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Celo
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About
Celo is an Ethereum Optimium based on the OP stack, scaling real-world solutions & leading a thriving new digital economy for all.
Badges
About
Celo is an Ethereum Optimium based on the OP stack, scaling real-world solutions & leading a thriving new digital economy for all.
2025 Sep 03 — 2026 Sep 03
The section shows the operating costs that L2s pay to Ethereum.
2025 Sep 03 — 2026 Sep 03
This section shows how much data the project publishes to its data-availability (DA) layer over time. The project currently posts data toEthereum
EigenDA.
2025 Sep 03 — 2026 Sep 03
This section shows how "live" the project's operators are by displaying how frequently they submit transactions of the selected type. It also highlights anomalies - significant deviations from their typical schedule.
2026 Aug 04 — Sep 03
Last 30 day anomalies
All liveness anomalies detected for this project in the last 30 days, helping you review recent downtime and availability issues.
No State updates were performed for 1h 50m (from 2026 Aug 17, 06:34 UTC until 2026 Aug 17, 08:24 UTC). These typically occur every 19m 29s on average.
Jello hardfork activates OP Succinct Lite
2025 Dec 10th
Celo implements OP Succinct Lite, introducing ZK proofs for dispute resolution and DA verification.
Funds can be stolen if
- a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL),
- the validity proof cryptography is broken or implemented incorrectly,
- no whitelisted challenger disputes an invalid state root before the challenge window expires (CRITICAL),
- the proposer routes proof verification through a malicious or faulty verifier.
Funds can be lost if
Funds can be frozen if
MEV can be extracted if
Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Single round proofs (1R) only require a single transaction to resolve. ZK proofs are used to prove the correctness of the state transition. The system currently operates with at least 5 whitelisted challengers external to the team.
There is no exit window for users to exit in case of unwanted upgrades as they are initiated by the Security Council with instant upgrade power and without proper notice.
Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.
Data is posted to EigenDA
Transactions roots are posted onchain and the full data is posted on EigenDA. The sequencer is publishing data to EigenDA v2. The DACert Verifier is used to verify attestations from the EigenDA operator set that the data is indeed available. If EigenDA becomes unavailable, the sequencer falls back to Ethereum.
Funds can be lost if the sequencer posts an unavailable transaction root (CRITICAL).
Funds can be lost if the data is not available on the external provider (CRITICAL).
- EigenDA Docs - Overview
- Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs
- BatchInbox - address
- OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function
EigenDAState roots are proposed by whitelisted proposers who create dispute games via the DisputeGameFactory by posting a bond of 0.01 ETH. Once created, the game enters a challenge period of 3d 12h during which whitelisted challengers can dispute the proposal by posting a bond of 0.01 ETH. If challenged, anyone can submit a ZK proof to prove the correct state within the proving period of 1d. After the challenge period passes without a successful challenge, or after a valid proof is submitted, anyone can resolve the game and finalize the state root.
Funds can be stolen if the validity proof cryptography is broken or implemented incorrectly.
Funds can be stolen if no whitelisted challenger disputes an invalid state root before the challenge window expires (CRITICAL).
Funds can be stolen if the proposer routes proof verification through a malicious or faulty verifier.
Funds can be frozen if the permissioned proposer fails to publish state roots to the L1.
Trusted Setups
Onchain verifier
Used in
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Onchain verifier | Used in Projects used inSearch for projects used in |
Celo’s L1 contracts are upgradable by a ProxyAdmin owned by the 2/2 CeloProxyAdminOwner, a nested Safe whose two signers are the 6/8 Celo Security Council and the 6/8 Celo cLabs Multisig. Both halves must approve, and there is no delay on upgrades. The shared SuperchainConfig is the exception: it remains under the 2/2 SuperchainProxyAdminOwner controlled by the Optimism Foundation and the Optimism Security Council, outside Celo’s control.
Pause powers sit apart from the upgrade path. The CeloSuperchainConfig guardian, which can pause Celo withdrawals, is the Celo cLabs Multisig acting alone; the shared SuperchainConfig guardian, which can pause the whole Superchain including Celo, resolves to the Optimism Security Council. The Celo Security Council holds no pause power at all. Celo cLabs Multisig also owns SystemConfig and the OP Succinct AccessManager on its own, so it sets the sequencer, gas configuration and the proposer and challenger allowlists without Council approval.
Governance profile
Security Council
| Composition | 6/8 community Security Council, nested as one of two signers in the 2/2 |
|---|---|
| Members public | Named, not mapped — the docs name 8 members (L2Beat, Hyperlane, Valora, Mento, Nitya Subramanian, Kris Kaczor, Tim Moreton, Aaron Boyd) without addresses, and the founding proposal lists 8 signer addresses “in no particular order”, so no member can be tied to a signer. Membership is mostly Celo-ecosystem projects, and cLabs sits on the other half of the 2/2 rather than inside the Council. |
| Charter | No charter — the docs page is explicitly a work in progress restating the founding forum proposal, which deferred term lengths to “a later date” and never defined renewal, removal or rotation. Review feedback on that thread flagged missing emergency protocols, timezone coverage, compensation and reporting cadence; none have since been published. The Council does follow the Optimism multisig security policy. |
| Can bypass DAO? | Entirely — every L1 upgrade runs on the 2/2 |
| DAO can override SC? | No — the Council administers itself. Seats are changed by the Council Safe calling itself, so 6 of the 8 sitting members decide who joins or leaves. CELO governance ratified the inaugural cohort by vote but holds no standing power, because the |
Upgrades
| Normal upgrade path | A task is published in the public celo-superchain-ops repo → 6/8 Security Council approval → 6/8 cLabs approval → execution through the 2/2 |
|---|---|
| Emergency upgrade path | No separate path — the normal path executes as soon as both halves have signed, so there is no lower emergency threshold. The fast levers are pauses, and neither belongs to the Security Council: the 6/8 |
| Exit window | None — nothing separates the second approval from the upgrade taking effect, so users get no notice and cannot withdraw ahead of an unwanted change. Routine changes run through the same gate: rotating the OP Succinct verification keys is a |
| Proof-system levers | Beyond upgrades, whoever controls the proof system controls withdrawals. |
Token governance
| Governance token |
|
|---|---|
| Voting venue | The onchain |
| Proposal threshold | 10,000 CELO deposit to queue a proposal. Queued proposals expire after 4 weeks, and only the 3 most-upvoted are promoted to a vote each day. |
| Quorum | Participation must clear a moving baseline — currently ~23% of Locked CELO, scaled by a 0.5 quorum factor to roughly 12%, with a 5% floor. The baseline is an exponential moving average of past turnout, so quorum drifts with participation rather than being fixed. |
| Execution model | 7d referendum → 3d execution window. A 3/14 approver multisig must approve before execution, after which anyone can execute. Scope is the limiting factor: this path governs Celo’s L2 core contracts and the Community Fund, while every L1 rollup contract sits behind the 2/2 |
Past upgrades
The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.
2026 July 17, 10:07 UTC2changesOpFoundation shared Safes (UpgradeSafe + OperationsSafe): 2 members rotated.
OpFoundation shared Safes (UpgradeSafe + OperationsSafe): 2 members rotated.
| contract OpFoundationUpgradeSafe (eth:0x847B5c174615B1B7fDF770882256e2D3E95b9D92) [GnosisSafe] { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| values.$members.0: | |
| - | "eth:0x6419F81580343DF023E68715C6e269aFb00a2cc7" |
| + | "eth:0xf1EfbdC2C0BDC4554E0f1639D7fe88cD870a4639" |
| values.$members.3: | |
| - | "eth:0xBF93D4d727F7Ba1F753E1124C3e532dCb04Ea2c8" |
| + | "eth:0x7F1D4FE689B73B628285454667B93cfd09409f27" |
| } |
2026 July 06, 07:55 UTCHigh severity8changesShared SuperchainConfig upgraded 2.4.0 → 2.4.2 (diff). No behavioral change — ProxyAdminOwnedBase import moved, misleading pause-state warning removed, and 5 new unused constants added to the shared Constants library (forward-plumbing for OPCM tooling).
Shared SuperchainConfig upgraded 2.4.0 → 2.4.2 (diff). No behavioral change — ProxyAdminOwnedBase import moved, misleading pause-state warning removed, and 5 new unused constants added to the shared Constants library (forward-plumbing for OPCM tooling).
| contract SuperchainConfig (eth:0x95703e0982140D16f8ebA6d158FccEde42f04a4C) [opstack/SuperchainConfig_expiry] { | |
| +++ description: Used to manage global configuration values for multiple OP Chains within a single Superchain network. The SuperchainConfig contract manages individual pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3 months if left untouched. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x5fb525d1572fb90d060d122143b915059cbff39e0298b345857fd4267d7f6b28" |
| + | "0x2cd597b7305a446a1df355e6909cbd75fe38aa045faf4876a8e5496eebc1734f" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957" |
| + | "eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.6: | |
| + | ["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.7: | |
| + | ["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 6 |
| + | 8 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.4.0" |
| + | "2.4.2" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957: | |
| - | "SuperchainConfig" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550: | |
| + | "SuperchainConfig" |
| } |
2026 June 11, 11:08 UTCHigh severity8changesOPSuccinct fault-proof upgrade to celo/v2.1.0 (SP1 Hypercube). The respected dispute game implementation (game type 42) was swapped on the DisputeGameFactory from 0xE7bd695… to a new 0xfF1caC738… , rotating the program verification keys: - aggregationVkey: 0x004f4bbc…0377 - 0x00b04647…4be4 - rangeVkeyCommitment: 0x1fffeb5a…7c2c - 0x1dd60be4…5c94 Both new vkeys reproduce from the celo/v2.1.0 source (verified; steps in common/programHashes.ts). On-chain game code change is small and confined to anchoring: the starting output root now reads ANCHOR STATE REGISTRY.getAnchorRoot() instead of the deprecated anchors(GAME TYPE) , and a new invariant requires a parent game's L2 block to be ahead of the anchor (handles game-type-switch / retirement recovery; prevents duplicate or stale-parent games). The proof system and proposer/challenger access control are unchanged. diff: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xE7bd695d6A17970A2D9dB55cfeF7F2024d630aE1/eth:0xfF1caC738a5263736AF258e4b3D6a4970C6351FF SystemConfig minBaseFee raised 0.1 - 0.2 gwei. Routine shared OP governance rotations (not Celo-specific, tracked across OP Stack chains): - DeputyPauseModule deputy: 0x352f1de… - 0x2fA1503… . Scheduled key hygiene. - OpFoundationUpgradeSafe member[6]: 0xc222ab08… - 0xa2A58E31… . Member rotated. - Optimism Security Council member[12]: 0x9282722… - 0xcbC7dCe… . Member rotated.
OPSuccinct fault-proof upgrade to celo/v2.1.0 (SP1 Hypercube).
The respected dispute game implementation (game type 42) was swapped on the
DisputeGameFactory from 0xE7bd695… to a new 0xfF1caC738…,
rotating the program verification keys:
- aggregationVkey:
0x004f4bbc…0377->0x00b04647…4be4 - rangeVkeyCommitment:
0x1fffeb5a…7c2c->0x1dd60be4…5c94
Both new vkeys reproduce from the celo/v2.1.0 source (verified; steps in common/programHashes.ts).
On-chain game code change is small and confined to anchoring:
the starting output root now reads ANCHOR_STATE_REGISTRY.getAnchorRoot() instead of the deprecated
anchors(GAME_TYPE), and a new invariant requires a parent game’s L2 block to be ahead of the anchor
(handles game-type-switch / retirement recovery; prevents duplicate or stale-parent games). The proof
system and proposer/challenger access control are unchanged.
diff: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xE7bd695d6A17970A2D9dB55cfeF7F2024d630aE1/eth:0xfF1caC738a5263736AF258e4b3D6a4970C6351FF
SystemConfig minBaseFee raised 0.1 -> 0.2 gwei.
Routine shared OP governance rotations (not Celo-specific, tracked across OP Stack chains):
- DeputyPauseModule deputy:
0x352f1de…->0x2fA1503…. Scheduled key hygiene. - OpFoundationUpgradeSafe member[6]:
0xc222ab08…->0xa2A58E31…. Member rotated. - Optimism Security Council member[12]:
0x9282722…->0xcbC7dCe…. Member rotated.
| contract DeputyPauseModule (eth:0x76fC2F971FB355D0453cF9F64d3F9E4f640E1754) [opstack/DeputyPauseModule] { | |
| +++ description: Allows eth:0x2fA150379bF32b6d79Eeb4ff9bD280E76049a87c, called the deputy pauser, to act on behalf of the eth:0x847B5c174615B1B7fDF770882256e2D3E95b9D92 if set as its Safe module. | |
| description: | |
| - | "Allows eth:0x352f1defB49718e7Ea411687E850aA8d6299F7aC, called the deputy pauser, to act on behalf of the eth:0x847B5c174615B1B7fDF770882256e2D3E95b9D92 if set as its Safe module." |
| + | "Allows eth:0x2fA150379bF32b6d79Eeb4ff9bD280E76049a87c, called the deputy pauser, to act on behalf of the eth:0x847B5c174615B1B7fDF770882256e2D3E95b9D92 if set as its Safe module." |
| values.deputy: | |
| - | "eth:0x352f1defB49718e7Ea411687E850aA8d6299F7aC" |
| + | "eth:0x2fA150379bF32b6d79Eeb4ff9bD280E76049a87c" |
| } |
| contract OpFoundationUpgradeSafe (eth:0x847B5c174615B1B7fDF770882256e2D3E95b9D92) [GnosisSafe] { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| values.$members.6: | |
| - | "eth:0xc222ab08333109243B1f4E2a80e3D0A190714AB5" |
| + | "eth:0xa2A58E31C03C59e34ab4d996d811DA0C035BfDea" |
| } |
| contract SystemConfig (eth:0x89E31965D844a309231B1f17759Ccaf1b7c09861) [opstack/SystemConfig] { | |
| +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address. | |
| values.minBaseFee: | |
| - | 100000000000 |
| + | 200000000000 |
| } |
| contract Optimism Security Council (eth:0xc2819DC788505Aac350142A7A707BF9D03E3Bd03) [GnosisSafe] { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| values.$members.12: | |
| - | "eth:0x92827223f6b397CE9F208eE352bacA710765cACb" |
| + | "eth:0xcbC7dCeb857F0b25523618cCa0A03c419a6d7eA6" |
| } |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract OPSuccinctFaultDisputeGame (eth:0xE7bd695d6A17970A2D9dB55cfeF7F2024d630aE1) [succinct/OPSuccinct/OPSuccinctFaultDisputeGame] | |
| +++ description: Logic of the dispute game. When a state root is proposed, a dispute game contract is deployed. Challengers can use such contracts to challenge the proposed state root. |
| contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0xFbAC162162f4009Bb007C6DeBC36B1dAC10aF683) [opstack/DisputeGameFactory] { | |
| +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. | |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.game42: | |
| - | "eth:0xE7bd695d6A17970A2D9dB55cfeF7F2024d630aE1" |
| + | "eth:0xfF1caC738a5263736AF258e4b3D6a4970C6351FF" |
| } |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract OPSuccinctFaultDisputeGame (eth:0xfF1caC738a5263736AF258e4b3D6a4970C6351FF) [succinct/OPSuccinct/OPSuccinctFaultDisputeGame] | |
| +++ description: Logic of the dispute game. When a state root is proposed, a dispute game contract is deployed. Challengers can use such contracts to challenge the proposed state root. |
2026 April 24, 13:43 UTC1changeSystemConfig minBaseFee raised from 50 gwei to 100 gwei.
SystemConfig minBaseFee raised from 50 gwei to 100 gwei.
| contract SystemConfig (eth:0x89E31965D844a309231B1f17759Ccaf1b7c09861) { | |
| +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address. | |
| values.minBaseFee: | |
| - | 50000000000 |
| + | 100000000000 |
| } |
2026 April 17, 13:47 UTC3changesNew SP1 Hypercube Plonk v6.1.0 verifier (0xc3c6dDD) registered in SP1VerifierGateway with selector 0x5a093a2f. Added to activeVerifiers and allVerifiers ; SP1 proofs using this selector are now routed to the new contract. The verifier is the canonical Succinct deployment at that address on Ethereum mainnet (V6 1 0 SP1 VERIFIER PLONK). Registered in sp1hypercube catalog.
New SP1 Hypercube Plonk v6.1.0 verifier (0xc3c6dDD) registered in SP1VerifierGateway with selector 0x5a093a2f. Added to activeVerifiers and allVerifiers; SP1 proofs using this selector are now routed to the new contract. The verifier is the canonical Succinct deployment at that address on Ethereum mainnet (V6_1_0_SP1_VERIFIER_PLONK). Registered in sp1hypercube catalog.
| contract SP1VerifierGateway (eth:0x3B6041173B80E77f038f3F2C0f9744f04837185e) { | |
| +++ description: This contract is the router for zk proof verification. It stores the mapping between identifiers and the address of onchain verifier contracts, routing each identifier to the corresponding verifier contract. | |
| +++ description: Verifiers that are routed to by their selector and not frozen. | |
| values.activeVerifiers.2: | |
| + | {"selector":"0x5a093a2f","verifier":"eth:0xc3c6dDDAc8829b233Dc6536Ec024775a57b0AF2A"} |
| +++ description: All verifiers that were ever routed to by this gateway. | |
| values.allVerifiers.11: | |
| + | {"selector":"0x5a093a2f","verifier":"eth:0xc3c6dDDAc8829b233Dc6536Ec024775a57b0AF2A"} |
| } |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract SP1Verifier (eth:0xc3c6dDDAc8829b233Dc6536Ec024775a57b0AF2A) | |
| +++ description: None |
The system has a centralized operator
MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
Users can force any transaction
Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.
Regular exits
The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.
Forced messaging
If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.
EVM compatible smart contracts are supported
OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.
Ethereum
Actors:
A Multisig with 2/2 threshold.
- Can upgrade with no delay
- Celo native asset Token ProxyAdmin
- L1CrossDomainMessenger ProxyAdmin
- CeloSuperchainConfig ProxyAdmin
- L1ERC721Bridge ProxyAdmin
- OptimismMintableERC20Factory ProxyAdmin
- SystemConfig ProxyAdmin
- AnchorStateRegistry ProxyAdmin
- DelayedWETH ProxyAdmin
- L1StandardBridge ProxyAdmin
- OptimismPortal2 ProxyAdmin
- DelayedWETH ProxyAdmin
- DisputeGameFactory ProxyAdmin
- Can interact with AddressManager
- set and change address mappings ProxyAdmin
A Multisig with 6/8 threshold. Member of CeloProxyAdminOwner.
A Multisig with 5/7 threshold. It uses the following modules: SaferSafes (A Gnosis Safe module combining LivenessModule and TimelockGuard. Provides liveness checks where a fallback owner can challenge and take over if Safe owners are unresponsive, plus optional timelock delays for transaction scheduling). Member of SuperchainProxyAdminOwner.
- Can interact with SuperchainConfig
- Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless) LivenessModule if the number of Optimism Security Council members falls below 8 → Optimism Security Council → Optimism Guardian Multisig
A Gnosis Safe module combining LivenessModule and TimelockGuard. Provides liveness checks where a fallback owner can challenge and take over if Safe owners are unresponsive, plus optional timelock delays for transaction scheduling.
- Can interact with SuperchainConfig
- Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless) OpFoundationUpgradeSafe → LivenessModule if the number of Optimism Security Council members falls below 8 → Optimism Security Council → Optimism Guardian Multisig
A Multisig with 10/13 threshold. It uses the following modules: LivenessModule (used to remove members inactive for 3mo 8d while making sure that the threshold remains above 75%. If the number of members falls below 8, the OpFoundationUpgradeSafe takes ownership of the multisig). Member of Optimism Guardian Multisig, SuperchainProxyAdminOwner.
- Can interact with SuperchainConfig
- Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless) Optimism Guardian Multisig
Participants (13):
0xE61F…76aE0x652B…cB5f0x5c1f…7a810x4A73…e61E0x3A53…aa940xEF9A…877c0x6323…c8650xd5b7…aC900x7ed8…9E390x0aA3…75D70x0a87…efE60xbfA0…E0d90xcbC7…7eA6A Multisig with 2/2 threshold.
- Can upgrade with no delay
- SuperchainConfig SuperchainProxyAdmin
- Can interact with AddressManager
- set and change address mappings SuperchainProxyAdmin
Modular contract to be used together with the LivenessModule. Tracks liveness / activity of Safe owners.
- Can interact with LivenessModule
- can remove members of Optimism Security Council inactive for 3mo 8d
A Multisig with 1/1 threshold. It uses the following modules: DeputyPauseModule (Allows 0x2fA150379bF32b6d79Eeb4ff9bD280E76049a87c, called the deputy pauser, to act on behalf of the OpFoundationUpgradeSafe if set as its Safe module).
Participants (1):
Optimism Security CouncilA Multisig with 6/8 threshold. Member of CeloProxyAdminOwner.
- Can interact with SystemConfig
- Allowed to commit transactions from the current layer to the host chain
- Can interact with SuperchainConfig
- Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless) DeputyPauseModule though restricted to the SuperchainConfig’s
pause()function → Optimism Guardian Multisig
- Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless) DeputyPauseModule though restricted to the SuperchainConfig’s
- Can interact with AccessManager
- Allowed to post new state roots of the current layer to the host chain
Ethereum
The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CeloProxyAdminOwner
Used to manage global configuration values for multiple OP Chains within a single Superchain network. The SuperchainConfig contract manages individual pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3 months if left untouched.
- Roles:
- admin: SuperchainProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner
- guardian: Optimism Guardian Multisig; ultimately OpFoundationUpgradeSafe, Optimism EOA 1, Optimism Security Council, SaferSafes
Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain’s epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CeloProxyAdminOwner
Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CeloProxyAdminOwner
The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CeloProxyAdminOwner
All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation.
used to remove members inactive for 3mo 8d while making sure that the threshold remains above 75%. If the number of members falls below 8, the OpFoundationUpgradeSafe takes ownership of the multisig
- Roles:
- fallbackOwner: OpFoundationUpgradeSafe if the number of Optimism Security Council members falls below 8
- livenessGuard: LivenessGuard
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CeloProxyAdminOwner
The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CeloProxyAdminOwner
Logic of the dispute game. When a state root is proposed, a dispute game contract is deployed. Challengers can use such contracts to challenge the proposed state root.
The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.
A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it’s deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain’s representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CeloProxyAdminOwner
Allows 0x2fA150379bF32b6d79Eeb4ff9bD280E76049a87c, called the deputy pauser, to act on behalf of the OpFoundationUpgradeSafe if set as its Safe module.
- Roles:
- deputy: Optimism EOA 1 though restricted to the SuperchainConfig’s
pause()function
- deputy: Optimism EOA 1 though restricted to the SuperchainConfig’s
- Roles:
- owner: CeloProxyAdminOwner
Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the OPSuccinctFaultDisputeGame. Variant for chains using OPSuccinct (SP1) games instead of Cannon, which omits Cannon-specific cross-contract fields (vm, oracle, weth, challengePeriod, absolutePrestate from game).
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CeloProxyAdminOwner
Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CeloProxyAdminOwner
Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger.
Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CeloProxyAdminOwner
Contract managing access control for proposers and challengers in OPSuccinct.
- Roles:
- challengers: EOA 3, EOA 4, EOA 5, EOA 6, EOA 8, EOA 9
- owner: Celo cLabs Multisig
- proposers: EOA 2, EOA 7
Logic of the dispute game. When a state root is proposed, a dispute game contract is deployed. Challengers can use such contracts to challenge the proposed state root.
The current deployment carries some associated risks:
Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).