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Derive

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Derive Chain is an L2 scaling solution built using OP Stack specially for the Derive protocol - a settlement protocol for spot, perpetuals, and options trading.


  • Total Value SecuredTVS
    $135.89 M8.78%
  • Past day UOPSDaily UOPS
    0.6313.1%
  • Gas token
    ETH
  • Type
    Other

  • Purposes
    Universal, Exchange
  • Chain ID
    957

  • Tokens breakdown

    Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure

    Badges

    About

    Derive Chain is an L2 scaling solution built using OP Stack specially for the Derive protocol - a settlement protocol for spot, perpetuals, and options trading.

    Why is the project listed in others?

    The proof system isn't fully functional

    Consequence: projects without a proper proof system fully rely on single entities to safely update the state. A malicious proposer can finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds.

    There is no data availability bridge

    Consequence: projects without a data availability bridge fully rely on single entities (the sequencer) to honestly rely available data roots on Ethereum. A malicious sequencer can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds.

    Learn more about the recategorisation here.


    Total
    Canonically BridgedCanonically Bridged ValueCanonical
    Natively MintedNatively Minted TokensNative
    Externally BridgedExternally Bridged ValueExternal

    ETH & derivatives
    Stablecoins
    BTC & derivatives
    Other
    Compare with other projects
    Past Day UOPS
    Past Day Ops count
    Max. UOPS
    Past day UOPS/TPS Ratio
    Compare with other projects

    The section shows the operating costs that L2s pay to Ethereum.



    Total cost
    Avg cost per L2 UOP
    Avg cost per day

    Compare with other projects

    This section shows how much data the project publishes to its data-availability (DA) layer over time. The project currently posts data toCelestiaCelestia.



    Data posted
    Avg size per day
    Avg size per L2 UOP

    Compare with other projects

    This section shows how "live" the project's operators are by displaying how frequently they submit transactions of the selected type. It also highlights anomalies - significant deviations from their typical schedule.

    No ongoing anomalies detected

    Avg. tx data subs. interval
    Avg. state updates interval
    Past 30 days anomalies
    99% normal uptime

    Last 30 day anomalies

    All liveness anomalies detected for this project in the last 30 days, helping you review recent downtime and availability issues.

    No Tx data submissions were performed for 58m 36s (from 2026 Sep 08, 14:29 UTC until 2026 Sep 08, 15:28 UTC). These typically occur every 30m 5s on average.

    Derive rebrand

    2024 Aug 28th

    Lyra is now called Derive.

    Learn more

    Lyra switches to Celestia

    2024 Jan 16th

    Learn more
    The fault proof systemThe infrastructure that allows projects to verify their state transitions. It is composed by onchain verifiers and offchain provers. The main two flavors are optimistic and ZK proof systems, but they can be combined in a hybrid model. In general though, if a system is able to accept state roots optimistically, even if it has a ZK component, it is considered an optimistic proof system. is deployed but is not functional. The dispute game commits to an op-program release that predates the Jovian hardfork active on the chain, so it cannot derive current blocksAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over. and no dispute can be resolved correctly by execution. Security relies entirely on the permissioned proposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block. and challengers.
    The fault proof systemThe infrastructure that allows projects to verify their state transitions. It is composed by onchain verifiers and offchain provers. The main two flavors are optimistic and ZK proof systems, but they can be combined in a hybrid model. In general though, if a system is able to accept state roots optimistically, even if it has a ZK component, it is considered an optimistic proof system. is deployed but is not functional. The dispute game commits to an op-program release that predates the Jovian hardfork active on the chain, so it cannot derive current blocksAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over. and no dispute can be resolved correctly by execution. Security relies entirely on the permissioned proposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block. and challengers.
    Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure
    Sequencer failure
    Self sequence

    In the event of a sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project’s chain by sending them to L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development.. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.

    State validation
    Fraud proofs (INT)

    Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. Only one entity is currently allowed to propose and submit challenges, as only permissioned games are currently allowed.

    Data availability
    External

    Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on Celestia. SequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. tx roots are not checked against the Blobstream bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. data roots onchain, but L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. nodes can verify data availabilityThe property of a rollup's data being reachable by any node retrieving the data that were rolled up and executed to reach the proposed state. Data availability (DA), specifically decoupling it from the rollup nodes themselves, is one of the preeminent factors which allows a rollup to scale securely. A rollup is faced with a decision of what to use as a DA layer to guarantee that any node can retrieve this data--permissionlessly under any circumstance. For this reason, using Ethereum for DA currently provides the strongest security guarantees. If data is stored somewhere other than a permissionless L1, then the project is not a rollup, but rather a validium or an optimium. by running a Celestia light clientSometimes labelled interchangeably as a “node”, they are tasked with processing transactions and managing the blockchains's state. They run the computations for each transaction according to the rollup's virtual machine and protocol rules. If comparing to Ethereum clients, these would be execution clients such as Geth, as opposed to consensus clients..

    Exit window
    None

    There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.

    Proposer failure
    Cannot withdraw

    Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. on L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development., so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.

    Derive
    Derive is not even a
    Stage 0
    project.
    The requirement for available nodeA software client that participates in the network. software is under review.

    Learn more about Stages
    Please keep in mind that these stages do not reflect project security, this is an opinionated assessment of project maturity based on subjective criteria, created with a goal of incentivizing projects to push toward better decentralization. Each team may have taken different paths to achieve this goal.

    Data is posted to Celestia

    Transactions roots are posted onchain and the full data is posted on Celestia. Since the Blobstream bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. is not used, availability of the data is not verified against Celestia validatorsIn the context of L2s, a Validator is an actor that validates the correctness of state transitions. For optimistic rollups this corresponds to challengers, and for ZK rollups this corresponds to the onchain verifier, meaning that the SequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. can single-handedly publish unavailable roots. If Celestia becomes unavailable, the sequencer falls back to Ethereum.

    • Funds can be lost if the sequencer posts an unavailable transaction root (CRITICAL).

    • Funds can be lost if the data is not available on the external provider (CRITICAL).

    1. Introducing Blobstream: streaming modular DA to Ethereum
    2. Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs
    3. BatchInbox - address
    4. OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function
    Learn more about the DA layer here: Celestia logoCelestia

    Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by permissioned operators only. If a state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. passes the challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled., it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.


    State root proposals

    Proposers submit state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the create function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.0 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proofAlso referred to as a fault proof, it is the construction of an assertion that fraud was perpetrated on an optimistic rollup. More concretely, that an invalid state transition took place according to the protocol rules. The submitter of a fraud proof would expect a reward from the optimistic rollup protocol for helping maintain the integrity of the system.. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled. has passed and it is not countered.

    • Funds can be stolen if no whitelisted challenger disputes an invalid state root before the challenge window expires (CRITICAL).

    1. OP stack specification: Fault Dispute Game
    Challenges

    Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 0.00 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the defend or attack functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with full concurrency. Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 3d 12h. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see freeloader claims), an inherited clock with too little time remaining is generally extended by 3h. The extension is 6h when the next claim is immediately before split depth 30, and 1d 3h (the standard extension plus the 1d oracle challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled.) immediately before the last depth. Along a full-depth path, cumulative extensions can therefore add up to 10d 3h. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers’ stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step proverAn entity that generates the cryptographic proof to convince the verifier that the statement is true. In a ZK-Rollup, the prover generates the ZK (validity) proof to submit to the verifier contract. contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks (Spearbit 5.1.3).

    1. Fraud Proof Wars: OPFP

    Program Hashes

    Name
    Hash
    Repository
    Verification
    Used in
    0x0368...94b6
    Derive logoOrderly Network logoAevo logoNillion logoPhala logo

    Projects used in

    Search for projects used in

    Past upgrades

    The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.

    Count of upgrades
    73
    Last upgrade
    1mo 14d ago
    Avg upgrade interval
    2mo 18d
    2026 August 27, 12:37 UTC
    2changes

    Refresh config-derived discovery metadata at the main-branch block.

    New and verified contracts

    + Status: CREATED
    contract PreimageOracle (eth:0x1E1d73536A081Ef2F355d29794547a9770Aeb1E0) [opstack/PreimageOracle]
    +++ description: The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract MIPS (eth:0xaCc005DCd857B401e4732E6F7837135A22825cfA) [opstack/MIPS]
    +++ description: The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.
    2026 August 27, 12:37 UTC
    2changes

    Conduit Multisig 1: member added; threshold 4/10 → 4/11.

    contract Conduit Multisig 1 (eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746) [GnosisSafe] {
    +++ description: None
    values.$members.0:
    + "eth:0x9402c42dB162d5a0927c032136f40Cc9C71853F2"
    values.multisigThreshold:
    - "4 of 10 (40%)"
    + "4 of 11 (36%)"
    }
    2026 August 14, 15:41 UTC
    High severity
    135changes

    Upgrade 19b "Karst" (op-contracts/v7.0.0): core L1 contracts upgraded to their v7 implementations (OptimismPortal2, SystemConfig, DisputeGameFactory, AnchorStateRegistry, bridges, etc.), executed via a Conduit-deployed OPContractsManagerV2 (v7.1.17). The chain remains on permissioned fault proofs (respected game type 1); it did not move to CANNON KONA.

    contract OptimismMintableERC20Factory (eth:0x08Dea366F26C25a08C8D1C3568ad07d1e587136d) [opstack/OptimismMintableERC20Factory] {
    +++ description: A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it's deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain's representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x307d4cb83e682629880fe9bb874a188805e3b93cb11a2cbf80095975f1e5b04e"
    + "0x11b0ed6f15cabf613492a8d54c55304a17cf60f4fd94a655d7e720d4556906d0"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB"
    + "eth:0xaAbEA75Da509fA518Fd8a91Eae4BE5813B829b12"
    values.$pastUpgrades.6:
    + ["2026-08-13T14:48:23.000Z","0x07debde13d710db6e3f7315bc195032e59304371664450f583fd465a09ff0995",["eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.7:
    + ["2026-08-13T14:48:23.000Z","0x07debde13d710db6e3f7315bc195032e59304371664450f583fd465a09ff0995",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.8:
    + ["2026-08-13T14:48:23.000Z","0x07debde13d710db6e3f7315bc195032e59304371664450f583fd465a09ff0995",["eth:0xaAbEA75Da509fA518Fd8a91Eae4BE5813B829b12"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 6
    + 9
    values.version:
    - "1.10.2"
    + "1.11.0"
    values.proxyAdmin:
    + "eth:0x35d5D43271548c984662d4879FBc8e041Bc1Ff93"
    values.proxyAdminOwner:
    + "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746"
    implementationNames.eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB:
    - "OptimismMintableERC20Factory"
    implementationNames.eth:0xaAbEA75Da509fA518Fd8a91Eae4BE5813B829b12:
    + "OptimismMintableERC20Factory"
    }
    contract SuperchainConfig (eth:0x097f99768A0a4a0A81bAbbCB1ea18193bA9D53cC) [opstack/SuperchainConfigFake_expiry] {
    +++ description: This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3mo 1d if left untouched.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x5fb525d1572fb90d060d122143b915059cbff39e0298b345857fd4267d7f6b28"
    + "0x2cd597b7305a446a1df355e6909cbd75fe38aa045faf4876a8e5496eebc1734f"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957"
    + "eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550"
    values.$pastUpgrades.8:
    + ["2026-08-13T13:32:47.000Z","0x2c62c31e4108c24123b9f5b3c26a87e5ec6b4fc3b85163c7257edb523316f9db",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.9:
    + ["2026-08-13T13:32:47.000Z","0x2c62c31e4108c24123b9f5b3c26a87e5ec6b4fc3b85163c7257edb523316f9db",["eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 8
    + 10
    values.version:
    - "2.4.0"
    + "2.4.2"
    implementationNames.eth:0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957:
    - "SuperchainConfig"
    implementationNames.eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550:
    + "SuperchainConfig"
    }
    contract SystemConfig (eth:0x0e4C4CDd01ceCB01070E9Fdfe7600871e4ae996e) [opstack/SystemConfig] {
    +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0xaa1b3bedab4e63198240e9dea4503f0e615e4d18a545961c9f11b72143279fbc"
    + "0x3d8e7cdbbdbf274bba0a11a060b01d5a50e3a478683af9ec079874d1758576d6"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0x2fA28989fc559836E9d66dFf3010C7F7f41c65ED"
    + "eth:0x42Ad0173051225Ac784100e9acD43349707F4db9"
    values.$pastUpgrades.10:
    + ["2026-08-13T14:48:23.000Z","0x07debde13d710db6e3f7315bc195032e59304371664450f583fd465a09ff0995",["eth:0xd392c27B84b1cA776528F2704BC67B82a62132d2"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.11:
    + ["2026-08-13T14:48:23.000Z","0x07debde13d710db6e3f7315bc195032e59304371664450f583fd465a09ff0995",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.12:
    + ["2026-08-13T14:48:23.000Z","0x07debde13d710db6e3f7315bc195032e59304371664450f583fd465a09ff0995",["eth:0x42Ad0173051225Ac784100e9acD43349707F4db9"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 10
    + 13
    values.batchInbox:
    - "eth:0x5f7f7f6DB967F0ef10BdA0678964DBA185d16c50"
    + "eth:0x00f9B4fE1d9146893e3Fc6794e4e1CfA442a478C"
    values.getAddresses.delayedWETH:
    + "eth:0x97FB4d882175097A4BBfc61d67f9Fb28723C3c94"
    values.getAddresses.opcm:
    + "eth:0xbfb9219d933ec96Ac99C4f3D7231eFE43757811F"
    values.version:
    - "3.11.0"
    + "3.14.2"
    values.DELAYED_WETH_SLOT:
    + "0x51547f31a231e1007dca33017faa3da20d959b95087c588a7768bfb922fd58ff"
    values.delayedWETH:
    + "eth:0x97FB4d882175097A4BBfc61d67f9Fb28723C3c94"
    values.isCustomGasToken:
    + false
    values.lastUsedOPCM:
    + "eth:0xbfb9219d933ec96Ac99C4f3D7231eFE43757811F"
    values.lastUsedOPCMVersion:
    + "7.1.17"
    values.OPCM_SLOT:
    + "0x99f45962df4bc30de8d4c3c6d1ffc0f100edce16e80c7a5768b6d55ca463ff42"
    implementationNames.eth:0x2fA28989fc559836E9d66dFf3010C7F7f41c65ED:
    - "SystemConfig"
    implementationNames.eth:0x42Ad0173051225Ac784100e9acD43349707F4db9:
    + "SystemConfig"
    }
    - Status: DELETED
    contract PreimageOracle (eth:0x1fb8cdFc6831fc866Ed9C51aF8817Da5c287aDD3) [opstack/PreimageOracle]
    +++ description: The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game.
    - Status: DELETED
    contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0x2839BaF8BbdA830e96896aA698A6183ea42295A8) [opstack/PermissionedDisputeGame]
    +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger.
    - Status: DELETED
    contract DelayedWETH (eth:0x30332E9ec0833ECd34d6eb0bf5C14C442D0217F1) [opstack/DelayedWETH]
    +++ description: Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.
    contract ProxyAdmin (eth:0x35d5D43271548c984662d4879FBc8e041Bc1Ff93) [global/ProxyAdmin] {
    +++ description: None
    directlyReceivedPermissions.3:
    - {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x30332E9ec0833ECd34d6eb0bf5C14C442D0217F1","role":"admin"}
    directlyReceivedPermissions.9:
    + {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x97FB4d882175097A4BBfc61d67f9Fb28723C3c94","role":"admin"}
    }
    contract Conduit Multisig 1 (eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746) [GnosisSafe] {
    +++ description: None
    receivedPermissions.6:
    - {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x30332E9ec0833ECd34d6eb0bf5C14C442D0217F1","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x35d5D43271548c984662d4879FBc8e041Bc1Ff93"}]}
    receivedPermissions.12:
    + {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x97FB4d882175097A4BBfc61d67f9Fb28723C3c94","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x35d5D43271548c984662d4879FBc8e041Bc1Ff93"}]}
    }
    contract L1CrossDomainMessenger (eth:0x5456f02c08e9A018E42C39b351328E5AA864174A) [opstack/L1CrossDomainMessenger] {
    +++ description: Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x1f2c13ad1144ce6548e578b834c33b0d65b1564aeb0d5c708ed4e7fb50535cc6"
    + "0x694050f95b40e6d92ee91ca0f60acb9c4a74d1b0325c33fd4bd7445fde90e806"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0"
    + "eth:0x59D497530b00062f40950ba8EaB88868bf7F86f0"
    values.$pastUpgrades.10:
    + ["2026-08-13T14:48:23.000Z","0x07debde13d710db6e3f7315bc195032e59304371664450f583fd465a09ff0995",["eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.11:
    + ["2026-08-13T14:48:23.000Z","0x07debde13d710db6e3f7315bc195032e59304371664450f583fd465a09ff0995",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.12:
    + ["2026-08-13T14:48:23.000Z","0x07debde13d710db6e3f7315bc195032e59304371664450f583fd465a09ff0995",["eth:0x59D497530b00062f40950ba8EaB88868bf7F86f0"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 10
    + 13
    values.version:
    - "2.11.0"
    + "2.11.1"
    implementationNames.eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0:
    - "L1CrossDomainMessenger"
    implementationNames.eth:0x59D497530b00062f40950ba8EaB88868bf7F86f0:
    + "L1CrossDomainMessenger"
    }
    contract L1StandardBridge (eth:0x61E44dC0dae6888B5a301887732217d5725B0bFf) [opstack/L1StandardBridge] {
    +++ description: The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0xcacd38e7b52353ad3463da40b7e7a29b028f95500a82590d2b8f8ffd26b83f6d"
    + "0x6469155800e1489607c8fa062550a362dfa8978885df4714ca4653e5f3d25b0c"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A"
    + "eth:0xB37a11AadF167B2F0b8dD85372De4bC66CD4A891"
    values.version:
    - "2.8.0"
    + "2.8.2"
    implementationNames.eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A:
    - "L1StandardBridge"
    implementationNames.eth:0xB37a11AadF167B2F0b8dD85372De4bC66CD4A891:
    + "L1StandardBridge"
    }
    - Status: DELETED
    contract MIPS (eth:0x6463dEE3828677F6270d83d45408044fc5eDB908) [opstack/MIPS]
    +++ description: The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.
    contract L1ERC721Bridge (eth:0x6CC3268794c5d3E3d9d52adEfC748B59d536cb22) [opstack/L1ERC721Bridge] {
    +++ description: Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x1f65fda230b6d0df44e466b06418b2e12a401ef82c07521ad18d2f4ae6c70fb2"
    + "0xc5ed62b03fb7c1340609ace7ebb0c5bf8d43b1814b1ab4f10863bfa21d13b90b"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9"
    + "eth:0x9F164f1d02A81e06D639E55F65a87f0070E3Cb2e"
    values.$pastUpgrades.9:
    + ["2026-08-13T14:48:23.000Z","0x07debde13d710db6e3f7315bc195032e59304371664450f583fd465a09ff0995",["eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.10:
    + ["2026-08-13T14:48:23.000Z","0x07debde13d710db6e3f7315bc195032e59304371664450f583fd465a09ff0995",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.11:
    + ["2026-08-13T14:48:23.000Z","0x07debde13d710db6e3f7315bc195032e59304371664450f583fd465a09ff0995",["eth:0x9F164f1d02A81e06D639E55F65a87f0070E3Cb2e"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 9
    + 12
    values.version:
    - "2.9.0"
    + "2.9.1"
    implementationNames.eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9:
    - "L1ERC721Bridge"
    implementationNames.eth:0x9F164f1d02A81e06D639E55F65a87f0070E3Cb2e:
    + "L1ERC721Bridge"
    }
    contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0x85eA9c11cf3D4786027F7FD08F4406b15777e5f8) [opstack/OptimismPortal2] {
    +++ description: The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x3e7e2cb08ba995795937c9c2e8ea9d0e4d2e2de852f389055073384d5f79c59d"
    + "0xe1df4caf26d9a0735bd53eeb020546840bd2f2fd4d0d9e2519f873306b5e19b1"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202"
    + "eth:0xe89F13c5ee4033B2D3cD76C9d6958eFBfe26D3C2"
    values.$pastUpgrades.9:
    + ["2026-08-13T14:48:23.000Z","0x07debde13d710db6e3f7315bc195032e59304371664450f583fd465a09ff0995",["eth:0x97cEbbf8959e2A5476fbe9B98A21806Ec234609B"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.10:
    + ["2026-08-13T14:48:23.000Z","0x07debde13d710db6e3f7315bc195032e59304371664450f583fd465a09ff0995",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.11:
    + ["2026-08-13T14:48:23.000Z","0x07debde13d710db6e3f7315bc195032e59304371664450f583fd465a09ff0995",["eth:0xe89F13c5ee4033B2D3cD76C9d6958eFBfe26D3C2"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 9
    + 12
    values.version:
    - "5.1.1"
    + "5.6.1"
    implementationNames.eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202:
    - "OptimismPortal2"
    implementationNames.eth:0xe89F13c5ee4033B2D3cD76C9d6958eFBfe26D3C2:
    + "OptimismPortal2"
    }
    contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0x87DAFf495b5F6c4f79CEeAAF85f1Ef3df3B30d21) [opstack/DisputeGameFactory_v2] {
    +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. This variant exposes per-type reads only; the legacy array views (gameImpls[], initBonds[]) were removed in the new implementation.
    template:
    - "opstack/DisputeGameFactory"
    + "opstack/DisputeGameFactory_v2"
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x7daf6049672fd2ab7dc8dd3b6287e1d0a40958346c5e2857c4616a73dcac4da6"
    + "0x8912e655e26f51d4384fc950df847ae65bccf1f5ec5458642402f385c3dadf78"
    description:
    - "The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them."
    + "The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. This variant exposes per-type reads only; the legacy array views (gameImpls[], initBonds[]) were removed in the new implementation."
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0x74Fac1D45B98bae058F8F566201c9A81B85C7D50"
    + "eth:0x72B971717E088B59F26d4236BE222ADB6ACD393b"
    values.$pastUpgrades.4:
    + ["2026-08-13T14:48:23.000Z","0x07debde13d710db6e3f7315bc195032e59304371664450f583fd465a09ff0995",["eth:0xc040F392E52Cb6970CA8E110c280fE24E07C5e2c"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.5:
    + ["2026-08-13T14:48:23.000Z","0x07debde13d710db6e3f7315bc195032e59304371664450f583fd465a09ff0995",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.6:
    + ["2026-08-13T14:48:23.000Z","0x07debde13d710db6e3f7315bc195032e59304371664450f583fd465a09ff0995",["eth:0x72B971717E088B59F26d4236BE222ADB6ACD393b"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 4
    + 7
    values.challengerFromDGF:
    - "UNRESOLVED"
    + "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746"
    values.game2000:
    - "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
    values.gameImpls:
    - ["eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000","eth:0x2839BaF8BbdA830e96896aA698A6183ea42295A8","eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000","eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000","eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000","eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000","eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"]
    values.initBonds:
    - [0,0,0,0,0]
    values.permissionedGameArgs:
    - "0x"
    + "0x03682932cec7ce0a3874b19675a6bbc923054a7b321efc7d3835187b172494b6acc005dcd857b401e4732e6f7837135a22825cfa9793c7fd587b979d2894a0e52eb41461378afbf497fb4d882175097a4bbfc61d67f9fb28723c3c9400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003bd03e820562ffd2e0390787cad706eaf1ff98c26084a4962275df8c60a80d3a25faec5aa7de116a746"
    values.proposerFromDGF:
    - "UNRESOLVED"
    + "eth:0x03e820562ffd2e0390787caD706EaF1FF98C2608"
    values.version:
    - "1.3.0"
    + "1.6.1"
    values.wethFromDGF:
    - "UNRESOLVED"
    + "eth:0x97FB4d882175097A4BBfc61d67f9Fb28723C3c94"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.game0:
    + "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.game1:
    + "eth:0xe1dFFCBE4e22B813F26d2106D943C102e7cAb87e"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.game621:
    + "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.game8:
    + "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
    values.game8Args:
    + "0x"
    values.game8Vm:
    + "UNRESOLVED"
    values.initBondGame0:
    + 0
    values.initBondGame1:
    + 0
    values.initBondGame621:
    + 0
    values.initBondGame8:
    + 0
    fieldMeta.gameImpls:
    - {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.game2000:
    - {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.game621:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.game0:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.game1:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.game8:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    implementationNames.eth:0x74Fac1D45B98bae058F8F566201c9A81B85C7D50:
    - "DisputeGameFactory"
    implementationNames.eth:0x72B971717E088B59F26d4236BE222ADB6ACD393b:
    + "DisputeGameFactory"
    usedTypes.0:
    + {"typeCaster":"SliceAddress","arg":{"offset":32}}
    }
    contract AnchorStateRegistry (eth:0x9793C7fD587b979D2894A0e52Eb41461378AFbF4) [opstack/AnchorStateRegistry_post20] {
    +++ description: Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. This variant stores respectedGameType, retirementTimestamp, and disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds locally and drops the legacy *FromGame fields, since the AggregateVerifier model does not expose vm()/weth()/absolutePrestate() on its game implementation.
    template:
    - "opstack/AnchorStateRegistry_post13"
    + "opstack/AnchorStateRegistry_post20"
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0xf808a203af41f7932eb8e39985e56a7c75c940a260fb17d76d1003a3793281b5"
    + "0x10f64124093daab87c84d97148854054f9622bf86e09e98d496f123be3368122"
    description:
    - "Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame."
    + "Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. This variant stores respectedGameType, retirementTimestamp, and disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds locally and drops the legacy *FromGame fields, since the AggregateVerifier model does not expose vm()/weth()/absolutePrestate() on its game implementation."
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0xeb69cC681E8D4a557b30DFFBAd85aFfD47a2CF2E"
    + "eth:0x8F40Cc98D694AB986F026C5383A181FCc9B6B281"
    values.$pastUpgrades.1:
    + ["2026-08-13T14:48:23.000Z","0x07debde13d710db6e3f7315bc195032e59304371664450f583fd465a09ff0995",["eth:0x36398155Cd17cfe804F69b233eDDA800DD4D5aA5"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.2:
    + ["2026-08-13T14:48:23.000Z","0x07debde13d710db6e3f7315bc195032e59304371664450f583fd465a09ff0995",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.3:
    + ["2026-08-13T14:48:23.000Z","0x07debde13d710db6e3f7315bc195032e59304371664450f583fd465a09ff0995",["eth:0x8F40Cc98D694AB986F026C5383A181FCc9B6B281"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 1
    + 4
    values.absolutePrestateFromGame:
    - "0x03682932cec7ce0a3874b19675a6bbc923054a7b321efc7d3835187b172494b6"
    values.challengePeriodFromOracle:
    - 86400
    values.oracleFromVm:
    - "eth:0x1fb8cdFc6831fc866Ed9C51aF8817Da5c287aDD3"
    values.version:
    - "3.5.0"
    + "3.9.0"
    values.vmFromGame:
    - "eth:0x6463dEE3828677F6270d83d45408044fc5eDB908"
    values.wethFromGame:
    - "eth:0x30332E9ec0833ECd34d6eb0bf5C14C442D0217F1"
    values.getStartingAnchorRoot:
    + {"root":"0xdead000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","l2SequenceNumber":0}
    fieldMeta.retirementTimestamp:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    fieldMeta.disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds:
    + {"severity":"HIGH"}
    implementationNames.eth:0xeb69cC681E8D4a557b30DFFBAd85aFfD47a2CF2E:
    - "AnchorStateRegistry"
    implementationNames.eth:0x8F40Cc98D694AB986F026C5383A181FCc9B6B281:
    + "AnchorStateRegistry"
    usedTypes.0.arg.621:
    + "AggregateVerifier"
    usedTypes.0.arg.8:
    + "FaultDisputeGame"
    }
    + Status: CREATED
    contract DelayedWETH (eth:0x97FB4d882175097A4BBfc61d67f9Fb28723C3c94) [opstack/DelayedWETH]
    +++ description: Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0xe1dFFCBE4e22B813F26d2106D943C102e7cAb87e) [opstack/PermissionedDisputeGame]
    +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger.
    2026 August 04, 21:27 UTC
    High severity
    9changes

    Shared SuperchainConfig implementation rolled back v2.4.2 → v2.4.0. The two versions differ only in comments, unused internal constants, and the version string; no change to logic or storage.

    contract SuperchainConfig (eth:0x097f99768A0a4a0A81bAbbCB1ea18193bA9D53cC) [opstack/SuperchainConfigFake_expiry] {
    +++ description: This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3mo 1d if left untouched.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x2cd597b7305a446a1df355e6909cbd75fe38aa045faf4876a8e5496eebc1734f"
    + "0x5fb525d1572fb90d060d122143b915059cbff39e0298b345857fd4267d7f6b28"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550"
    + "eth:0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957"
    values.$pastUpgrades.5:
    + ["2026-08-04T13:59:35.000Z","0xfb6124f237aaaccedd1f8d1298ae5f3b19871f7af18bd4c791a818487cc199de",["eth:0x4da82a327773965b8d4D85Fa3dB8249b387458E7"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.6:
    + ["2026-08-04T14:11:35.000Z","0xf7dd2207111f0f269b7cdfa8a7fa703b664585513bc113e0d2c8bc7ce9eb355f",["eth:0xCe28685EB204186b557133766eCA00334EB441E4"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.7:
    + ["2026-08-04T14:16:11.000Z","0xeb6b35d861c5b232c47bc0e604f0834975876f80181776e46cb486f7a398cf03",["eth:0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 5
    + 8
    values.version:
    - "2.4.2"
    + "2.4.0"
    implementationNames.eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550:
    - "SuperchainConfig"
    implementationNames.eth:0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957:
    + "SuperchainConfig"
    }
    2026 July 20, 15:57 UTC
    High severity
    8changes

    Shared Conduit SuperchainConfig upgraded 2.4.0 → 2.4.2 (diff). No behavioral change — just an import-path move, a stale pause-state warning removed, and the version tick, as with the main-Superchain upgrade on 2026-06-25.

    contract SuperchainConfig (eth:0x097f99768A0a4a0A81bAbbCB1ea18193bA9D53cC) [opstack/SuperchainConfigFake_expiry] {
    +++ description: This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3mo 1d if left untouched.
    sourceHashes.1:
    - "0x5fb525d1572fb90d060d122143b915059cbff39e0298b345857fd4267d7f6b28"
    + "0x2cd597b7305a446a1df355e6909cbd75fe38aa045faf4876a8e5496eebc1734f"
    values.$implementation:
    - "eth:0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957"
    + "eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550"
    values.$pastUpgrades.3:
    + ["2026-07-17T11:30:11.000Z","0x1f1d4768cc0d3f218a3f5aea7b6ceed0ae663498958e8194f208e88522c6404b",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
    values.$pastUpgrades.4:
    + ["2026-07-17T11:30:11.000Z","0x1f1d4768cc0d3f218a3f5aea7b6ceed0ae663498958e8194f208e88522c6404b",["eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550"]]
    values.$upgradeCount:
    - 3
    + 5
    values.version:
    - "2.4.0"
    + "2.4.2"
    implementationNames.eth:0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957:
    - "SuperchainConfig"
    implementationNames.eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550:
    + "SuperchainConfig"
    }

    The system has a centralized operator

    The operatorAn operator is the entity charged with managing a rollup and progressing its state. A rollup operator can be a centralized sequencer, proposer, prover, challenger, pauser of admin that is able to perform upgrades. is the only entity that can propose blocksAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over.. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.

    • MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

    Users can force any transaction

    Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.

    1. Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs
    2. OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function

    Regular exits

    The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlementThe mechanism with which the execution of rollup blocks and the resultant state is verified and possible disputes are resolved. In the context of rollups or other modular blockchains, it often refers to the proof system used--validity (ZK) or fraud proofs, or a combination thereof. Sometimes it will refer to this mechanism along with where the mechanism's outputs are ultimately published and verified, as in Ethereum being a settlement layer by verifying the proofs and allowing for withdrawals., but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled. of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.

    1. OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function
    2. OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function

    Forced messaging

    If the user experiences censorship from the operatorAn operator is the entity charged with managing a rollup and progressing its state. A rollup operator can be a centralized sequencer, proposer, prover, challenger, pauser of admin that is able to perform upgrades. with regular L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups.->L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.

    1. Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain

    EVM compatible smart contracts are supported

    OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM EquivalenceA perfect degree of compatibility; where one system or concept is indistinguishable from another in the domain being compared. In the context of rollups, it generally refers to the proximity to the EVM and to Ethereum architecture. model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. can be deployed on L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups..

    1. Introducing EVM Equivalence
    A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions
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    Ethereum

    Actors:

    Conduit Multisig 10x4a49…A746

    A Multisig with 4/11 threshold.

    • Can upgrade with no delay
      • OptimismMintableERC20Factory
      • SuperchainConfig
      • SystemConfig
      • L1CrossDomainMessenger
      • L1StandardBridge
      • L1ERC721Bridge
      • OptimismPortal2
      • DisputeGameFactory
      • AnchorStateRegistry
      • DelayedWETH
    • Can interact with SuperchainConfig
      • Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof systemThe infrastructure that allows projects to verify their state transitions. It is composed by onchain verifiers and offchain provers. The main two flavors are optimistic and ZK proof systems, but they can be combined in a hybrid model. In general though, if a system is able to accept state roots optimistically, even if it has a ZK component, it is considered an optimistic proof system., the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionlessAnyone willing should be able to join and leave the network at any time, without causing significant disturbance to the network or being detrimental to the party in question. No single entity should have the power to allowlist or blocklist participants.)
    • Can interact with SystemConfig
      • it can update the preconfer address, the batch submitter (SequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs.) address and the gasA virtual fuel used to execute smart contracts on a rollup. The EVM (or other VM within the rollup) uses an accounting mechanism to correspond the consumption of gas to the consumption of computing resources, and to limit the consumption of computing resources. configuration of the system
    • Can interact with AddressManager
      • set and change address mappings
    Used in:
    • Can interact with SystemConfig
      • Allowed to commit transactions from the current layer to the host chain
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    Ethereum

    Contains configuration parameters such as the SequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. address, gas limitThe maximum amount of gas a transaction or block may consume. on this chain and the unsafe blockAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over. signer address.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
      • batcherHash: EOA 1
      • owner: Conduit Multisig 1
    Implementation used in:

    The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. to L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups.. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
    The following tokens are included in the value secured calculation:
    ETH token logo
    Implementation used in:

    The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. and eventually challenge them. This variant exposes per-type reads only; the legacy array views (gameImpls[], initBonds[]) were removed in the new implementation.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
    Implementation used in:

    This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3mo 1d if left untouched.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
      • guardian: Conduit Multisig 1
    Proxy used in:
    Implementation used in:

    Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain’s epoch gas limitThe maximum amount of gas a transaction or block may consume., it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
    Implementation used in:

    The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1

    All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation.

    Implementation used in:

    Used to bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
    Implementation used in:

    A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the networkA constellation of nodes (peers) that communicate via a peer-to-peer protocol, for example, in propagating transactions and blocks to other nodes. it’s deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain’s representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
    Implementation used in:
    PreimageOracle0x1E1d…b1E0

    The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. for a dispute game.

    Implementation used in:
    ProxyAdmin0x35d5…Ff93
    • Roles:
      • owner: Conduit Multisig 1

    Contains the latest confirmed state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. This variant stores respectedGameType, retirementTimestamp, and disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds locally and drops the legacy *FromGame fields, since the AggregateVerifier model does not expose vm()/weth()/absolutePrestate() on its game implementation.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
    Implementation used in:

    Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Conduit Multisig 1
    Implementation used in:

    The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.

    Implementation used in:
    ProxyAdmin0xb489…d0b5
    • Roles:
      • owner: Conduit Multisig 1
    Implementation used in:
    PermissionedDisputeGame0xe1dF…b87e

    Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block. and challenger.

    Implementation used in:

    The current deployment carries some associated risks:

    • Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).

    Program Hashes

    Name
    Hash
    Repository
    Verification
    Used in
    0x0368...94b6
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