Experimental Stats (7 days)
|Inflows||$42.28 M (excl. ETH)|
|Outflows||$29.38 M (excl. ETH)|
Arbitrum is an Optimistic Rollup that aims to feel exactly like interacting with Ethereum, but with transactions costing a fraction of what they do on L1.
Funds can be stolen if…
Funds can be lost if…
Funds can be frozen if…
MEV can be extracted if…
After some period of time, the published state root is assumed to be correct. For a certain time period, usually one week one of the whitelisted actors can submit a fraud proof that shows that the state was incorrect.
- Funds can be stolen if none of the whitelisted verifiers checks the published state. Fraud proofs assume at least one honest and able validator (CRITICAL).
- MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a transaction on L2. When the block containing that transaction is finalized the funds become available for withdrawal on L1. The process of block finalization usually takes several days to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.
- Funds can be frozen if the centralized validator goes down. Users cannot produce blocks themselves and exiting the system requires new block production (CRITICAL).
When a user initiates a regular withdrawal a third party verifying the chain can offer to buy this withdrawal by paying the user on L1. The user will get the funds immediately, however the third party has to wait for the block to be finalized. This is implemented as a first party functionality inside Arbitrum's token bridge.
Arbitrum uses the Arbitrum Virtual Machine (AVM) to execute transactions. This is similar to the EVM, but is independent from it and allows fraud proofs to be executed.
- Funds can be lost if there are mistakes in the highly complex AVM implementation.
The system consists of the following smart contracts:
- ProxyAdmin 0x171a…d7c4Through this contract that controls upgrades for most other contracts. It is owned by a 4-of-6 multisig.
- This contract stores the following tokens: ETH.
- ProxyAdmin (2) 0x9aD4…0aDaThis is a different proxy admin for the three contracts below. It is also owned by a single private key.
- This contract stores the following tokens: BADGER, BAL, CELR, COMP, CRV, DODO, DPX, GNO, GRT, LINK, LRC, MATH, MKR, OHM, SPELL, sUSD, SUSHI, UNI, WBTC, WOO, YFI.
- This contract stores the following tokens: LAND, MCB, USDC, USDT.
- ValidatorUtils 0x2B36…5DC1
- ValidatorWalletCreator 0xe17d…C178
- BridgeUtils 0x84eF…18Ec
- L1Escrow 0xA10c…9400This contract stores the following tokens: DAI.
The current deployment carries some associated risks:
- Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).
- Executing and Securing the Chain - Arbitrum documentation
- Note: onlyValidator modifier
- Submitting Transactions - Arbitrum documentation
- Validators - Arbitrum documentation
- If the sequencer is malicious - Arbitrum documentation
- Mainnet for everyone - Arbitrum Blog
- L2 to L1 Messages Lifecycle - Arbitrum documentation
- Rules for Confirming or Rejecting Rollup Blocks - Arbitrum documentation
- Tradeable Bridge Exits - Arbitrum documentation
- AVM - Arbitrum documentation