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Privacy

Privacy

Analysis of privacy protocols on Ethereum focusing on the CROPS principles: censorship resistance, open source, privacy and security.

Total value locked

2025 Oct 15 — 2026 Oct 15

Total deposit and withdrawal counts

2025 Oct 15 — 2026 Oct 15

Total value locked

2025 Oct 15 — 2026 Oct 15

How to read the privacy rosette

Each slice is one adversary testing the protocol's privacy promise.

  • Private: The promise holds for a careful user with the app's own settings.
  • At risk: The promise holds only with significant extra work, like a custom build or your own servers.
  • Exposed: The promise breaks, and no reasonable effort prevents that.

Link privacy
10

Hides which deposit became which withdrawal. Both stay public.

#
Name
Privacy
TVL
Anon. set
Setup
Exit
Repro
1
Tornado Cash logo
Tornado Cash
Tornado Cash
Pool
Privacy assessment
  • Public observerPrivate

    Each pool has one fixed amount and no in-pool transfers, so every withdrawal spends exactly one deposit.

  • Chain analystPrivate

    A relayed withdrawal hides among all unspent deposits of its pool, the anonymity set, which differs sharply between pools.

  • Network observerPrivate

    The app works in Tor Browser and downloads every deposit of a pool, so its services learn the pool but never the user's note.

  • Privileged insiderPrivate

    The pools cannot be paused, upgraded or made to reveal anything.

  • Future adversaryAt risk

    Commitments use a Pedersen hash on an elliptic curve.

$605.26 M
2
Railgun logo
Railgun
Railgun
Shielded ledger
Privacy assessment
  • Public observerPrivate

    Everything inside the pool is hidden, including which shield funds which unshield.

  • Chain analystPrivate

    The candidates for an unshield are the shields of the same token.

  • Network observerPrivate

    RailOxide sends all traffic over built-in Tor, broadcaster messages included, and finds the user's notes by decrypting every note locally.

  • Privileged insiderPrivate

    Only the user holds viewing keys, and DAO upgrades wait 7 days.

  • Future adversaryAt risk

    Notes are encrypted with elliptic-curve key exchange.

$105.64 M
3
Privacy Pools logo
Privacy Pools
Privacy Pools
Pool
Privacy assessment
  • Public observerPrivate

    A zero-knowledge proof hides which approved deposit a withdrawal spends.

  • Chain analystPrivate

    A relayed withdrawal of a common amount hides among all approved deposits of its pool.

  • Network observerPrivate

    The website works in Tor Browser and scans every pool whole, matching notes locally without revealing the user's deposits to third parties.

  • Privileged insiderAt risk

    The ASP postman can publish a new approved list at any time with no delay, and withdrawals must prove against the latest one.

  • Future adversaryPrivate

    Nothing encrypted is written onchain and commitments are hashes, so whoever breaks public-key cryptography recovers nothing from the chain.

$9.27 M
4
zkAPI logo
zkAPI
zkAPI
Anonymous access
Privacy assessment
  • Public observerPrivate

    Requests stay offchain, so nothing onchain ties a request to the deposit that pays for it.

  • Chain analystPrivate

    Authorizations never reach the chain, so correlating public data adds nothing to the note record.

  • Network observerPrivate

    The app works in Tor Browser, the daemon has a Tor setting with a kill switch, and no third party sees both a deposit and a request.

  • Privileged insiderAt risk

    The operator sees each request's time and budget but not its note, so the candidates are all active notes, a small set.

  • Future adversaryAt risk

    Onchain data stays hashed, but retained operator transcripts and indexer logs would tie requests to deposits.

$2.19 K
No data
5
Monero via Cake Wallet logo
Monero via Cake Wallet
Monero via Cake Wallet
Shielded ledger
Privacy assessment
  • Public observerPrivate

    The Monero transactions between the deposit into a swap service and the payout from its hot wallet hide sender, recipient and amount.

  • Chain analystPrivate

    Only amount and timing can pair a deposit into a swap service with a payout from a hot wallet serving every asset the service trades.

  • Network observerAt risk

    Built-in Tor sends every call over one shared circuit for up to ten minutes, so only separate app sessions keep the legs apart.

  • Privileged insiderExposed

    Each swap service custodies its leg and can hold the funds until the user passes identity checks, and identities on both legs link them.

  • Future adversaryExposed

    Whoever breaks elliptic-curve cryptography recovers every Monero output key from public chain data, so every ring shows its real spend.

N/A
N/A
6
Zcash via NEAR Intents logo
Zcash via NEAR Intents
Zcash via NEAR Intents
Shielded ledger
Privacy assessment
  • Public observerPrivate

    Zcash's shielded pool hides which payout into it funds which later exit.

  • Chain analystPrivate

    Only the amount and timing of a round trip can pair a payout into the pool with a later deposit to the bridge.

  • Network observerAt risk

    Each sync sends the user's transparent addresses to lightwalletd outside Tor, tying both the payout fetch and the exit to that user by timing.

  • Privileged insiderExposed

    The operator custodies both legs in transit and can freeze any account or deposit, setting the terms on which the user's funds return.

  • Future adversaryExposed

    All of an account's rotated addresses share one incoming viewing key on the Pallas curve, and every payout address is public on NEAR.

N/A
N/A
7
zk.money logo
zk.money
zk.money
Shielded ledger
Privacy assessment
  • Public observerPrivate

    Private payments publish encrypted notes.

  • Chain analystAt risk

    In practice the anonymity set is zk.money's users on Aztec, although the L2 contract is permissionless.

  • Network observerAt risk

    Anyone on the user's network path sees their Aztec transactions and can match their deposit and withdrawal to the blocks they land in.

  • Privileged insiderExposed

    The wallets derive their own deposit addresses from an ECDH secret shared with the resolver operator, Aztec Labs today.

  • Future adversaryExposed

    Whoever breaks elliptic-curve cryptography can decrypt historical notes and payment events published to Ethereum.

$29.70 K
8
STRK-20 logo
STRK-20
STRK-20
Shielded ledger
Privacy assessment
  • Public observerAt risk

    Transfers inside the pool are encrypted, but the first payment to each new contact writes the recipient's address in cleartext.

  • Chain analystAt risk

    The set of active users is small and split further by token and by fee token.

  • Network observerAt risk

    Ready and Xverse are closed source, so what they send to third parties is up to their makers and can change at any time.

  • Privileged insiderExposed

    Every user's viewing key is escrowed onchain, encrypted to one auditor key that a role holder can replace at any time with no delay.

  • Future adversaryExposed

    The proofs rest only on hashes, the encryption on elliptic curves.

$1.41 M
9
Privacy Boost logo
Privacy Boost
Privacy Boost
Shielded ledger
Privacy assessment
  • Public observerPrivate

    Transfers inside publish only encrypted notes.

  • Chain analystExposed

    The anonymity set is very small.

  • Network observerExposed

    The SDK's core is closed source with no open alternative, so what it sends, and where, is up to the operator and can change with any release.

  • Privileged insiderExposed

    The operator's enclave holds every transfer in plaintext and a key to every note.

  • Future adversaryExposed

    Every note wraps its key to the enclave's long-lived elliptic-curve public key as well as the receiver's.

$960.59 K
10
Payy logo
Payy
Payy
Shielded ledger
Privacy assessment
  • Public observerExposed

    Every transaction names the notes it spends and creates, so which notes fund which is public.

  • Chain analystExposed

    Along a path without splits or merges, the deposit and withdrawal amounts fix every amount in between.

  • Network observerExposed

    The Payy app is closed source and no open client works on mainnet, so what it sends to third parties is up to Payy and can change at any time.

  • Privileged insiderExposed

    One company runs the only validator and prover, the node, the note registry, the deposit relayer and the KYC checks.

  • Future adversaryExposed

    The per-transaction proofs are public and not zero-knowledge, and the commitments inside them rest on elliptic curves.

$710.51
No data

Recipient privacy
3

Hides who is paid. Each payment lands at a fresh one-time address.

#
Name
Privacy
30D vol.
Anon. set
Exit
Repro
1
Umbra Cash logo
Umbra Cash
Umbra Cash
Stealth address
Privacy assessment
  • Public observerPrivate

    Each payment goes to a fresh stealth address, and only the recipient's viewing key shows whose it is.

  • Chain analystPrivate

    Any of the 11,983 registered recipients could be behind a stealth address.

  • Network observerAt risk

    The hosted app checks the payee's address with its Alchemy RPC seconds before each payment, so timing ties the payee to the payment.

  • Privileged insiderAt risk

    The hosted app gives the operator the user's wallet address on every scan and withdrawal address in the same session.

  • Future adversaryExposed

    Whoever breaks elliptic-curve cryptography matches every past payment to its registered recipient from chain data alone.

$9.87 M
2
Fluidkey logo
Fluidkey
Fluidkey
Stealth address
Privacy assessment
  • Public observerPrivate

    Each payment reaches a fresh Safe, and nothing onchain names the account behind it.

  • Chain analystPrivate

    At least 2,189 accounts have claimed Fluidkey's 'score' token, giving a lower bound of the anonymity set.

  • Network observerExposed

    The app is closed source with no open alternative, so what it sends to third parties is up to Fluidkey and can change at any time.

  • Privileged insiderExposed

    Fluidkey holds the viewing key, so it can regenerate every address and tie its activity to the user's account.

  • Future adversaryAt risk

    No announcement is published, so address derivations cannot be replayed from the chain alone.

No data
N/A
3
Cloaked logo
Cloaked
Cloaked
Stealth address
Privacy assessment
  • Public observerPrivate

    Each payment reaches a fresh address, and nothing onchain names the account behind it.

  • Chain analystAt risk

    Cloaked's relayers and fee Safe mark every spend, so an address hides only among Cloaked's users, a small set by onchain activity.

  • Network observerExposed

    The app is closed source with no open alternative, so what it sends to third parties is up to Cloaked and can change at any time.

  • Privileged insiderExposed

    Cloaked holds the viewing key, so it can regenerate every address and tie its activity to the user's account.

  • Future adversaryAt risk

    No announcement is published, so address derivations cannot be replayed from the chain alone.

No data
N/A

Amount privacy
1

Hides how much moves. Balances and transfers are encrypted.

#
Name
Privacy
TVL
Exit
Repro
1
Zama Confidential Tokens logo
Zama Conf. Tokens
Zama Conf. Tokens
Confidential amounts
Privacy assessment
  • Public observerAt risk

    Wraps and unwraps publish their amounts, while confidential transfers keep theirs encrypted.

  • Chain analystAt risk

    An account's balance is bounded by its public wraps and unwraps, and exact if it never took part in a confidential transfer.

  • Network observerAt risk

    Zama's app is closed source, so what it sends to third parties is up to Zama and can change at any time.

  • Privileged insiderExposed

    Any 5 of the 13 KMS operators can combine their key shares and decrypt every balance and transfer ever made.

  • Future adversaryExposed

    One long-lived lattice key protects every balance and transfer amount, and anyone can download the ciphertexts today.

$120.24 M
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