BOB

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About

BOB (Build on Bitcoin) is an OP Stack rollup that aims to natively support the Bitcoin stack. The current implementation supports a variety of canonical and external bridging for BTC-related assets and a tBTC-v2 LightRelay smart contract for verifying... Bitcoin transaction proofs through their blocks' headers on the L2.

Total Value SecuredTVS

$61.15 M0.77%

Past day UOPSDaily UOPS

0.0443.6%

Stage

Gas token

ETH

Type

Optimistic Rollup

Purposes

Universal, Bitcoin DApps

Chain ID

60808

Tokens breakdown

Value secured breakdown

73.0% with additional trust assumptions

View TVS breakdown

Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure

Explore more in Discovery UI

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About

Value Secured View TVS breakdown

Exclude restricted RWA tokens

Total

Canonically BridgedCanonically Bridged ValueCanonical

Natively MintedNatively Minted TokensNative

Externally BridgedExternally Bridged ValueExternal

ETH & derivatives

Stablecoins

BTC & derivatives

Other

View TVS breakdown

Activity

2025 Jul 09 — 2026 Jul 09

Past Day UOPS

0.0443.6%

Past Day Ops count

3.77 K

Max. UOPS

2.19

2024 Dec 04

Past day UOPS/TPS Ratio

1.00

Onchain costs

The section shows the operating costs that L2s pay to Ethereum.

2025 Jul 09 — 2026 Jul 09

Total cost

$1.63 K

Avg cost per L2 UOP

$0.000617

Avg cost per day

$4.46

Data posted

This section shows how much data the project publishes to its data-availability (DA) layer over time. The project currently posts data toEthereum.

2025 Jul 09 — 2026 Jul 09

Data posted

1.02 GiB

Avg size per day

2.86 MiB

Avg size per L2 UOP

414.76 B

Liveness

This section shows how "live" the project's operators are by displaying how frequently they submit transactions of the selected type. It also highlights anomalies - significant deviations from their typical schedule.

No ongoing anomalies detected

2026 Jun 09 — Jul 09

Avg. tx data subs. interval

59 minutes

Avg. state updates interval

12 hours

Past 30 days anomalies

100% normal uptime

Milestones & Incidents

Kona derivation bug

2025 Dec 5th

To fix a bug in the Kona derivation, the proof system is updated and a state root manually resolved.

Learn more

Proof System Intervention

2025 Jul 24th

A state root proposal is manually resolved after changing the finalization config.

Learn more

Risk summary

Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure

Sequencer failure

Self sequence

In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project’s chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.

State validation

Fraud proofs (1R, ZK)

Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Single round proofs (1R) prove the validity of a state proposal, only requiring a single transaction to resolve. A fault proof eliminates a state proposal by proving that any intermediate state transition in the proposal results in a different state root. For either, a ZK proof is used.

Data availability

Onchain

All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.

Exit window

None

There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.

Proposer failure

Self propose

The primary whitelisted proposer has an optimistic advantage, letting them win by default if no conflicting proposals are made. This privilege is dropped after 1mo of inactivity, and anyone can leverage the source available zk prover to prove a fault or a conflicting valid proposal to win against the privileged proposer and/or supply a bond and make a counter proposal at any time.

Stage

BOB is a

Stage 0

Optimistic Rollup.

Learn more about Stages

Please keep in mind that these stages do not reflect project security, this is an opinionated assessment of project maturity based on subjective criteria, created with a goal of incentivizing projects to push toward better decentralization. Each team may have taken different paths to achieve this goal.

Data availability

All data required for proofs is published on chain

All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.

Learn more about the DA layer here:

Ethereum

State derivation

Node software

The rollup node is composed of two software components: op-node, implementing consensus related logic, and op-geth, implementing execution logic. The configuration file can be found here.

Compression scheme

Data batches are compressed using the zlib algorithm with best compression level.

Genesis state

The genesis file can be found here.

Data format

The format specification of Sequencer’s data batches can be found here.

State validation

State root proposals

Proposers submit state roots as children of any (possibly unresolved) previous state root proposal, by calling the propose() function in the KailuaTreasury. A parent state root can have multiple conflicting children, composing a tournament. Each proposer requires to lock a bond, currently set to 0.5 ETH, that can be slashed if any proposal made by them is proven incorrect via a fault proof or a conflicting validity proof. The bond can be withdrawn once the proposer has no more pending proposals that need to be resolved and was not eliminated.

Proposals consist of a state root and a reference to their parent and implicitly challenge any sibling proposals who have the same parent. A proposal asserts that the proposed state root constitutes a valid state transition from the parent’s state root. To offer efficient zk fault proofs, each proposal must include 3600 intermediate state commitments, each spanning 6 L2 blocks.

Proposals target sequential tournament epochs of currently 3600 * 6 L2 blocks. A tournament with a resolved parent tournament, a single child- and no conflicting sibling proposals can be resolved after 3d.

The Vanguard is a privileged actor who can always make the first child proposal on a parent state root. They can, in the worst case, delay each tournament for up to 1mo by not making this first proposal. Sibling proposals made after the Vanguard’s initial one or after the 1mo vanguardAdvantage in each tournament are permissionless.

Funds can be frozen if the vanguard exploits their vanguard advantage (1mo), halting the chain until they propose.

Challenges

Any conflicting sibling proposals within a tournament that are made within the 3d challenge period of a proposal they are challenging, delay resolving the tournament until sufficient ZK proofs are published to leave one single tournament survivor.

In the tree of proposed state roots, each parent node can have multiple children. These children are indirectly challenging each other in a tournament, which can only be resolved if but a single child survives. A state root can be resolved if it is the only remaining proposal due to any combination of the following elimination methods:

the proposal’s challenge period of 3d has ended before a conflicting proposal was made
the proposal is proven correct with a full validity proof (invalidates all conflicting proposals)
a conflicting sibling proposal is proven faulty

Proving any of the 3600 intermediate state commitments in a proposal faulty invalidates the entire proposal. Proving a proposal valid invalidates all conflicting siblings. Pruning of a tournament’s children happens strictly chronologically, which guarantees that the first faulty proposal of a given proposer is always pruned first. When pruned, an invalid proposal leads to the elimination of its proposer, which invalidates all their subsequent proposals, slashes their bond, and disallows future proposals by the same address. A slashed bond is transferred to an address chosen by the prover who caused the slashing.

A single remaining child in a tournament can be ‘resolved’ and will be finalized and usable for withdrawals after an execution delay of 1d (time for the Guardian to manually blacklist malicious state roots).

Validity proofs

Validity proofs and fault proofs both must be accompanied by a ZK proof that ensures that the new state was derived by correctly applying a series of valid user transactions to the previous state. These proofs are then verified on Ethereum by a smart contract.

The Kailua state validation system is primarily optimistically resolved, so no validity proofs are required in the happy case. But two different zk proofs on unresolved state roots are possible and permissionless: The proveValidity() function proves a state root proposal’s full validity, automatically invalidating all conflicting sibling proposals. proveOutputFault() allows any actor to eliminate a state root proposal for which they can prove that any of the 3600 intermediate state transitions in the proposal are not correct. Both are zk proofs of validity, although one is used as an efficient fault proof to invalidate a single conflicting state transition.

Funds can be stolen if the validity proof cryptography is broken or implemented incorrectly.
Funds can be stolen if no challenger checks the published state.
Funds can be stolen if the proposer routes proof verification through a malicious or faulty verifier by specifying an unsafe route selector.
Funds can be frozen if a verifier needed for a given proof is paused by its permissioned owner.

PROVER

RISC Zero

Trusted Setups

Onchain verifier

RiscZeroGroth16Verifier

KailuaVerifier

RiscZeroGroth16Verifier

Used in

Onchain verifier

RiscZeroGroth16Verifier

KailuaVerifier

RiscZeroGroth16Verifier

Used in

Program Hashes

Name	Hash	Repository	Verification	Used in

	0xb2e2...c2bf	Github

Upgrades & Governance

Past upgrades

The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.

Count of upgrades

Last upgrade

1d 8h ago

Avg upgrade interval

2mo 28d

Updates

2026 July 08, 08:22 UTC

High severity

13changes

Upgraded Kailua to v1.3.0 release, program hash reproduced. Also rotated ms member.

	contract KailuaVerifier (eth:0xa23bf38299bbCbAA01b9ea8a1d3412D9f405b97d) [N/A] {
	+++ description: None
	values.$implementation:
-	"eth:0xF59DA245d3D69E5432Afd05008E8D332C1bfAb4e"
+	"eth:0xC9934Db60031aDd319d008f8d643E3b723f28e43"
	values.$pastUpgrades.1:
+	["2026-07-08T07:35:47.000Z","0x211cae5e55a0b57029752e11536fb7a4175d8059cb9d4ec37ca7e50d635809dd",["eth:0xC9934Db60031aDd319d008f8d643E3b723f28e43"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	1
+	2
	values.FPVM_IMAGE_ID:
-	"0x3768ea4f0e0d940f69c4cc5bd39a9e2772bfe3cb57818ce526bbe68033ee5934"
+	"0xb2e2b1513e80ea1e8f998e51bf8e7754eec21dbd0463e0b6b115165ba6bac2bf"
	values.ROLLUP_CONFIG_HASH:
-	"0x8afe7ad42347f5d9f9ad307825d14a39630504005cb998d5132dcd0d0485d64d"
+	"0x56ed6a78ed98a992a16a46513ee4ee496a86302a96d0f2bcee133c21351cd681"
	implementationNames.eth:0xF59DA245d3D69E5432Afd05008E8D332C1bfAb4e:
-	"KailuaVerifier"
	implementationNames.eth:0xC9934Db60031aDd319d008f8d643E3b723f28e43:
+	"KailuaVerifier"
	}

	contract Bob Multisig 1 (eth:0xC91482A96e9c2A104d9298D1980eCCf8C4dc764E) [GnosisSafe] {
	+++ description: None
	values.$members.4:
-	"eth:0x3840f487A17A41100DD1Bf0946c34f132a57Fd5f"
+	"eth:0xefCf0c8faFB425997870f845e26fC6cA6EE6dD5C"
	}

2026 July 03, 09:58 UTC

High severity

55changes

Upgrade to Kailua v1.2.0. - Vanguard advantage activated: previously 0s (disabled), now 1mo with a designated vanguard ( 0x7cB1022D… ). The vanguard can delay the first child proposal of each parent tournament by up to a month; sibling proposals stay permissionless (v1.2.0 retains the childCount() == 1 gate). - KailuaGame impl rotated (diff) — now holds a direct KAILUA VERIFIER reference (read once from the treasury at construction) and calls the verifier for proof checking. The vanguard gate is unchanged ( assignVanguard , vanguardAdvantage , childCount() == 1 ), but tournament payout economics were reworked (see below). - KailuaTreasury rotated (diff) — drops the RISC ZERO VERIFIER , FPVM IMAGE ID , and ROLLUP CONFIG HASH immutables (moved to KailuaVerifier) and holds a KAILUA VERIFIER reference instead. - KailuaVerifier (new in v1.2.0) — proxy-wrapped, holds the proof config that used to sit on KailuaTreasury, and replaces the previous RiscZeroVerifierRouter + emergency-stop path. Adds optional fault-proof permits: a prover can lock collateral to reserve an exclusive window for collecting the fault-proof reward (anti-front-run). On bob the permit window is effectively off ( PERMIT DELAY=0 , PERMIT DURATION=1 → 1-second active window); fault-proof submission remains permissionless. - Tournament payout economics reworked (independent of the vanguard gate). Slashed participation bonds now split 1/3 prover / 1/3 winner / 1/3 burn ( ELIMINATION SPLIT DENOM=3 , PROVER NUM=1 , WINNER NUM=1 ) accrued via eliminationRewards / winnerSharesByParent and claimed with claimEliminationRewards() , replacing the old full-bond claimEliminationBonds(uint256) / eliminations[] mechanic. And KailuaGame.getPayoutRecipient now routes the fault-proof reward through KAILUA VERIFIER.faultProofPermitBeneficiary before falling back to the fault/validity prover (inert on bob given the 1-second permit window). - New FPVM image ID deployed alongside the v1.2.0 contracts.

Upgrade to Kailua v1.2.0.

Vanguard advantage activated: previously 0s (disabled), now 1mo with a designated vanguard (0x7cB1022D…). The vanguard can delay the first child proposal of each parent tournament by up to a month; sibling proposals stay permissionless (v1.2.0 retains the childCount() == 1 gate).
KailuaGame impl rotated (diff) — now holds a direct KAILUA_VERIFIER reference (read once from the treasury at construction) and calls the verifier for proof checking. The vanguard gate is unchanged (assignVanguard, vanguardAdvantage, childCount() == 1), but tournament payout economics were reworked (see below).
KailuaTreasury rotated (diff) — drops the RISC_ZERO_VERIFIER, FPVM_IMAGE_ID, and ROLLUP_CONFIG_HASH immutables (moved to KailuaVerifier) and holds a KAILUA_VERIFIER reference instead.
KailuaVerifier (new in v1.2.0) — proxy-wrapped, holds the proof config that used to sit on KailuaTreasury, and replaces the previous RiscZeroVerifierRouter + emergency-stop path. Adds optional fault-proof permits: a prover can lock collateral to reserve an exclusive window for collecting the fault-proof reward (anti-front-run). On bob the permit window is effectively off (PERMIT_DELAY=0, PERMIT_DURATION=1 → 1-second active window); fault-proof submission remains permissionless.
Tournament payout economics reworked (independent of the vanguard gate). Slashed participation bonds now split 1/3 prover / 1/3 winner / 1/3 burn (ELIMINATION_SPLIT_DENOM=3, PROVER_NUM=1, WINNER_NUM=1) accrued via eliminationRewards / winnerSharesByParent and claimed with claimEliminationRewards(), replacing the old full-bond claimEliminationBonds(uint256) / eliminations[] mechanic. And KailuaGame.getPayoutRecipient now routes the fault-proof reward through KAILUA_VERIFIER.faultProofPermitBeneficiary before falling back to the fault/validity prover (inert on bob given the 1-second permit window).
New FPVM image ID deployed alongside the v1.2.0 contracts.

	contract TimelockController (eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711) [global/TimelockController] {
	+++ description: A timelock with access control. The current minimum delay is 3d.
	values.accessControl.PROPOSER_ROLE.members.0:
-	"eth:0xF616A4f81857CFEe54A4A049Ec187172574bd412"
+	"eth:0x2E5bcc9959dB5F5016F830E47943b07242CB2609"
	values.accessControl.CANCELLER_ROLE.members.0:
-	"eth:0xF616A4f81857CFEe54A4A049Ec187172574bd412"
+	"eth:0x2E5bcc9959dB5F5016F830E47943b07242CB2609"
	values.accessControl.EXECUTOR_ROLE.members.0:
-	"eth:0xF616A4f81857CFEe54A4A049Ec187172574bd412"
+	"eth:0x2E5bcc9959dB5F5016F830E47943b07242CB2609"
	+++ description: since the RiscZeroVerifierRouter does not emit events on verifier changes, we watch the single upstream permissioned address.
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.callsExecuted.12:
+	{"id":"0x5fb8d6ab7b9ad6614a645faf85120306acf72c02bc66de00b027c8ec57eff377","index":0,"target":"eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711","value":0,"data":"0x2f2ff15db09aa5aeb3702cfd50b6b62bc4532604938f21248a27a1d5ca736082b6819cc10000000000000000000000002e5bcc9959db5f5016f830e47943b07242cb2609"}
	+++ description: since the RiscZeroVerifierRouter does not emit events on verifier changes, we watch the single upstream permissioned address.
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.callsExecuted.13:
+	{"id":"0x336fa76c82918a2642423bcae028021a204288e86965316b58737fb6e6a2d985","index":0,"target":"eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711","value":0,"data":"0x2f2ff15dd8aa0f3194971a2a116679f7c2090f6939c8d4e01a2a8d7e41d55e5351469e630000000000000000000000002e5bcc9959db5f5016f830e47943b07242cb2609"}
	+++ description: since the RiscZeroVerifierRouter does not emit events on verifier changes, we watch the single upstream permissioned address.
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.callsExecuted.14:
+	{"id":"0x0c0f9e544f5acb8eafdf44bbd4a1f21cde030970ad1f76c01504ff1c291f0e9d","index":0,"target":"eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711","value":0,"data":"0x2f2ff15dfd643c72710c63c0180259aba6b2d05451e3591a24e58b62239378085726f7830000000000000000000000002e5bcc9959db5f5016f830e47943b07242cb2609"}
	+++ description: since the RiscZeroVerifierRouter does not emit events on verifier changes, we watch the single upstream permissioned address.
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.callsExecuted.15:
+	{"id":"0x89a458a6781bd045d785361e429a3df71167dff9e14996fa5f98ca7c5eb9d4c3","index":0,"target":"eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711","value":0,"data":"0xd547741fb09aa5aeb3702cfd50b6b62bc4532604938f21248a27a1d5ca736082b6819cc1000000000000000000000000f616a4f81857cfee54a4a049ec187172574bd412"}
	+++ description: since the RiscZeroVerifierRouter does not emit events on verifier changes, we watch the single upstream permissioned address.
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.callsExecuted.16:
+	{"id":"0x4acc61e26f03e0270258c3fe8aec76d8ce5c80e8e100972e3091fc77c8882819","index":0,"target":"eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711","value":0,"data":"0xd547741fd8aa0f3194971a2a116679f7c2090f6939c8d4e01a2a8d7e41d55e5351469e63000000000000000000000000f616a4f81857cfee54a4a049ec187172574bd412"}
	+++ description: since the RiscZeroVerifierRouter does not emit events on verifier changes, we watch the single upstream permissioned address.
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.callsExecuted.17:
+	{"id":"0xf239631e46b22677b2b8b3b35d3780a1de298d9234c6906ce98aa3168d52cc97","index":0,"target":"eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711","value":0,"data":"0xd547741ffd643c72710c63c0180259aba6b2d05451e3591a24e58b62239378085726f783000000000000000000000000f616a4f81857cfee54a4a049ec187172574bd412"}
	+++ description: since the RiscZeroVerifierRouter does not emit events on verifier changes, we watch the single upstream permissioned address.
	values.callsScheduled.15:
+	{"id":"0x5fb8d6ab7b9ad6614a645faf85120306acf72c02bc66de00b027c8ec57eff377","index":0,"target":"eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711","value":0,"data":"0x2f2ff15db09aa5aeb3702cfd50b6b62bc4532604938f21248a27a1d5ca736082b6819cc10000000000000000000000002e5bcc9959db5f5016f830e47943b07242cb2609","predecessor":"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","delay":259200}
	+++ description: since the RiscZeroVerifierRouter does not emit events on verifier changes, we watch the single upstream permissioned address.
	values.callsScheduled.16:
+	{"id":"0x336fa76c82918a2642423bcae028021a204288e86965316b58737fb6e6a2d985","index":0,"target":"eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711","value":0,"data":"0x2f2ff15dd8aa0f3194971a2a116679f7c2090f6939c8d4e01a2a8d7e41d55e5351469e630000000000000000000000002e5bcc9959db5f5016f830e47943b07242cb2609","predecessor":"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","delay":259200}
	+++ description: since the RiscZeroVerifierRouter does not emit events on verifier changes, we watch the single upstream permissioned address.
	values.callsScheduled.17:
+	{"id":"0x0c0f9e544f5acb8eafdf44bbd4a1f21cde030970ad1f76c01504ff1c291f0e9d","index":0,"target":"eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711","value":0,"data":"0x2f2ff15dfd643c72710c63c0180259aba6b2d05451e3591a24e58b62239378085726f7830000000000000000000000002e5bcc9959db5f5016f830e47943b07242cb2609","predecessor":"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","delay":259200}
	+++ description: since the RiscZeroVerifierRouter does not emit events on verifier changes, we watch the single upstream permissioned address.
	values.callsScheduled.18:
+	{"id":"0x89a458a6781bd045d785361e429a3df71167dff9e14996fa5f98ca7c5eb9d4c3","index":0,"target":"eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711","value":0,"data":"0xd547741fb09aa5aeb3702cfd50b6b62bc4532604938f21248a27a1d5ca736082b6819cc1000000000000000000000000f616a4f81857cfee54a4a049ec187172574bd412","predecessor":"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","delay":259200}
	+++ description: since the RiscZeroVerifierRouter does not emit events on verifier changes, we watch the single upstream permissioned address.
	values.callsScheduled.19:
+	{"id":"0x4acc61e26f03e0270258c3fe8aec76d8ce5c80e8e100972e3091fc77c8882819","index":0,"target":"eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711","value":0,"data":"0xd547741fd8aa0f3194971a2a116679f7c2090f6939c8d4e01a2a8d7e41d55e5351469e63000000000000000000000000f616a4f81857cfee54a4a049ec187172574bd412","predecessor":"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","delay":259200}
	+++ description: since the RiscZeroVerifierRouter does not emit events on verifier changes, we watch the single upstream permissioned address.
	values.callsScheduled.20:
+	{"id":"0xf239631e46b22677b2b8b3b35d3780a1de298d9234c6906ce98aa3168d52cc97","index":0,"target":"eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711","value":0,"data":"0xd547741ffd643c72710c63c0180259aba6b2d05451e3591a24e58b62239378085726f783000000000000000000000000f616a4f81857cfee54a4a049ec187172574bd412","predecessor":"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","delay":259200}
	values.Canceller.0:
-	"eth:0xF616A4f81857CFEe54A4A049Ec187172574bd412"
+	"eth:0x2E5bcc9959dB5F5016F830E47943b07242CB2609"
	values.Executor.0:
-	"eth:0xF616A4f81857CFEe54A4A049Ec187172574bd412"
+	"eth:0x2E5bcc9959dB5F5016F830E47943b07242CB2609"
	values.Proposer.0:
-	"eth:0xF616A4f81857CFEe54A4A049Ec187172574bd412"
+	"eth:0x2E5bcc9959dB5F5016F830E47943b07242CB2609"
	}

	contract RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop (eth:0x1efDd13f831ceeEa14940806705A53D3211CD698) [risc0/RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop] {
	+++ description: A verifier wrapper for the eth:0xafB31f5b70623CDF4b20Ada3f7230916A5A79df9 that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.
	values.owner:
-	"eth:0xF616A4f81857CFEe54A4A049Ec187172574bd412"
+	"eth:0x2E5bcc9959dB5F5016F830E47943b07242CB2609"
	}

-	Status: DELETED
	contract KailuaGame (eth:0x4BE239c86364eD73fc244A5F50c8ccB101a492eF) [risc0/KailuaGame]
	+++ description: Implementation of the KailuaGame with type 1337. Based on this implementation, new KailuaGames are created with every new state root proposal.

	contract RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop (eth:0x68dC2cB4e61774873971c499D9b239ec5Ac540E3) [risc0/RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop] {
	+++ description: A verifier wrapper for the eth:0x20ff7C2Cf391a5F096A2Cc181cb41916680f8E97 that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.
	values.owner:
-	"eth:0xF616A4f81857CFEe54A4A049Ec187172574bd412"
+	"eth:0x2E5bcc9959dB5F5016F830E47943b07242CB2609"
	}

	EOA (eth:0x7cB1022D30b9860C36b243E7B181A1d46f618C69) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions:
+	[{"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x9937033Cc967eED9d753e31c77D2F146d002ae53","description":"propose new state roots before anyone else, giving a first-mover advantage on the optimistic clock.","role":".vanguard"}]
	}

	contract RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop (eth:0x844D5f01161E3559d36f23d0Aa9E9620949aF782) [risc0/RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop] {
	+++ description: A verifier wrapper for the eth:0x5005aBa3DFf7C940fcc1e48DccCAD611a80eEB85 that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.
	values.owner:
-	"eth:0xF616A4f81857CFEe54A4A049Ec187172574bd412"
+	"eth:0x2E5bcc9959dB5F5016F830E47943b07242CB2609"
	}

	contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0x96123dbFC3253185B594c6a7472EE5A21E9B1079) [opstack/DisputeGameFactory] {
	+++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them.
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.game1337:
-	"eth:0x4BE239c86364eD73fc244A5F50c8ccB101a492eF"
+	"eth:0xD37b0BEdD9094988a31dBbB6BF77dC97269E742b"
	}

-	Status: DELETED
	contract KailuaTreasury (eth:0x9B3E1661bccAF907893B71e4016c01513ae9263C) [risc0/KailuaTreasury]
	+++ description: Entrypoint for state root proposals. Manages bonds (currently 0.5 ETH) and tournaments for the OP Kailua state validation system, wrapping the OP stack native DisputeGameFactory. The current vanguard advantage is defined here as 0s.

	contract RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop (eth:0x9F9994Eb4Cb5200198FEfb470f8b50301662e696) [risc0/RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop] {
	+++ description: A verifier wrapper for the eth:0x2a098988600d87650Fb061FfAff08B97149Fa84D that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.
	values.owner:
-	"eth:0xF616A4f81857CFEe54A4A049Ec187172574bd412"
+	"eth:0x2E5bcc9959dB5F5016F830E47943b07242CB2609"
	}

	contract Bob Multisig 1 (eth:0xC91482A96e9c2A104d9298D1980eCCf8C4dc764E) [GnosisSafe] {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.9:
+	{"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xa23bf38299bbCbAA01b9ea8a1d3412D9f405b97d","role":"admin"}
	}

	contract RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop (eth:0xDa8f3de6fBBdb261Ac771B813a578A7aBdA6B2b1) [risc0/RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop] {
	+++ description: A verifier wrapper for the eth:0x54aCE3ED46529B4d4F3770C8Bad5dDC48717B9bF that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.
	values.owner:
-	"eth:0xF616A4f81857CFEe54A4A049Ec187172574bd412"
+	"eth:0x2E5bcc9959dB5F5016F830E47943b07242CB2609"
	}

	EOA (eth:0xF616A4f81857CFEe54A4A049Ec187172574bd412) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.0:
-	{"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711","description":"cancel queued transactions.","role":".Canceller"}
	receivedPermissions.1:
-	{"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711","description":"execute transactions that are ready.","role":".Executor"}
	receivedPermissions.2:
-	{"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711","description":"manage all access control roles.","role":".defaultAdminAC","via":[{"address":"eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711","delay":259200}]}
	receivedPermissions.3:
-	{"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711","description":"propose transactions.","role":".Proposer"}
	receivedPermissions.4:
-	{"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x1efDd13f831ceeEa14940806705A53D3211CD698","description":"pause the verifier.","role":".owner"}
	receivedPermissions.6:
-	{"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x68dC2cB4e61774873971c499D9b239ec5Ac540E3","description":"pause the verifier.","role":".owner"}
	receivedPermissions.7:
-	{"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x844D5f01161E3559d36f23d0Aa9E9620949aF782","description":"pause the verifier.","role":".owner"}
	receivedPermissions.8:
-	{"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x8EaB2D97Dfce405A1692a21b3ff3A172d593D319","description":"add/remove verifiers and the selectors they are mapped to.","role":".owner","via":[{"address":"eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711","delay":259200}]}
	receivedPermissions.9:
-	{"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x9F9994Eb4Cb5200198FEfb470f8b50301662e696","description":"pause the verifier.","role":".owner"}
	receivedPermissions.10:
-	{"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0xDa8f3de6fBBdb261Ac771B813a578A7aBdA6B2b1","description":"pause the verifier.","role":".owner"}
	directlyReceivedPermissions:
-	[{"permission":"act","from":"eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711","delay":259200,"role":".Executor"}]
	}

+	Status: CREATED
	contract Safe (eth:0x2E5bcc9959dB5F5016F830E47943b07242CB2609) [GnosisSafe]
	+++ description: None

+	Status: CREATED
	contract KailuaTreasury (eth:0x9937033Cc967eED9d753e31c77D2F146d002ae53) [risc0/KailuaTreasury]
	+++ description: Entrypoint for state root proposals. Manages bonds (currently 0.5 ETH) and tournaments for the OP Kailua state validation system, wrapping the OP stack native DisputeGameFactory. The current vanguard advantage is defined here as 1mo.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract KailuaVerifier (eth:0xa23bf38299bbCbAA01b9ea8a1d3412D9f405b97d) [N/A]
	+++ description: None

+	Status: CREATED
	contract KailuaGame (eth:0xD37b0BEdD9094988a31dBbB6BF77dC97269E742b) [risc0/KailuaGame]
	+++ description: Implementation of the KailuaGame with type 1337. Based on this implementation, new KailuaGames are created with every new state root proposal.

2026 March 12, 13:06 UTC

High severity

20changes

OptimismPortal2 and AnchorStateRegistry upgraded (same tx). proofMaturityDelaySeconds reduced from 604800 (7 days) to 86400 (1 day), disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds from 302400 (3.5 days) to 86400 (1 day). Actual withdrawal time still depends on Kailua game resolution / proof timing. Templates still match — no new functionality, just constructor parameter changes baked into the new implementations. OptimismPortal2 diff: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202/eth:0x3C877699263119022Cdaa251058c1BAc8Fc43287 AnchorStateRegistry diff: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xeb69cC681E8D4a557b30DFFBAd85aFfD47a2CF2E/eth:0xd0216bdcC195abDF77746B6a6347CE85e2535431

	contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0x8AdeE124447435fE03e3CD24dF3f4cAE32E65a3E) {
	+++ description: The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the KailuaGame.
	values.$implementation:
-	"eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202"
+	"eth:0x3C877699263119022Cdaa251058c1BAc8Fc43287"
	values.$pastUpgrades.10:
+	["2026-03-12T10:39:35.000Z","0x0c0e889a96e766d168753f3e596af7d57a9c07f7d84fb0ba05e3d46adf61ddd8",["eth:0x3C877699263119022Cdaa251058c1BAc8Fc43287"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	10
+	11
	values.disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds:
-	302400
+	86400
	values.proofMaturityDelaySeconds:
-	604800
+	86400
	implementationNames.eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202:
-	"OptimismPortal2"
	implementationNames.eth:0x3C877699263119022Cdaa251058c1BAc8Fc43287:
+	"OptimismPortal2"
	}

	contract AnchorStateRegistry (eth:0xC9AC21AcD8696B64270716528bF83630Ea7a293c) {
	+++ description: Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the KailuaGame.
	values.$implementation:
-	"eth:0xeb69cC681E8D4a557b30DFFBAd85aFfD47a2CF2E"
+	"eth:0xd0216bdcC195abDF77746B6a6347CE85e2535431"
	values.$pastUpgrades.1:
+	["2026-03-12T10:39:35.000Z","0x0c0e889a96e766d168753f3e596af7d57a9c07f7d84fb0ba05e3d46adf61ddd8",["eth:0xd0216bdcC195abDF77746B6a6347CE85e2535431"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	1
+	2
	values.disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds:
-	302400
+	86400
	implementationNames.eth:0xeb69cC681E8D4a557b30DFFBAd85aFfD47a2CF2E:
-	"AnchorStateRegistry"
	implementationNames.eth:0xd0216bdcC195abDF77746B6a6347CE85e2535431:
+	"AnchorStateRegistry"
	}

2026 March 06, 10:03 UTC

High severity

6changes

New KailuaGame and KailuaTreasury instances deployed with the same implementation code (identical source hashes). The ROLLUP CONFIG HASH changed (0x4910...→0x69d9...) in preparation for BOB's Jovian hardfork activation on March 12, 2026 (mainnet timestamp 1773325801). The Kailua config hash includes hardfork timestamps, so adding jovian time changes the hash. Ref: https://github.com/bob-collective/bob/pull/960. The KailuaTreasury L2 BLOCK NUMBER also advanced (29576476→29835945). KailuaGame diff: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xe34577E7d8bbdf044de236B15DF132B1409ca82a/eth:0x4BE239c86364eD73fc244A5F50c8ccB101a492eF KailuaTreasury diff: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xE99AF5F4C60E06Beb3827F4ffdD06E88c55fB895/eth:0x9B3E1661bccAF907893B71e4016c01513ae9263C

New KailuaGame and KailuaTreasury instances deployed with the same implementation code (identical source hashes). The ROLLUP_CONFIG_HASH changed (0x4910…→0x69d9…) in preparation for BOB’s Jovian hardfork activation on March 12, 2026 (mainnet timestamp 1773325801). The Kailua config hash includes hardfork timestamps, so adding jovian_time changes the hash. Ref: https://github.com/bob-collective/bob/pull/960. The KailuaTreasury L2_BLOCK_NUMBER also advanced (29576476→29835945).

KailuaGame diff: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xe34577E7d8bbdf044de236B15DF132B1409ca82a/eth:0x4BE239c86364eD73fc244A5F50c8ccB101a492eF

KailuaTreasury diff: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xE99AF5F4C60E06Beb3827F4ffdD06E88c55fB895/eth:0x9B3E1661bccAF907893B71e4016c01513ae9263C

	contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0x96123dbFC3253185B594c6a7472EE5A21E9B1079) {
	+++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them.
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.game1337:
-	"eth:0xe34577E7d8bbdf044de236B15DF132B1409ca82a"
+	"eth:0x4BE239c86364eD73fc244A5F50c8ccB101a492eF"
	}

-	Status: DELETED
	contract KailuaGame (eth:0xe34577E7d8bbdf044de236B15DF132B1409ca82a)
	+++ description: Implementation of the KailuaGame with type 1337. Based on this implementation, new KailuaGames are created with every new state root proposal.

-	Status: DELETED
	contract KailuaTreasury (eth:0xE99AF5F4C60E06Beb3827F4ffdD06E88c55fB895)
	+++ description: Entrypoint for state root proposals. Manages bonds (currently 0.5 ETH) and tournaments for the OP Kailua state validation system, wrapping the OP stack native DisputeGameFactory. The current vanguard advantage is defined here as 0s.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract KailuaGame (eth:0x4BE239c86364eD73fc244A5F50c8ccB101a492eF)
	+++ description: Implementation of the KailuaGame with type 1337. Based on this implementation, new KailuaGames are created with every new state root proposal.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract KailuaTreasury (eth:0x9B3E1661bccAF907893B71e4016c01513ae9263C)
	+++ description: Entrypoint for state root proposals. Manages bonds (currently 0.5 ETH) and tournaments for the OP Kailua state validation system, wrapping the OP stack native DisputeGameFactory. The current vanguard advantage is defined here as 0s.

2026 February 26, 22:02 UTC

High severity

7changes

BOB's Kailua dispute system was updated with new KailuaGame and KailuaTreasury contract instances. The DisputeGameFactory's game1337 implementation changed from 0xe4341585 to 0xe34577E7. The new KailuaTreasury (0xE99AF5F4) retains the 0.5 ETH participation bond but has no vanguard advantage set (previously 1 month). The source code change is the addition of an OP-Contracts v5 compatibility shim: an anchorStateRegistry() function that returns msg.sender , allowing withdrawals under op-contracts v5.0.0. The FPVM image ID also updated (0xf176eb82 → 0x4aca4abd), indicating a new ZK verification image for the RISC Zero prover. KailuaGame diff: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xe4341585B9BbC55A44C20A3C037058891e7A053b/eth:0xe34577E7d8bbdf044de236B15DF132B1409ca82a KailuaTreasury diff: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x6F27A23Fc28C18EB2C268BFe1d575E051Ad94420/eth:0xE99AF5F4C60E06Beb3827F4ffdD06E88c55fB895

BOB’s Kailua dispute system was updated with new KailuaGame and KailuaTreasury contract instances. The DisputeGameFactory’s game1337 implementation changed from 0xe4341585 to 0xe34577E7.

The new KailuaTreasury (0xE99AF5F4) retains the 0.5 ETH participation bond but has no vanguard advantage set (previously 1 month). The source code change is the addition of an OP-Contracts v5 compatibility shim: an anchorStateRegistry() function that returns msg.sender, allowing withdrawals under op-contracts v5.0.0.

The FPVM image ID also updated (0xf176eb82 → 0x4aca4abd), indicating a new ZK verification image for the RISC Zero prover.

KailuaGame diff: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xe4341585B9BbC55A44C20A3C037058891e7A053b/eth:0xe34577E7d8bbdf044de236B15DF132B1409ca82a

KailuaTreasury diff: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x6F27A23Fc28C18EB2C268BFe1d575E051Ad94420/eth:0xE99AF5F4C60E06Beb3827F4ffdD06E88c55fB895

-	Status: DELETED
	contract KailuaTreasury (eth:0x6F27A23Fc28C18EB2C268BFe1d575E051Ad94420)
	+++ description: Entrypoint for state root proposals. Manages bonds (currently 0.5 ETH) and tournaments for the OP Kailua state validation system, wrapping the OP stack native DisputeGameFactory. The current vanguard advantage is defined here as 1mo.

	EOA (eth:0x7cB1022D30b9860C36b243E7B181A1d46f618C69) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions:
-	[{"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x6F27A23Fc28C18EB2C268BFe1d575E051Ad94420","description":"propose new state roots before anyone else, giving a first-mover advantage on the optimistic clock.","role":".vanguard"}]
	}

	contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0x96123dbFC3253185B594c6a7472EE5A21E9B1079) {
	+++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them.
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.game1337:
-	"eth:0xe4341585B9BbC55A44C20A3C037058891e7A053b"
+	"eth:0xe34577E7d8bbdf044de236B15DF132B1409ca82a"
	}

-	Status: DELETED
	contract KailuaGame (eth:0xe4341585B9BbC55A44C20A3C037058891e7A053b)
	+++ description: Implementation of the KailuaGame with type 1337. Based on this implementation, new KailuaGames are created with every new state root proposal.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract KailuaGame (eth:0xe34577E7d8bbdf044de236B15DF132B1409ca82a)
	+++ description: Implementation of the KailuaGame with type 1337. Based on this implementation, new KailuaGames are created with every new state root proposal.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract KailuaTreasury (eth:0xE99AF5F4C60E06Beb3827F4ffdD06E88c55fB895)
	+++ description: Entrypoint for state root proposals. Manages bonds (currently 0.5 ETH) and tournaments for the OP Kailua state validation system, wrapping the OP stack native DisputeGameFactory. The current vanguard advantage is defined here as 0s.

Operator

The system has a centralized operator

The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.

MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

Users can force any transaction

Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.

Withdrawals

Regular exits

The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 1d. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 1d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.

Forced messaging

If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.

Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain

Other considerations

EVM compatible smart contracts are supported

OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.

Introducing EVM Equivalence

Permissions

A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions

Go to Disco

Explore in Disco

Ethereum

Actors:

Bob Multisig 10xC914…764E

A Multisig with 4/6 threshold.

Can upgrade with no delay
- DelayedWETH ProxyAdmin
- L1StandardBridge ProxyAdmin
- OptimismMintableERC20Factory ProxyAdmin
- L1ERC721Bridge ProxyAdmin
- OptimismPortal2 ProxyAdmin
- DisputeGameFactory ProxyAdmin
- KailuaVerifier
- SystemConfig ProxyAdmin
- AnchorStateRegistry ProxyAdmin
- L1CrossDomainMessenger ProxyAdmin
- SuperchainConfig ProxyAdmin
Can interact with SystemConfig
- it can update the preconfer address, the batch submitter (Sequencer) address and the gas configuration of the system
Can interact with SuperchainConfig
- Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless)
Can interact with AddressManager
- set and change address mappings ProxyAdmin

Participants (6):

0x32B8…C3D7 0x3C30…93aB 0xFB77…5BF6 0x8117…E7Ac 0xefCf…dD5C 0xA073…bda2

Safe0x2E5b…2609

A Multisig with 3/5 threshold.

Can interact with TimelockController
- cancel queued transactions
- execute transactions that are ready
- manage all access control roles with 3d delay TimelockController with 3d delay
- propose transactions
Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop
- pause the verifier
Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop
- pause the verifier
Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop
- pause the verifier
Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierRouter
- add/remove verifiers and the selectors they are mapped to with 3d delay TimelockController with 3d delay
Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop
- pause the verifier
Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop
- pause the verifier

Participants (5):

0x10B0…6A0E 0x7517…BdC7 0xbF58…73a4 0xd5D4…9926 0xDA8e…0A01

Used in:

EOA 10x08F9…1D11

Can interact with SystemConfig
- Allowed to commit transactions from the current layer to the host chain

EOA 20x7cB1…8C69

Can interact with KailuaTreasury
- propose new state roots before anyone else, giving a first-mover advantage on the optimistic clock

EOA 30xF616…d412

Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop
- pause the verifier

Used in:

Smart contracts

A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions

Go to Disco

Explore in Disco

A diagram of the smart contract architecture

Ethereum

RiscZeroGroth16Verifier0x20ff…8E97

Verifier contract for RISC Zero Groth16 proofs (version 2.0.0-rc.3).

Implementation used in:

RiscZeroGroth16Verifier0x2a09…a84D

Verifier contract for RISC Zero Groth16 proofs (version 3.0.0).

Implementation used in:

RiscZeroGroth16Verifier0x54aC…B9bF

Verifier contract for RISC Zero Groth16 proofs (version 2.0.3).

Implementation used in:

OptimismPortal2

Escrow

0x8Ade…5a3E Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the KailuaGame.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Bob Multisig 1

The following tokens are included in the value secured calculation:

Can be upgraded by:

Bob Multisig 1 with no delay

DisputeGameFactory0x9612…1079 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Bob Multisig 1

Can be upgraded by:

Bob Multisig 1 with no delay

Implementation used in:

SystemConfig0xACB8…5393 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Bob Multisig 1
- batcherHash: EOA 1
- owner: Bob Multisig 1

Can be upgraded by:

Bob Multisig 1 with no delay

Implementation used in:

RiscZeroGroth16Verifier0xafB3…9df9

Verifier contract for RISC Zero Groth16 proofs (version 2.2.0).

Implementation used in:

RiscZeroGroth16Verifier0xf70a…E93C

Verifier contract for RISC Zero Groth16 proofs. This older implementation exposes control-root and selector constants but does not expose a VERSION getter.

Implementation used in:

SuperchainConfig0xE925…5C46 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3mo 1d if left untouched.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Bob Multisig 1
- guardian: Bob Multisig 1

Can be upgraded by:

Bob Multisig 1 with no delay

Implementation used in:

L1StandardBridge

Escrow

0x3F6c…c1f7 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Bob Multisig 1

All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation.

Can be upgraded by:

Bob Multisig 1 with no delay

Implementation used in:

L1ERC721Bridge0x5fF9…D50a Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Bob Multisig 1

Can be upgraded by:

Bob Multisig 1 with no delay

Implementation used in:

L1CrossDomainMessenger0xE3d9…7EdA Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain’s epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Bob Multisig 1

Can be upgraded by:

Bob Multisig 1 with no delay

Implementation used in:

L1ERC20TokenBridge

Escrow

0x091d…5B72 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Escrow for custom external tokens that use the canonical bridge for messaging but are governed externally.

The following tokens are included in the value secured calculation:

TimelockController0x0b14…b711

A timelock with access control. The current minimum delay is 3d.

Roles:
- canceller: Safe
- defaultAdmin: TimelockController; ultimately Safe
- executor: Safe
- proposer: Safe

Implementation used in:

ProxyAdmin0x0d9f…7Cd0

Roles:
- owner: Bob Multisig 1

PermissionedDisputeGame0x15F8…d19A

Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger.

DelayedWETH0x1A08…B35d Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Bob Multisig 1

Can be upgraded by:

Bob Multisig 1 with no delay

Implementation used in:

RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop0x1efD…D698

A verifier wrapper for the RiscZeroGroth16Verifier that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.

Roles:
- owner: Safe

Implementation used in:

PreimageOracle0x1fb8…aDD3

The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game.

Implementation used in:

RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop0x44c2…33e7

A verifier wrapper for the RiscZeroGroth16Verifier that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.

Roles:
- owner: EOA 3

Implementation used in:

RiscZeroSetVerifier0x5005…EB85

Set verifier contract for RISC Zero proofs (version 0.9.0). It allows verifying a whole set of proofs identified with a Merkle root at once, afterwards each individual proof could be efficiently verified just by checking Merkle inclusion against the verified root.

Implementation used in:

OptimismMintableERC20Factory0x5557…9cb6 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it’s deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain’s representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Bob Multisig 1

Can be upgraded by:

Bob Multisig 1 with no delay

Implementation used in:

MIPS0x6463…B908

The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.

Implementation used in:

RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop0x68dC…40E3

A verifier wrapper for the RiscZeroGroth16Verifier that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.

Roles:
- owner: Safe

Implementation used in:

RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop0x844D…F782

A verifier wrapper for the RiscZeroSetVerifier that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.

Roles:
- owner: Safe

Implementation used in:

RiscZeroVerifierRouter0x8EaB…D319

A router proxy that routes to verifiers based on selectors. The mapping can be changed by a permissioned owner (TimelockController).

Roles:
- owner: TimelockController; ultimately Safe

Implementation used in:

KailuaTreasury0x9937…ae53

Entrypoint for state root proposals. Manages bonds (currently 0.5 ETH) and tournaments for the OP Kailua state validation system, wrapping the OP stack native DisputeGameFactory. The current vanguard advantage is defined here as 1mo.

Roles:
- vanguard: EOA 2

RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop0x9F99…e696

A verifier wrapper for the RiscZeroGroth16Verifier that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.

Roles:
- owner: Safe

Implementation used in:

KailuaVerifier0xa23b…b97d Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Roles:
- admin: Bob Multisig 1

Can be upgraded by:

Bob Multisig 1 with no delay

ProxyAdmin0xa70d…3E1c

Roles:
- owner: Bob Multisig 1

AnchorStateRegistry0xC9AC…293c Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the KailuaGame.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Bob Multisig 1

Can be upgraded by:

Bob Multisig 1 with no delay

KailuaGame0xD37b…742b

Implementation of the KailuaGame with type 1337. Based on this implementation, new KailuaGames are created with every new state root proposal.

RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop0xDa8f…B2b1

A verifier wrapper for the RiscZeroGroth16Verifier that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.

Roles:
- owner: Safe

Implementation used in:

The current deployment carries some associated risks:

Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).

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Name	Hash	Repository	Verification	Used in

	0xb2e2...c2bf	Github

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BOB

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Funds can be stolen if

Funds can be frozen if

MEV can be extracted if

All data required for proofs is published on chain

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Past upgrades

The system has a centralized operator

Users can force any transaction

Regular exits

Forced messaging

EVM compatible smart contracts are supported

Ethereum

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Ethereum

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