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Celo
There are impactful changes and part of the information might be outdated.
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About
Celo is an Ethereum Optimium based on the OP stack, scaling real-world solutions & leading a thriving new digital economy for all.
Interop protocols used
Tokens transferred
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About
Celo is an Ethereum Optimium based on the OP stack, scaling real-world solutions & leading a thriving new digital economy for all.
2025 Jun 12 — 2026 Jun 12
The section shows the operating costs that L2s pay to Ethereum.
2025 Jun 12 — 2026 Jun 12
This section shows how much data the project publishes to its data-availability (DA) layer over time. The project currently posts data toEthereum
EigenDA.
2025 Jun 12 — 2026 Jun 12
This section shows how "live" the project's operators are by displaying how frequently they submit transactions of the selected type. It also highlights anomalies - significant deviations from their typical schedule.
2026 May 13 — Jun 12
Last 30 day anomalies
All liveness anomalies detected for this project in the last 30 days, helping you review recent downtime and availability issues.
No Tx data submissions were performed for 7h 15m (from 2026 Jun 05, 13:49 UTC until 2026 Jun 05, 21:04 UTC). These typically occur every 6min 28s on average.
No State updates were performed for 7h 34m 24s (from 2026 Jun 05, 13:27 UTC until 2026 Jun 05, 21:02 UTC). These typically occur every 30min 17s on average.
No State updates were performed for 4h 3m (from 2026 May 19, 09:54 UTC until 2026 May 19, 13:57 UTC). These typically occur every 30min 17s on average.
No State updates were performed for 4h 39m 24s (from 2026 May 18, 12:53 UTC until 2026 May 18, 17:32 UTC). These typically occur every 30min 17s on average.
Jello hardfork activates OP Succinct Lite
2025 Dec 10th
Celo implements OP Succinct Lite, introducing ZK proofs for dispute resolution and DA verification.
Funds can be stolen if
Funds can be lost if
Funds can be frozen if
MEV can be extracted if
Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Single round proofs (1R) only require a single transaction to resolve. ZK proofs are used to prove the correctness of the state transition. The system currently operates with at least 5 whitelisted challengers external to the team.
There is no exit window for users to exit in case of unwanted upgrades as they are initiated by the Security Council with instant upgrade power and without proper notice.
Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.
Data is posted to EigenDA
Transactions roots are posted onchain and the full data is posted on EigenDA. The sequencer is publishing data to EigenDA v2. The DACert Verifier is used to verify attestations from the EigenDA operator set that the data is indeed available. If EigenDA becomes unavailable, the sequencer falls back to Ethereum.
Funds can be lost if the sequencer posts an unavailable transaction root (CRITICAL).
Funds can be lost if the data is not available on the external provider (CRITICAL).
- EigenDA Docs - Overview
- Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs
- BatchInbox - address
- OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function
EigenDAState roots are proposed by whitelisted proposers who create dispute games via the DisputeGameFactory by posting a bond of 0.01 ETH. Once created, the game enters a challenge period of 3d 12h during which whitelisted challengers can dispute the proposal by posting a bond of 0.01 ETH. If challenged, anyone can submit a ZK proof to prove the correct state within the proving period of 1d. After the challenge period passes without a successful challenge, or after a valid proof is submitted, anyone can resolve the game and finalize the state root.
Funds can be stolen if the validity proof cryptography is broken or implemented incorrectly.
Funds can be stolen if the proposer routes proof verification through a malicious or faulty verifier.
Funds can be frozen if the permissioned proposer fails to publish state roots to the L1.
Trusted Setups
Onchain verifier
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Past upgrades
The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.
2026 April 24, 13:43 UTC2changesSystemConfig minBaseFee raised from 50 gwei to 100 gwei.
SystemConfig minBaseFee raised from 50 gwei to 100 gwei.
| contract SystemConfig (eth:0x89E31965D844a309231B1f17759Ccaf1b7c09861) { | |
| +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address. | |
| values.minBaseFee: | |
| - | 50000000000 |
| + | 100000000000 |
| } |
2026 April 17, 13:47 UTC3changesNew SP1 Hypercube Plonk v6.1.0 verifier (0xc3c6dDD) registered in SP1VerifierGateway with selector 0x5a093a2f. Added to activeVerifiers and allVerifiers ; SP1 proofs using this selector are now routed to the new contract. The verifier is the canonical Succinct deployment at that address on Ethereum mainnet (V6 1 0 SP1 VERIFIER PLONK). Registered in sp1hypercube catalog.
New SP1 Hypercube Plonk v6.1.0 verifier (0xc3c6dDD) registered in SP1VerifierGateway with selector 0x5a093a2f. Added to activeVerifiers and allVerifiers; SP1 proofs using this selector are now routed to the new contract. The verifier is the canonical Succinct deployment at that address on Ethereum mainnet (V6_1_0_SP1_VERIFIER_PLONK). Registered in sp1hypercube catalog.
| contract SP1VerifierGateway (eth:0x3B6041173B80E77f038f3F2C0f9744f04837185e) { | |
| +++ description: This contract is the router for zk proof verification. It stores the mapping between identifiers and the address of onchain verifier contracts, routing each identifier to the corresponding verifier contract. | |
| +++ description: Verifiers that are routed to by their selector and not frozen. | |
| values.activeVerifiers.2: | |
| + | {"selector":"0x5a093a2f","verifier":"eth:0xc3c6dDDAc8829b233Dc6536Ec024775a57b0AF2A"} |
| +++ description: All verifiers that were ever routed to by this gateway. | |
| values.allVerifiers.11: | |
| + | {"selector":"0x5a093a2f","verifier":"eth:0xc3c6dDDAc8829b233Dc6536Ec024775a57b0AF2A"} |
| } |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract SP1Verifier (eth:0xc3c6dDDAc8829b233Dc6536Ec024775a57b0AF2A) | |
| +++ description: None |
2026 April 16, 09:28 UTC5changesSystemConfig minBaseFee raised from 25 gwei to 50 gwei. AccessManager (OPSuccinct proposer/challenger access control) owner transferred from an EIP-7702 delegator EOA (0x95FFAC, now deleted from discovery) to the Celo cLabs Multisig (0x9Eb44D).
SystemConfig minBaseFee raised from 25 gwei to 50 gwei. AccessManager (OPSuccinct proposer/challenger access control) owner transferred from an EIP-7702 delegator EOA (0x95FFAC, now deleted from discovery) to the Celo cLabs Multisig (0x9Eb44D).
| contract SystemConfig (eth:0x89E31965D844a309231B1f17759Ccaf1b7c09861) { | |
| +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address. | |
| values.minBaseFee: | |
| - | 25000000000 |
| + | 50000000000 |
| } |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| EOA (eth:0x95FFAC468e37DdeEF407FfEf18f0cC9E86D8f13B) | |
| +++ description: None |
| contract AccessManager (eth:0xF59a19c5578291cB7fd22618D16281aDf76f2816) { | |
| +++ description: Contract managing access control for proposers and challengers in OPSuccinct. | |
| values.owner: | |
| - | "eth:0x95FFAC468e37DdeEF407FfEf18f0cC9E86D8f13B" |
| + | "eth:0x9Eb44Da23433b5cAA1c87e35594D15FcEb08D34d" |
| } |
2026 April 01, 15:28 UTCHigh severity170changesMajor upgrade to op-contracts v5.x. Two-phase upgrade executed on 2026-03-31. OptimismPortal2 v3.14→v5.1.1, SystemConfig v2.5→v3.11, L1CrossDomainMessenger v2.6→v2.11, L1StandardBridge v2.3→v2.8, L1ERC721Bridge v2.4→v2.9, DisputeGameFactory v1.0.1→v1.3. SuperchainConfigLocal replaced by CeloSuperchainConfig - all contracts now reference the new local superchain config (0x25035d). Guardian changed to Celo cLabs Multisig (0x9Eb44D). SystemConfig maximumGasLimit increased from 200M to 500M. New AnchorStateRegistry, DelayedWETH contracts, and redeployed dispute game implementations (FaultDisputeGame, PermissionedDisputeGame, OPSuccinctFaultDisputeGame). New MIPS64 contract. OptimismPortal2: diff SystemConfig: diff L1CrossDomainMessenger: diff L1StandardBridge: diff L1ERC721Bridge: diff DisputeGameFactory: diff OptimismMintableERC20Factory: diff MIPS (MIPS32→MIPS64): diff FaultDisputeGame: diff PermissionedDisputeGame: diff OPSuccinctFaultDisputeGame: diff
Major upgrade to op-contracts v5.x. Two-phase upgrade executed on 2026-03-31.
OptimismPortal2 v3.14→v5.1.1, SystemConfig v2.5→v3.11, L1CrossDomainMessenger v2.6→v2.11, L1StandardBridge v2.3→v2.8, L1ERC721Bridge v2.4→v2.9, DisputeGameFactory v1.0.1→v1.3. SuperchainConfigLocal replaced by CeloSuperchainConfig - all contracts now reference the new local superchain config (0x25035d). Guardian changed to Celo cLabs Multisig (0x9Eb44D). SystemConfig maximumGasLimit increased from 200M to 500M. New AnchorStateRegistry, DelayedWETH contracts, and redeployed dispute game implementations (FaultDisputeGame, PermissionedDisputeGame, OPSuccinctFaultDisputeGame). New MIPS64 contract.
OptimismPortal2: diff SystemConfig: diff L1CrossDomainMessenger: diff L1StandardBridge: diff L1ERC721Bridge: diff DisputeGameFactory: diff OptimismMintableERC20Factory: diff MIPS (MIPS32→MIPS64): diff FaultDisputeGame: diff PermissionedDisputeGame: diff OPSuccinctFaultDisputeGame: diff
| contract L1CrossDomainMessenger (eth:0x1AC1181fc4e4F877963680587AEAa2C90D7EbB95) { | |
| +++ description: Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x6831ab5545aca99fd05c64f6718bff61dc5cbdb7d5b248257ea6e95a132024c3" |
| + | "0x9db9942f58670bab2d2f04cd659483dd804b63208c5c83a704972a47b551b85e" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x807124F75FF2120b2f26D7e6f9e39C03ee9DE212" |
| + | "eth:0xE45D2d835d0b2D3C7f4fEe1eaa19A068d0ba8A88" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.3: | |
| + | ["2026-03-31T07:05:23.000Z","0x66a97a8a6934d37b3ed077e788fb02fbce53e02ad7d95d3159ba6347ede395c8",["eth:0xA183A771B6c5F6e88cd351bBDC40E1ECD4521Cad"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.4: | |
| + | ["2026-03-31T07:08:11.000Z","0xce8f5d953104dbe1a793fdcf76a16290f1c8765f87fcef729c2ad7e2e95a07dc",["eth:0xE45D2d835d0b2D3C7f4fEe1eaa19A068d0ba8A88"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 3 |
| + | 5 |
| values.superchainConfig: | |
| - | "eth:0xa440975E5A6BB19Bc3Bee901d909BB24b0f43D33" |
| + | "eth:0x25035d2233d099f0BA710ca1e5a3834842870C66" |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.6.0" |
| + | "2.11.0" |
| values.initVersion: | |
| + | 3 |
| values.proxyAdmin: | |
| + | "eth:0x783A434532Ee94667979213af1711505E8bFE374" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| + | "eth:0x4092A77bAF58fef0309452cEaCb09221e556E112" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x807124F75FF2120b2f26D7e6f9e39C03ee9DE212: | |
| - | "L1CrossDomainMessenger" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xE45D2d835d0b2D3C7f4fEe1eaa19A068d0ba8A88: | |
| + | "L1CrossDomainMessenger" |
| } |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0x25c2e07A24a74F9FA54f7CA5ddAfedB2264a5d02) | |
| +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger. |
| contract L1ERC721Bridge (eth:0x3C519816C5BdC0a0199147594F83feD4F5847f13) { | |
| +++ description: Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x28669b49da3effd51f0f9424ca9cdd455c5b9327c09a40c65fc06f114a6eb837" |
| + | "0x75cd470a9d1c1afc343b599b1c14731f55bb36fe8a4e844ddb88a0b791918795" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x7aE1d3BD877a4C5CA257404ce26BE93A02C98013" |
| + | "eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.3: | |
| + | ["2026-03-31T07:05:23.000Z","0x66a97a8a6934d37b3ed077e788fb02fbce53e02ad7d95d3159ba6347ede395c8",["eth:0x7f1d12fB2911EB095278085f721e644C1f675696"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.4: | |
| + | ["2026-03-31T07:08:11.000Z","0xce8f5d953104dbe1a793fdcf76a16290f1c8765f87fcef729c2ad7e2e95a07dc",["eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 3 |
| + | 5 |
| values.superchainConfig: | |
| - | "eth:0xa440975E5A6BB19Bc3Bee901d909BB24b0f43D33" |
| + | "eth:0x25035d2233d099f0BA710ca1e5a3834842870C66" |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.4.0" |
| + | "2.9.0" |
| values.initVersion: | |
| + | 3 |
| values.proxyAdmin: | |
| + | "eth:0x783A434532Ee94667979213af1711505E8bFE374" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| + | "eth:0x4092A77bAF58fef0309452cEaCb09221e556E112" |
| values.systemConfig: | |
| + | "eth:0x89E31965D844a309231B1f17759Ccaf1b7c09861" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x7aE1d3BD877a4C5CA257404ce26BE93A02C98013: | |
| - | "L1ERC721Bridge" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9: | |
| + | "L1ERC721Bridge" |
| } |
| contract CeloProxyAdminOwner (eth:0x4092A77bAF58fef0309452cEaCb09221e556E112) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| receivedPermissions.1: | |
| - | {"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x89E31965D844a309231B1f17759Ccaf1b7c09861","description":"it can update the preconfer address, the batch submitter (Sequencer) address and the gas configuration of the system.","role":".owner"} |
| receivedPermissions.2: | |
| - | {"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0xa316D42E8Fd98D2Ec364b8bF853d2623E768f95a","description":"can pull funds from the contract in case of emergency.","role":".owner"} |
| receivedPermissions.3: | |
| + | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x25035d2233d099f0BA710ca1e5a3834842870C66","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x783A434532Ee94667979213af1711505E8bFE374"}]} |
| receivedPermissions.7: | |
| + | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x8fE58d2168b5412Cf1Bd212cE6137f8b7300222d","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x783A434532Ee94667979213af1711505E8bFE374"}]} |
| receivedPermissions.8.from: | |
| - | "eth:0x9c314E8057025F2982aa4B3923Abd741A8e8DE91" |
| + | "eth:0x91FA5B653aFe81A79890A93ad83768A04cc011b4" |
| receivedPermissions.10: | |
| - | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x9F18D91949731E766f294A14027bBFE8F28328CC","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x783A434532Ee94667979213af1711505E8bFE374"}]} |
| receivedPermissions.11: | |
| - | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xa316D42E8Fd98D2Ec364b8bF853d2623E768f95a","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x783A434532Ee94667979213af1711505E8bFE374"}]} |
| receivedPermissions.12: | |
| - | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xa440975E5A6BB19Bc3Bee901d909BB24b0f43D33","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x783A434532Ee94667979213af1711505E8bFE374"}]} |
| receivedPermissions.11: | |
| + | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xC700d16428cF5Bfa71D91E66fA54Fc11A73f2552","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x783A434532Ee94667979213af1711505E8bFE374"}]} |
| } |
| contract OptimismMintableERC20Factory (eth:0x6f0E4f1EB98A52EfaCF7BE11d48B9d9d6510A906) { | |
| +++ description: A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it's deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain's representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x9650b4bba6299e410f01a369a95a2c57e1c3ca35f0d80c13f4f59fc468f370e5" |
| + | "0x25bad2bdb7df4347412a48e271dea1489299460192b43b8ca52ed191b4940992" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x5493f4677A186f64805fe7317D6993ba4863988F" |
| + | "eth:0x149BD036f5F57D0FF4b5F102C9d46E3c0EB2C016" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.2: | |
| + | ["2026-03-31T07:08:11.000Z","0xce8f5d953104dbe1a793fdcf76a16290f1c8765f87fcef729c2ad7e2e95a07dc",["eth:0x149BD036f5F57D0FF4b5F102C9d46E3c0EB2C016"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 2 |
| + | 3 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "1.10.1" |
| + | "1.10.2" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x5493f4677A186f64805fe7317D6993ba4863988F: | |
| - | "OptimismMintableERC20Factory" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x149BD036f5F57D0FF4b5F102C9d46E3c0EB2C016: | |
| + | "OptimismMintableERC20Factory" |
| } |
| contract ProxyAdmin (eth:0x783A434532Ee94667979213af1711505E8bFE374) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| directlyReceivedPermissions.3: | |
| + | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x25035d2233d099f0BA710ca1e5a3834842870C66","role":"admin"} |
| directlyReceivedPermissions.7: | |
| + | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x8fE58d2168b5412Cf1Bd212cE6137f8b7300222d","role":"admin"} |
| directlyReceivedPermissions.6.from: | |
| - | "eth:0x9c314E8057025F2982aa4B3923Abd741A8e8DE91" |
| + | "eth:0x91FA5B653aFe81A79890A93ad83768A04cc011b4" |
| directlyReceivedPermissions.8: | |
| - | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x9F18D91949731E766f294A14027bBFE8F28328CC","role":"admin"} |
| directlyReceivedPermissions.9: | |
| - | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xa316D42E8Fd98D2Ec364b8bF853d2623E768f95a","role":"admin"} |
| directlyReceivedPermissions.10: | |
| - | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xa440975E5A6BB19Bc3Bee901d909BB24b0f43D33","role":"admin"} |
| directlyReceivedPermissions.11: | |
| + | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xC700d16428cF5Bfa71D91E66fA54Fc11A73f2552","role":"admin"} |
| } |
| contract SystemConfig (eth:0x89E31965D844a309231B1f17759Ccaf1b7c09861) { | |
| +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x91eb7a11bc6b22871adb21c12699c6d110b59393d358aa82559927584f1bf804" |
| + | "0xec811d054ae19d6bf9a5a9be07ae9ec060a10d411e1cd81528489e4450a5e313" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x9c61C5a8FF9408B83ac92571278550097A9d2BB5" |
| + | "eth:0xe5Dc3C0a3489b81A6F3AE3bB49bF9CcBFB85a3dB" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.3: | |
| + | ["2026-03-31T07:05:23.000Z","0x66a97a8a6934d37b3ed077e788fb02fbce53e02ad7d95d3159ba6347ede395c8",["eth:0xa9c79551eA70D311f5153a27Cba12396e5128b9c"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.4: | |
| + | ["2026-03-31T07:08:11.000Z","0xce8f5d953104dbe1a793fdcf76a16290f1c8765f87fcef729c2ad7e2e95a07dc",["eth:0xe5Dc3C0a3489b81A6F3AE3bB49bF9CcBFB85a3dB"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 3 |
| + | 5 |
| values.DISPUTE_GAME_FACTORY_SLOT: | |
| - | "0x52322a25d9f59ea17656545543306b7aef62bc0cc53a0e65ccfa0c75b97aa906" |
| values.getAddresses.disputeGameFactory: | |
| - | "eth:0xFbAC162162f4009Bb007C6DeBC36B1dAC10aF683" |
| values.maximumGasLimit: | |
| - | 200000000 |
| + | 500000000 |
| values.opStackDA.isUsingEigenDA: | |
| - | "v2" |
| + | "v3" |
| values.owner: | |
| - | "eth:0x4092A77bAF58fef0309452cEaCb09221e556E112" |
| + | "eth:0x9Eb44Da23433b5cAA1c87e35594D15FcEb08D34d" |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.5.0" |
| + | "3.11.0" |
| values.daFootprintGasScalar: | |
| + | 1 |
| values.guardian: | |
| + | "eth:0x9Eb44Da23433b5cAA1c87e35594D15FcEb08D34d" |
| values.initVersion: | |
| + | 3 |
| values.l2ChainId: | |
| + | 42220 |
| values.minBaseFee: | |
| + | 25000000000 |
| values.paused: | |
| + | false |
| values.proxyAdmin: | |
| + | "eth:0x783A434532Ee94667979213af1711505E8bFE374" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| + | "eth:0x4092A77bAF58fef0309452cEaCb09221e556E112" |
| values.superchainConfig: | |
| + | "eth:0x25035d2233d099f0BA710ca1e5a3834842870C66" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x9c61C5a8FF9408B83ac92571278550097A9d2BB5: | |
| - | "SystemConfig" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xe5Dc3C0a3489b81A6F3AE3bB49bF9CcBFB85a3dB: | |
| + | "SystemConfig" |
| } |
| contract SuperchainConfig (eth:0x95703e0982140D16f8ebA6d158FccEde42f04a4C) { | |
| +++ description: Used to manage global configuration values for multiple OP Chains within a single Superchain network. The SuperchainConfig contract manages individual pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3 months if left untouched. | |
| receivedPermissions: | |
| - | [{"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0xa440975E5A6BB19Bc3Bee901d909BB24b0f43D33","description":"act as an override that pauses the SuperchainConfigLocal.","role":".superchainConfig","condition":"if the (global) eth:0x95703e0982140D16f8ebA6d158FccEde42f04a4C is paused."}] |
| } |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract DelayedWETH (eth:0x9c314E8057025F2982aa4B3923Abd741A8e8DE91) | |
| +++ description: Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds. |
| contract L1StandardBridge (eth:0x9C4955b92F34148dbcfDCD82e9c9eCe5CF2badfe) { | |
| +++ description: The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0xcc038053dba84fe88b91f9062f3927165798c810fed5cb953c2045de301daf95" |
| + | "0xf687ceb2d3a3ac5806864ef0c440ed6639eb8570b227e7bdb1748d7d24be0d18" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x28841965B26d41304905A836Da5C0921DA7dBB84" |
| + | "eth:0xfA707F45A23370d9154AF4457401274E38FA2d8A" |
| values.superchainConfig: | |
| - | "eth:0xa440975E5A6BB19Bc3Bee901d909BB24b0f43D33" |
| + | "eth:0x25035d2233d099f0BA710ca1e5a3834842870C66" |
| values.version: | |
| - | "2.3.0" |
| + | "2.8.0" |
| values.initVersion: | |
| + | 3 |
| values.proxyAdmin: | |
| + | "eth:0x783A434532Ee94667979213af1711505E8bFE374" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| + | "eth:0x4092A77bAF58fef0309452cEaCb09221e556E112" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x28841965B26d41304905A836Da5C0921DA7dBB84: | |
| - | "L1StandardBridge" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xfA707F45A23370d9154AF4457401274E38FA2d8A: | |
| + | "L1StandardBridge" |
| } |
| contract Celo cLabs Multisig (eth:0x9Eb44Da23433b5cAA1c87e35594D15FcEb08D34d) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| receivedPermissions: | |
| + | [{"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x89E31965D844a309231B1f17759Ccaf1b7c09861","description":"it can update the preconfer address, the batch submitter (Sequencer) address and the gas configuration of the system.","role":".owner"}] |
| } |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract AnchorStateRegistry (eth:0x9F18D91949731E766f294A14027bBFE8F28328CC) | |
| +++ description: Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract DelayedWETH (eth:0xa316D42E8Fd98D2Ec364b8bF853d2623E768f95a) | |
| +++ description: Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds. |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract SuperchainConfigLocal (eth:0xa440975E5A6BB19Bc3Bee901d909BB24b0f43D33) | |
| +++ description: A local contract acting as source of truth for the paused status and the guardian role for the local chain. |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract MIPS (eth:0xaA59A0777648BC75cd10364083e878c1cCd6112a) | |
| +++ description: The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute. |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract OPSuccinctFaultDisputeGame (eth:0xc5bd131ceAEb72F15C66418bc2668332AB99DE37) | |
| +++ description: Logic of the dispute game. When a state root is proposed, a dispute game contract is deployed. Challengers can use such contracts to challenge the proposed state root. |
| contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0xc5c5D157928BDBD2ACf6d0777626b6C75a9EAEDC) { | |
| +++ description: The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the 42. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x61779e0cf81852e74f9420c1500237e5c588b39f95b03369daca20d2e624b741" |
| + | "0x2747309564448749b20795c515708ee56536208ae4dadd4096a4819135b2b71f" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x215A5fF85308A72A772F09B520dA71D3520e9aC7" |
| + | "eth:0x2c431080Fc733E259654f3b91E39468d9A85Ac9b" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.4: | |
| + | ["2026-03-31T07:05:23.000Z","0x66a97a8a6934d37b3ed077e788fb02fbce53e02ad7d95d3159ba6347ede395c8",["eth:0x661DfA933f77148Dc8d84b06646a2868D7ae5DeB"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.5: | |
| + | ["2026-03-31T07:08:11.000Z","0xce8f5d953104dbe1a793fdcf76a16290f1c8765f87fcef729c2ad7e2e95a07dc",["eth:0x2c431080Fc733E259654f3b91E39468d9A85Ac9b"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 4 |
| + | 6 |
| values.guardian: | |
| - | "eth:0x6E226fa22e5F19363d231D3FA048aaBa73CC1f47" |
| + | "eth:0x9Eb44Da23433b5cAA1c87e35594D15FcEb08D34d" |
| values.respectedGameTypeUpdatedAt: | |
| - | 1741879583 |
| + | 1774940723 |
| values.superchainConfig: | |
| - | "eth:0xa440975E5A6BB19Bc3Bee901d909BB24b0f43D33" |
| + | "eth:0x25035d2233d099f0BA710ca1e5a3834842870C66" |
| values.version: | |
| - | "3.14.0" |
| + | "5.1.1" |
| values.anchorStateRegistry: | |
| + | "eth:0x8fE58d2168b5412Cf1Bd212cE6137f8b7300222d" |
| values.ethLockbox: | |
| + | "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" |
| values.initVersion: | |
| + | 3 |
| values.proxyAdmin: | |
| + | "eth:0x783A434532Ee94667979213af1711505E8bFE374" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| + | "eth:0x4092A77bAF58fef0309452cEaCb09221e556E112" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x215A5fF85308A72A772F09B520dA71D3520e9aC7: | |
| - | "OptimismPortal2" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x2c431080Fc733E259654f3b91E39468d9A85Ac9b: | |
| + | "OptimismPortal2" |
| } |
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract FaultDisputeGame (eth:0xcc744008aD3306a716fED303b0A6eA5b5d0690a5) | |
| +++ description: Logic of the dispute game. When a state root is proposed, a dispute game contract is deployed. Challengers can use such contracts to challenge the proposed state root. |
| contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0xFbAC162162f4009Bb007C6DeBC36B1dAC10aF683) { | |
| +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. | |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x85ca17941ef36ac6b28a4f8f89803d0d41ef419c47586dcd3acdb47ee9617285" |
| + | "0x19f3f7c7ee3977705261bfb86f826d5f97b885796f2246be7cc3e815c3e95dca" |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x4bbA758F006Ef09402eF31724203F316ab74e4a0" |
| + | "eth:0x74Fac1D45B98bae058F8F566201c9A81B85C7D50" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.2: | |
| + | ["2026-03-31T07:05:23.000Z","0x66a97a8a6934d37b3ed077e788fb02fbce53e02ad7d95d3159ba6347ede395c8",["eth:0x33D1e8571a85a538ed3D5A4d88f46C112383439D"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.3: | |
| + | ["2026-03-31T07:08:11.000Z","0xce8f5d953104dbe1a793fdcf76a16290f1c8765f87fcef729c2ad7e2e95a07dc",["eth:0x74Fac1D45B98bae058F8F566201c9A81B85C7D50"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 2 |
| + | 4 |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.game42: | |
| - | "eth:0xc5bd131ceAEb72F15C66418bc2668332AB99DE37" |
| + | "eth:0xE7bd695d6A17970A2D9dB55cfeF7F2024d630aE1" |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.gameImpls.0: | |
| - | "eth:0xcc744008aD3306a716fED303b0A6eA5b5d0690a5" |
| + | "eth:0x25Bd434Aa96EE31D6661c89CF4290281f1ed856F" |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.gameImpls.1: | |
| - | "eth:0x25c2e07A24a74F9FA54f7CA5ddAfedB2264a5d02" |
| + | "eth:0xa83a2E8595b602aD98C928E9cD123c0E05C84FD9" |
| values.permissionedGameArgs: | |
| - | "EXPECT_REVERT" |
| + | "0x" |
| values.version: | |
| - | "1.0.1" |
| + | "1.3.0" |
| values.initVersion: | |
| + | 1 |
| values.proxyAdmin: | |
| + | "eth:0x783A434532Ee94667979213af1711505E8bFE374" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| + | "eth:0x4092A77bAF58fef0309452cEaCb09221e556E112" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x4bbA758F006Ef09402eF31724203F316ab74e4a0: | |
| - | "DisputeGameFactory" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x74Fac1D45B98bae058F8F566201c9A81B85C7D50: | |
| + | "DisputeGameFactory" |
| } |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract CeloSuperchainConfig (eth:0x25035d2233d099f0BA710ca1e5a3834842870C66) | |
| +++ description: None |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract FaultDisputeGame (eth:0x25Bd434Aa96EE31D6661c89CF4290281f1ed856F) | |
| +++ description: Logic of the dispute game. When a state root is proposed, a dispute game contract is deployed. Challengers can use such contracts to challenge the proposed state root. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract MIPS (eth:0x6463dEE3828677F6270d83d45408044fc5eDB908) | |
| +++ description: The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract AnchorStateRegistry (eth:0x8fE58d2168b5412Cf1Bd212cE6137f8b7300222d) | |
| +++ description: Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the 42. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract DelayedWETH (eth:0x91FA5B653aFe81A79890A93ad83768A04cc011b4) | |
| +++ description: Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0xa83a2E8595b602aD98C928E9cD123c0E05C84FD9) | |
| +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract DelayedWETH (eth:0xC700d16428cF5Bfa71D91E66fA54Fc11A73f2552) | |
| +++ description: Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract OPSuccinctFaultDisputeGame (eth:0xE7bd695d6A17970A2D9dB55cfeF7F2024d630aE1) | |
| +++ description: Logic of the dispute game. When a state root is proposed, a dispute game contract is deployed. Challengers can use such contracts to challenge the proposed state root. |
2026 March 25, 10:05 UTC11changesThree signers of the shared OpFoundation multisigs (OpFoundationUpgradeSafe) were rotated. The old signer at position 0 was a GnosisSafe (0x42d27eEA1AD6e22Af6284F609847CB3Cd56B9c64) which was replaced by a new EOA. Additionally, two signers of the Celo cLabs Multisig (members 3 and 4) were rotated.
Three signers of the shared OpFoundation multisigs (OpFoundationUpgradeSafe) were rotated. The old signer at position 0 was a GnosisSafe (0x42d27eEA1AD6e22Af6284F609847CB3Cd56B9c64) which was replaced by a new EOA. Additionally, two signers of the Celo cLabs Multisig (members 3 and 4) were rotated.
| - | Status: DELETED |
| contract GnosisSafe (eth:0x42d27eEA1AD6e22Af6284F609847CB3Cd56B9c64) | |
| +++ description: None |
| contract OpFoundationUpgradeSafe (eth:0x847B5c174615B1B7fDF770882256e2D3E95b9D92) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| values.$members.0: | |
| - | "eth:0x42d27eEA1AD6e22Af6284F609847CB3Cd56B9c64" |
| + | "eth:0x6419F81580343DF023E68715C6e269aFb00a2cc7" |
| values.$members.2: | |
| - | "eth:0xE7dEA1306D9F829bA469d1904c50903b46ebd02e" |
| + | "eth:0xC2Db495f5a1F91172A361AAFA6FdE47c41de6dF5" |
| values.$members.6: | |
| - | "eth:0x9bbFB9919062C29a5eE15aCD93c9D7c3b14d31aa" |
| + | "eth:0xc222ab08333109243B1f4E2a80e3D0A190714AB5" |
| } |
| contract Celo cLabs Multisig (eth:0x9Eb44Da23433b5cAA1c87e35594D15FcEb08D34d) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| values.$members.3: | |
| - | "eth:0x326b764CEb4FE11e70af538D3CB997Bb2e16659d" |
| + | "eth:0x812f7C111476D45998e6D0C615B41c180C362263" |
| values.$members.4: | |
| - | "eth:0x48139512241D32047760E7481eBf0b6BF3390f8F" |
| + | "eth:0x74bc9E59B52117Ccf5Ee457cFb0CBE83b339A065" |
| } |
The system has a centralized operator
MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
Users can force any transaction
Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.
Regular exits
The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.
Forced messaging
If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.
EVM compatible smart contracts are supported
OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.
Ethereum
Actors:
A Multisig with 2/2 threshold.
- Can upgrade with no delay
- Celo native asset Token ProxyAdmin
- L1CrossDomainMessenger ProxyAdmin
- CeloSuperchainConfig ProxyAdmin
- L1ERC721Bridge ProxyAdmin
- OptimismMintableERC20Factory ProxyAdmin
- SystemConfig ProxyAdmin
- AnchorStateRegistry ProxyAdmin
- DelayedWETH ProxyAdmin
- L1StandardBridge ProxyAdmin
- OptimismPortal2 ProxyAdmin
- DelayedWETH ProxyAdmin
- DisputeGameFactory ProxyAdmin
- Can interact with AddressManager
- set and change address mappings ProxyAdmin
A Multisig with 5/7 threshold. It uses the following modules: SaferSafes (A Gnosis Safe module combining LivenessModule and TimelockGuard. Provides liveness checks where a fallback owner can challenge and take over if Safe owners are unresponsive, plus optional timelock delays for transaction scheduling). Member of SuperchainProxyAdminOwner.
- Can interact with SuperchainConfig
- Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless) LivenessModule if the number of Optimism Security Council members falls below 8 → Optimism Security Council → Optimism Guardian Multisig
A Gnosis Safe module combining LivenessModule and TimelockGuard. Provides liveness checks where a fallback owner can challenge and take over if Safe owners are unresponsive, plus optional timelock delays for transaction scheduling.
- Can interact with SuperchainConfig
- Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless) OpFoundationUpgradeSafe → LivenessModule if the number of Optimism Security Council members falls below 8 → Optimism Security Council → Optimism Guardian Multisig
A Multisig with 10/13 threshold. It uses the following modules: LivenessModule (used to remove members inactive for 3mo 8d while making sure that the threshold remains above 75%. If the number of members falls below 8, the OpFoundationUpgradeSafe takes ownership of the multisig). Member of Optimism Guardian Multisig, SuperchainProxyAdminOwner.
- Can interact with SuperchainConfig
- Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless) Optimism Guardian Multisig
Participants (13):
0xE61F…76aE0x652B…cB5f0x5c1f…7a810x4A73…e61E0x3A53…aa940xEF9A…877c0x6323…c8650xd5b7…aC900x7ed8…9E390x0aA3…75D70x0a87…efE60xbfA0…E0d90x9282…cACbA Multisig with 2/2 threshold.
- Can upgrade with no delay
- SuperchainConfig SuperchainProxyAdmin
- Can interact with AddressManager
- set and change address mappings SuperchainProxyAdmin
Modular contract to be used together with the LivenessModule. Tracks liveness / activity of Safe owners.
- Can interact with LivenessModule
- can remove members of Optimism Security Council inactive for 3mo 8d
A Multisig with 1/1 threshold. It uses the following modules: DeputyPauseModule (Allows 0x352f1defB49718e7Ea411687E850aA8d6299F7aC, called the deputy pauser, to act on behalf of the OpFoundationUpgradeSafe if set as its Safe module).
Participants (1):
Optimism Security CouncilA Multisig with 6/8 threshold. Member of CeloProxyAdminOwner.
- Can interact with SystemConfig
- Allowed to commit transactions from the current layer to the host chain
- Can interact with SuperchainConfig
- Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless) DeputyPauseModule though restricted to the SuperchainConfig’s
pause()function → Optimism Guardian Multisig
- Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless) DeputyPauseModule though restricted to the SuperchainConfig’s
- Can interact with AccessManager
- Allowed to post new state roots of the current layer to the host chain
Ethereum
Used to manage global configuration values for multiple OP Chains within a single Superchain network. The SuperchainConfig contract manages individual pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3 months if left untouched.
- Roles:
- admin: SuperchainProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner
- guardian: Optimism Guardian Multisig; ultimately EOA 2, OpFoundationUpgradeSafe, Optimism Security Council, SaferSafes
Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain’s epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CeloProxyAdminOwner
Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CeloProxyAdminOwner
The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CeloProxyAdminOwner
All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation.
used to remove members inactive for 3mo 8d while making sure that the threshold remains above 75%. If the number of members falls below 8, the OpFoundationUpgradeSafe takes ownership of the multisig
- Roles:
- fallbackOwner: OpFoundationUpgradeSafe if the number of Optimism Security Council members falls below 8
- livenessGuard: LivenessGuard
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CeloProxyAdminOwner
The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CeloProxyAdminOwner
Logic of the dispute game. When a state root is proposed, a dispute game contract is deployed. Challengers can use such contracts to challenge the proposed state root.
The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.
A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it’s deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain’s representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CeloProxyAdminOwner
Allows 0x352f1defB49718e7Ea411687E850aA8d6299F7aC, called the deputy pauser, to act on behalf of the OpFoundationUpgradeSafe if set as its Safe module.
- Roles:
- deputy: EOA 2 though restricted to the SuperchainConfig’s
pause()function
- deputy: EOA 2 though restricted to the SuperchainConfig’s
- Roles:
- owner: CeloProxyAdminOwner
Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the OPSuccinctFaultDisputeGame. Variant for chains using OPSuccinct (SP1) games instead of Cannon, which omits Cannon-specific cross-contract fields (vm, oracle, weth, challengePeriod, absolutePrestate from game).
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CeloProxyAdminOwner
Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CeloProxyAdminOwner
Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger.
Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CeloProxyAdminOwner
Logic of the dispute game. When a state root is proposed, a dispute game contract is deployed. Challengers can use such contracts to challenge the proposed state root.
Contract managing access control for proposers and challengers in OPSuccinct.
- Roles:
- challengers: EOA 10, EOA 4, EOA 5, EOA 6, EOA 7, EOA 9
- proposers: EOA 3, EOA 8
The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CeloProxyAdminOwner
The current deployment carries some associated risks:
Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).