircuit:0xe95F7EdfB4cbf87eD14d94913448d89282513d66"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 1
    + 2
    values.basefee:
    - 129016686
    values.baseFeeScalar:
    - 1368
    values.batcherHash:
    - "0x000000000000000000000000af1e4f6a47af647f87c0ec814d8032c4a4bff145"
    values.blobBaseFee:
    - 6234620
    values.blobBaseFeeScalar:
    - 810949
    values.depositExclusions:
    - "0x"
    values.DEPOSITOR_ACCOUNT:
    - "zircuit:0xDeaDDEaDDeAdDeAdDEAdDEaddeAddEAdDEAd0001"
    values.hash:
    - "0x1cfd2189d2e946c9d3da809f0e22666602b7d2b84dcf08793f293371c9ad5f6a"
    values.l1FeeOverhead:
    - 0
    values.l1FeeScalar:
    - 0
    values.number:
    - 25645265
    values.operatorFeeConstant:
    - 360000000000
    values.operatorFeeScalar:
    - 4200000000
    values.sequenceNumber:
    - 5
    values.timestamp:
    - 1785409595
    values.version:
    - "1.3.0"
    implementationNames.zircuit:0xFf256497D61dcd71a9e9Ff43967C13fdE1F72D12:
    - "L1Block"
    implementationNames.zircuit:0xe95F7EdfB4cbf87eD14d94913448d89282513d66:
    + ""
    unverified:
    + true
    }
    contract ProxyAdmin (zircuit:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018) [global/ProxyAdmin] {
    +++ description: None
    values.owner:
    - "zircuit:0xC463EaC02572CC964D43D2414023E2c6B62bAF38"
    + "zircuit:0x5b5A62275DF8c60A80D3a25FAeC5aA7De116b857"
    }
    - Status: DELETED
    contract GnosisSafe (zircuit:0xC463EaC02572CC964D43D2414023E2c6B62bAF38) [GnosisSafe]
    +++ description: None
    + Status: CREATED
    contract SuperchainConfig (eth:0x097f99768A0a4a0A81bAbbCB1ea18193bA9D53cC) [opstack/SuperchainConfigFake_expiry]
    +++ description: This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3mo 1d if left untouched.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract PreimageOracle (eth:0x1fb8cdFc6831fc866Ed9C51aF8817Da5c287aDD3) [opstack/PreimageOracle]
    +++ description: The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract AnchorStateRegistry (eth:0x2613d77fFBE105CA861D526061dC3ef191E17051) [opstack/AnchorStateRegistry_post13]
    +++ description: Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract Conduit Multisig 1 (eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746) [GnosisSafe]
    +++ description: None
    + Status: CREATED
    contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0x4F80B390aF3b49dda96134DA1ac905b05e816496) [opstack/PermissionedDisputeGame]
    +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract MIPS (eth:0x6463dEE3828677F6270d83d45408044fc5eDB908) [opstack/MIPS]
    +++ description: The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0x6b9e81504e961a9CDf81A06e916720fb4c273e90) [opstack/DisputeGameFactory]
    +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract DelayedWETH (eth:0x798d82222eC87C6B76aeF659A490e1ab9f7f9162) [opstack/DelayedWETH]
    +++ description: Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract ProxyAdmin (eth:0xb4899FF43Ae727B1E9CB19AC44660e4A43Fad0b5) [global/ProxyAdmin]
    +++ description: None
    2026 July 30, 11:07 UTC
    2changes

    Zircuit Multisig 2 rotated one signer ( 0x3880...8679 - 0xf5B2...c1ae ); threshold remains 2/5.

    Zircuit Multisig 2 rotated one signer (0x3880...8679 -> 0xf5B2...c1ae); threshold remains 2/5.

    contract Zircuit Multisig 2 (eth:0x2c0B27F7C8F083B539557a0bA787041BF22DB276) [GnosisSafe] {
    +++ description: None
    values.$members.4:
    - "eth:0x38809210f69ed6204E276d2Be6b15cd530698679"
    + "eth:0xf5B2C0bfA18561d5374EAcc5FFfA3E39B049c1ae"
    }
    2026 June 02, 11:15 UTC
    8changes

    Zircuit Multisig 1 rotated two signers ( $members[0] and $members[5] ).

    Zircuit Multisig 1 rotated two signers ($members[0] and $members[5]).

    contract Zircuit Multisig 1 (eth:0xC463EaC02572CC964D43D2414023E2c6B62bAF38) [GnosisSafe] {
    +++ description: None
    values.$members.0:
    - "eth:0xaAf347c2381369cA0bE97320413E3C04f8561f7e"
    + "eth:0xf1829C83C227d3cc30a4204B091A7865AbCD0419"
    values.$members.5:
    - "eth:0x38809210f69ed6204E276d2Be6b15cd530698679"
    + "eth:0xf5B2C0bfA18561d5374EAcc5FFfA3E39B049c1ae"
    }
    contract GnosisSafe (zircuit:0xC463EaC02572CC964D43D2414023E2c6B62bAF38) [GnosisSafe] {
    +++ description: None
    values.$members.0:
    - "zircuit:0xaAf347c2381369cA0bE97320413E3C04f8561f7e"
    + "zircuit:0xf1829C83C227d3cc30a4204B091A7865AbCD0419"
    values.$members.5:
    - "zircuit:0x38809210f69ed6204E276d2Be6b15cd530698679"
    + "zircuit:0xf5B2C0bfA18561d5374EAcc5FFfA3E39B049c1ae"
    }
    2026 March 25, 10:04 UTC
    High severity
    8changes

    L2OutputOracle was upgraded twice in the same transaction. The proposer address was changed from 0xE8C20EA8eF100d7aa3846616E5D07A5aBb067C65 to 0x691b3588eB87E6163260650D3BB465883EB6A575.

    L2OutputOracle was upgraded twice in the same transaction. The proposer address was changed from 0xE8C20EA8eF100d7aa3846616E5D07A5aBb067C65 to 0x691b3588eB87E6163260650D3BB465883EB6A575.

    contract L2OutputOracle (eth:0x92Ef6Af472b39F1b363da45E35530c24619245A4) {
    +++ description: Entrypoint for permissioned proposers to propose new L2 outputs (state roots). New proposals have to be accompanied by a zk-SNARK proof of a correct state transition. Users can 'escape' their funds after 1mo of no state updates by supplying merkle proofs or using a resolver.
    values.$pastUpgrades.9:
    + ["2026-03-19T11:32:11.000Z","0xde1731a6499e91bf3c8d7b575fc6b5e8b92966625ed4f890142c94d8de15ab5a",["eth:0xB0790b9d22F92131e9E8D46F5b0f99ab88C3a21d"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.10:
    + ["2026-03-19T11:32:11.000Z","0xde1731a6499e91bf3c8d7b575fc6b5e8b92966625ed4f890142c94d8de15ab5a",["eth:0x5E66C2820666f4Fb490d2D2edE4dCB0E46CD03C6"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 9
    + 11
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.proposer:
    - "eth:0xE8C20EA8eF100d7aa3846616E5D07A5aBb067C65"
    + "eth:0x691b3588eB87E6163260650D3BB465883EB6A575"
    values.PROPOSER:
    - "eth:0xE8C20EA8eF100d7aa3846616E5D07A5aBb067C65"
    + "eth:0x691b3588eB87E6163260650D3BB465883EB6A575"
    }
    2026 February 27, 13:19 UTC
    3changes

    SP1MockVerifierWithHash (a no-op verifier that accepts all proofs) was added to the SP1VerifierGateway with selector 0xffffffff. Proof verification can be bypassed by the proposer via this selector; safety then depends on challenger intervention before finalization. The mock verifier's verifyProof function has an empty body with comment // accept everything . Diff with a real verifier: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x50ACFBEdecf4cbe350E1a86fC6f03a821772f1e5/eth:0xb4bd9A37998576C2FfD863b6dc9E0124021B8739

    SP1MockVerifierWithHash (a no-op verifier that accepts all proofs) was added to the SP1VerifierGateway with selector 0xffffffff. Proof verification can be bypassed by the proposer via this selector; safety then depends on challenger intervention before finalization. The mock verifier’s verifyProof function has an empty body with comment // accept everything. Diff with a real verifier: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x50ACFBEdecf4cbe350E1a86fC6f03a821772f1e5/eth:0xb4bd9A37998576C2FfD863b6dc9E0124021B8739

    contract SP1VerifierGateway (eth:0xf35A4088eA0231C44B9DB52D25c0E9E2fEe31f67) {
    +++ description: This contract is the router for zk proof verification. It stores the mapping between identifiers and the address of onchain verifier contracts, routing each identifier to the corresponding verifier contract.
    +++ description: Verifiers that are routed to by their selector and not frozen.
    values.activeVerifiers.2:
    + {"selector":"0xffffffff","verifier":"eth:0xb4bd9A37998576C2FfD863b6dc9E0124021B8739"}
    +++ description: All verifiers that were ever routed to by this gateway.
    values.allVerifiers.2:
    + {"selector":"0xffffffff","verifier":"eth:0xb4bd9A37998576C2FfD863b6dc9E0124021B8739"}
    }
    + Status: CREATED
    contract SP1MockVerifierWithHash (eth:0xb4bd9A37998576C2FfD863b6dc9E0124021B8739)
    +++ description: None
    Operator

    The system has a centralized operator

    The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system. The L2 code has been modified to allow the sequencer to explicitly censor selected L1->L2 transactions.

    • MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

    1. L1Block.sol - Sourcify explorer source code

    Users can force any transaction

    Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.

    1. Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs
    2. OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function
    Withdrawals

    Regular exits

    The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.

    1. OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function
    2. OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function

    Forced messaging

    If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.

    • Users can be censored if the operator explicitly censors their forced transaction, possible through a modification in the smart contracts.

    1. Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain
    Other considerations

    EVM compatible smart contracts are supported

    OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.

    1. Introducing EVM Equivalence
    Permissions
    A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions
    Go to Disco
    Disco UI Banner
    Disco UI BannerExplore in Disco

    Ethereum

    Actors:

    Conduit Multisig 10x4a49…A746

    A Multisig with 4/10 threshold.

    • Can upgrade with no delay
      • SuperchainConfig
      • OptimismPortal2
      • AnchorStateRegistry
      • L1CrossDomainMessenger
      • SystemConfig
      • L1StandardBridge
      • DisputeGameFactory
      • DelayedWETH
      • L1ERC721Bridge
      • OptimismMintableERC20Factory
    • Can interact with SuperchainConfig
      • Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless)
    • Can interact with SystemConfig
      • it can update the preconfer address, the batch submitter (Sequencer) address and the gas configuration of the system

    Participants (10):

    0xcdC9…48530xA9FC…8d090x6BB4…83A60x2103…911c0x8117…E7Ac0xA073…bda20xF331…647D0xa0C6…90380xefCf…dD5C0x4D80…5BAe
    Used in:
    EOA 10xCf82…9de8
    • Can interact with SystemConfig
      • Allowed to commit transactions from the current layer to the host chain

    Zircuit

    Actors:

    EOA 20x5b5A…b857
    • Can upgrade with no delay
      • L1Block
      • ProxyAdmin
    Smart contracts
    A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions
    Go to Disco
    Disco UI Banner
    Disco UI BannerExplore in Disco
    Note: Contracts presented in this section had their implementations updated since the last time our team looked at this project. The information presented may be inaccurate.
    A diagram of the smart contract architecture
    A diagram of the smart contract architecture

    Ethereum

    OptimismPortal2
    Escrow
    0x17bf…3fb1Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
    The following tokens are included in the value secured calculation:
    ETH token logo
    Can be upgraded by:
    Conduit Multisig 1 with no delay
    Implementation used in:
    SystemConfig0x30F8…28ffImplementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
      • batcherHash: EOA 1
      • owner: Conduit Multisig 1
    Can be upgraded by:
    Conduit Multisig 1 with no delay
    Implementation used in:
    DisputeGameFactory0x6b9e…3e90Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
    Can be upgraded by:
    Conduit Multisig 1 with no delay
    Implementation used in:
    L1CrossDomainMessenger0x2a72…A091Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain’s epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
    Can be upgraded by:
    Conduit Multisig 1 with no delay
    Implementation used in:
    L1StandardBridge
    Escrow
    0x386B…6dd8Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1

    All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation.

    Can be upgraded by:
    Conduit Multisig 1 with no delay
    Implementation used in:
    L1ERC721Bridge0x994e…d244Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
    Can be upgraded by:
    Conduit Multisig 1 with no delay
    Implementation used in:
    PreimageOracle0x1fb8…aDD3

    The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game.

    Implementation used in:
    AnchorStateRegistry0x2613…7051Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
    Can be upgraded by:
    Conduit Multisig 1 with no delay
    Implementation used in:
    PermissionedDisputeGame0x4F80…6496

    Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger.

    ProxyAdmin0x5B1E…5257
    • Roles:
      • owner: Conduit Multisig 1
    MIPS0x6463…B908

    The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.

    Implementation used in:
    DelayedWETH0x798d…9162Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
    Can be upgraded by:
    Conduit Multisig 1 with no delay
    Implementation used in:
    L1ERC20TokenBridge
    Escrow
    0x912C…6C79Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Escrow for custom external tokens that use the canonical bridge for messaging but are governed externally.

    The following tokens are included in the value secured calculation:
    wstETH token logo
    ProxyAdmin0xb489…d0b5
    • Roles:
      • owner: Conduit Multisig 1
    Implementation used in:
    OptimismMintableERC20Factory0xc77e…E932Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it’s deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain’s representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
    Can be upgraded by:
    Conduit Multisig 1 with no delay
    Implementation used in:
    There are impactful changes to the following contracts, and part of the information might be outdated.
    SuperchainConfig0x097f…53cCImplementation (Upgradable)Admin

    This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3mo 1d if left untouched.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
      • guardian: Conduit Multisig 1
    Can be upgraded by:
    Conduit Multisig 1 with no delay
    Proxy used in:
    Implementation used in:

    Zircuit

    L1Block0x4200…0015Implementation (Upgradable)Admin
    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately EOA 2 The source code of this contract is not verified on Etherscan.
    Can be upgraded by:
    EOA 2 with no delay
    ProxyAdmin0x4200…0018Implementation (Upgradable)Admin
    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately EOA 2
      • owner: EOA 2
    Can be upgraded by:
    EOA 2 with no delay

    The current deployment carries some associated risks:

    • Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).

    • Funds can be stolen if the source code of unverified contracts contains malicious code (CRITICAL).