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BOB
There are impactful changes and part of the information might be outdated.
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About
BOB (Build on Bitcoin) is an OP Stack rollup that aims to natively support the Bitcoin stack. The current implementation supports a variety of canonical and external bridging for BTC-related assets and a tBTC-v2 LightRelay smart contract for verifying... Bitcoin transaction proofs through their blocks' headers on the L2.
Badges
About
BOB (Build on Bitcoin) is an OP Stack rollup that aims to natively support the Bitcoin stack. The current implementation supports a variety of canonical and external bridging for BTC-related assets and a tBTC-v2 LightRelay smart contract for verifying... Bitcoin transaction proofs through their blocks' headers on the L2.
2025 May 28 — 2026 May 28
The section shows the operating costs that L2s pay to Ethereum.
2025 May 28 — 2026 May 28
This section shows how much data the project publishes to its data-availability (DA) layer over time. The project currently posts data to
Ethereum.
2025 May 28 — 2026 May 28
This section shows how "live" the project's operators are by displaying how frequently they submit transactions of the selected type. It also highlights anomalies - significant deviations from their typical schedule.
Last 30 day anomalies
All liveness anomalies detected for this project in the last 30 days, helping you review recent downtime and availability issues.
No State updates were performed for 24h 13m (from 2026 May 04, 11:30 UTC until 2026 May 05, 11:43 UTC). These typically occur every 11h 50m 11s on average.
Kona derivation bug
2025 Dec 5th
To fix a bug in the Kona derivation, the proof system is updated and a state root manually resolved.
Proof System Intervention
2025 Jul 24th
A state root proposal is manually resolved after changing the finalization config.
Funds can be stolen if
- a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL),
- the validity proof cryptography is broken or implemented incorrectly,
- no challenger checks the published state,
- the proposer routes proof verification through a malicious or faulty verifier by specifying an unsafe route selector.
Funds can be frozen if
MEV can be extracted if
Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Single round proofs (1R) prove the validity of a state proposal, only requiring a single transaction to resolve. A fault proof eliminates a state proposal by proving that any intermediate state transition in the proposal results in a different state root. For either, a ZK proof is used.
All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.
There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.
The primary whitelisted proposer currently has no optimistic advantage (vanguardAdvantage = 0), so this privilege is disabled (not active). Anyone can leverage the source available zk prover to prove a fault or a conflicting valid proposal to win against the privileged proposer and/or supply a bond and make a counter proposal immediately.
All data required for proofs is published on chain
All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.
- Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs
- BatchInbox - address
- OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function
Ethereum
Proposers submit state roots as children of any (possibly unresolved) previous state root proposal, by calling the propose() function in the KailuaTreasury. A parent state root can have multiple conflicting children, composing a tournament. Each proposer requires to lock a bond, currently set to 0.5 ETH, that can be slashed if any proposal made by them is proven incorrect via a fault proof or a conflicting validity proof. The bond can be withdrawn once the proposer has no more pending proposals that need to be resolved and was not eliminated.
Proposals consist of a state root and a reference to their parent and implicitly challenge any sibling proposals who have the same parent. A proposal asserts that the proposed state root constitutes a valid state transition from the parent’s state root. To offer efficient zk fault proofs, each proposal must include 3600 intermediate state commitments, each spanning 6 L2 blocks.
Proposals target sequential tournament epochs of currently 3600 * 6 L2 blocks. A tournament with a resolved parent tournament, a single child- and no conflicting sibling proposals can be resolved after 3d.
The Vanguard is configured with vanguardAdvantage = 0, so this advantage is currently disabled (not active) and child proposals are permissionless immediately.
Any conflicting sibling proposals within a tournament that are made within the 3d challenge period of a proposal they are challenging, delay resolving the tournament until sufficient ZK proofs are published to leave one single tournament survivor.
In the tree of proposed state roots, each parent node can have multiple children. These children are indirectly challenging each other in a tournament, which can only be resolved if but a single child survives. A state root can be resolved if it is the only remaining proposal due to any combination of the following elimination methods:
- the proposal’s challenge period of 3d has ended before a conflicting proposal was made
- the proposal is proven correct with a full validity proof (invalidates all conflicting proposals)
- a conflicting sibling proposal is proven faulty
Proving any of the 3600 intermediate state commitments in a proposal faulty invalidates the entire proposal. Proving a proposal valid invalidates all conflicting siblings. Pruning of a tournament’s children happens strictly chronologically, which guarantees that the first faulty proposal of a given proposer is always pruned first. When pruned, an invalid proposal leads to the elimination of its proposer, which invalidates all their subsequent proposals, slashes their bond, and disallows future proposals by the same address. A slashed bond is transferred to an address chosen by the prover who caused the slashing.
A single remaining child in a tournament can be ‘resolved’ and will be finalized and usable for withdrawals after an execution delay of 1d (time for the Guardian to manually blacklist malicious state roots).
Validity proofs and fault proofs both must be accompanied by a ZK proof that ensures that the new state was derived by correctly applying a series of valid user transactions to the previous state. These proofs are then verified on Ethereum by a smart contract.
The Kailua state validation system is primarily optimistically resolved, so no validity proofs are required in the happy case. But two different zk proofs on unresolved state roots are possible and permissionless: The proveValidity() function proves a state root proposal’s full validity, automatically invalidating all conflicting sibling proposals. proveOutputFault() allows any actor to eliminate a state root proposal for which they can prove that any of the 3600 intermediate state transitions in the proposal are not correct. Both are zk proofs of validity, although one is used as an efficient fault proof to invalidate a single conflicting state transition.
Funds can be stolen if the validity proof cryptography is broken or implemented incorrectly.
Funds can be stolen if no challenger checks the published state.
Funds can be stolen if the proposer routes proof verification through a malicious or faulty verifier by specifying an unsafe route selector.
Funds can be frozen if a verifier needed for a given proof is paused by its permissioned owner.
Trusted Setups
Onchain verifier
Used in
Onchain verifier | Used in |
Program Hashes
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0x4aca...7b25 | Code unknown | None | | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
0x7090...2cc9 | | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Past upgrades
The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.
2026 March 12, 13:06 UTCHigh severity20changesOptimismPortal2 and AnchorStateRegistry upgraded (same tx). proofMaturityDelaySeconds reduced from 604800 (7 days) to 86400 (1 day), disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds from 302400 (3.5 days) to 86400 (1 day). Actual withdrawal time still depends on Kailua game resolution / proof timing. Templates still match — no new functionality, just constructor parameter changes baked into the new implementations. OptimismPortal2 diff: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202/eth:0x3C877699263119022Cdaa251058c1BAc8Fc43287 AnchorStateRegistry diff: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xeb69cC681E8D4a557b30DFFBAd85aFfD47a2CF2E/eth:0xd0216bdcC195abDF77746B6a6347CE85e2535431
OptimismPortal2 and AnchorStateRegistry upgraded (same tx). proofMaturityDelaySeconds reduced from 604800 (7 days) to 86400 (1 day), disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds from 302400 (3.5 days) to 86400 (1 day). Actual withdrawal time still depends on Kailua game resolution / proof timing. Templates still match — no new functionality, just constructor parameter changes baked into the new implementations. OptimismPortal2 diff: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202/eth:0x3C877699263119022Cdaa251058c1BAc8Fc43287 AnchorStateRegistry diff: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xeb69cC681E8D4a557b30DFFBAd85aFfD47a2CF2E/eth:0xd0216bdcC195abDF77746B6a6347CE85e2535431
| contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0x8AdeE124447435fE03e3CD24dF3f4cAE32E65a3E) { | |
| +++ description: The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the KailuaGame. | |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202" |
| + | "eth:0x3C877699263119022Cdaa251058c1BAc8Fc43287" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.10: | |
| + | ["2026-03-12T10:39:35.000Z","0x0c0e889a96e766d168753f3e596af7d57a9c07f7d84fb0ba05e3d46adf61ddd8",["eth:0x3C877699263119022Cdaa251058c1BAc8Fc43287"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 10 |
| + | 11 |
| values.disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds: | |
| - | 302400 |
| + | 86400 |
| values.proofMaturityDelaySeconds: | |
| - | 604800 |
| + | 86400 |
| implementationNames.eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202: | |
| - | "OptimismPortal2" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x3C877699263119022Cdaa251058c1BAc8Fc43287: | |
| + | "OptimismPortal2" |
| } |
| contract AnchorStateRegistry (eth:0xC9AC21AcD8696B64270716528bF83630Ea7a293c) { | |
| +++ description: Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the KailuaGame. | |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0xeb69cC681E8D4a557b30DFFBAd85aFfD47a2CF2E" |
| + | "eth:0xd0216bdcC195abDF77746B6a6347CE85e2535431" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.1: | |
| + | ["2026-03-12T10:39:35.000Z","0x0c0e889a96e766d168753f3e596af7d57a9c07f7d84fb0ba05e3d46adf61ddd8",["eth:0xd0216bdcC195abDF77746B6a6347CE85e2535431"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 1 |
| + | 2 |
| values.disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds: | |
| - | 302400 |
| + | 86400 |
| implementationNames.eth:0xeb69cC681E8D4a557b30DFFBAd85aFfD47a2CF2E: | |
| - | "AnchorStateRegistry" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xd0216bdcC195abDF77746B6a6347CE85e2535431: | |
| + | "AnchorStateRegistry" |
| } |
2026 March 06, 10:03 UTCHigh severity6changesNew KailuaGame and KailuaTreasury instances deployed with the same implementation code (identical source hashes). The ROLLUP CONFIG HASH changed (0x4910...→0x69d9...) in preparation for BOB's Jovian hardfork activation on March 12, 2026 (mainnet timestamp 1773325801). The Kailua config hash includes hardfork timestamps, so adding jovian time changes the hash. Ref: https://github.com/bob-collective/bob/pull/960. The KailuaTreasury L2 BLOCK NUMBER also advanced (29576476→29835945). KailuaGame diff: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xe34577E7d8bbdf044de236B15DF132B1409ca82a/eth:0x4BE239c86364eD73fc244A5F50c8ccB101a492eF KailuaTreasury diff: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xE99AF5F4C60E06Beb3827F4ffdD06E88c55fB895/eth:0x9B3E1661bccAF907893B71e4016c01513ae9263C
New KailuaGame and KailuaTreasury instances deployed with the same implementation code (identical source hashes). The ROLLUP_CONFIG_HASH changed (0x4910…→0x69d9…) in preparation for BOB’s Jovian hardfork activation on March 12, 2026 (mainnet timestamp 1773325801). The Kailua config hash includes hardfork timestamps, so adding jovian_time changes the hash. Ref: https://github.com/bob-collective/bob/pull/960. The KailuaTreasury L2_BLOCK_NUMBER also advanced (29576476→29835945).
KailuaGame diff: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xe34577E7d8bbdf044de236B15DF132B1409ca82a/eth:0x4BE239c86364eD73fc244A5F50c8ccB101a492eF
KailuaTreasury diff: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xE99AF5F4C60E06Beb3827F4ffdD06E88c55fB895/eth:0x9B3E1661bccAF907893B71e4016c01513ae9263C
| contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0x96123dbFC3253185B594c6a7472EE5A21E9B1079) { | |
| +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. | |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.game1337: | |
| - | "eth:0xe34577E7d8bbdf044de236B15DF132B1409ca82a" |
| + | "eth:0x4BE239c86364eD73fc244A5F50c8ccB101a492eF" |
| } |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract KailuaGame (eth:0xe34577E7d8bbdf044de236B15DF132B1409ca82a) | |
| +++ description: Implementation of the KailuaGame with type 1337. Based on this implementation, new KailuaGames are created with every new state root proposal. |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract KailuaTreasury (eth:0xE99AF5F4C60E06Beb3827F4ffdD06E88c55fB895) | |
| +++ description: Entrypoint for state root proposals. Manages bonds (currently 0.5 ETH) and tournaments for the OP Kailua state validation system, wrapping the OP stack native DisputeGameFactory. The current vanguard advantage is defined here as 0s. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract KailuaGame (eth:0x4BE239c86364eD73fc244A5F50c8ccB101a492eF) | |
| +++ description: Implementation of the KailuaGame with type 1337. Based on this implementation, new KailuaGames are created with every new state root proposal. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract KailuaTreasury (eth:0x9B3E1661bccAF907893B71e4016c01513ae9263C) | |
| +++ description: Entrypoint for state root proposals. Manages bonds (currently 0.5 ETH) and tournaments for the OP Kailua state validation system, wrapping the OP stack native DisputeGameFactory. The current vanguard advantage is defined here as 0s. |
2026 February 26, 22:02 UTCHigh severity7changesBOB's Kailua dispute system was updated with new KailuaGame and KailuaTreasury contract instances. The DisputeGameFactory's game1337 implementation changed from 0xe4341585 to 0xe34577E7. The new KailuaTreasury (0xE99AF5F4) retains the 0.5 ETH participation bond but has no vanguard advantage set (previously 1 month). The source code change is the addition of an OP-Contracts v5 compatibility shim: an anchorStateRegistry() function that returns msg.sender , allowing withdrawals under op-contracts v5.0.0. The FPVM image ID also updated (0xf176eb82 → 0x4aca4abd), indicating a new ZK verification image for the RISC Zero prover. KailuaGame diff: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xe4341585B9BbC55A44C20A3C037058891e7A053b/eth:0xe34577E7d8bbdf044de236B15DF132B1409ca82a KailuaTreasury diff: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x6F27A23Fc28C18EB2C268BFe1d575E051Ad94420/eth:0xE99AF5F4C60E06Beb3827F4ffdD06E88c55fB895
BOB’s Kailua dispute system was updated with new KailuaGame and KailuaTreasury contract instances. The DisputeGameFactory’s game1337 implementation changed from 0xe4341585 to 0xe34577E7.
The new KailuaTreasury (0xE99AF5F4) retains the 0.5 ETH participation bond but has no vanguard advantage set (previously 1 month). The source code change is the addition of an OP-Contracts v5 compatibility shim: an anchorStateRegistry() function that returns msg.sender, allowing withdrawals under op-contracts v5.0.0.
The FPVM image ID also updated (0xf176eb82 → 0x4aca4abd), indicating a new ZK verification image for the RISC Zero prover.
KailuaGame diff: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xe4341585B9BbC55A44C20A3C037058891e7A053b/eth:0xe34577E7d8bbdf044de236B15DF132B1409ca82a
KailuaTreasury diff: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x6F27A23Fc28C18EB2C268BFe1d575E051Ad94420/eth:0xE99AF5F4C60E06Beb3827F4ffdD06E88c55fB895
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract KailuaTreasury (eth:0x6F27A23Fc28C18EB2C268BFe1d575E051Ad94420) | |
| +++ description: Entrypoint for state root proposals. Manages bonds (currently 0.5 ETH) and tournaments for the OP Kailua state validation system, wrapping the OP stack native DisputeGameFactory. The current vanguard advantage is defined here as 1mo. |
| EOA (eth:0x7cB1022D30b9860C36b243E7B181A1d46f618C69) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| receivedPermissions: | |
| - | [{"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x6F27A23Fc28C18EB2C268BFe1d575E051Ad94420","description":"propose new state roots before anyone else, giving a first-mover advantage on the optimistic clock.","role":".vanguard"}] |
| } |
| contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0x96123dbFC3253185B594c6a7472EE5A21E9B1079) { | |
| +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. | |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.game1337: | |
| - | "eth:0xe4341585B9BbC55A44C20A3C037058891e7A053b" |
| + | "eth:0xe34577E7d8bbdf044de236B15DF132B1409ca82a" |
| } |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract KailuaGame (eth:0xe4341585B9BbC55A44C20A3C037058891e7A053b) | |
| +++ description: Implementation of the KailuaGame with type 1337. Based on this implementation, new KailuaGames are created with every new state root proposal. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract KailuaGame (eth:0xe34577E7d8bbdf044de236B15DF132B1409ca82a) | |
| +++ description: Implementation of the KailuaGame with type 1337. Based on this implementation, new KailuaGames are created with every new state root proposal. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract KailuaTreasury (eth:0xE99AF5F4C60E06Beb3827F4ffdD06E88c55fB895) | |
| +++ description: Entrypoint for state root proposals. Manages bonds (currently 0.5 ETH) and tournaments for the OP Kailua state validation system, wrapping the OP stack native DisputeGameFactory. The current vanguard advantage is defined here as 0s. |
2026 January 27, 16:44 UTCHigh severity4changesNew KailuaGame implementation (type 1337) deployed with OP-Contracts v5 compatibility patch. The new implementation adds a mock anchorStateRegistry() function that returns msg.sender as a workaround - OP-Contracts v5 expects dispute games to have this function for withdrawal finalization. Diff: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x1E987CF54A39CA2AC5FdC97DCaFbbB805ef356bD/eth:0xe4341585B9BbC55A44C20A3C037058891e7A053b
New KailuaGame implementation (type 1337) deployed with OP-Contracts v5 compatibility patch. The new implementation adds a mock anchorStateRegistry() function that returns msg.sender as a workaround - OP-Contracts v5 expects dispute games to have this function for withdrawal finalization.
Diff: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x1E987CF54A39CA2AC5FdC97DCaFbbB805ef356bD/eth:0xe4341585B9BbC55A44C20A3C037058891e7A053b
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract KailuaGame (eth:0x1E987CF54A39CA2AC5FdC97DCaFbbB805ef356bD) | |
| +++ description: Implementation of the KailuaGame with type 1337. Based on this implementation, new KailuaGames are created with every new state root proposal. |
| contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0x96123dbFC3253185B594c6a7472EE5A21E9B1079) { | |
| +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. | |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.game1337: | |
| - | "eth:0x1E987CF54A39CA2AC5FdC97DCaFbbB805ef356bD" |
| + | "eth:0xe4341585B9BbC55A44C20A3C037058891e7A053b" |
| } |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract KailuaGame (eth:0xe4341585B9BbC55A44C20A3C037058891e7A053b) | |
| +++ description: Implementation of the KailuaGame with type 1337. Based on this implementation, new KailuaGames are created with every new state root proposal. |
2026 January 21, 10:01 UTCHigh severity165changesUpgraded to op-contracts v1.8.0-rc.4 (isthmus). Major version upgrades: OptimismPortal2 3.14.0 → 5.1.1, SystemConfig 2.5.0 → 3.11.0, L1CrossDomainMessenger 2.6.0 → 2.11.0, L1StandardBridge 2.3.0 → 2.8.0, L1ERC721Bridge 2.4.0 → 2.9.0, DisputeGameFactory 1.0.1 → 1.3.0. New dispute game infrastructure deployed with MIPS64, PermissionedDisputeGame, DelayedWETH, and AnchorStateRegistry at new addresses. SystemConfig maximumGasLimit increased from 200M to 500M. Notable changes specific to Bob: disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds increased from 1 day to 3.5 days, proofMaturityDelaySeconds increased from 1 day to 7 days. SuperchainConfig upgraded to v2.4.0 with pause expiry feature (3mo 1d).
Upgraded to op-contracts v1.8.0-rc.4 (isthmus). Major version upgrades: OptimismPortal2 3.14.0 → 5.1.1, SystemConfig 2.5.0 → 3.11.0, L1CrossDomainMessenger 2.6.0 → 2.11.0, L1StandardBridge 2.3.0 → 2.8.0, L1ERC721Bridge 2.4.0 → 2.9.0, DisputeGameFactory 1.0.1 → 1.3.0. New dispute game infrastructure deployed with MIPS64, PermissionedDisputeGame, DelayedWETH, and AnchorStateRegistry at new addresses. SystemConfig maximumGasLimit increased from 200M to 500M.
Notable changes specific to Bob: disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds increased from 1 day to 3.5 days, proofMaturityDelaySeconds increased from 1 day to 7 days. SuperchainConfig upgraded to v2.4.0 with pause expiry feature (3mo 1d).
| contract ProxyAdmin (eth:0x0d9f416260598313Be6FDf6B010f2FbC34957Cd0) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| directlyReceivedPermissions.1.from: | |
| - | "eth:0x3a1D54496cf461fFc96d3b1a8A0B43B091ea3c13" |
| + | "eth:0x1A08BA77CB95184Ea0C31e56f199Db068eb6B35d" |
| directlyReceivedPermissions.8: | |
| + | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xC9AC21AcD8696B64270716528bF83630Ea7a293c","role":"admin"} |
| directlyReceivedPermissions.9: | |
| - | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xeBA14d52F1b19cA65455E5ECaB72D2FfD9e43fEF","role":"admin"} |
| } |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract DelayedWETH (eth:0x3a1D54496cf461fFc96d3b1a8A0B43B091ea3c13) | |
| +++ description: Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds. |
| contract L1StandardBridge (eth:0x3F6cE1b36e5120BBc59D0cFe8A5aC8b6464ac1f7) { | |
| +++ description: The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x4e15d99844dc5a4304c2396a66c95ec41218ea311c8e524b118fad7beed0bb53" |
| + | "0x0114d3af66179d6404d14360203dc6bcf404f23e2db4ee1b5848e923e131bc00" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x0b09ba359A106C9ea3b181CBc5F394570c7d2a7A" |
| + | "eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A" |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.3.0" |
| + | "2.8.0" |
| values.initVersion: | |
| + | 3 |
| values.proxyAdmin: | |
| + | "eth:0x0d9f416260598313Be6FDf6B010f2FbC34957Cd0" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| + | "eth:0xC91482A96e9c2A104d9298D1980eCCf8C4dc764E" |
| values.systemConfig: | |
| + | "eth:0xACB886b75D76d1c8d9248cFdDfA09b70C71c5393" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x0b09ba359A106C9ea3b181CBc5F394570c7d2a7A: | |
| - | "L1StandardBridge" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A: | |
| + | "L1StandardBridge" |
| } |
| contract OptimismMintableERC20Factory (eth:0x5557408ab14013ce9Dbb300dE0D87D386BB09cb6) { | |
| +++ description: A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it's deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain's representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x9650b4bba6299e410f01a369a95a2c57e1c3ca35f0d80c13f4f59fc468f370e5" |
| + | "0x25bad2bdb7df4347412a48e271dea1489299460192b43b8ca52ed191b4940992" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x5493f4677A186f64805fe7317D6993ba4863988F" |
| + | "eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.5: | |
| + | ["2026-01-20T14:40:23.000Z","0xd025dbac937aa7bd1c53511421d35cc97c18a848ebb123cc85e910ab517a8922",["eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 5 |
| + | 6 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "1.10.1" |
| + | "1.10.2" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x5493f4677A186f64805fe7317D6993ba4863988F: | |
| - | "OptimismMintableERC20Factory" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB: | |
| + | "OptimismMintableERC20Factory" |
| } |
| contract L1ERC721Bridge (eth:0x5fF93263D5181b2A826f8c51d54BC0da2d20D50a) { | |
| +++ description: Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x28669b49da3effd51f0f9424ca9cdd455c5b9327c09a40c65fc06f114a6eb837" |
| + | "0x75cd470a9d1c1afc343b599b1c14731f55bb36fe8a4e844ddb88a0b791918795" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x7aE1d3BD877a4C5CA257404ce26BE93A02C98013" |
| + | "eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.7: | |
| + | ["2026-01-20T14:40:23.000Z","0xd025dbac937aa7bd1c53511421d35cc97c18a848ebb123cc85e910ab517a8922",["eth:0x7f1d12fB2911EB095278085f721e644C1f675696"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.8: | |
| + | ["2026-01-20T14:40:23.000Z","0xd025dbac937aa7bd1c53511421d35cc97c18a848ebb123cc85e910ab517a8922",["eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 7 |
| + | 9 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.4.0" |
| + | "2.9.0" |
| values.initVersion: | |
| + | 3 |
| values.proxyAdmin: | |
| + | "eth:0x0d9f416260598313Be6FDf6B010f2FbC34957Cd0" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| + | "eth:0xC91482A96e9c2A104d9298D1980eCCf8C4dc764E" |
| values.systemConfig: | |
| + | "eth:0xACB886b75D76d1c8d9248cFdDfA09b70C71c5393" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x7aE1d3BD877a4C5CA257404ce26BE93A02C98013: | |
| - | "L1ERC721Bridge" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9: | |
| + | "L1ERC721Bridge" |
| } |
| contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0x8AdeE124447435fE03e3CD24dF3f4cAE32E65a3E) { | |
| +++ description: The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the KailuaGame. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0xc483ef9e0a5ec2a0450732e743b3784de0cd3876b8fadfce14c0805a0846d26b" |
| + | "0xec3fef2865ee3bd465fea37851bfc490f143eba36d1e45d220832d39770aa8f2" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0xB250566074B3c0f1B109A531A83f3d9B1a579273" |
| + | "eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.8: | |
| + | ["2026-01-20T14:40:23.000Z","0xd025dbac937aa7bd1c53511421d35cc97c18a848ebb123cc85e910ab517a8922",["eth:0x381E729FF983FA4BCEd820e7b922d79bF653B999"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.9: | |
| + | ["2026-01-20T14:40:23.000Z","0xd025dbac937aa7bd1c53511421d35cc97c18a848ebb123cc85e910ab517a8922",["eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 8 |
| + | 10 |
| values.disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds: | |
| - | 86400 |
| + | 302400 |
| values.proofMaturityDelaySeconds: | |
| - | 86400 |
| + | 604800 |
| values.respectedGameTypeUpdatedAt: | |
| - | 1752761915 |
| + | 1768920023 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "3.14.0" |
| + | "5.1.1" |
| values.anchorStateRegistry: | |
| + | "eth:0xC9AC21AcD8696B64270716528bF83630Ea7a293c" |
| values.ethLockbox: | |
| + | "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" |
| values.initVersion: | |
| + | 3 |
| values.proxyAdmin: | |
| + | "eth:0x0d9f416260598313Be6FDf6B010f2FbC34957Cd0" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| + | "eth:0xC91482A96e9c2A104d9298D1980eCCf8C4dc764E" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xB250566074B3c0f1B109A531A83f3d9B1a579273: | |
| - | "OptimismPortal2" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202: | |
| + | "OptimismPortal2" |
| } |
| contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0x96123dbFC3253185B594c6a7472EE5A21E9B1079) { | |
| +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x85ca17941ef36ac6b28a4f8f89803d0d41ef419c47586dcd3acdb47ee9617285" |
| + | "0x19f3f7c7ee3977705261bfb86f826d5f97b885796f2246be7cc3e815c3e95dca" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x4bbA758F006Ef09402eF31724203F316ab74e4a0" |
| + | "eth:0x74Fac1D45B98bae058F8F566201c9A81B85C7D50" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.2: | |
| + | ["2026-01-20T14:40:23.000Z","0xd025dbac937aa7bd1c53511421d35cc97c18a848ebb123cc85e910ab517a8922",["eth:0x33D1e8571a85a538ed3D5A4d88f46C112383439D"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.3: | |
| + | ["2026-01-20T14:40:23.000Z","0xd025dbac937aa7bd1c53511421d35cc97c18a848ebb123cc85e910ab517a8922",["eth:0x74Fac1D45B98bae058F8F566201c9A81B85C7D50"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 2 |
| + | 4 |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.gameImpls.1: | |
| - | "eth:0xe3BD00F57B44E7aa4A6C212878427c85D638702A" |
| + | "eth:0x15F80920C8Fec136e2A804E04f26203FF8dAd19A" |
| values.version: | |
| - | "1.0.1" |
| + | "1.3.0" |
| values.initVersion: | |
| + | 1 |
| values.proxyAdmin: | |
| + | "eth:0x0d9f416260598313Be6FDf6B010f2FbC34957Cd0" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| + | "eth:0xC91482A96e9c2A104d9298D1980eCCf8C4dc764E" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x4bbA758F006Ef09402eF31724203F316ab74e4a0: | |
| - | "DisputeGameFactory" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x74Fac1D45B98bae058F8F566201c9A81B85C7D50: | |
| + | "DisputeGameFactory" |
| } |
| contract SystemConfig (eth:0xACB886b75D76d1c8d9248cFdDfA09b70C71c5393) { | |
| +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x921de6fc906d159fdcef862d2b9559063f5e7b9b7588fa5f33153360ddf296e7" |
| + | "0x09e12b8c0307a4da75a8b84ed7c88ced81e386ec09025ec5b36873b4f69614d0" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x340f923E5c7cbB2171146f64169EC9d5a9FfE647" |
| + | "eth:0x2fA28989fc559836E9d66dFf3010C7F7f41c65ED" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.8: | |
| + | ["2026-01-20T14:40:23.000Z","0xd025dbac937aa7bd1c53511421d35cc97c18a848ebb123cc85e910ab517a8922",["eth:0x2bFE4A5Bd5A41e9d848d843ebCDFa15954e9A557"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.9: | |
| + | ["2026-01-20T14:40:23.000Z","0xd025dbac937aa7bd1c53511421d35cc97c18a848ebb123cc85e910ab517a8922",["eth:0x2fA28989fc559836E9d66dFf3010C7F7f41c65ED"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 8 |
| + | 10 |
| values.DISPUTE_GAME_FACTORY_SLOT: | |
| - | "0x52322a25d9f59ea17656545543306b7aef62bc0cc53a0e65ccfa0c75b97aa906" |
| values.getAddresses.disputeGameFactory: | |
| - | "eth:0x96123dbFC3253185B594c6a7472EE5A21E9B1079" |
| values.maximumGasLimit: | |
| - | 200000000 |
| + | 500000000 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.5.0" |
| + | "3.11.0" |
| values.daFootprintGasScalar: | |
| + | 0 |
| values.guardian: | |
| + | "eth:0xC91482A96e9c2A104d9298D1980eCCf8C4dc764E" |
| values.initVersion: | |
| + | 3 |
| values.l2ChainId: | |
| + | 60808 |
| values.minBaseFee: | |
| + | 0 |
| values.paused: | |
| + | false |
| values.proxyAdmin: | |
| + | "eth:0x0d9f416260598313Be6FDf6B010f2FbC34957Cd0" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| + | "eth:0xC91482A96e9c2A104d9298D1980eCCf8C4dc764E" |
| values.superchainConfig: | |
| + | "eth:0xE925205ad05D8d612Ac205C4941CCd61Fc965C46" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x340f923E5c7cbB2171146f64169EC9d5a9FfE647: | |
| - | "SystemConfig" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x2fA28989fc559836E9d66dFf3010C7F7f41c65ED: | |
| + | "SystemConfig" |
| } |
| contract Bob Multisig 1 (eth:0xC91482A96e9c2A104d9298D1980eCCf8C4dc764E) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| receivedPermissions.1: | |
| - | {"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x3a1D54496cf461fFc96d3b1a8A0B43B091ea3c13","description":"can pull funds from the contract in case of emergency.","role":".owner"} |
| receivedPermissions.4.from: | |
| - | "eth:0x3a1D54496cf461fFc96d3b1a8A0B43B091ea3c13" |
| + | "eth:0x1A08BA77CB95184Ea0C31e56f199Db068eb6B35d" |
| receivedPermissions.10: | |
| + | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xC9AC21AcD8696B64270716528bF83630Ea7a293c","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x0d9f416260598313Be6FDf6B010f2FbC34957Cd0"}]} |
| receivedPermissions.13: | |
| - | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xeBA14d52F1b19cA65455E5ECaB72D2FfD9e43fEF","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x0d9f416260598313Be6FDf6B010f2FbC34957Cd0"}]} |
| } |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0xe3BD00F57B44E7aa4A6C212878427c85D638702A) | |
| +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger. |
| contract L1CrossDomainMessenger (eth:0xE3d981643b806FB8030CDB677D6E60892E547EdA) { | |
| +++ description: Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x03bcdc719cb7bd0a1377c01bb50b30a6122b308f673b7d7b15a3bb8628e6bd8c" |
| + | "0xfa9c986019a03bd66efb7584a7064e708f6fb71956643a9d4daa2c0972a29c03" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x5D5a095665886119693F0B41d8DFeE78da033e8B" |
| + | "eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.8: | |
| + | ["2026-01-20T14:40:23.000Z","0xd025dbac937aa7bd1c53511421d35cc97c18a848ebb123cc85e910ab517a8922",["eth:0x22D12E0FAebD62d429514A65EBAe32dd316c12D6"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.9: | |
| + | ["2026-01-20T14:40:23.000Z","0xd025dbac937aa7bd1c53511421d35cc97c18a848ebb123cc85e910ab517a8922",["eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 8 |
| + | 10 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.6.0" |
| + | "2.11.0" |
| values.initVersion: | |
| + | 3 |
| values.proxyAdmin: | |
| + | "eth:0x0d9f416260598313Be6FDf6B010f2FbC34957Cd0" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| + | "eth:0xC91482A96e9c2A104d9298D1980eCCf8C4dc764E" |
| values.systemConfig: | |
| + | "eth:0xACB886b75D76d1c8d9248cFdDfA09b70C71c5393" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x5D5a095665886119693F0B41d8DFeE78da033e8B: | |
| - | "L1CrossDomainMessenger" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0: | |
| + | "L1CrossDomainMessenger" |
| } |
| contract SuperchainConfig (eth:0xE925205ad05D8d612Ac205C4941CCd61Fc965C46) { | |
| +++ description: This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3mo 1d if left untouched. | |
| template: | |
| - | "opstack/SuperchainConfigFake" |
| + | "opstack/SuperchainConfigFake_expiry" |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x03dba37173051b02bc81487e181c791bcf1aef664c249e5d035f11f488bdd686" |
| + | "0x53a6b3db7f270298025bbfef7f6c77b420a9808341212fa9cf54a5e157a18567" |
| description: | |
| - | "This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages the `PAUSED_SLOT`, a boolean value indicating whether the local chain is paused, and `GUARDIAN_SLOT`, the address of the guardian which can pause and unpause the system." |
| + | "This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3mo 1d if left untouched." |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x4da82a327773965b8d4D85Fa3dB8249b387458E7" |
| + | "eth:0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.1: | |
| + | ["2026-01-20T14:40:23.000Z","0xd025dbac937aa7bd1c53511421d35cc97c18a848ebb123cc85e910ab517a8922",["eth:0xCe28685EB204186b557133766eCA00334EB441E4"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.2: | |
| + | ["2026-01-20T14:40:23.000Z","0xd025dbac937aa7bd1c53511421d35cc97c18a848ebb123cc85e910ab517a8922",["eth:0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 1 |
| + | 3 |
| values.GUARDIAN_SLOT: | |
| - | "0xd30e835d3f35624761057ff5b27d558f97bd5be034621e62240e5c0b784abe68" |
| values.PAUSED_SLOT: | |
| - | "0x54176ff9944c4784e5857ec4e5ef560a462c483bf534eda43f91bb01a470b1b6" |
| values.version: | |
| - | "1.2.0" |
| + | "2.4.0" |
| values.initVersion: | |
| + | 2 |
| values.pauseExpiry: | |
| + | 7884000 |
| values.pauseExpiryFmt: | |
| + | "3mo 1d" |
| values.proxyAdmin: | |
| + | "eth:0xa70ddfb3e00fCFD083E64B200FE867104f703E1c" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| + | "eth:0xC91482A96e9c2A104d9298D1980eCCf8C4dc764E" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x4da82a327773965b8d4D85Fa3dB8249b387458E7: | |
| - | "SuperchainConfig" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957: | |
| + | "SuperchainConfig" |
| category.name: | |
| - | "Governance" |
| + | "Shared Infrastructure" |
| category.priority: | |
| - | 3 |
| + | 4 |
| fieldMeta: | |
| + | {"paused":{"severity":"HIGH"}} |
| } |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract AnchorStateRegistry (eth:0xeBA14d52F1b19cA65455E5ECaB72D2FfD9e43fEF) | |
| +++ description: Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract MIPS (eth:0xF027F4A985560fb13324e943edf55ad6F1d15Dc1) | |
| +++ description: The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0x15F80920C8Fec136e2A804E04f26203FF8dAd19A) | |
| +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract DelayedWETH (eth:0x1A08BA77CB95184Ea0C31e56f199Db068eb6B35d) | |
| +++ description: Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract MIPS (eth:0x6463dEE3828677F6270d83d45408044fc5eDB908) | |
| +++ description: The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract AnchorStateRegistry (eth:0xC9AC21AcD8696B64270716528bF83630Ea7a293c) | |
| +++ description: Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the KailuaGame. |
The system has a centralized operator
MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
Users can force any transaction
Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.
Regular exits
The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 1d. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 1d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.
Forced messaging
If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.
EVM compatible smart contracts are supported
OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.
Ethereum
Roles:
Allowed to commit transactions from the current layer to the host chain.
Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless).
Actors:
- A Sequencer - acting directly
- Can interact with TimelockController
- cancel queued transactions
- execute transactions that are ready
- manage all access control roles with 3d delay TimelockController with 3d delay
- propose transactions
- Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop
- pause the verifier
- Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop
- pause the verifier
- Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierRouter
- add/remove verifiers and the selectors they are mapped to with 3d delay TimelockController with 3d delay
- Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop
- pause the verifier
A Multisig with 4/6 threshold.
- Can upgrade with no delay
- DelayedWETH ProxyAdmin
- L1StandardBridge ProxyAdmin
- OptimismMintableERC20Factory ProxyAdmin
- L1ERC721Bridge ProxyAdmin
- OptimismPortal2 ProxyAdmin
- DisputeGameFactory ProxyAdmin
- SystemConfig ProxyAdmin
- AnchorStateRegistry ProxyAdmin
- L1CrossDomainMessenger ProxyAdmin
- SuperchainConfig ProxyAdmin
- Can interact with SystemConfig
- Can interact with AddressManager
- set and change address mappings ProxyAdmin
- A Guardian - acting directly
Ethereum
This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3mo 1d if left untouched.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Bob Multisig 1
- guardian: Bob Multisig 1
The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Bob Multisig 1
All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation.
Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Bob Multisig 1
Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain’s epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Bob Multisig 1
Escrow for custom external tokens that use the canonical bridge for messaging but are governed externally.
- Roles:
- owner: Bob Multisig 1
Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger.
Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Bob Multisig 1
The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game.
Implementation of the KailuaGame with type 1337. Based on this implementation, new KailuaGames are created with every new state root proposal.
Set verifier contract for RISC Zero proofs (version 0.9.0). It allows verifying a whole set of proofs identified with a Merkle root at once, afterwards each individual proof could be efficiently verified just by checking Merkle inclusion against the verified root.
A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it’s deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain’s representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Bob Multisig 1
The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.
A router proxy that routes to verifiers based on selectors. The mapping can be changed by a permissioned owner (TimelockController).
- Roles:
- owner: TimelockController; ultimately EOA 2
Entrypoint for state root proposals. Manages bonds (currently 0.5 ETH) and tournaments for the OP Kailua state validation system, wrapping the OP stack native DisputeGameFactory. The current vanguard advantage is defined here as 0s.
- Roles:
- owner: Bob Multisig 1
Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the KailuaGame.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Bob Multisig 1
The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Bob Multisig 1
A timelock with access control. The current minimum delay is 3d.
- Roles:
- canceller: EOA 2
- defaultAdmin: TimelockController; ultimately EOA 2
- executor: EOA 2
- proposer: EOA 2
The current deployment carries some associated risks:
Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).
Program Hashes
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