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Katana is a Layer 2 specializing on DeFi. Its unique architecture combines an OP stack base with Agglayer shared bridge interoperability and OP-Succinct SP1 validity proofs.
Interop protocols used
Tokens transferred



Katana is a Layer 2 specializing on DeFi. Its unique architecture combines an OP stack base with Agglayer shared bridge interoperability and OP-Succinct SP1 validity proofs.
2025 Jun 03 — 2026 Jun 03
The section shows the operating costs that L2s pay to Ethereum.
2025 Jun 04 — 2026 Jun 03
This section shows how much data the project publishes to its data-availability (DA) layer over time. The project currently posts data to
Ethereum.
2025 Jun 04 — 2026 Jun 03
This section shows how "live" the project's operators are by displaying how frequently they submit transactions of the selected type. It also highlights anomalies - significant deviations from their typical schedule.
2026 May 05 — Jun 04
All liveness anomalies detected for this project in the last 30 days, helping you review recent downtime and availability issues.
No Tx data submissions were performed for 20min 36s (from 2026 Jun 03, 11:03 UTC until 2026 Jun 03, 11:24 UTC). These typically occur every 7min 1s on average.
No State updates were performed for 4h 36s (from 2026 May 28, 18:57 UTC until 2026 May 28, 22:58 UTC). These typically occur every 1h 56s on average.
No Proof submissions were performed for 4h 36s (from 2026 May 28, 18:57 UTC until 2026 May 28, 22:58 UTC). These typically occur every 1h 56s on average.
STARKs and SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. STARKs proofs are wrapped in SNARKs proofs for efficiency. SNARKs require a trusted setup.
All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.
There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since the Security Council can remove the delay on upgrades.
Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.
All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.
Katana uses the Agglayer CDK in CDK-opgeth-zkrollup configuration. This combines an OP-Succinct zk rollup base with Agglayer shared bridge interoperability. Both parts are verified in a single nested proof using the Succinct Sp1Verifier. This proof is called the pessimistic proof by Agglayer which contains 1) the bridge accounting proof proving only the secure accounting of the Agglayer shared bridge and can have 2) a reference to an ‘aggchain proof’, which can define additional programs to be proven. In the case of Katana, these are the op-succinct block range proofs as an aggregated proof proving the state transitions of the L2, resulting in a full validity proof of L2 execution and agglayer bridge accounting.
Each update to the rollup state must be accompanied by a ZK proof that ensures that the new state was derived by correctly applying a series of valid user transactions to the previous state. These proofs are then verified on Ethereum by a smart contract.
Funds can be stolen if the state transition validity proof cryptography is broken or implemented incorrectly.
Funds can be stolen if A malicious state transition is finalized by activating the permissioned optimistic mode.
Funds can be stolen if the proposer routes proof verification through a malicious or faulty verifier by specifying an unsafe route id.
Funds can be frozen if the AggLayerGateway is unable to route proof verification to a valid verifier.
The pessimistic proofs that are used to prove correct accounting in the Agglayer shared bridge (minimum security guarantee) are using the SP1 zkVM by Succinct.
Funds can be stolen if the pessimistic proof cryptography is broken or implemented incorrectly.
Onchain verifier
Onchain verifier |

The regular upgrade process for all system contracts (shared and L2-specific) starts at the PolygonAdminMultisig. For the shared contracts, they schedule a transaction that targets the ProxyAdmin via the Timelock, wait for 3d and then execute the upgrade. An upgrade of the Layer 2 specific rollup- or validium contract requires first adding a new rollupType through the Timelock and the AgglayerManager (defining the new implementation and verifier contracts). Now that the rollupType is created, either the local admin or the PolygonAdminMultisig can immediately upgrade the local system contracts to it.
The PolygonSecurityCouncil can expedite the upgrade process by declaring an emergency state. This state pauses both the shared bridge and the AgglayerManager and allows for instant upgrades through the timelock. Accordingly, instant upgrades for all system contracts are possible with the cooperation of the SecurityCouncil. The emergency state has been activated 1 time(s) since inception.
Furthermore, the PolygonAdminMultisig is permissioned to manage the shared trusted aggregator (proposer and prover) for all participating Layer 2s, deactivate the emergency state, obsolete rollupTypes and manage operational parameters and fees in the AgglayerManager directly. The local admin of a specific Layer 2 can manage their chain by choosing the trusted sequencer, manage forced batches and set the data availability config. Creating new Layer 2s (of existing rollupType) is outsourced to the PolygonCreateRollupMultisig but can also be done by the PolygonAdminMultisig. Finally, it can manage SP1 verification keys for pessimistic proofs and aggchain proofs, which defines the affected chains’ state validation. Custom non-shared bridge escrows have their custom upgrade admins listed in the permissions section.
The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.
Config ignores and conduit ms changes.
Config ignores and conduit ms changes.
| contract Conduit Multisig 1 (eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746) [GnosisSafe] { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| values.$members.0: | |
| + | "eth:0xcdC931935768c0562AfE989A366a3Dc4d52F4853" |
| values.$members.8: | |
| - | "eth:0x3840f487A17A41100DD1Bf0946c34f132a57Fd5f" |
| } |
| contract Polygon Labs Engineering/Security Multisig (eth:0x9d851f8b8751c5FbC09b9E74E6e68E9950949052) [GnosisSafe] { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| values.$members.0: | |
| + | "eth:0xf02BE0dA37dB50BEFA5a525158aa94b50F81D4B2" |
| values.$members.1: | |
| + | "eth:0xe0e8e6bBDef7bbcf8dF1F5Ac0ab9906BFe991d8B" |
| values.$members.2: | |
| + | "eth:0x6Ab87a62E250A5EB09a53Fca832B9Bda480c3890" |
| values.multisigThreshold: | |
| - | "2 of 5 (40%)" |
| + | "2 of 8 (25%)" |
| } |
Standard L2 contract sources have been verified.
Standard L2 contract sources have been verified.
| contract AgglayerBridgeL2 (katana:0x2a3DD3EB832aF982ec71669E178424b10Dca2EDe) [katana/AgglayerBridgeL2] { | |
| +++ description: Agglayer bridge contract. Supports interop with Ethereum and blockchains connected to Agglayer. Escrows all preminted ETH because it cannot mint on the L2. The globalExitRootManager is used as an oracle to validate bridge messages against. | |
| values.claimedGlobalIndexHashChain: | |
| - | "0x5fede20963bde12c20e3076c4426550f570914a8a035c1381bc98f8bed306a46" |
| + | "0xdef05ec6820a531b383dc3f9dbbc1aac9846e2eab7a821929b5a07cc51659e4c" |
| values.getRoot: | |
| - | "0x1d743ae7262c7410af3fb680660e6c1f336b2f49609f709a69a9fd8b9ad21bb2" |
| + | "0x5ed5cfaf86b2b848194a0a9ebfa969a88ddee6b8f6f007a0ef658482f2665402" |
| } |
| contract GlobalExitRootManagerL2SovereignChain (katana:0xa40D5f56745a118D0906a34E69aeC8C0Db1cB8fA) [katana/GlobalExitRootManagerL2SovereignChain] { | |
| +++ description: Manages Layer 2 and global merkle roots (exit roots). It stores exit roots written during bridge deposits, accepts imported global exit roots from a permissioned address, and manages historical roots. | |
| values.insertedGERHashChain: | |
| - | "0xaae24c57922b6453c1812383dba7b31cf9788b57cfc281e208b4e2911e5feee7" |
| + | "0x59bc3b88b56a09b106e04e1ffe3fd6dc754bf81029ef9cfe2723275b8f5b347c" |
| values.lastRollupExitRoot: | |
| - | "0x1d743ae7262c7410af3fb680660e6c1f336b2f49609f709a69a9fd8b9ad21bb2" |
| + | "0x5ed5cfaf86b2b848194a0a9ebfa969a88ddee6b8f6f007a0ef658482f2665402" |
| } |
minimal diff upgrade to the OptiPortal that adds deposited transactions! https://flat.l2beat.com/diff/ink:0xC0D3C0d3C0d3c0d3C0d3C0D3c0D3c0d3c0D30016/katana:0xFBF44D0341C03098A1D9C0336e3d5C34E8BFdf1A users can now force transactions that do not relate to bridging (they still cannot force ETH- or token deposits). the force tx delay in op stack (or op-succinct) depends on the node config/programHash and both are unverified for katana. as soon as we have a source, we should look for sequencerWindowSize (OP stack standard is 3600). we will assume standard and show the delay as 12h but say that this is unverified. proposals are also still permissioned, meaning that, assuming sequencer and proposer/prover are the same entity, the system changed from 'sequencer can cherry-pick/censor' to 'proposer must blanket-censor, no cherry-pick'. the agglayer bridge is separate from the OP stack proof system and bridge and has its own proof system and l2 smart contract. this includes the gas token (ETH) bridge. the oracle on L2 that allows to update the agglayer bridge state roots is permissioned to an EOA atm.
minimal diff upgrade to the OptiPortal that adds deposited transactions! https://flat.l2beat.com/diff/ink:0xC0D3C0d3C0d3c0d3C0d3C0D3c0D3c0d3c0D30016/katana:0xFBF44D0341C03098A1D9C0336e3d5C34E8BFdf1A
users can now force transactions that do not relate to bridging (they still cannot force ETH- or token deposits). the force tx delay in op stack (or op-succinct) depends on the node config/programHash and both are unverified for katana. as soon as we have a source, we should look for sequencerWindowSize (OP stack standard is 3600). we will assume standard and show the delay as 12h but say that this is unverified.
proposals are also still permissioned, meaning that, assuming sequencer and proposer/prover are the same entity, the system changed from ‘sequencer can cherry-pick/censor’ to ‘proposer must blanket-censor, no cherry-pick’.
the agglayer bridge is separate from the OP stack proof system and bridge and has its own proof system and l2 smart contract. this includes the gas token (ETH) bridge. the oracle on L2 that allows to update the agglayer bridge state roots is permissioned to an EOA atm.
| contract Yearn Strategist Multisig (eth:0x16388463d60FFE0661Cf7F1f31a7D658aC790ff7) [GnosisSafe] { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| values.$members.0: | |
| + | "eth:0x5E5D6f849Fa86c058f148E9D3f643C8F4c43f20b" |
| values.$members.1: | |
| + | "eth:0x5250077c42627cBd112988f32D482acC9ff40bDB" |
| values.$members.2: | |
| + | "eth:0xC357eE8a8DdE88Dd5a3Ea54847Adef6846A28c51" |
| values.$members.3: | |
| + | "eth:0xFcc3796370e1538F8cC60bec19A8be5457f2C74F" |
| values.$members.4: | |
| + | "eth:0xFafFb75e14faFf9f11315E44a2E54A22872c7a34" |
| values.$members.2: | |
| - | "eth:0xBD5f1429Ab467E69BEeba51E547C00A21F2a2092" |
| values.$members.3: | |
| - | "eth:0x787aba336583f4A1D4f8cBBFDFFD49f3a38De665" |
| values.$members.4: | |
| - | "eth:0x2C2dc95F8C8060a7e3B354c1B9540881AEa1613C" |
| values.$members.5: | |
| - | "eth:0xd0002c648CCa8DeE2f2b8D70D542Ccde8ad6EC03" |
| values.$members.6: | |
| - | "eth:0x1b5f15DCb82d25f91c65b53CEe151E8b9fBdD271" |
| } |
| contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0x250D30c523104bf0a06825e7eAdE4Dc46EdfE40E) [katana/OptimismPortal2] { | |
| +++ description: Stores the configuration of the OP stack components and proof system. Specifies which game type is used for state validation, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame. This contract is modified to disable asset bridging, but it allows forced transactions. | |
| name: | |
| - | "OptimismPortal2_neutered" |
| + | "OptimismPortal2" |
| template: | |
| - | "opstack/OptimismPortal2_noForce" |
| + | "katana/OptimismPortal2" |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x4cc0e4525ed77b81565c05c0e673e043a93d9878924197f772581f72c11c91c5" |
| + | "0xfcecb325a86c39482f8e9d29272f25089eec0b5fbefe21444fd1ea690c911f0c" |
| description: | |
| - | "The OptimismPortal contract usually is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2 or for finalizing withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame. This specific fork of the standard contract **disables the depositTransaction() function**, which prevents users from sending or forcing any transactions from L1 to L2, including token deposits. It is instead used for configuration and administration of the system." |
| + | "Stores the configuration of the OP stack components and proof system. Specifies which game type is used for state validation, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame. This contract is modified to disable asset bridging, but it allows forced transactions." |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x3e6753e6c0162061cfa7eEc88d8fdaE651160Bf4" |
| + | "eth:0x5dEcbEEEFeCc5353355CD79A8fECC4c03F61ce8a" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.8: | |
| + | ["2026-05-22T16:31:35.000Z","0x46d8e0a3a5383c133292ef51e4d7eef96fddc443b892d38e62c39b1186055691",["eth:0x5dEcbEEEFeCc5353355CD79A8fECC4c03F61ce8a"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 8 |
| + | 9 |
| values.version: | |
| - | "5.1.1" |
| + | "agg3.15.0" |
| fieldMeta.respectedGameType: | |
| + | {"severity":"HIGH"} |
| implementationNames.eth:0x3e6753e6c0162061cfa7eEc88d8fdaE651160Bf4: | |
| - | "OptimismPortal2" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x5dEcbEEEFeCc5353355CD79A8fECC4c03F61ce8a: | |
| + | "OptimismPortal2" |
| usedTypes.0.arg.1337: | |
| + | "KailuaGame" |
| } |
| contract AgglayerBridgeL2 (katana:0x2a3DD3EB832aF982ec71669E178424b10Dca2EDe) [katana/AgglayerBridgeL2] { | |
| +++ description: Agglayer bridge contract. Supports interop with Ethereum and blockchains connected to Agglayer. Escrows all preminted ETH because it cannot mint on the L2. The globalExitRootManager is used as an oracle to validate bridge messages against. | |
| values.claimedGlobalIndexHashChain: | |
| - | "0xfcb94fe6eae1dd3db9426645c49bdd5a55f574591df36333e3822c2e28a6aa5d" |
| + | "0x5fede20963bde12c20e3076c4426550f570914a8a035c1381bc98f8bed306a46" |
| values.getRoot: | |
| - | "0x77b2c19aaa8daa89496903e91a84dfdf09cbc2821671eb351e953ed0c646be5b" |
| + | "0x1d743ae7262c7410af3fb680660e6c1f336b2f49609f709a69a9fd8b9ad21bb2" |
| } |
| contract GlobalExitRootManagerL2SovereignChain (katana:0xa40D5f56745a118D0906a34E69aeC8C0Db1cB8fA) [katana/GlobalExitRootManagerL2SovereignChain] { | |
| +++ description: Manages Layer 2 and global merkle roots (exit roots). It stores exit roots written during bridge deposits, accepts imported global exit roots from a permissioned address, and manages historical roots. | |
| values.insertedGERHashChain: | |
| - | "0x64bc5ca77fa29cfc3cd117f2314df1d7c1c5f3d01f31f2c58bd277f3e75b1016" |
| + | "0xaae24c57922b6453c1812383dba7b31cf9788b57cfc281e208b4e2911e5feee7" |
| values.lastRollupExitRoot: | |
| - | "0x77b2c19aaa8daa89496903e91a84dfdf09cbc2821671eb351e953ed0c646be5b" |
| + | "0x1d743ae7262c7410af3fb680660e6c1f336b2f49609f709a69a9fd8b9ad21bb2" |
| } |
ms member change.
ms member change.
| contract Safe (eth:0xFA58659F64a393A6E1A548ABc70Ad2CfE1e8f9Cb) [GnosisSafe] { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| values.$members.4: | |
| - | "eth:0x6c20ea7778EA9F3Afd74Ce4538bc4D9d61E6ABb1" |
| + | "eth:0xFAc88BB6229F47A31A78F0Ba91E5a541Cb1866a3" |
| } |
Two unrelated changes: 1. EOA 0x227D9Ea8... set up an EIP-7702 delegation. This EOA is a signer on two katana multisigs. It now delegates to 0x63c0c19a... (MetaMask's EIP7702StatelessDeleGator v1.3.0) with delegationManager = 0xdb9B1e94... and entryPoint = 0x00000000...da032 (ERC-4337 EntryPoint v0.7). No protocol change for katana — just the signer's own EOA upgrading to a smart-account setup that runs through ERC-4337. 2. Conduit Multisig 1 ( eth:0x4a496227... ) — signer 0x381624F7 removed. Threshold unchanged at 4; total signers 13 → 12 (31% → 33%). Same shared multisig change observed on forknet .
Two unrelated changes:
EOA 0x227D9Ea8... set up an EIP-7702 delegation. This EOA is a signer on two katana multisigs. It now delegates to 0x63c0c19a... (MetaMask’s EIP7702StatelessDeleGator v1.3.0) with delegationManager = 0xdb9B1e94... and entryPoint = 0x00000000...da032 (ERC-4337 EntryPoint v0.7). No protocol change for katana — just the signer’s own EOA upgrading to a smart-account setup that runs through ERC-4337.
Conduit Multisig 1 (eth:0x4a496227...) — signer 0x381624F7 removed. Threshold unchanged at 4; total signers 13 → 12 (31% → 33%). Same shared multisig change observed on forknet.
| EOA (eth:0x227D9Ea843910Edd305c42e7bB9Ce6D9f369238c) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| proxyType: | |
| - | "EOA" |
| + | "EIP7702 EOA" |
| sourceHashes: | |
| + | ["0x41c6ce964a4ef3e910f9ddf78152734dae8d1b1094ffc8334c50249a3b112bbf"] |
| values: | |
| + | {"$implementation":"eth:0x63c0c19a282a1B52b07dD5a65b58948A07DAE32B","delegationManager":"eth:0xdb9B1e94B5b69Df7e401DDbedE43491141047dB3","DOMAIN_VERSION":"1","eip712Domain":{"fields":"0x0f","name":"EIP7702StatelessDeleGator","version":"1","chainId":1,"verifyingContract":"eth:0x227D9Ea843910Edd305c42e7bB9Ce6D9f369238c","salt":"0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000","extensions":[]},"entryPoint":"eth:0x0000000071727De22E5E9d8BAf0edAc6f37da032","getDeposit":0,"getDomainHash":"0x876a24e12d1595ba43f838917743b4ea108e3957c4df5ec812cf3348b156d941","getNonce":0,"NAME":"EIP7702StatelessDeleGator","PACKED_USER_OP_TYPEHASH":"0xbc37962d8bd1d319c95199bdfda6d3f92baa8903a61b32d5f4ec1f4b36a3bc18","VERSION":"1.3.0"} |
| } |
| contract Conduit Multisig 1 (eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| values.$members.1: | |
| - | "eth:0x381624F7912BddD83dc67c6C53Ef6FE61B87Cf07" |
| values.multisigThreshold: | |
| - | "4 of 13 (31%)" |
| + | "4 of 12 (33%)" |
| } |
Only a trusted sequencer is allowed to submit transaction batches. A mechanism for users to submit their own batches is currently disabled. Only a trusted proposer can propose and prove new state roots.
Funds can be frozen if the permissioned proposer fails to publish state roots to the L1.
Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly. The self-sequencing delay is configured offchain and the node source and config are unverified.
Polygon Agglayer uses a shared bridge escrow for Rollups, Validiums and external chains that opt in to participate in interoperability. Each participating chain needs to provide zk proofs to access any assets in the shared bridge. In addition to the full execution proofs that are used for the state validation of Rollups and Validiums, accounting proofs over the bridges state (Polygon calls them ‘Pessimistic Proofs’) are used by external chains (‘cdk-sovereign’ and aggchains). Using the SP1 zkVM by Succinct, projects without a full proof system on Ethereum or custom proof systems are able to share the bridge with the zkEVM Agglayer projects.
Funds can be lost if the accounting proof system for the bridge (pessimistic proofs, SP1) is implemented incorrectly.

Allowed to commit transactions from the current layer to the host chain.
Permissioned to post new state roots and global exit roots accompanied by ZK proofs.
A Multisig with 5/9 threshold.
Participants (9):
0xEB5E…EA720xAb35…235E0xED7c…B5a20xdFEd…56Da0xffbf…32380xeD44…dB370x516e…46B70xA0B0…f2270x8B9F…782BA Multisig with 3/5 threshold. Member of Katana vaultBridge Multisig 1, Katana vaultBridge Multisig 2, Katana vaultBridge Multisig 3.
A Multisig with 6/8 threshold.
Participants (8):
0xFe45…2e4b0xaF46…261D0xBDc2…FEFf0x4c16…88910x3ab9…D6220x49c1…0E860x9F7d…86A00x2188…1C28A Multisig with 3/5 threshold.
A Multisig with 2/3 threshold.
A Multisig with 2/8 threshold. Member of Katana vaultBridge Multisig 1, Katana vaultBridge Multisig 2, Katana vaultBridge Multisig 3.
A Multisig with 2/3 threshold.
A Multisig with 2/3 threshold.
A Multisig with 3/8 threshold. Member of Katana vaultBridge Multisig 2.
A Multisig with 1/4 threshold.
A Multisig with 2/4 threshold. Member of Safe.
A Multisig with 4/12 threshold.
Participants (12):
0xcdC9…48530xA9FC…8d090x6BB4…83A60x2103…911c0x65D1…60070x8117…E7Ac0xA073…bda20xF331…647D0xa400…e6e40xa0C6…90380xefCf…dD5C0x4D80…5BAeA Multisig with 2/5 threshold.
A Multisig with 2/7 threshold. Member of Safe.
A Multisig with 2/6 threshold. Member of Katana vaultBridge Multisig 3.
A Multisig with 2/7 threshold. Member of Safe.
A Multisig with 2/5 threshold.
A Multisig with 3/5 threshold.
A Multisig with 3/5 threshold.


The main system contract defining the katana Aggchain logic. This contract, based on the OP-Succinct L2OutputOracle, supports validity proofs and OP stack outputRoots (L2 state roots) are saved here.
Stores the configuration of the OP stack components and proof system. Specifies which game type is used for state validation, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame. This contract is modified to disable asset bridging, but it allows forced transactions.
A verifier gateway for pessimistic proofs. Manages a map of chains and their verifier keys and is used to route proofs based on the first 4 bytes of proofBytes data in a proof submission. The SP1 verifier is used for all proofs.
The shared bridge contract, escrowing user funds sent to Agglayer chains. It is usually mirrored on each chain and can be used to transfer both ERC20 assets and arbitrary messages.
All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation.
The central shared managing contract for Polygon Agglayer chains. This contract coordinates chain deployments and proof validation. All connected Layer 2s can be globally paused by activating the ‘Emergency State’. This can be done by the PolygonSecurityCouncil or by anyone after 1 week of inactive verifiers.
A merkle tree storage contract aggregating state roots of each participating Layer 2, thus creating a single global merkle root representing the global state of the Agglayer, the ‘global exit root’. The global exit root is synchronized to all connected Layer 2s to help with their interoperability.
A timelock with access control. In the case of an activated emergency state in the AgglayerManager, all transactions through this timelock are immediately executable. The current minimum delay is 3d.
This token contract uses a standard ‘vault bridge token’ implementation created by Agglayer CDK. It keeps deposited assets in a vault and issues an IOU token (Vault Bridge WBTC) which can be deposited to Agglayer. The underlying asset is generating yield, which does not accrue to the vbWBTC-IOU but is sent to Safe.
This token contract uses a standard ‘vault bridge token’ implementation created by Agglayer CDK. It keeps deposited assets in a vault and issues an IOU token (Vault Bridge ETH) which can be deposited to Agglayer. The underlying asset is generating yield, which does not accrue to the vbETH-IOU but is sent to Safe.
This token contract uses a standard ‘vault bridge token’ implementation created by Agglayer CDK. It keeps deposited assets in a vault and issues an IOU token (Vault Bridge USDS) which can be deposited to Agglayer. The underlying asset is generating yield, which does not accrue to the vbUSDS-IOU but is sent to Safe.
This token contract uses a standard ‘vault bridge token’ implementation created by Agglayer CDK. It keeps deposited assets in a vault and issues an IOU token (Vault Bridge USDC) which can be deposited to Agglayer. The underlying asset is generating yield, which does not accrue to the vbUSDC-IOU but is sent to Safe.
This token contract uses a standard ‘vault bridge token’ implementation created by Agglayer CDK. It keeps deposited assets in a vault and issues an IOU token (Vault Bridge USDT) which can be deposited to Agglayer. The underlying asset is generating yield, which does not accrue to the vbUSDT-IOU but is sent to Safe.
The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game.
The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.
Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger.
Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame.
Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.
Extension contract of the AgglayerBridge for asset metadata…
Agglayer bridge contract. Supports interop with Ethereum and blockchains connected to Agglayer. Escrows all preminted ETH because it cannot mint on the L2. The globalExitRootManager is used as an oracle to validate bridge messages against.
Manages Layer 2 and global merkle roots (exit roots). It stores exit roots written during bridge deposits, accepts imported global exit roots from a permissioned address, and manages historical roots.
A timelock with access control. The current minimum delay is 12h.
The L2CrossDomainMessenger (L2xDM) contract sends messages from L2 to L1, and relays messages from L1 onto L2 with a system tx. In the event that a message sent from L2 to L1 is rejected for exceeding the L1 gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.
Collects the sequencer fees.
Contract used internally by the L2CrossDomainMessenger to send messages to L1. It can also be used directly as a low-level interface.
Collects EIP-1559 base fees
Contracts to register schemas for the Ethereum Attestation Service (EAS).
Contract containing the main logic for the Ethereum Attestation Service (EAS).
Utility library contract for the AgglayerBridgeL2.
The current deployment carries some associated risks:
Funds can be stolen if the contracts or their dependencies (e.g. AggLayerGateway) receive a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on upgrades.