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Soneium is an Optimistic rollup based on the OP Stack. It is built by Sony Block Solutions Labs and planned to stand as a versatile, general-purpose blockchain.
Soneium is an Optimistic rollup based on the OP Stack. It is built by Sony Block Solutions Labs and planned to stand as a versatile, general-purpose blockchain.
Consequence: projects without a proper proof system fully rely on single entities to safely update the state. A malicious proposer can finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds.
Learn more about the recategorisation here.
The section shows the operating costs that L2s pay to Ethereum.
This section shows how much data the project publishes to its data-availability (DA) layer over time. The project currently posts data to
Ethereum.
This section shows how "live" the project's operators are by displaying how frequently they submit transactions of the selected type. It also highlights anomalies - significant deviations from their typical schedule.
Soneium RPC providers censor IP-infringing tokens
2025 Jan 14th
RPC providers blacklist certain tokens - can still be used by self-hosting or forcing txs from L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development..
In the event of a sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project’s chain by sending them to L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development.. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.
State rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. are proposed as super roots by a permissioned proposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block.. The respected game type exposes no challenger, VM or challenge clock, so proposals cannot be disputed by execution. Validity is governed by the AnchorStateRegistry, and the Guardian can blacklist games and change the respected game type.
All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development..
There is no exit windowThe amount of time that users have to exit a system before an unwanted upgrade. It takes into account upgrade delays, forced transaction delays and other time factors. To be considered Stage 1, a rollup needs to have an exit window of at least 7d if upgrades are initiated by a permissioned actor less decentralized than a Security Council. For Stage 2, a rollup needs at least 30d in all cases outside of onchain provable bugs. for users to exit in case of unwanted upgrades as they are initiated by the Security CouncilA Security Council is a sufficiently decentralized set of members that is able to upgrade a system. A properly set up Security Council consists of at least 8 members with a threshold greater than 75%. What 'sufficiently decentralized' means is fundamentally subjective and L2BEAT evaluates each case individually. A Security Council is allowed to instantly upgrade Stage 1 rollups. with instant upgrade power and without proper notice.
Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. on L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development., so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.
All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobsThe data that a rollup publishes to its L1/data availability (DA) layer. They consist of the L2 transactions that are rolled up, along with some metadata. Blobs are introduced as a new transaction type within Ethereum with EIP-4844, and has rollup scaling specifically in mind. Blobs persist on Ethereum’s Beacon Chain ephemerally. or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.
The rollupA blockchain that inherits consensus and data availability from another blockchain called L1. Rollups enable trust minimized bridges with the base layer via proof systems, either optimistic or zero-knowledge. A rollup without a bridge, or without considering the bridge, is called a sovereign rollup. nodeA software client that participates in the network. is composed of two software components: op-node, implementing consensusAn agreement on the latest and correct state of a blockchain. Unlike L1 blockchains which coordinate participating nodes with consensus rules, rollups rely on L1s for reaching consensus by checking the state of the rollup smart contract deployed thereon. related logic, and op-geth, implementing execution logic. The configuration file can be found here.
Data batches are compressed using the zlib algorithm with best compression level.
The genesis file can be found here.
The format specification of SequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs.’s data batches can be found here.
State rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. are proposed as super roots by a permissioned proposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block.. The respected game type is the super permissioned game, which carries no bond and exposes no challenge mechanics: validity is governed by the AnchorStateRegistry, and the Guardian can blacklist games and change the respected game type.
Only the permissioned proposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block. configured in the dispute game factory can create games of the respected type. Each proposal commits to a super root anchored to an L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. timestamp rather than an L2 blockAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over. number.
The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.
OP Contracts Upgrade 20 (op-contracts/v8.0.0-rc.3), executed 2026-09-24. State roots are now proposed as super roots, which are addressed by an L2 timestamp rather than by a block number on this chain. The starting anchor sequence number is therefore a timestamp, changing from 5084269 to 1788848425. The format carries per-chain roots for a future interop set; today each game commits only to this chain. Proving a withdrawal now requires a game whose sequence number is at or after the timestamp of the initiating block rather than its block number; proveWithdrawalTransaction is unchanged, as the portal reads this chain's output root out of the super root. The respected game type changed 1 → 5, PERMISSIONED CANNON to SUPER PERMISSIONED. Game types 0, 1 and 8 were cleared and type 5 is the only type registered; no permissionless type is installed. The type 5 game defines only a proposer and an anchor state registry. It carries no bond, runs no VM and has no challenger, so proposals cannot be disputed by execution and the OP Foundation Operations Safe no longer holds a challenger role. Validity is governed by the AnchorStateRegistry, and the Guardian can blacklist games and change the respected game type. SystemConfig v3.14.2 → v4.0.0 removes the batchInbox() getter; the batch inbox address now lives only in the rollup config. The Soneium Multisig moved from Safe 1.4.1 to Safe 1.5.0 and its signer set was replaced: 6 members reduced to 5, threshold unchanged at 3. Version changes and implementation diffs: - PermissionedDisputeGame - SuperPermissionedDisputeGame (type 1 - 5): https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xe1dFFCBE4e22B813F26d2106D943C102e7cAb87e/eth:0x5C3eb47cB0174aea522a2a9Ae79487139A53D691 - Soneium Multisig implementation rotated: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x41675C099F32341bf84BFc5382aF534df5C7461a/eth:0xFf51A5898e281Db6DfC7855790607438dF2ca44b - SystemConfig 3.14.2 - 4.0.0: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x42Ad0173051225Ac784100e9acD43349707F4db9/eth:0x670b850A235A6fA98cD7a195eB139D0277E471fA - OptimismPortal2 5.6.1 - 5.8.0: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xe89F13c5ee4033B2D3cD76C9d6958eFBfe26D3C2/eth:0x1005217ad392DC64CEf501FA1777A27D42166748 - SuperchainConfig 2.4.2 - 2.4.3: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550/eth:0x5570b1f2b97B1E35b5C6f9Ee76f6cf02c9917504
OP Contracts Upgrade 20 (op-contracts/v8.0.0-rc.3), executed 2026-09-24.
State roots are now proposed as super roots, which are addressed by an L2 timestamp rather than by a block number on this chain. The starting anchor sequence number is therefore a timestamp, changing from 5084269 to 1788848425. The format carries per-chain roots for a future interop set; today each game commits only to this chain. Proving a withdrawal now requires a game whose sequence number is at or after the timestamp of the initiating block rather than its block number; proveWithdrawalTransaction is unchanged, as the portal reads this chain’s output root out of the super root.
The respected game type changed 1 → 5, PERMISSIONED_CANNON to SUPER_PERMISSIONED. Game types 0, 1 and 8 were cleared and type 5 is the only type registered; no permissionless type is installed.
The type 5 game defines only a proposer and an anchor state registry. It carries no bond, runs no VM and has no challenger, so proposals cannot be disputed by execution and the OP Foundation Operations Safe no longer holds a challenger role. Validity is governed by the AnchorStateRegistry, and the Guardian can blacklist games and change the respected game type.
SystemConfig v3.14.2 → v4.0.0 removes the batchInbox() getter; the batch inbox address now lives only in the rollup config.
The Soneium Multisig moved from Safe 1.4.1 to Safe 1.5.0 and its signer set was replaced: 6 members reduced to 5, threshold unchanged at 3.
Version changes and implementation diffs:
| contract DelayedWETH (eth:0x18fBb58C366e21F395DdEc7cBa0510a2D9116B47) [opstack/DelayedWETH] { | |
| +++ description: Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds. | |
| values.$pastUpgrades.2: | |
| + | ["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.3: | |
| + | ["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0xE440CC08A71694C8229323803F59024E3144630e"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.4: | |
| + | ["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.5: | |
| + | ["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0xE440CC08A71694C8229323803F59024E3144630e"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 2 |
| + | 6 |
| } | |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract PreimageOracle (eth:0x1E1d73536A081Ef2F355d29794547a9770Aeb1E0) [opstack/PreimageOracle] | |
| +++ description: The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game. | |
| contract AnchorStateRegistry (eth:0x4890928941e62e273dA359374b105F803329F473) [opstack/AnchorStateRegistry_post20] { | |
| +++ description: Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. This variant stores respectedGameType, retirementTimestamp, and disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds locally and drops the legacy *FromGame fields, since the AggregateVerifier model does not expose vm()/weth()/absolutePrestate() on its game implementation. | |
| values.$pastUpgrades.5: | |
| + | ["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.6: | |
| + | ["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x8F40Cc98D694AB986F026C5383A181FCc9B6B281"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.7: | |
| + | ["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.8: | |
| + | ["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x8F40Cc98D694AB986F026C5383A181FCc9B6B281"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 5 |
| + | 9 |
| values.getStartingAnchorRoot.root: | |
| - | "0x17ce11194e3dd58b940485ebc70141f3654183ceb2700d590a6bc57c4cc7f68c" |
| + | "0x08a53686fd0b1671ff7b89c3a994582503f15f7be00f0f2e7c9f0d3b187ab124" |
| values.getStartingAnchorRoot.l2SequenceNumber: | |
| - | 5084269 |
| + | 1788848425 |
| values.RespectedGameString: | |
| - | "PermissionedDisputeGame" |
| + | "SuperPermissionedDisputeGame" |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.respectedGameType: | |
| - | 1 |
| + | 5 |
| } | |
| contract Soneium Multisig (eth:0x509182eC226b3B71D36A3255A80EF0b1A9D43033) [GnosisSafe] { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0xe23c519b7324d6dc9132c8567ac55ae72bdf168c914d22825c7614d822364b0f" |
| + | "0xb66849da6643e8cd188f73efe4edb32704a1540eda5b1aef77a2217ad2d81f78" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x41675C099F32341bf84BFc5382aF534df5C7461a" |
| + | "eth:0xFf51A5898e281Db6DfC7855790607438dF2ca44b" |
| values.$members.0: | |
| - | "eth:0xd45F9F3990C48AfA5C90404c7a748b4c23FB2cba" |
| values.$members.1: | |
| - | "eth:0x94e9Ef16A9eF6C37164A7BCA6CFb03b52d23AF7E" |
| + | "eth:0x0e22018D5D2E676aD5f72F0Ac435b001Eb6d07E0" |
| values.$members.2: | |
| - | "eth:0x556Eb1b888eF0a02be4360e960824fc5aC197d65" |
| + | "eth:0x9c60eE40a77f76E59D92C0F860FE22b581b70587" |
| values.$members.3: | |
| - | "eth:0xb9269f274E7Edc73bf3d923E347d0784e4a5e452" |
| + | "eth:0x989a65FfBe51B22987c08F722Ba09cB3784e7DAd" |
| values.$members.4: | |
| - | "eth:0xD6db4b8aD9b8BD4665B968fab017ffEAb546F94a" |
| + | "eth:0xEFe58621C63620CF4d7F6027fD867455e2e8dBdD" |
| values.$members.5: | |
| - | "eth:0x1edae2A7C9ECF37319D4E113588d946e9901F5ea" |
| + | "eth:0x08968F6Ebf7bfd3987410d5dafd45d59B5537a0e" |
| values.getChainId: | |
| - | 1 |
| values.multisigThreshold: | |
| - | "3 of 6 (50%)" |
| + | "3 of 5 (60%)" |
| values.VERSION: | |
| - | "1.4.1" |
| + | "1.5.0" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x41675C099F32341bf84BFc5382aF534df5C7461a: | |
| - | "Safe" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xFf51A5898e281Db6DfC7855790607438dF2ca44b: | |
| + | "Safe" |
| } | |
| contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0x512A3d2c7a43BD9261d2B8E8C9c70D4bd4D503C0) [opstack/DisputeGameFactory_v2] { | |
| +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. This variant exposes per-type reads only; the legacy array views (gameImpls[], initBonds[]) were removed in the new implementation. | |
| values.$pastUpgrades.8: | |
| + | ["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.9: | |
| + | ["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x72B971717E088B59F26d4236BE222ADB6ACD393b"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.10: | |
| + | ["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.11: | |
| + | ["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x72B971717E088B59F26d4236BE222ADB6ACD393b"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 8 |
| + | 12 |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.absolutePrestateFromDGF: | |
| - | "0xdead000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000" |
| + | "UNRESOLVED" |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.anchorStateRegistryFromDGF: | |
| - | "eth:0x4890928941e62e273dA359374b105F803329F473" |
| + | "UNRESOLVED" |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.chainIdFromDGF: | |
| - | 1868 |
| + | "UNRESOLVED" |
| values.challengerFromDGF: | |
| - | "eth:0x9BA6e03D8B90dE867373Db8cF1A58d2F7F006b3A" |
| + | "UNRESOLVED" |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.game1: | |
| - | "eth:0xe1dFFCBE4e22B813F26d2106D943C102e7cAb87e" |
| + | "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.game5: | |
| - | "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" |
| + | "eth:0x5C3eb47cB0174aea522a2a9Ae79487139A53D691" |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.game5AnchorStateRegistry: | |
| - | "UNRESOLVED" |
| + | "eth:0x4890928941e62e273dA359374b105F803329F473" |
| values.game5Args: | |
| - | "0x" |
| + | "0x4890928941e62e273da359374b105f803329f473400c164c4a8ca84385b70eed6eb03ea847c8e1b8" |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.game5Proposer: | |
| - | "UNRESOLVED" |
| + | "eth:0x400c164C4a8cA84385B70EEd6eB03ea847c8E1b8" |
| values.permissionedGameArgs: | |
| - | "0xdead000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000acc005dcd857b401e4732e6f7837135a22825cfa4890928941e62e273da359374b105f803329f47318fbb58c366e21f395ddec7cba0510a2d9116b47000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000074c400c164c4a8ca84385b70eed6eb03ea847c8e1b89ba6e03d8b90de867373db8cf1a58d2f7f006b3a" |
| + | "0x" |
| values.proposerFromDGF: | |
| - | "eth:0x400c164C4a8cA84385B70EEd6eB03ea847c8E1b8" |
| + | "UNRESOLVED" |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.vmFromDGF: | |
| - | "eth:0xaCc005DCd857B401e4732E6F7837135A22825cfA" |
| + | "UNRESOLVED" |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.wethFromDGF: | |
| - | "eth:0x18fBb58C366e21F395DdEc7cBa0510a2D9116B47" |
| + | "UNRESOLVED" |
| } | |
| contract L1ERC721Bridge (eth:0x5933e323bE8896DfaCd1cD671442F27dAA10a053) [opstack/L1ERC721Bridge] { | |
| +++ description: Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain. | |
| values.$pastUpgrades.9: | |
| + | ["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.10: | |
| + | ["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x9F164f1d02A81e06D639E55F65a87f0070E3Cb2e"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.11: | |
| + | ["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.12: | |
| + | ["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x9F164f1d02A81e06D639E55F65a87f0070E3Cb2e"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 9 |
| + | 13 |
| } | |
| contract ETHLockbox (eth:0x67B4de6FfA66EF201Ea6099A89cA397D56622E31) [opstack/ETHLockbox] { | |
| +++ description: A simple escrow contract storing ETH for the canonical bridge. | |
| values.$pastUpgrades.3: | |
| + | ["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.4: | |
| + | ["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0xb3A24DB07038b51962026329B62E7a965d56A6ad"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.5: | |
| + | ["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.6: | |
| + | ["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0xb3A24DB07038b51962026329B62E7a965d56A6ad"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 3 |
| + | 7 |
| } | |
| contract SystemConfig (eth:0x7A8Ed66B319911A0F3E7288BDdAB30d9c0C875c3) [opstack/SystemConfig] { | |
| +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x3d8e7cdbbdbf274bba0a11a060b01d5a50e3a478683af9ec079874d1758576d6" |
| + | "0x532730df835e1a130919ca2afe170505acde568abb77ed1f9a018e5019415ab6" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x42Ad0173051225Ac784100e9acD43349707F4db9" |
| + | "eth:0x670b850A235A6fA98cD7a195eB139D0277E471fA" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.12: | |
| + | ["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.13: | |
| + | ["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x670b850A235A6fA98cD7a195eB139D0277E471fA"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.14: | |
| + | ["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.15: | |
| + | ["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x670b850A235A6fA98cD7a195eB139D0277E471fA"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 12 |
| + | 16 |
| values.BATCH_INBOX_SLOT: | |
| - | "0x71ac12829d66ee73d8d95bff50b3589745ce57edae70a3fb111a2342464dc597" |
| values.batchInbox: | |
| - | "eth:0x008dC74CecC9dedA8595B2Fe210cE5979F0BfA8e" |
| values.getAddresses.opcm: | |
| - | "eth:0x9Ce712Ff84E02659846dc6450BB9b7642fE8bE5D" |
| + | "eth:0x1951828Ce913DC4383a8A1695695D537a11D896a" |
| values.lastUsedOPCM: | |
| - | "eth:0x9Ce712Ff84E02659846dc6450BB9b7642fE8bE5D" |
| + | "eth:0x1951828Ce913DC4383a8A1695695D537a11D896a" |
| values.lastUsedOPCMVersion: | |
| - | "7.1.17" |
| + | "8.0.1" |
| values.version: | |
| - | "3.14.2" |
| + | "4.0.0" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x42Ad0173051225Ac784100e9acD43349707F4db9: | |
| - | "SystemConfig" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x670b850A235A6fA98cD7a195eB139D0277E471fA: | |
| + | "SystemConfig" |
| } | |
| contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0x88e529A6ccd302c948689Cd5156C83D4614FAE92) [opstack/OptimismPortal2] { | |
| +++ description: The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the SuperPermissionedDisputeGame. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0xe1df4caf26d9a0735bd53eeb020546840bd2f2fd4d0d9e2519f873306b5e19b1" |
| + | "0x5a3a97f72d46aaebbcbdba3783f7c5a8acfcd5ae928afe402abdb21acc0be49f" |
| description: | |
| - | "The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame." |
| + | "The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the SuperPermissionedDisputeGame." |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0xe89F13c5ee4033B2D3cD76C9d6958eFBfe26D3C2" |
| + | "eth:0x1005217ad392DC64CEf501FA1777A27D42166748" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.9: | |
| + | ["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.10: | |
| + | ["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x1005217ad392DC64CEf501FA1777A27D42166748"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.11: | |
| + | ["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.12: | |
| + | ["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x1005217ad392DC64CEf501FA1777A27D42166748"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 9 |
| + | 13 |
| values.RespectedGameString: | |
| - | "PermissionedDisputeGame" |
| + | "SuperPermissionedDisputeGame" |
| values.respectedGameType: | |
| - | 1 |
| + | 5 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "5.6.1" |
| + | "5.8.0" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xe89F13c5ee4033B2D3cD76C9d6958eFBfe26D3C2: | |
| - | "OptimismPortal2" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x1005217ad392DC64CEf501FA1777A27D42166748: | |
| + | "OptimismPortal2" |
| } | |
| contract SuperchainConfig (eth:0x95703e0982140D16f8ebA6d158FccEde42f04a4C) [opstack/SuperchainConfig_expiry] { | |
| +++ description: Used to manage global configuration values for multiple OP Chains within a single Superchain network. The SuperchainConfig contract manages individual pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3 months if left untouched. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x2cd597b7305a446a1df355e6909cbd75fe38aa045faf4876a8e5496eebc1734f" |
| + | "0xb74ed3aa109bd981b095c02d6e3bda2b2467d40e9d1060b4c89b01de32ebad3a" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550" |
| + | "eth:0x5570b1f2b97B1E35b5C6f9Ee76f6cf02c9917504" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.8: | |
| + | ["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.9: | |
| + | ["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x5570b1f2b97B1E35b5C6f9Ee76f6cf02c9917504"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.10: | |
| + | ["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.11: | |
| + | ["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x5570b1f2b97B1E35b5C6f9Ee76f6cf02c9917504"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 8 |
| + | 12 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.4.2" |
| + | "2.4.3" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550: | |
| - | "SuperchainConfig" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x5570b1f2b97B1E35b5C6f9Ee76f6cf02c9917504: | |
| + | "SuperchainConfig" |
| } | |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract OpFoundationOperationsSafe (eth:0x9BA6e03D8B90dE867373Db8cF1A58d2F7F006b3A) [GnosisSafe] | |
| +++ description: None | |
| contract L1CrossDomainMessenger (eth:0x9CF951E3F74B644e621b36Ca9cea147a78D4c39f) [opstack/L1CrossDomainMessenger] { | |
| +++ description: Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function. | |
| values.$pastUpgrades.9: | |
| + | ["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.10: | |
| + | ["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x59D497530b00062f40950ba8EaB88868bf7F86f0"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.11: | |
| + | ["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.12: | |
| + | ["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x59D497530b00062f40950ba8EaB88868bf7F86f0"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 9 |
| + | 13 |
| } | |
| contract SaferSafes (eth:0xA8447329e52F64AED2bFc9E7a2506F7D369f483a) [gnosisSafeModules/SaferSafes] { | |
| +++ description: A Gnosis Safe module combining LivenessModule and TimelockGuard. Provides liveness checks where a fallback owner can challenge and take over if Safe owners are unresponsive, plus optional timelock delays for transaction scheduling. | |
| directlyReceivedPermissions.1: | |
| - | {"permission":"act","from":"eth:0x9BA6e03D8B90dE867373Db8cF1A58d2F7F006b3A","role":".GnosisSafe_modules"} |
| } | |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract MIPS (eth:0xaCc005DCd857B401e4732E6F7837135A22825cfA) [opstack/MIPS] | |
| +++ description: The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute. | |
| contract OptimismMintableERC20Factory (eth:0xc1047e30EFC9E172cFe7aa0219895B6a43fC415F) [opstack/OptimismMintableERC20Factory] { | |
| +++ description: A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it's deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain's representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa. | |
| values.$pastUpgrades.6: | |
| + | ["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.7: | |
| + | ["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0xaAbEA75Da509fA518Fd8a91Eae4BE5813B829b12"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.8: | |
| + | ["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.9: | |
| + | ["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0xaAbEA75Da509fA518Fd8a91Eae4BE5813B829b12"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 6 |
| + | 10 |
| } | |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0xe1dFFCBE4e22B813F26d2106D943C102e7cAb87e) [opstack/PermissionedDisputeGame] | |
| +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract SuperPermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0x5C3eb47cB0174aea522a2a9Ae79487139A53D691) [opstack/SuperPermissionedDisputeGame] | |
| +++ description: Logic of the permissioned dispute game introduced in Upgrade 20. Only the proposer configured in the DisputeGameFactory can create games of this type, and each one commits to a super root anchored to an L2 timestamp. Unlike the permissioned game it replaces, it runs no VM and exposes no challenger, bond, clock or absolute prestate: validity is governed by the AnchorStateRegistry and the Guardian. | |
Refresh config-derived discovery metadata at the main-branch block.
Refresh config-derived discovery metadata at the main-branch block.
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract PreimageOracle (eth:0x1E1d73536A081Ef2F355d29794547a9770Aeb1E0) [opstack/PreimageOracle] | |
| +++ description: The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract MIPS (eth:0xaCc005DCd857B401e4732E6F7837135A22825cfA) [opstack/MIPS] | |
| +++ description: The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute. | |
Optimism Security Council: Member rotated.
Optimism Security Council: Member rotated.
| contract Optimism Security Council (eth:0xc2819DC788505Aac350142A7A707BF9D03E3Bd03) [GnosisSafe] { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| values.$members.9: | |
| - | "eth:0x0aA384EB2fedD2741277A0f72909A0d7275575D7" |
| + | "eth:0xd91530dB01c60C6B3b824707D33fb0771aB85930" |
| } | |
OpFoundation shared Safes (UpgradeSafe + OperationsSafe): 2 members rotated.
OpFoundation shared Safes (UpgradeSafe + OperationsSafe): 2 members rotated.
| contract OpFoundationUpgradeSafe (eth:0x847B5c174615B1B7fDF770882256e2D3E95b9D92) [GnosisSafe] { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| values.$members.0: | |
| - | "eth:0x6419F81580343DF023E68715C6e269aFb00a2cc7" |
| + | "eth:0xf1EfbdC2C0BDC4554E0f1639D7fe88cD870a4639" |
| values.$members.3: | |
| - | "eth:0xBF93D4d727F7Ba1F753E1124C3e532dCb04Ea2c8" |
| + | "eth:0x7F1D4FE689B73B628285454667B93cfd09409f27" |
| } | |
| contract OpFoundationOperationsSafe (eth:0x9BA6e03D8B90dE867373Db8cF1A58d2F7F006b3A) [GnosisSafe] { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| values.$members.0: | |
| - | "eth:0x6419F81580343DF023E68715C6e269aFb00a2cc7" |
| + | "eth:0xf1EfbdC2C0BDC4554E0f1639D7fe88cD870a4639" |
| values.$members.3: | |
| - | "eth:0xBF93D4d727F7Ba1F753E1124C3e532dCb04Ea2c8" |
| + | "eth:0x7F1D4FE689B73B628285454667B93cfd09409f27" |
| } | |
Upgrade 19b "Karst" (op-contracts/v7.0.0): core L1 contracts upgraded to their v7 implementations (OptimismPortal2, SystemConfig, DisputeGameFactory, AnchorStateRegistry, bridges, etc.). The chain remains on permissioned fault proofs (respected game type 1); it did not move to CANNON KONA.
Upgrade 19b “Karst” (op-contracts/v7.0.0): core L1 contracts upgraded to their v7 implementations (OptimismPortal2, SystemConfig, DisputeGameFactory, AnchorStateRegistry, bridges, etc.). The chain remains on permissioned fault proofs (respected game type 1); it did not move to CANNON_KONA.
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract PreimageOracle (eth:0x1fb8cdFc6831fc866Ed9C51aF8817Da5c287aDD3) [opstack/PreimageOracle] | |
| +++ description: The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game. | |
| contract AnchorStateRegistry (eth:0x4890928941e62e273dA359374b105F803329F473) [opstack/AnchorStateRegistry_post20] { | |
| +++ description: Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. This variant stores respectedGameType, retirementTimestamp, and disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds locally and drops the legacy *FromGame fields, since the AggregateVerifier model does not expose vm()/weth()/absolutePrestate() on its game implementation. | |
| template: | |
| - | "opstack/AnchorStateRegistry_post13" |
| + | "opstack/AnchorStateRegistry_post20" |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0xfdabc8b9b4db9b7aa78227b26e936abaf24f058502b96e8d9a293d49b1e89b47" |
| + | "0x10f64124093daab87c84d97148854054f9622bf86e09e98d496f123be3368122" |
| description: | |
| - | "Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame." |
| + | "Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. This variant stores respectedGameType, retirementTimestamp, and disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds locally and drops the legacy *FromGame fields, since the AggregateVerifier model does not expose vm()/weth()/absolutePrestate() on its game implementation." |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x36398155Cd17cfe804F69b233eDDA800DD4D5aA5" |
| + | "eth:0x8F40Cc98D694AB986F026C5383A181FCc9B6B281" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.3: | |
| + | ["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.4: | |
| + | ["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0x8F40Cc98D694AB986F026C5383A181FCc9B6B281"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 3 |
| + | 5 |
| values.absolutePrestateFromGame: | |
| - | "0x033c000916b4a88cfffeceddd6cf0f4be3897a89195941e5a7c3f8209b4dbb6e" |
| values.challengePeriodFromOracle: | |
| - | 86400 |
| values.oracleFromVm: | |
| - | "eth:0x1fb8cdFc6831fc866Ed9C51aF8817Da5c287aDD3" |
| values.version: | |
| - | "3.7.0" |
| + | "3.9.0" |
| values.vmFromGame: | |
| - | "eth:0x6463dEE3828677F6270d83d45408044fc5eDB908" |
| values.wethFromGame: | |
| - | "eth:0x70277624cdE90492231Eb23309e1251Beb18Dff5" |
| fieldMeta.retirementTimestamp: | |
| + | {"severity":"HIGH"} |
| fieldMeta.disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds: | |
| + | {"severity":"HIGH"} |
| implementationNames.eth:0x36398155Cd17cfe804F69b233eDDA800DD4D5aA5: | |
| - | "AnchorStateRegistry" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x8F40Cc98D694AB986F026C5383A181FCc9B6B281: | |
| + | "AnchorStateRegistry" |
| usedTypes.0.arg.621: | |
| + | "AggregateVerifier" |
| usedTypes.0.arg.8: | |
| + | "FaultDisputeGame" |
| } | |
| contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0x512A3d2c7a43BD9261d2B8E8C9c70D4bd4D503C0) [opstack/DisputeGameFactory_v2] { | |
| +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. This variant exposes per-type reads only; the legacy array views (gameImpls[], initBonds[]) were removed in the new implementation. | |
| template: | |
| - | "opstack/DisputeGameFactory" |
| + | "opstack/DisputeGameFactory_v2" |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x8f21dbc160582c568a2a925ddad1b2bb889a9f72bac2067c6e72d43b662ef538" |
| + | "0x8912e655e26f51d4384fc950df847ae65bccf1f5ec5458642402f385c3dadf78" |
| description: | |
| - | "The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them." |
| + | "The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. This variant exposes per-type reads only; the legacy array views (gameImpls[], initBonds[]) were removed in the new implementation." |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0xc040F392E52Cb6970CA8E110c280fE24E07C5e2c" |
| + | "eth:0x72B971717E088B59F26d4236BE222ADB6ACD393b" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.6: | |
| + | ["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.7: | |
| + | ["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0x72B971717E088B59F26d4236BE222ADB6ACD393b"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 6 |
| + | 8 |
| values.game2000: | |
| - | "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" |
| values.gameImpls: | |
| - | ["eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000","eth:0x58bf355C5d4EdFc723eF89d99582ECCfd143266A","eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000","eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000","eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000","eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000","eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"] |
| values.initBonds: | |
| - | [0,0,0,0,0] |
| values.permissionedGameArgs: | |
| - | "0x033c000916b4a88cfffeceddd6cf0f4be3897a89195941e5a7c3f8209b4dbb6e6463dee3828677f6270d83d45408044fc5edb9084890928941e62e273da359374b105f803329f47370277624cde90492231eb23309e1251beb18dff5000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000074c400c164c4a8ca84385b70eed6eb03ea847c8e1b89ba6e03d8b90de867373db8cf1a58d2f7f006b3a" |
| + | "0xdead000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000acc005dcd857b401e4732e6f7837135a22825cfa4890928941e62e273da359374b105f803329f47318fbb58c366e21f395ddec7cba0510a2d9116b47000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000074c400c164c4a8ca84385b70eed6eb03ea847c8e1b89ba6e03d8b90de867373db8cf1a58d2f7f006b3a" |
| values.version: | |
| - | "1.4.0" |
| + | "1.6.1" |
| values.wethFromDGF: | |
| - | "eth:0x70277624cdE90492231Eb23309e1251Beb18Dff5" |
| + | "eth:0x18fBb58C366e21F395DdEc7cBa0510a2D9116B47" |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.game0: | |
| + | "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.game1: | |
| + | "eth:0xe1dFFCBE4e22B813F26d2106D943C102e7cAb87e" |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.game621: | |
| + | "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.game8: | |
| + | "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" |
| values.game8Args: | |
| + | "0x" |
| values.game8Vm: | |
| + | "UNRESOLVED" |
| values.initBondGame0: | |
| + | 0 |
| values.initBondGame1: | |
| + | 0 |
| values.initBondGame621: | |
| + | 0 |
| values.initBondGame8: | |
| + | 0 |
| fieldMeta.gameImpls: | |
| - | {"severity":"HIGH"} |
| fieldMeta.game2000: | |
| - | {"severity":"HIGH"} |
| fieldMeta.game621: | |
| + | {"severity":"HIGH"} |
| fieldMeta.game0: | |
| + | {"severity":"HIGH"} |
| fieldMeta.game1: | |
| + | {"severity":"HIGH"} |
| fieldMeta.game8: | |
| + | {"severity":"HIGH"} |
| implementationNames.eth:0xc040F392E52Cb6970CA8E110c280fE24E07C5e2c: | |
| - | "DisputeGameFactory" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x72B971717E088B59F26d4236BE222ADB6ACD393b: | |
| + | "DisputeGameFactory" |
| usedTypes.0: | |
| + | {"typeCaster":"SliceAddress","arg":{"offset":32}} |
| } | |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0x58bf355C5d4EdFc723eF89d99582ECCfd143266A) [opstack/PermissionedDisputeGame] | |
| +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger. | |
| contract L1ERC721Bridge (eth:0x5933e323bE8896DfaCd1cD671442F27dAA10a053) [opstack/L1ERC721Bridge] { | |
| +++ description: Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x1f65fda230b6d0df44e466b06418b2e12a401ef82c07521ad18d2f4ae6c70fb2" |
| + | "0xc5ed62b03fb7c1340609ace7ebb0c5bf8d43b1814b1ab4f10863bfa21d13b90b" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9" |
| + | "eth:0x9F164f1d02A81e06D639E55F65a87f0070E3Cb2e" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.7: | |
| + | ["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.8: | |
| + | ["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0x9F164f1d02A81e06D639E55F65a87f0070E3Cb2e"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 7 |
| + | 9 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.9.0" |
| + | "2.9.1" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9: | |
| - | "L1ERC721Bridge" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x9F164f1d02A81e06D639E55F65a87f0070E3Cb2e: | |
| + | "L1ERC721Bridge" |
| } | |
| contract SuperchainProxyAdminOwner (eth:0x5a0Aae59D09fccBdDb6C6CcEB07B7279367C3d2A) [GnosisSafe] { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| receivedPermissions.2: | |
| + | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x18fBb58C366e21F395DdEc7cBa0510a2D9116B47","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x89889B569c3a505f3640ee1Bd0ac1D557f436D2a"}]} |
| receivedPermissions.6: | |
| - | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x70277624cdE90492231Eb23309e1251Beb18Dff5","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x89889B569c3a505f3640ee1Bd0ac1D557f436D2a"}]} |
| } | |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract MIPS (eth:0x6463dEE3828677F6270d83d45408044fc5eDB908) [opstack/MIPS] | |
| +++ description: The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute. | |
| contract ETHLockbox (eth:0x67B4de6FfA66EF201Ea6099A89cA397D56622E31) [opstack/ETHLockbox] { | |
| +++ description: A simple escrow contract storing ETH for the canonical bridge. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x330c0ee4ca969ca3a1deda35d8ce83d1861361088ef0b4b8efe0ec23b4f24c19" |
| + | "0x99fabdfb3d8ef02962877763f6f3c7ec26d39e15e700fa854a040321a79f61ec" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x784d2F03593A42A6E4676A012762F18775ecbBe6" |
| + | "eth:0xb3A24DB07038b51962026329B62E7a965d56A6ad" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.1: | |
| + | ["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.2: | |
| + | ["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0xb3A24DB07038b51962026329B62E7a965d56A6ad"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 1 |
| + | 3 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "1.2.0" |
| + | "1.3.1" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x784d2F03593A42A6E4676A012762F18775ecbBe6: | |
| - | "ETHLockbox" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xb3A24DB07038b51962026329B62E7a965d56A6ad: | |
| + | "ETHLockbox" |
| } | |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract DelayedWETH (eth:0x70277624cdE90492231Eb23309e1251Beb18Dff5) [opstack/DelayedWETH] | |
| +++ description: Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds. | |
| contract SystemConfig (eth:0x7A8Ed66B319911A0F3E7288BDdAB30d9c0C875c3) [opstack/SystemConfig] { | |
| +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x703fe68eeb3d5454a8ef012933846f1ff1433fc2df39c0c94f2a550d8325f085" |
| + | "0x3d8e7cdbbdbf274bba0a11a060b01d5a50e3a478683af9ec079874d1758576d6" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0xd392c27B84b1cA776528F2704BC67B82a62132d2" |
| + | "eth:0x42Ad0173051225Ac784100e9acD43349707F4db9" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.10: | |
| + | ["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.11: | |
| + | ["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0x42Ad0173051225Ac784100e9acD43349707F4db9"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 10 |
| + | 12 |
| values.delayedWETH: | |
| - | "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" |
| + | "eth:0x18fBb58C366e21F395DdEc7cBa0510a2D9116B47" |
| values.getAddresses.delayedWETH: | |
| - | "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" |
| + | "eth:0x18fBb58C366e21F395DdEc7cBa0510a2D9116B47" |
| values.getAddresses.opcm: | |
| + | "eth:0x9Ce712Ff84E02659846dc6450BB9b7642fE8bE5D" |
| values.version: | |
| - | "3.13.1" |
| + | "3.14.2" |
| values.lastUsedOPCM: | |
| + | "eth:0x9Ce712Ff84E02659846dc6450BB9b7642fE8bE5D" |
| values.lastUsedOPCMVersion: | |
| + | "7.1.17" |
| values.OPCM_SLOT: | |
| + | "0x99f45962df4bc30de8d4c3c6d1ffc0f100edce16e80c7a5768b6d55ca463ff42" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xd392c27B84b1cA776528F2704BC67B82a62132d2: | |
| - | "SystemConfig" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x42Ad0173051225Ac784100e9acD43349707F4db9: | |
| + | "SystemConfig" |
| } | |
| contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0x88e529A6ccd302c948689Cd5156C83D4614FAE92) [opstack/OptimismPortal2] { | |
| +++ description: The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x7883f2d27d696b1fa6259a97c561d651493c2c1324e9646e04dba10adcfd8a21" |
| + | "0xe1df4caf26d9a0735bd53eeb020546840bd2f2fd4d0d9e2519f873306b5e19b1" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x97cEbbf8959e2A5476fbe9B98A21806Ec234609B" |
| + | "eth:0xe89F13c5ee4033B2D3cD76C9d6958eFBfe26D3C2" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.7: | |
| + | ["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.8: | |
| + | ["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0xe89F13c5ee4033B2D3cD76C9d6958eFBfe26D3C2"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 7 |
| + | 9 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "5.2.0" |
| + | "5.6.1" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x97cEbbf8959e2A5476fbe9B98A21806Ec234609B: | |
| - | "OptimismPortal2" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xe89F13c5ee4033B2D3cD76C9d6958eFBfe26D3C2: | |
| + | "OptimismPortal2" |
| } | |
| contract ProxyAdmin (eth:0x89889B569c3a505f3640ee1Bd0ac1D557f436D2a) [global/ProxyAdmin] { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| directlyReceivedPermissions.1: | |
| + | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x18fBb58C366e21F395DdEc7cBa0510a2D9116B47","role":"admin"} |
| directlyReceivedPermissions.5: | |
| - | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x70277624cdE90492231Eb23309e1251Beb18Dff5","role":"admin"} |
| } | |
| contract SuperchainConfig (eth:0x95703e0982140D16f8ebA6d158FccEde42f04a4C) [opstack/SuperchainConfig_expiry] { | |
| +++ description: Used to manage global configuration values for multiple OP Chains within a single Superchain network. The SuperchainConfig contract manages individual pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3 months if left untouched. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x5fb525d1572fb90d060d122143b915059cbff39e0298b345857fd4267d7f6b28" |
| + | "0x2cd597b7305a446a1df355e6909cbd75fe38aa045faf4876a8e5496eebc1734f" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957" |
| + | "eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.6: | |
| + | ["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.7: | |
| + | ["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 6 |
| + | 8 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.4.0" |
| + | "2.4.2" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957: | |
| - | "SuperchainConfig" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550: | |
| + | "SuperchainConfig" |
| } | |
| contract L1CrossDomainMessenger (eth:0x9CF951E3F74B644e621b36Ca9cea147a78D4c39f) [opstack/L1CrossDomainMessenger] { | |
| +++ description: Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x1f2c13ad1144ce6548e578b834c33b0d65b1564aeb0d5c708ed4e7fb50535cc6" |
| + | "0x694050f95b40e6d92ee91ca0f60acb9c4a74d1b0325c33fd4bd7445fde90e806" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0" |
| + | "eth:0x59D497530b00062f40950ba8EaB88868bf7F86f0" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.7: | |
| + | ["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.8: | |
| + | ["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0x59D497530b00062f40950ba8EaB88868bf7F86f0"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 7 |
| + | 9 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.11.0" |
| + | "2.11.1" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0: | |
| - | "L1CrossDomainMessenger" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x59D497530b00062f40950ba8EaB88868bf7F86f0: | |
| + | "L1CrossDomainMessenger" |
| } | |
| contract OptimismMintableERC20Factory (eth:0xc1047e30EFC9E172cFe7aa0219895B6a43fC415F) [opstack/OptimismMintableERC20Factory] { | |
| +++ description: A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it's deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain's representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x307d4cb83e682629880fe9bb874a188805e3b93cb11a2cbf80095975f1e5b04e" |
| + | "0x11b0ed6f15cabf613492a8d54c55304a17cf60f4fd94a655d7e720d4556906d0" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB" |
| + | "eth:0xaAbEA75Da509fA518Fd8a91Eae4BE5813B829b12" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.4: | |
| + | ["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.5: | |
| + | ["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0xaAbEA75Da509fA518Fd8a91Eae4BE5813B829b12"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 4 |
| + | 6 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "1.10.2" |
| + | "1.11.0" |
| values.proxyAdmin: | |
| + | "eth:0x89889B569c3a505f3640ee1Bd0ac1D557f436D2a" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| + | "eth:0x5a0Aae59D09fccBdDb6C6CcEB07B7279367C3d2A" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB: | |
| - | "OptimismMintableERC20Factory" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xaAbEA75Da509fA518Fd8a91Eae4BE5813B829b12: | |
| + | "OptimismMintableERC20Factory" |
| } | |
| contract L1StandardBridge (eth:0xeb9bf100225c214Efc3E7C651ebbaDcF85177607) [opstack/L1StandardBridge] { | |
| +++ description: The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0xcacd38e7b52353ad3463da40b7e7a29b028f95500a82590d2b8f8ffd26b83f6d" |
| + | "0x6469155800e1489607c8fa062550a362dfa8978885df4714ca4653e5f3d25b0c" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A" |
| + | "eth:0xB37a11AadF167B2F0b8dD85372De4bC66CD4A891" |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.8.0" |
| + | "2.8.2" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A: | |
| - | "L1StandardBridge" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xB37a11AadF167B2F0b8dD85372De4bC66CD4A891: | |
| + | "L1StandardBridge" |
| } | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract DelayedWETH (eth:0x18fBb58C366e21F395DdEc7cBa0510a2D9116B47) [opstack/DelayedWETH] | |
| +++ description: Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0xe1dFFCBE4e22B813F26d2106D943C102e7cAb87e) [opstack/PermissionedDisputeGame] | |
| +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger. | |
The operatorAn operator is the entity charged with managing a rollup and progressing its state. A rollup operator can be a centralized sequencer, proposer, prover, challenger, pauser of admin that is able to perform upgrades. is the only entity that can propose blocksAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over.. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.
MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.
The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlementThe mechanism with which the execution of rollup blocks and the resultant state is verified and possible disputes are resolved. In the context of rollups or other modular blockchains, it often refers to the proof system used--validity (ZK) or fraud proofs, or a combination thereof. Sometimes it will refer to this mechanism along with where the mechanism's outputs are ultimately published and verified, as in Ethereum being a settlement layer by verifying the proofs and allowing for withdrawals., but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The respected game type carries no on-chain challenge process, so settlement waits only for the delays above. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.
If the user experiences censorship from the operatorAn operator is the entity charged with managing a rollup and progressing its state. A rollup operator can be a centralized sequencer, proposer, prover, challenger, pauser of admin that is able to perform upgrades. with regular L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups.->L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.
OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM EquivalenceA perfect degree of compatibility; where one system or concept is indistinguishable from another in the domain being compared. In the context of rollups, it generally refers to the proximity to the EVM and to Ethereum architecture. model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. can be deployed on L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups..

A Multisig with 2/2 threshold.
A Multisig with 3/5 threshold.
A Multisig with 5/7 threshold. It uses the following modules: SaferSafes (A Gnosis Safe module combining LivenessModule and TimelockGuard. Provides livenessLiveness refers to the ability of a system to respond to requests and to process them in a timely manner. In the context of L2s, it refers to the ability of settling transactions, proofs and state roots to the base layer. checks where a fallback owner can challenge and take over if Safe owners are unresponsive, plus optional timelock delays for transaction scheduling). Member of SuperchainProxyAdminOwner.
A Gnosis Safe module combining LivenessModule and TimelockGuard. Provides livenessLiveness refers to the ability of a system to respond to requests and to process them in a timely manner. In the context of L2s, it refers to the ability of settling transactions, proofs and state roots to the base layer. checks where a fallback owner can challenge and take over if Safe owners are unresponsive, plus optional timelock delays for transaction scheduling.
A Multisig with 10/13 threshold. It uses the following modules: LivenessModule (used to remove members inactive for 3mo 8d while making sure that the threshold remains above 75%. If the number of members falls below 8, the OpFoundationUpgradeSafe takes ownership of the multisig). Member of Optimism Guardian Multisig, SuperchainProxyAdminOwner.
Participants (13):
0xE61F…76aE0x652B…cB5f0x5c1f…7a810x4A73…e61E0x3A53…aa940xEF9A…877c0x6323…c8650xd5b7…aC900x7ed8…9E390xd915…59300x0a87…efE60xbfA0…E0d90xcbC7…7eA6Modular contract to be used together with the LivenessModule. Tracks livenessLiveness refers to the ability of a system to respond to requests and to process them in a timely manner. In the context of L2s, it refers to the ability of settling transactions, proofs and state roots to the base layer. / activity of Safe owners.
A Multisig with 1/1 threshold. It uses the following modules: DeputyPauseModule (Allows 0x2fA150379bF32b6d79Eeb4ff9bD280E76049a87c, called the deputy pauser, to act on behalf of the OpFoundationUpgradeSafe if set as its Safe module).
Participants (1):
Optimism Security Councilpause() function → Optimism Guardian Multisig

The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. and eventually challenge them. This variant exposes per-type reads only; the legacy array views (gameImpls[], initBonds[]) were removed in the new implementation.
Contains configuration parameters such as the SequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. address, gas limitThe maximum amount of gas a transaction or block may consume. on this chain and the unsafe blockAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over. signer address.
The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. to L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups.. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the SuperPermissionedDisputeGame.
Used to manage global configuration values for multiple OP Chains within a single Superchain networkA constellation of nodes (peers) that communicate via a peer-to-peer protocol, for example, in propagating transactions and blocks to other nodes.. The SuperchainConfig contract manages individual pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3 months if left untouched.
Used to bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.
Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain’s epoch gas limitThe maximum amount of gas a transaction or block may consume., it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.
The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.
All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation.
used to remove members inactive for 3mo 8d while making sure that the threshold remains above 75%. If the number of members falls below 8, the OpFoundationUpgradeSafe takes ownership of the multisig
Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.
Lido custom escrow for wstETH tokens that uses the canonical bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. for messaging but is governed externally.


Contains the latest confirmed state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. This variant stores respectedGameType, retirementTimestamp, and disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds locally and drops the legacy *FromGame fields, since the AggregateVerifier model does not expose vm()/weth()/absolutePrestate() on its game implementation.
Logic of the permissioned dispute game introduced in Upgrade 20. Only the proposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block. configured in the DisputeGameFactory can create games of this type, and each one commits to a super root anchored to an L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. timestamp. Unlike the permissioned game it replaces, it runs no VM and exposes no challenger, bond, clock or absolute prestate: validity is governed by the AnchorStateRegistry and the Guardian.
A simple escrow contract storing ETH for the canonical bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge..

Allows 0x2fA150379bF32b6d79Eeb4ff9bD280E76049a87c, called the deputy pauser, to act on behalf of the OpFoundationUpgradeSafe if set as its Safe module.
pause() functionA helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the networkA constellation of nodes (peers) that communicate via a peer-to-peer protocol, for example, in propagating transactions and blocks to other nodes. it’s deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain’s representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.
Escrow for USDC that uses the canonical bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. for messaging but is governed externally.

The current deployment carries some associated risks:
Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. Both regular and emergency upgrades must be approved by both the Security Council and the Foundation. There is no delay on regular upgrades.