Unichain

Volume and flows

Explore Interop

15/26Chains

+10

43/43Protocols

+38

Chain stats

Transfer size

Under $100

$100-$1K

$1K-$10K

$10K-$100K

Over $100K

Transfer type distribution

Explore Interop

Activity

Compare

Past Day UOPS

Past Day Ops count

Max. UOPS

Past day UOPS/TPS Ratio

Onchain costs

Compare

The section shows the operating costs that L2s pay to Ethereum.

Total cost

Avg cost per L2 UOP

Avg cost per day

Data posted

Compare

This section shows how much data the project publishes to its data-availability (DA) layer over time. The project currently posts data toEthereum.

Data posted

Avg size per day

Avg size per L2 UOP

OpFoundationUpgradeSafe Optimism Security Council

This section shows how "live" the project's operators are by displaying how frequently they submit transactions of the selected type. It also highlights anomalies - significant deviations from their typical schedule.

No ongoing anomalies detected

Avg. tx data subs. interval

Avg. state updates interval

Past 30 days anomalies

100% normal uptime

Milestones & Incidents

UNIfication proposal executed

2025 Dec 27th

Uniswap governance enabled protocol fees, burned 100M UNI, and routed Unichain fees to UNI burn.

Learn more

Unichain flashblocks are live

2025 Aug 14th

Unichain hits 200ms sub-blocksAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over. inside Trusted Execution Environments.

Learn more

Risk summary

Funds can be stolen if

a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. Both regular and emergency upgrades must be approved by both the Security Council and the Foundation. There is no delay on regular upgrades.

MEV can be extracted if

the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

Risk analysis

Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure

Sequencer failure

Self sequence

In the event of a sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project’s chain by sending them to L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development.. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.

State validation

Fraud proofs (INT)

Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.

Data availability

Onchain

All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development..

Exit window

None

There is no exit windowThe amount of time that users have to exit a system before an unwanted upgrade. It takes into account upgrade delays, forced transaction delays and other time factors. To be considered Stage 1, a rollup needs to have an exit window of at least 7d if upgrades are initiated by a permissioned actor less decentralized than a Security Council. For Stage 2, a rollup needs at least 30d in all cases outside of onchain provable bugs. for users to exit in case of unwanted upgrades as they are initiated by the Security CouncilA Security Council is a sufficiently decentralized set of members that is able to upgrade a system. A properly set up Security Council consists of at least 8 members with a threshold greater than 75%. What 'sufficiently decentralized' means is fundamentally subjective and L2BEAT evaluates each case individually. A Security Council is allowed to instantly upgrade Stage 1 rollups. with instant upgrade power and without proper notice.

Proposer failure

Self propose

Anyone can be a ProposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block. and propose new roots to the L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge..

Stage

Unichain is a

Stage 1

Optimistic Rollup.

The project passes the walkaway test: users can exit in the presence of malicious operators even if the Security Council disappears.

Learn more about Stages

Please keep in mind that these stages do not reflect project security, this is an opinionated assessment of project maturity based on subjective criteria, created with a goal of incentivizing projects to push toward better decentralization. Each team may have taken different paths to achieve this goal.

Data availability

All data required for proofs is published on chain

All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobsThe data that a rollup publishes to its L1/data availability (DA) layer. They consist of the L2 transactions that are rolled up, along with some metadata. Blobs are introduced as a new transaction type within Ethereum with EIP-4844, and has rollup scaling specifically in mind. Blobs persist on Ethereum’s Beacon Chain ephemerally. or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.

Learn more about the DA layer here:

Ethereum

State derivation

Node software

The rollupA blockchain that inherits consensus and data availability from another blockchain called L1. Rollups enable trust minimized bridges with the base layer via proof systems, either optimistic or zero-knowledge. A rollup without a bridge, or without considering the bridge, is called a sovereign rollup. nodeA software client that participates in the network. is composed of two software components: op-node, implementing consensusAn agreement on the latest and correct state of a blockchain. Unlike L1 blockchains which coordinate participating nodes with consensus rules, rollups rely on L1s for reaching consensus by checking the state of the rollup smart contract deployed thereon. related logic, and op-geth, implementing execution logic. The configuration file can be found here.

Compression scheme

Data batches are compressed using the zlib algorithm with best compression level.

Genesis state

The genesis file can be found here.

Data format

The format specification of SequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs.’s data batches can be found here.

State validation

Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by anyone who has sufficient funds. If a state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. passes the challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled., it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.

State root proposals

Proposers submit state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the create function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.08 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proofAlso referred to as a fault proof, it is the construction of an assertion that fraud was perpetrated on an optimistic rollup. More concretely, that an invalid state transition took place according to the protocol rules. The submitter of a fraud proof would expect a reward from the optimistic rollup protocol for helping maintain the integrity of the system.. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled. has passed and it is not countered.

OP stack specification: Fault Dispute Game

Challenges

Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 691.23 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the defend or attack functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with full concurrency. Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 3d 12h. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see freeloader claims), an inherited clock with too little time remaining is generally extended by 3h. The extension is 6h when the next claim is immediately before split depth 30, and 1d 3h (the standard extension plus the 1d oracle challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled.) immediately before the last depth. Along a full-depth path, cumulative extensions can therefore add up to 10d 3h. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers’ stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step proverAn entity that generates the cryptographic proof to convince the verifier that the statement is true. In a ZK-Rollup, the prover generates the ZK (validity) proof to submit to the verifier contract. contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks (Spearbit 5.1.3).

Fraud Proof Wars: OPFP

Program Hashes

Name

Hash

Repository

Verification

Used in

Name

Hash

Repository

Verification

Used in

Name	Hash	Repository	Verification	Used in

	0x031a...e1df	Github

Upgrades & Governance

Past upgrades

The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.

Count of upgrades

Last upgrade

13d 14h ago

Avg upgrade interval

2mo 10d

Ossification & Updates

Ossification

Contracts our research team classifies as critical form the project's critical perimeter. Its clock starts at the ossification genesis, and every critical change resets it (changes within 24 hours count as one). The ossification score is the share of recorded code-bug exploits whose exploited code was younger than this perimeter is today. Battle-tested exposure is the value secured, summed over that unchanged period.

Ossification %

38since 2026 Sep 24

TVS & changes (1Y)

Battle-tested exposure

$1.65 M·years

Critical changes / year

8.8across 24 contracts

Exit window

Discovery updates

2026 October 01, 13:46 UTC

Critical code change

413changes

OP Contracts Upgrade 19b "Karst" (op-contracts/v7.0.0) on 2026-07-06 upgraded the L1 contracts to their v7 implementations. The Karst L2 hardfork activated on 2026-07-08 16:00:01 UTC. Every L2 predeploy was upgraded, and most now inherit ProxyAdminOwnedBase , which gates privileged functions to the proxy's ProxyAdmin or its owner. OP Contracts Upgrade 20 (op-contracts/v8.0.0-rc.3) followed on 2026-09-24. State roots are now proposed as super roots, which are addressed by an L2 timestamp rather than by a block number on this chain. The starting anchor sequence number is therefore a timestamp, changing from 22024228 to 1788848651. The format carries per-chain roots for a future interop set; today each game commits only to this chain. Proving a withdrawal now requires a game whose sequence number is at or after the timestamp of the initiating block rather than its block number; proveWithdrawalTransaction is unchanged, as the portal reads this chain's output root out of the super root. The respected game type changed 0 → 9, CANNON to SUPER CANNON KONA. Proposing and challenging remain permissionless, with a 0.08 ETH bond, a 3.5 day clock, max game depth 73 and split depth 30. The fault proof program is the interop variant of kona v1.7.0-rc.2. Game types 0, 1 and 8 were cleared; the permissioned fallback is now type 5, SUPER PERMISSIONED, which carries no bond, defines only a proposer and has no challenger. The chain moved onto the shared Superchain MIPS, PreimageOracle and DelayedWETH instances, replacing its own, and the two previous DelayedWETH contracts were replaced by one. SystemConfig reached v4.0.0, removing the batchInbox() getter; the batch inbox address now lives only in the rollup config. The ProxyAdmin owner moved from the UnichainProxyAdminOwner to the SuperchainProxyAdminOwner, on L1 and through its L2 alias. The Unichain-specific owner Safe, its LivenessModule and LivenessGuard are no longer part of the permission graph. Version changes and implementation diffs: - FaultDisputeGame - SuperFaultDisputeGame (type 0 - 9): https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x6dDBa09bc4cCB0D6Ca9Fc5350580f74165707499/eth:0x19AF533Cc2A2A55786DCB8672aA5717e64213208 - PermissionedDisputeGame - SuperPermissionedDisputeGame (type 1 - 5): https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x58bf355C5d4EdFc723eF89d99582ECCfd143266A/eth:0x5C3eb47cB0174aea522a2a9Ae79487139A53D691 - ETHLockbox 1.2.0 - 1.3.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x784d2F03593A42A6E4676A012762F18775ecbBe6/eth:0xb3A24DB07038b51962026329B62E7a965d56A6ad - OptimismPortal2 5.2.0 - 5.8.0: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x97cEbbf8959e2A5476fbe9B98A21806Ec234609B/eth:0x1005217ad392DC64CEf501FA1777A27D42166748 - AnchorStateRegistry 3.7.0 - 3.9.0: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x36398155Cd17cfe804F69b233eDDA800DD4D5aA5/eth:0x8F40Cc98D694AB986F026C5383A181FCc9B6B281 - DisputeGameFactory 1.4.0 - 1.6.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xc040F392E52Cb6970CA8E110c280fE24E07C5e2c/eth:0x72B971717E088B59F26d4236BE222ADB6ACD393b - L1StandardBridge 2.8.0 - 2.8.2: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A/eth:0xB37a11AadF167B2F0b8dD85372De4bC66CD4A891 - SuperchainConfig 2.4.2 - 2.4.3: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550/eth:0x5570b1f2b97B1E35b5C6f9Ee76f6cf02c9917504 - L1CrossDomainMessenger 2.11.0 - 2.11.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0/eth:0x59D497530b00062f40950ba8EaB88868bf7F86f0 - OptimismMintableERC20Factory 1.10.2 - 1.11.0: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB/eth:0xaAbEA75Da509fA518Fd8a91Eae4BE5813B829b12 - SystemConfig 3.13.1 - 4.0.0: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xd392c27B84b1cA776528F2704BC67B82a62132d2/eth:0x670b850A235A6fA98cD7a195eB139D0277E471fA - L1ERC721Bridge 2.9.0 - 2.9.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9/eth:0x9F164f1d02A81e06D639E55F65a87f0070E3Cb2e - L2CrossDomainMessenger 2.1.1-beta.1 - 2.2.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/unichain:0xC0d3c0d3c0D3c0D3C0d3C0D3C0D3c0d3c0d30007/unichain:0x250AF3f400cf8Aac8D410c90f1ba3968dD87DF96 - GasPriceOracle implementation rotated: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/unichain:0x4f1db3c6AbD250ba86E0928471A8F7DB3AFd88F1/unichain:0x547d0fba434877D7237d511cF87FABe2ee26b152 - L2StandardBridge 1.11.1-beta.1 - 1.13.2: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/unichain:0xC0d3c0d3c0D3c0d3C0D3c0D3C0d3C0D3C0D30010/unichain:0xAE9ed42f43a3ee45c3A9dEf8ae6B48cBb58Ed1a1 - SequencerFeeVault 1.5.0-beta.2 - 1.6.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/unichain:0xC0D3C0d3c0d3c0d3C0D3c0d3C0D3c0d3c0D30011/unichain:0xb178cdAa8336f25624A63C049EdB5AF7ca36C2dA - OptimismMintableERC20Factory 1.10.1-beta.2 - 1.11.0: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/unichain:0xc0D3c0d3C0d3c0d3c0D3c0d3c0D3c0D3c0D30012/unichain:0xAF87f2Fd347aCb94656f9F715B4f2409B98e75b9 - L2ERC721Bridge 1.7.1-beta.2 - 1.10.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/unichain:0xC0D3c0d3c0d3c0d3c0D3C0d3C0D3C0D3c0d30014/unichain:0x716eAd0Cf3e7FF86A02D4F8cb41a6D14922fA833 - L1Block implementation rotated: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/unichain:0x3Ba4007f5C922FBb33C454B41ea7a1f11E83df2C/unichain:0x6a97C5D55A21265326150Efe12FC30Fb21cbff56 - L2ToL1MessagePasser 1.1.1-beta.1 - 1.2.0: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/unichain:0xC0D3C0d3C0d3c0d3C0d3C0D3c0D3c0d3c0D30016/unichain:0x27E51B2254433A3284D9ba73Ea551C397DB2a124 - OptimismMintableERC721Factory 1.4.1-beta.1 - 1.5.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/unichain:0xc0d3C0d3C0d3C0d3C0d3c0d3C0D3C0d3C0D30017/unichain:0xf43862B9d814BB4504158CecCB0b74b31265e4eE - L2ProxyAdmin implementation rotated: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/unichain:0xC0d3C0D3c0d3C0d3c0d3c0D3C0D3C0d3C0D30018/unichain:0x893c2CEEb71D38514daF67728d3Ff1b213FC4B5F - BaseFeeVault 1.5.0-beta.2 - 1.6.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/unichain:0xC0d3c0D3c0d3C0D3C0D3C0d3c0D3C0D3c0d30019/unichain:0xf7bed7215EEF1003fac426682Cf2edeb958569f7 - L1FeeVault 1.5.0-beta.2 - 1.6.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/unichain:0xc0D3c0D3C0d3c0d3c0d3C0d3c0d3C0d3C0D3001A/unichain:0xf7bed7215EEF1003fac426682Cf2edeb958569f7 - SchemaRegistry 1.3.1-beta.1 - 1.3.1-beta.2: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/unichain:0xc0d3c0d3c0d3C0d3c0d3C0D3C0D3c0d3C0D30020/unichain:0x70DE55BC0bfBC52C5D0CCA1DA5816c2428886A34 - EAS 1.4.1-beta.1 - 1.4.1-beta.3: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/unichain:0xC0D3c0D3C0d3c0D3c0D3C0D3c0D3c0d3c0d30021/unichain:0xbEc660b456B84A081E90aF29BE43385BDa5bF7b6

OP Contracts Upgrade 19b “Karst” (op-contracts/v7.0.0) on 2026-07-06 upgraded the L1 contracts to their v7 implementations.

The Karst L2 hardfork activated on 2026-07-08 16:00:01 UTC. Every L2 predeploy was upgraded, and most now inherit ProxyAdminOwnedBase, which gates privileged functions to the proxy’s ProxyAdmin or its owner.

OP Contracts Upgrade 20 (op-contracts/v8.0.0-rc.3) followed on 2026-09-24. State roots are now proposed as super roots, which are addressed by an L2 timestamp rather than by a block number on this chain. The starting anchor sequence number is therefore a timestamp, changing from 22024228 to 1788848651. The format carries per-chain roots for a future interop set; today each game commits only to this chain. Proving a withdrawal now requires a game whose sequence number is at or after the timestamp of the initiating block rather than its block number; proveWithdrawalTransaction is unchanged, as the portal reads this chain’s output root out of the super root.

The respected game type changed 0 → 9, CANNON to SUPER_CANNON_KONA. Proposing and challenging remain permissionless, with a 0.08 ETH bond, a 3.5 day clock, max game depth 73 and split depth 30. The fault proof program is the interop variant of kona v1.7.0-rc.2. Game types 0, 1 and 8 were cleared; the permissioned fallback is now type 5, SUPER_PERMISSIONED, which carries no bond, defines only a proposer and has no challenger.

The chain moved onto the shared Superchain MIPS, PreimageOracle and DelayedWETH instances, replacing its own, and the two previous DelayedWETH contracts were replaced by one.

SystemConfig reached v4.0.0, removing the batchInbox() getter; the batch inbox address now lives only in the rollup config.

The ProxyAdmin owner moved from the UnichainProxyAdminOwner to the SuperchainProxyAdminOwner, on L1 and through its L2 alias. The Unichain-specific owner Safe, its LivenessModule and LivenessGuard are no longer part of the permission graph.

Version changes and implementation diffs:

FaultDisputeGame -> SuperFaultDisputeGame (type 0 -> 9): https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x6dDBa09bc4cCB0D6Ca9Fc5350580f74165707499/eth:0x19AF533Cc2A2A55786DCB8672aA5717e64213208
PermissionedDisputeGame -> SuperPermissionedDisputeGame (type 1 -> 5): https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x58bf355C5d4EdFc723eF89d99582ECCfd143266A/eth:0x5C3eb47cB0174aea522a2a9Ae79487139A53D691
ETHLockbox 1.2.0 -> 1.3.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x784d2F03593A42A6E4676A012762F18775ecbBe6/eth:0xb3A24DB07038b51962026329B62E7a965d56A6ad
OptimismPortal2 5.2.0 -> 5.8.0: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x97cEbbf8959e2A5476fbe9B98A21806Ec234609B/eth:0x1005217ad392DC64CEf501FA1777A27D42166748
AnchorStateRegistry 3.7.0 -> 3.9.0: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x36398155Cd17cfe804F69b233eDDA800DD4D5aA5/eth:0x8F40Cc98D694AB986F026C5383A181FCc9B6B281
DisputeGameFactory 1.4.0 -> 1.6.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xc040F392E52Cb6970CA8E110c280fE24E07C5e2c/eth:0x72B971717E088B59F26d4236BE222ADB6ACD393b
L1StandardBridge 2.8.0 -> 2.8.2: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A/eth:0xB37a11AadF167B2F0b8dD85372De4bC66CD4A891
SuperchainConfig 2.4.2 -> 2.4.3: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550/eth:0x5570b1f2b97B1E35b5C6f9Ee76f6cf02c9917504
L1CrossDomainMessenger 2.11.0 -> 2.11.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0/eth:0x59D497530b00062f40950ba8EaB88868bf7F86f0
OptimismMintableERC20Factory 1.10.2 -> 1.11.0: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB/eth:0xaAbEA75Da509fA518Fd8a91Eae4BE5813B829b12
SystemConfig 3.13.1 -> 4.0.0: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xd392c27B84b1cA776528F2704BC67B82a62132d2/eth:0x670b850A235A6fA98cD7a195eB139D0277E471fA
L1ERC721Bridge 2.9.0 -> 2.9.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9/eth:0x9F164f1d02A81e06D639E55F65a87f0070E3Cb2e
L2CrossDomainMessenger 2.1.1-beta.1 -> 2.2.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/unichain:0xC0d3c0d3c0D3c0D3C0d3C0D3C0D3c0d3c0d30007/unichain:0x250AF3f400cf8Aac8D410c90f1ba3968dD87DF96
GasPriceOracle implementation rotated: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/unichain:0x4f1db3c6AbD250ba86E0928471A8F7DB3AFd88F1/unichain:0x547d0fba434877D7237d511cF87FABe2ee26b152
L2StandardBridge 1.11.1-beta.1 -> 1.13.2: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/unichain:0xC0d3c0d3c0D3c0d3C0D3c0D3C0d3C0D3C0D30010/unichain:0xAE9ed42f43a3ee45c3A9dEf8ae6B48cBb58Ed1a1
SequencerFeeVault 1.5.0-beta.2 -> 1.6.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/unichain:0xC0D3C0d3c0d3c0d3C0D3c0d3C0D3c0d3c0D30011/unichain:0xb178cdAa8336f25624A63C049EdB5AF7ca36C2dA
OptimismMintableERC20Factory 1.10.1-beta.2 -> 1.11.0: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/unichain:0xc0D3c0d3C0d3c0d3c0D3c0d3c0D3c0D3c0D30012/unichain:0xAF87f2Fd347aCb94656f9F715B4f2409B98e75b9
L2ERC721Bridge 1.7.1-beta.2 -> 1.10.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/unichain:0xC0D3c0d3c0d3c0d3c0D3C0d3C0D3C0D3c0d30014/unichain:0x716eAd0Cf3e7FF86A02D4F8cb41a6D14922fA833
L1Block implementation rotated: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/unichain:0x3Ba4007f5C922FBb33C454B41ea7a1f11E83df2C/unichain:0x6a97C5D55A21265326150Efe12FC30Fb21cbff56
L2ToL1MessagePasser 1.1.1-beta.1 -> 1.2.0: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/unichain:0xC0D3C0d3C0d3c0d3C0d3C0D3c0D3c0d3c0D30016/unichain:0x27E51B2254433A3284D9ba73Ea551C397DB2a124
OptimismMintableERC721Factory 1.4.1-beta.1 -> 1.5.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/unichain:0xc0d3C0d3C0d3C0d3C0d3c0d3C0D3C0d3C0D30017/unichain:0xf43862B9d814BB4504158CecCB0b74b31265e4eE
L2ProxyAdmin implementation rotated: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/unichain:0xC0d3C0D3c0d3C0d3c0d3c0D3C0D3C0d3C0D30018/unichain:0x893c2CEEb71D38514daF67728d3Ff1b213FC4B5F
BaseFeeVault 1.5.0-beta.2 -> 1.6.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/unichain:0xC0d3c0D3c0d3C0D3C0D3C0d3c0D3C0D3c0d30019/unichain:0xf7bed7215EEF1003fac426682Cf2edeb958569f7
L1FeeVault 1.5.0-beta.2 -> 1.6.1: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/unichain:0xc0D3c0D3C0d3c0d3c0d3C0d3c0d3C0d3C0D3001A/unichain:0xf7bed7215EEF1003fac426682Cf2edeb958569f7
SchemaRegistry 1.3.1-beta.1 -> 1.3.1-beta.2: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/unichain:0xc0d3c0d3c0d3C0d3c0d3C0D3C0D3c0d3C0D30020/unichain:0x70DE55BC0bfBC52C5D0CCA1DA5816c2428886A34
EAS 1.4.1-beta.1 -> 1.4.1-beta.3: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/unichain:0xC0D3c0D3C0d3c0D3c0D3C0D3c0D3c0d3c0d30021/unichain:0xbEc660b456B84A081E90aF29BE43385BDa5bF7b6

	contract ETHLockbox (eth:0x08bA0023eD60C7Bd040716dD13C45fA0062df5C5) [opstack/ETHLockbox] {
	+++ description: A simple escrow contract storing ETH for the canonical bridge.
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0x330c0ee4ca969ca3a1deda35d8ce83d1861361088ef0b4b8efe0ec23b4f24c19"
+	"0x99fabdfb3d8ef02962877763f6f3c7ec26d39e15e700fa854a040321a79f61ec"
	values.$implementation:
-	"eth:0x784d2F03593A42A6E4676A012762F18775ecbBe6"
+	"eth:0xb3A24DB07038b51962026329B62E7a965d56A6ad"
	values.$pastUpgrades.1:
+	["2026-07-06T18:32:35.000Z","0xb3c65cbf6285d4b32d576c866fffced1c77747c53163b604e20feb6aad121421",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.2:
+	["2026-07-06T18:32:35.000Z","0xb3c65cbf6285d4b32d576c866fffced1c77747c53163b604e20feb6aad121421",["eth:0xb3A24DB07038b51962026329B62E7a965d56A6ad"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.3:
+	["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.4:
+	["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0xb3A24DB07038b51962026329B62E7a965d56A6ad"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.5:
+	["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.6:
+	["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0xb3A24DB07038b51962026329B62E7a965d56A6ad"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	1
+	7
	values.proxyAdminOwner:
-	"eth:0x6d5B183F538ABB8572F5cD17109c617b994D5833"
+	"eth:0x5a0Aae59D09fccBdDb6C6CcEB07B7279367C3d2A"
	values.version:
-	"1.2.0"
+	"1.3.1"
	implementationNames.eth:0x784d2F03593A42A6E4676A012762F18775ecbBe6:
-	"ETHLockbox"
	implementationNames.eth:0xb3A24DB07038b51962026329B62E7a965d56A6ad:
+	"ETHLockbox"
	}

	contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0x0bd48f6B86a26D3a217d0Fa6FfE2B491B956A7a2) [opstack/OptimismPortal2] {
	+++ description: The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the SuperFaultDisputeGame.
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0x7883f2d27d696b1fa6259a97c561d651493c2c1324e9646e04dba10adcfd8a21"
+	"0x5a3a97f72d46aaebbcbdba3783f7c5a8acfcd5ae928afe402abdb21acc0be49f"
	description:
-	"The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the FaultDisputeGame."
+	"The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the SuperFaultDisputeGame."
	values.$implementation:
-	"eth:0x97cEbbf8959e2A5476fbe9B98A21806Ec234609B"
+	"eth:0x1005217ad392DC64CEf501FA1777A27D42166748"
	values.$pastUpgrades.7:
+	["2026-07-06T18:32:35.000Z","0xb3c65cbf6285d4b32d576c866fffced1c77747c53163b604e20feb6aad121421",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.8:
+	["2026-07-06T18:32:35.000Z","0xb3c65cbf6285d4b32d576c866fffced1c77747c53163b604e20feb6aad121421",["eth:0xe89F13c5ee4033B2D3cD76C9d6958eFBfe26D3C2"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.9:
+	["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.10:
+	["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x1005217ad392DC64CEf501FA1777A27D42166748"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.11:
+	["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.12:
+	["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x1005217ad392DC64CEf501FA1777A27D42166748"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	7
+	13
	values.proxyAdminOwner:
-	"eth:0x6d5B183F538ABB8572F5cD17109c617b994D5833"
+	"eth:0x5a0Aae59D09fccBdDb6C6CcEB07B7279367C3d2A"
	values.RespectedGameString:
-	"FaultDisputeGame"
+	"SuperFaultDisputeGame"
	values.respectedGameType:
-	0
+	9
	values.version:
-	"5.2.0"
+	"5.8.0"
	implementationNames.eth:0x97cEbbf8959e2A5476fbe9B98A21806Ec234609B:
-	"OptimismPortal2"
	implementationNames.eth:0x1005217ad392DC64CEf501FA1777A27D42166748:
+	"OptimismPortal2"
	}

-	Status: DELETED
	contract DelayedWETH (eth:0x0bdbEc6bd35571F97f96f3ed21822a4f2e071A3c) [opstack/DelayedWETH]
	+++ description: Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.

-	Status: DELETED
	contract PreimageOracle (eth:0x1fb8cdFc6831fc866Ed9C51aF8817Da5c287aDD3) [opstack/PreimageOracle]
	+++ description: The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game.

	contract AnchorStateRegistry (eth:0x27Cf508E4E3Aa8d30b3226aC3b5Ea0e8bcaCAFF9) [opstack/AnchorStateRegistry_post20] {
	+++ description: Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. This variant stores respectedGameType, retirementTimestamp, and disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds locally and drops the legacy *FromGame fields, since the AggregateVerifier model does not expose vm()/weth()/absolutePrestate() on its game implementation.
	template:
-	"opstack/AnchorStateRegistry_post13"
+	"opstack/AnchorStateRegistry_post20"
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0xfdabc8b9b4db9b7aa78227b26e936abaf24f058502b96e8d9a293d49b1e89b47"
+	"0x10f64124093daab87c84d97148854054f9622bf86e09e98d496f123be3368122"
	description:
-	"Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the FaultDisputeGame."
+	"Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. This variant stores respectedGameType, retirementTimestamp, and disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds locally and drops the legacy *FromGame fields, since the AggregateVerifier model does not expose vm()/weth()/absolutePrestate() on its game implementation."
	values.$implementation:
-	"eth:0x36398155Cd17cfe804F69b233eDDA800DD4D5aA5"
+	"eth:0x8F40Cc98D694AB986F026C5383A181FCc9B6B281"
	values.$pastUpgrades.3:
+	["2026-07-06T18:32:35.000Z","0xb3c65cbf6285d4b32d576c866fffced1c77747c53163b604e20feb6aad121421",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.4:
+	["2026-07-06T18:32:35.000Z","0xb3c65cbf6285d4b32d576c866fffced1c77747c53163b604e20feb6aad121421",["eth:0x8F40Cc98D694AB986F026C5383A181FCc9B6B281"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.5:
+	["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.6:
+	["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x8F40Cc98D694AB986F026C5383A181FCc9B6B281"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.7:
+	["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.8:
+	["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x8F40Cc98D694AB986F026C5383A181FCc9B6B281"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	3
+	9
	values.absolutePrestateFromGame:
-	"0x033c000916b4a88cfffeceddd6cf0f4be3897a89195941e5a7c3f8209b4dbb6e"
	values.challengePeriodFromOracle:
-	86400
	values.getStartingAnchorRoot.root:
-	"0x193781a056643321a32aacffcb9087a6e54a0f858d5ee06f29cd920ada6eeea9"
+	"0xaf64a866304eb17696278d26290bb172aa941eac3370d9bc8bd313d492beb7d3"
	values.getStartingAnchorRoot.l2SequenceNumber:
-	22024228
+	1788848651
	values.oracleFromVm:
-	"eth:0x1fb8cdFc6831fc866Ed9C51aF8817Da5c287aDD3"
	values.proxyAdminOwner:
-	"eth:0x6d5B183F538ABB8572F5cD17109c617b994D5833"
+	"eth:0x5a0Aae59D09fccBdDb6C6CcEB07B7279367C3d2A"
	values.RespectedGameString:
-	"FaultDisputeGame"
+	"SuperFaultDisputeGame"
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.respectedGameType:
-	0
+	9
	values.version:
-	"3.7.0"
+	"3.9.0"
	values.vmFromGame:
-	"eth:0x6463dEE3828677F6270d83d45408044fc5eDB908"
	values.wethFromGame:
-	"eth:0x0bdbEc6bd35571F97f96f3ed21822a4f2e071A3c"
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.blacklistedGames:
+	[]
	fieldMeta.$admin:
-	{"severity":"HIGH"}
	fieldMeta.disputeGameFactory:
-	{"severity":"HIGH"}
	fieldMeta.systemConfig:
-	{"severity":"HIGH"}
	fieldMeta.blacklistedGames:
+	{"severity":"HIGH"}
	implementationNames.eth:0x36398155Cd17cfe804F69b233eDDA800DD4D5aA5:
-	"AnchorStateRegistry"
	implementationNames.eth:0x8F40Cc98D694AB986F026C5383A181FCc9B6B281:
+	"AnchorStateRegistry"
	usedTypes.0.arg.621:
+	"AggregateVerifier"
	usedTypes.0.arg.8:
+	"FaultDisputeGame"
	}

	contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0x2F12d621a16e2d3285929C9996f478508951dFe4) [opstack/DisputeGameFactory_v2] {
	+++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. This variant exposes per-type reads only; the legacy array views (gameImpls[], initBonds[]) were removed in the new implementation.
	template:
-	"opstack/DisputeGameFactory"
+	"opstack/DisputeGameFactory_v2"
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0x8f21dbc160582c568a2a925ddad1b2bb889a9f72bac2067c6e72d43b662ef538"
+	"0x8912e655e26f51d4384fc950df847ae65bccf1f5ec5458642402f385c3dadf78"
	description:
-	"The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them."
+	"The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. This variant exposes per-type reads only; the legacy array views (gameImpls[], initBonds[]) were removed in the new implementation."
	values.$implementation:
-	"eth:0xc040F392E52Cb6970CA8E110c280fE24E07C5e2c"
+	"eth:0x72B971717E088B59F26d4236BE222ADB6ACD393b"
	values.$pastUpgrades.6:
+	["2026-07-06T18:32:35.000Z","0xb3c65cbf6285d4b32d576c866fffced1c77747c53163b604e20feb6aad121421",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.7:
+	["2026-07-06T18:32:35.000Z","0xb3c65cbf6285d4b32d576c866fffced1c77747c53163b604e20feb6aad121421",["eth:0x72B971717E088B59F26d4236BE222ADB6ACD393b"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.8:
+	["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.9:
+	["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x72B971717E088B59F26d4236BE222ADB6ACD393b"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.10:
+	["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.11:
+	["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x72B971717E088B59F26d4236BE222ADB6ACD393b"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	6
+	12
	values.challengerFromDGF:
-	"eth:0x9BA6e03D8B90dE867373Db8cF1A58d2F7F006b3A"
+	"UNRESOLVED"
	values.game2000:
-	"eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
	values.gameImpls:
-	["eth:0x6dDBa09bc4cCB0D6Ca9Fc5350580f74165707499","eth:0x58bf355C5d4EdFc723eF89d99582ECCfd143266A","eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000","eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000","eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000","eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000","eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"]
	values.initBonds:
-	["80000000000000000","80000000000000000",0,0,0]
	values.owner:
-	"eth:0x6d5B183F538ABB8572F5cD17109c617b994D5833"
+	"eth:0x5a0Aae59D09fccBdDb6C6CcEB07B7279367C3d2A"
	values.permissionedGameArgs:
-	"0x033c000916b4a88cfffeceddd6cf0f4be3897a89195941e5a7c3f8209b4dbb6e6463dee3828677f6270d83d45408044fc5edb90827cf508e4e3aa8d30b3226ac3b5ea0e8bcacaff9e62b0279f6a466c5e1676f3ea955086300bcd0ac0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000082d5f0e2912c70771c589cd8bb087ede0dab4afa9a9ba6e03d8b90de867373db8cf1a58d2f7f006b3a"
+	"0x"
	values.proposerFromDGF:
-	"eth:0xD5F0E2912C70771C589CD8bB087EDE0Dab4AFA9A"
+	"UNRESOLVED"
	values.proxyAdminOwner:
-	"eth:0x6d5B183F538ABB8572F5cD17109c617b994D5833"
+	"eth:0x5a0Aae59D09fccBdDb6C6CcEB07B7279367C3d2A"
	values.version:
-	"1.4.0"
+	"1.6.1"
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.wethFromDGF:
-	"eth:0xe62B0279f6A466C5E1676f3ea955086300Bcd0Ac"
+	"UNRESOLVED"
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.absolutePrestateFromDGF:
+	"UNRESOLVED"
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.anchorStateRegistryFromDGF:
+	"UNRESOLVED"
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.chainIdFromDGF:
+	"UNRESOLVED"
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.game0:
+	"eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.game1:
+	"eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.game5:
+	"eth:0x5C3eb47cB0174aea522a2a9Ae79487139A53D691"
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.game5AnchorStateRegistry:
+	"eth:0x27Cf508E4E3Aa8d30b3226aC3b5Ea0e8bcaCAFF9"
	values.game5Args:
+	"0x27cf508e4e3aa8d30b3226ac3b5ea0e8bcacaff9d5f0e2912c70771c589cd8bb087ede0dab4afa9a"
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.game5Proposer:
+	"eth:0xD5F0E2912C70771C589CD8bB087EDE0Dab4AFA9A"
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.game621:
+	"eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.game8:
+	"eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.game8AbsolutePrestate:
+	"UNRESOLVED"
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.game8AnchorStateRegistry:
+	"UNRESOLVED"
	values.game8Args:
+	"0x"
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.game8ChainId:
+	"UNRESOLVED"
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.game8Vm:
+	"UNRESOLVED"
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.game8Weth:
+	"UNRESOLVED"
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.game9:
+	"eth:0x19AF533Cc2A2A55786DCB8672aA5717e64213208"
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.game9AbsolutePrestate:
+	"0x031ac6f15c19010da258f5cb633ef6ca9318c2d0f244bea6b2045ce6b790e1df"
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.game9AnchorStateRegistry:
+	"eth:0x27Cf508E4E3Aa8d30b3226aC3b5Ea0e8bcaCAFF9"
	values.game9Args:
+	"0x031ac6f15c19010da258f5cb633ef6ca9318c2d0f244bea6b2045ce6b790e1dfacc005dcd857b401e4732e6f7837135a22825cfa27cf508e4e3aa8d30b3226ac3b5ea0e8bcacaff974ad145ac900f1dd5551f0c9e143314dc4022fcf0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.game9Vm:
+	"eth:0xaCc005DCd857B401e4732E6F7837135A22825cfA"
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.game9Weth:
+	"eth:0x74ad145aC900F1DD5551F0C9E143314DC4022FCf"
	values.initBondGame0:
+	0
	values.initBondGame1:
+	0
	values.initBondGame5:
+	0
	values.initBondGame621:
+	0
	values.initBondGame8:
+	0
	values.initBondGame9:
+	"80000000000000000"
	+++ severity: HIGH
	values.vmFromDGF:
+	"UNRESOLVED"
	fieldMeta.$admin:
-	{"severity":"HIGH"}
	fieldMeta.owner:
-	{"severity":"HIGH"}
	fieldMeta.gameImpls:
-	{"severity":"HIGH"}
	fieldMeta.game2000:
-	{"severity":"HIGH"}
	fieldMeta.game621:
+	{"severity":"HIGH"}
	fieldMeta.game0:
+	{"severity":"HIGH"}
	fieldMeta.game1:
+	{"severity":"HIGH"}
	fieldMeta.game8:
+	{"severity":"HIGH"}
	fieldMeta.game9:
+	{"severity":"HIGH"}
	fieldMeta.game5:
+	{"severity":"HIGH"}
	fieldMeta.absolutePrestateFromDGF:
+	{"severity":"HIGH"}
	fieldMeta.vmFromDGF:
+	{"severity":"HIGH"}
	fieldMeta.game8AbsolutePrestate:
+	{"severity":"HIGH"}
	fieldMeta.game8Vm:
+	{"severity":"HIGH"}
	fieldMeta.game8AnchorStateRegistry:
+	{"severity":"HIGH"}
	fieldMeta.game8Weth:
+	{"severity":"HIGH"}
	fieldMeta.game8ChainId:
+	{"severity":"HIGH"}
	fieldMeta.game9AbsolutePrestate:
+	{"severity":"HIGH"}
	fieldMeta.game9Vm:
+	{"severity":"HIGH"}
	fieldMeta.game9AnchorStateRegistry:
+	{"severity":"HIGH"}
	fieldMeta.game9Weth:
+	{"severity":"HIGH"}
	fieldMeta.game5AnchorStateRegistry:
+	{"severity":"HIGH"}
	fieldMeta.game5Proposer:
+	{"severity":"HIGH"}
	fieldMeta.anchorStateRegistryFromDGF:
+	{"severity":"HIGH"}
	fieldMeta.chainIdFromDGF:
+	{"severity":"HIGH"}
	implementationNames.eth:0xc040F392E52Cb6970CA8E110c280fE24E07C5e2c:
-	"DisputeGameFactory"
	implementationNames.eth:0x72B971717E088B59F26d4236BE222ADB6ACD393b:
+	"DisputeGameFactory"
	usedTypes.0:
+	{"typeCaster":"SliceBytes32","arg":{"offset":0}}
	usedTypes.1:
+	{"typeCaster":"SliceAddress","arg":{"offset":32}}
	usedTypes.2:
+	{"typeCaster":"SliceAddress","arg":{"offset":32}}
	usedTypes.3:
+	{"typeCaster":"SliceAddress","arg":{"offset":52}}
	usedTypes.4:
+	{"typeCaster":"SliceAddress","arg":{"offset":72}}
	usedTypes.5:
+	{"typeCaster":"SliceUint256","arg":{"offset":92}}
	usedTypes.6:
+	{"typeCaster":"SliceAddress","arg":{"offset":0}}
	usedTypes.7:
+	{"typeCaster":"SliceAddress","arg":{"offset":20}}
	usedTypes.2:
-	{"typeCaster":"SliceAddress","arg":{"offset":72}}
	}

	contract ProxyAdmin (eth:0x3B73Fa8d82f511A3caE17B5a26E4E1a2d5E2f2A4) [global/ProxyAdmin] {
	+++ description: None
	values.owner:
-	"eth:0x6d5B183F538ABB8572F5cD17109c617b994D5833"
+	"eth:0x5a0Aae59D09fccBdDb6C6CcEB07B7279367C3d2A"
	directlyReceivedPermissions.3:
-	{"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x0bdbEc6bd35571F97f96f3ed21822a4f2e071A3c","role":"admin"}
	directlyReceivedPermissions.5:
+	{"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x74ad145aC900F1DD5551F0C9E143314DC4022FCf","role":"admin"}
	directlyReceivedPermissions.11:
-	{"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xe62B0279f6A466C5E1676f3ea955086300Bcd0Ac","role":"admin"}
	}

-	Status: DELETED
	contract LivenessModule (eth:0x4B4F1aF8d43C8c140D2355Fea663fC9f762067C2) [gnosisSafeModules/LivenessModule]
	+++ description: used to remove members inactive for 2mo 10d while making sure that the threshold remains above 60%. If the number of members falls below 1, the eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 takes ownership of the multisig

-	Status: DELETED
	contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0x58bf355C5d4EdFc723eF89d99582ECCfd143266A) [opstack/PermissionedDisputeGame]
	+++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger.

	contract SuperchainProxyAdminOwner (eth:0x5a0Aae59D09fccBdDb6C6CcEB07B7279367C3d2A) [GnosisSafe] {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.0:
+	{"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x2F12d621a16e2d3285929C9996f478508951dFe4","description":"set the dispute game implementation and initial bond for any game type.","role":".owner"}
	receivedPermissions.1:
+	{"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x8098F676033A377b9Defe302e9fE6877cD63D575","description":"set and change address mappings.","role":".owner","via":[{"address":"eth:0x3B73Fa8d82f511A3caE17B5a26E4E1a2d5E2f2A4"}]}
	receivedPermissions.3:
+	{"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x08bA0023eD60C7Bd040716dD13C45fA0062df5C5","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x3B73Fa8d82f511A3caE17B5a26E4E1a2d5E2f2A4"}]}
	receivedPermissions.4:
+	{"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x0bd48f6B86a26D3a217d0Fa6FfE2B491B956A7a2","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x3B73Fa8d82f511A3caE17B5a26E4E1a2d5E2f2A4"}]}
	receivedPermissions.5:
+	{"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x27Cf508E4E3Aa8d30b3226aC3b5Ea0e8bcaCAFF9","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x3B73Fa8d82f511A3caE17B5a26E4E1a2d5E2f2A4"}]}
	receivedPermissions.6:
+	{"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x2F12d621a16e2d3285929C9996f478508951dFe4","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x3B73Fa8d82f511A3caE17B5a26E4E1a2d5E2f2A4"}]}
	receivedPermissions.7:
+	{"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x74ad145aC900F1DD5551F0C9E143314DC4022FCf","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x3B73Fa8d82f511A3caE17B5a26E4E1a2d5E2f2A4"}]}
	receivedPermissions.8:
+	{"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x81014F44b0a345033bB2b3B21C7a1A308B35fEeA","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x3B73Fa8d82f511A3caE17B5a26E4E1a2d5E2f2A4"}]}
	receivedPermissions.10:
+	{"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x9A3D64E386C18Cb1d6d5179a9596A4B5736e98A6","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x3B73Fa8d82f511A3caE17B5a26E4E1a2d5E2f2A4"}]}
	receivedPermissions.11:
+	{"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xA2B597EaeAcb6F627e088cbEaD319e934ED5edad","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x3B73Fa8d82f511A3caE17B5a26E4E1a2d5E2f2A4"}]}
	receivedPermissions.12:
+	{"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xc407398d063f942feBbcC6F80a156b47F3f1BDA6","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x3B73Fa8d82f511A3caE17B5a26E4E1a2d5E2f2A4"}]}
	receivedPermissions.13:
+	{"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xD04D0D87E0bd4D2E50286760a3EF323FeA6849Cf","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x3B73Fa8d82f511A3caE17B5a26E4E1a2d5E2f2A4"}]}
	directlyReceivedPermissions.0:
+	{"permission":"act","from":"eth:0x3B73Fa8d82f511A3caE17B5a26E4E1a2d5E2f2A4","role":".owner"}
	}

-	Status: DELETED
	contract MIPS (eth:0x6463dEE3828677F6270d83d45408044fc5eDB908) [opstack/MIPS]
	+++ description: The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.

-	Status: DELETED
	contract UnichainProxyAdminOwner (eth:0x6d5B183F538ABB8572F5cD17109c617b994D5833) [GnosisSafe]
	+++ description: None

-	Status: DELETED
	contract FaultDisputeGame (eth:0x6dDBa09bc4cCB0D6Ca9Fc5350580f74165707499) [opstack/FaultDisputeGame]
	+++ description: Logic of the dispute game. When a state root is proposed, a dispute game contract is deployed. Challengers can use such contracts to challenge the proposed state root.

	contract L1StandardBridge (eth:0x81014F44b0a345033bB2b3B21C7a1A308B35fEeA) [opstack/L1StandardBridge] {
	+++ description: The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0xcacd38e7b52353ad3463da40b7e7a29b028f95500a82590d2b8f8ffd26b83f6d"
+	"0x6469155800e1489607c8fa062550a362dfa8978885df4714ca4653e5f3d25b0c"
	values.$implementation:
-	"eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A"
+	"eth:0xB37a11AadF167B2F0b8dD85372De4bC66CD4A891"
	values.proxyAdminOwner:
-	"eth:0x6d5B183F538ABB8572F5cD17109c617b994D5833"
+	"eth:0x5a0Aae59D09fccBdDb6C6CcEB07B7279367C3d2A"
	values.version:
-	"2.8.0"
+	"2.8.2"
	implementationNames.eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A:
-	"L1StandardBridge"
	implementationNames.eth:0xB37a11AadF167B2F0b8dD85372De4bC66CD4A891:
+	"L1StandardBridge"
	}

	contract OpFoundationUpgradeSafe (eth:0x847B5c174615B1B7fDF770882256e2D3E95b9D92) [GnosisSafe] {
	+++ description: None
	values.$members.0:
-	"eth:0x6419F81580343DF023E68715C6e269aFb00a2cc7"
+	"eth:0xf1EfbdC2C0BDC4554E0f1639D7fe88cD870a4639"
	values.$members.3:
-	"eth:0xBF93D4d727F7Ba1F753E1124C3e532dCb04Ea2c8"
+	"eth:0x7F1D4FE689B73B628285454667B93cfd09409f27"
	}

	contract Unichain Multisig 2 (eth:0x9245d5D10AA8a842B31530De71EA86c0760Ca1b1) [GnosisSafe] {
	+++ description: None
	values.$members.3:
-	"eth:0x31e5EDc2c4cC4AA25349339f96747B54d1624160"
+	"eth:0x01Bc161F133d37Ed8624f77e1DCF1671b9423c92"
	}

-	Status: DELETED
	contract LivenessGuard (eth:0x9343c452dec3251fe99D9Fd29b74c5b9CD1751a6) [N/A]
	+++ description: None

	contract SuperchainConfig (eth:0x95703e0982140D16f8ebA6d158FccEde42f04a4C) [opstack/SuperchainConfig_expiry] {
	+++ description: Used to manage global configuration values for multiple OP Chains within a single Superchain network. The SuperchainConfig contract manages individual pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3 months if left untouched.
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0x2cd597b7305a446a1df355e6909cbd75fe38aa045faf4876a8e5496eebc1734f"
+	"0xb74ed3aa109bd981b095c02d6e3bda2b2467d40e9d1060b4c89b01de32ebad3a"
	values.$implementation:
-	"eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550"
+	"eth:0x5570b1f2b97B1E35b5C6f9Ee76f6cf02c9917504"
	values.$pastUpgrades.8:
+	["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.9:
+	["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x5570b1f2b97B1E35b5C6f9Ee76f6cf02c9917504"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.10:
+	["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.11:
+	["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x5570b1f2b97B1E35b5C6f9Ee76f6cf02c9917504"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	8
+	12
	values.version:
-	"2.4.2"
+	"2.4.3"
	implementationNames.eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550:
-	"SuperchainConfig"
	implementationNames.eth:0x5570b1f2b97B1E35b5C6f9Ee76f6cf02c9917504:
+	"SuperchainConfig"
	}

	contract L1CrossDomainMessenger (eth:0x9A3D64E386C18Cb1d6d5179a9596A4B5736e98A6) [opstack/L1CrossDomainMessenger] {
	+++ description: Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function.
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0x1f2c13ad1144ce6548e578b834c33b0d65b1564aeb0d5c708ed4e7fb50535cc6"
+	"0x694050f95b40e6d92ee91ca0f60acb9c4a74d1b0325c33fd4bd7445fde90e806"
	values.$implementation:
-	"eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0"
+	"eth:0x59D497530b00062f40950ba8EaB88868bf7F86f0"
	values.$pastUpgrades.7:
+	["2026-07-06T18:32:35.000Z","0xb3c65cbf6285d4b32d576c866fffced1c77747c53163b604e20feb6aad121421",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.8:
+	["2026-07-06T18:32:35.000Z","0xb3c65cbf6285d4b32d576c866fffced1c77747c53163b604e20feb6aad121421",["eth:0x59D497530b00062f40950ba8EaB88868bf7F86f0"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.9:
+	["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.10:
+	["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x59D497530b00062f40950ba8EaB88868bf7F86f0"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.11:
+	["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.12:
+	["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x59D497530b00062f40950ba8EaB88868bf7F86f0"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	7
+	13
	values.proxyAdminOwner:
-	"eth:0x6d5B183F538ABB8572F5cD17109c617b994D5833"
+	"eth:0x5a0Aae59D09fccBdDb6C6CcEB07B7279367C3d2A"
	values.version:
-	"2.11.0"
+	"2.11.1"
	implementationNames.eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0:
-	"L1CrossDomainMessenger"
	implementationNames.eth:0x59D497530b00062f40950ba8EaB88868bf7F86f0:
+	"L1CrossDomainMessenger"
	}

-	Status: DELETED
	contract OpFoundationOperationsSafe (eth:0x9BA6e03D8B90dE867373Db8cF1A58d2F7F006b3A) [GnosisSafe]
	+++ description: None

	contract OptimismMintableERC20Factory (eth:0xA2B597EaeAcb6F627e088cbEaD319e934ED5edad) [opstack/OptimismMintableERC20Factory] {
	+++ description: A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it's deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain's representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0x307d4cb83e682629880fe9bb874a188805e3b93cb11a2cbf80095975f1e5b04e"
+	"0x11b0ed6f15cabf613492a8d54c55304a17cf60f4fd94a655d7e720d4556906d0"
	values.$implementation:
-	"eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB"
+	"eth:0xaAbEA75Da509fA518Fd8a91Eae4BE5813B829b12"
	values.$pastUpgrades.4:
+	["2026-07-06T18:32:35.000Z","0xb3c65cbf6285d4b32d576c866fffced1c77747c53163b604e20feb6aad121421",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.5:
+	["2026-07-06T18:32:35.000Z","0xb3c65cbf6285d4b32d576c866fffced1c77747c53163b604e20feb6aad121421",["eth:0xaAbEA75Da509fA518Fd8a91Eae4BE5813B829b12"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.6:
+	["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.7:
+	["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0xaAbEA75Da509fA518Fd8a91Eae4BE5813B829b12"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.8:
+	["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.9:
+	["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0xaAbEA75Da509fA518Fd8a91Eae4BE5813B829b12"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	4
+	10
	values.version:
-	"1.10.2"
+	"1.11.0"
	values.proxyAdmin:
+	"eth:0x3B73Fa8d82f511A3caE17B5a26E4E1a2d5E2f2A4"
	values.proxyAdminOwner:
+	"eth:0x5a0Aae59D09fccBdDb6C6CcEB07B7279367C3d2A"
	implementationNames.eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB:
-	"OptimismMintableERC20Factory"
	implementationNames.eth:0xaAbEA75Da509fA518Fd8a91Eae4BE5813B829b12:
+	"OptimismMintableERC20Factory"
	}

	contract SaferSafes (eth:0xA8447329e52F64AED2bFc9E7a2506F7D369f483a) [gnosisSafeModules/SaferSafes] {
	+++ description: A Gnosis Safe module combining LivenessModule and TimelockGuard. Provides liveness checks where a fallback owner can challenge and take over if Safe owners are unresponsive, plus optional timelock delays for transaction scheduling.
	directlyReceivedPermissions.1:
-	{"permission":"act","from":"eth:0x9BA6e03D8B90dE867373Db8cF1A58d2F7F006b3A","role":".GnosisSafe_modules"}
	}

-	Status: DELETED
	contract Unichain Multisig 1 (eth:0xb0c4C487C5cf6d67807Bc2008c66fa7e2cE744EC) [GnosisSafe]
	+++ description: None

	contract Optimism Security Council (eth:0xc2819DC788505Aac350142A7A707BF9D03E3Bd03) [GnosisSafe] {
	+++ description: None
	values.$members.9:
-	"eth:0x0aA384EB2fedD2741277A0f72909A0d7275575D7"
+	"eth:0xd91530dB01c60C6B3b824707D33fb0771aB85930"
	}

	contract SystemConfig (eth:0xc407398d063f942feBbcC6F80a156b47F3f1BDA6) [opstack/SystemConfig] {
	+++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address.
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0x703fe68eeb3d5454a8ef012933846f1ff1433fc2df39c0c94f2a550d8325f085"
+	"0x532730df835e1a130919ca2afe170505acde568abb77ed1f9a018e5019415ab6"
	values.$implementation:
-	"eth:0xd392c27B84b1cA776528F2704BC67B82a62132d2"
+	"eth:0x670b850A235A6fA98cD7a195eB139D0277E471fA"
	values.$pastUpgrades.9:
+	["2026-07-06T18:32:35.000Z","0xb3c65cbf6285d4b32d576c866fffced1c77747c53163b604e20feb6aad121421",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.10:
+	["2026-07-06T18:32:35.000Z","0xb3c65cbf6285d4b32d576c866fffced1c77747c53163b604e20feb6aad121421",["eth:0x42Ad0173051225Ac784100e9acD43349707F4db9"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.11:
+	["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.12:
+	["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x670b850A235A6fA98cD7a195eB139D0277E471fA"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.13:
+	["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.14:
+	["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x670b850A235A6fA98cD7a195eB139D0277E471fA"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	9
+	15
	values.BATCH_INBOX_SLOT:
-	"0x71ac12829d66ee73d8d95bff50b3589745ce57edae70a3fb111a2342464dc597"
	values.batchInbox:
-	"eth:0xFf00000000000000000000000000000000000130"
	values.delayedWETH:
-	"eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
+	"eth:0x74ad145aC900F1DD5551F0C9E143314DC4022FCf"
	values.getAddresses.delayedWETH:
-	"eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
+	"eth:0x74ad145aC900F1DD5551F0C9E143314DC4022FCf"
	values.getAddresses.opcm:
+	"eth:0x1951828Ce913DC4383a8A1695695D537a11D896a"
	values.proxyAdminOwner:
-	"eth:0x6d5B183F538ABB8572F5cD17109c617b994D5833"
+	"eth:0x5a0Aae59D09fccBdDb6C6CcEB07B7279367C3d2A"
	values.version:
-	"3.13.1"
+	"4.0.0"
	values.lastUsedOPCM:
+	"eth:0x1951828Ce913DC4383a8A1695695D537a11D896a"
	values.lastUsedOPCMVersion:
+	"8.0.1"
	values.OPCM_SLOT:
+	"0x99f45962df4bc30de8d4c3c6d1ffc0f100edce16e80c7a5768b6d55ca463ff42"
	implementationNames.eth:0xd392c27B84b1cA776528F2704BC67B82a62132d2:
-	"SystemConfig"
	implementationNames.eth:0x670b850A235A6fA98cD7a195eB139D0277E471fA:
+	"SystemConfig"
	}

	contract L1ERC721Bridge (eth:0xD04D0D87E0bd4D2E50286760a3EF323FeA6849Cf) [opstack/L1ERC721Bridge] {
	+++ description: Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0x1f65fda230b6d0df44e466b06418b2e12a401ef82c07521ad18d2f4ae6c70fb2"
+	"0xc5ed62b03fb7c1340609ace7ebb0c5bf8d43b1814b1ab4f10863bfa21d13b90b"
	values.$implementation:
-	"eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9"
+	"eth:0x9F164f1d02A81e06D639E55F65a87f0070E3Cb2e"
	values.$pastUpgrades.7:
+	["2026-07-06T18:32:35.000Z","0xb3c65cbf6285d4b32d576c866fffced1c77747c53163b604e20feb6aad121421",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.8:
+	["2026-07-06T18:32:35.000Z","0xb3c65cbf6285d4b32d576c866fffced1c77747c53163b604e20feb6aad121421",["eth:0x9F164f1d02A81e06D639E55F65a87f0070E3Cb2e"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.9:
+	["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.10:
+	["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x9F164f1d02A81e06D639E55F65a87f0070E3Cb2e"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.11:
+	["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.12:
+	["2026-09-24T16:51:23.000Z","0x0a0fe86f7b1a3d3d2d0be990e3f8b15628b885363ae527fa9548cb2c2375741a",["eth:0x9F164f1d02A81e06D639E55F65a87f0070E3Cb2e"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	7
+	13
	values.proxyAdminOwner:
-	"eth:0x6d5B183F538ABB8572F5cD17109c617b994D5833"
+	"eth:0x5a0Aae59D09fccBdDb6C6CcEB07B7279367C3d2A"
	values.version:
-	"2.9.0"
+	"2.9.1"
	implementationNames.eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9:
-	"L1ERC721Bridge"
	implementationNames.eth:0x9F164f1d02A81e06D639E55F65a87f0070E3Cb2e:
+	"L1ERC721Bridge"
	}

-	Status: DELETED
	contract DelayedWETH (eth:0xe62B0279f6A466C5E1676f3ea955086300Bcd0Ac) [opstack/DelayedWETH]
	+++ description: Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.

	contract L2CrossDomainMessenger (unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000007) [opstack/Layer2/L2CrossDomainMessenger] {
	+++ description: The L2CrossDomainMessenger (L2xDM) contract sends messages from L2 to L1, and relays messages from L1 onto L2 with a system tx. In the event that a message sent from L2 to L1 is rejected for exceeding the L1 gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0x1ef37a50dbdd57f7019208b81019e52087cb92379f963e1ec092bd3eb81ec978"
+	"0x9e9ae8aec73e808e50f80bced53c3a020588eed516b310a10397596869dcd3b1"
	values.$implementation:
-	"unichain:0xC0d3c0d3c0D3c0D3C0d3C0D3C0D3c0d3c0d30007"
+	"unichain:0x250AF3f400cf8Aac8D410c90f1ba3968dD87DF96"
	values.$pastUpgrades.0:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["unichain:0x2A5A3eabB9Fd571A3Af0299eebdF8EaafE29a914"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.1:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["unichain:0x250AF3f400cf8Aac8D410c90f1ba3968dD87DF96"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	0
+	2
	values.version:
-	"2.1.1-beta.1"
+	"2.2.1"
	values.ENCODING_OVERHEAD:
+	260
	values.FLOOR_CALLDATA_OVERHEAD:
+	40
	values.proxyAdmin:
+	"unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
	values.proxyAdminOwner:
+	"unichain:0x6B1BAE59D09fCcbdDB6C6cceb07B7279367C4E3b"
	values.TX_BASE_GAS:
+	21000
	implementationNames.unichain:0xC0d3c0d3c0D3c0D3C0d3C0D3C0D3c0d3c0d30007:
-	"L2CrossDomainMessenger"
	implementationNames.unichain:0x250AF3f400cf8Aac8D410c90f1ba3968dD87DF96:
+	"L2CrossDomainMessenger"
	}

	contract GasPriceOracle (unichain:0x420000000000000000000000000000000000000F) [opstack/Layer2/GasPriceOracle] {
	+++ description: Provides the current gas price for L2 transactions.
	values.$implementation:
-	"unichain:0x4f1db3c6AbD250ba86E0928471A8F7DB3AFd88F1"
+	"unichain:0x547d0fba434877D7237d511cF87FABe2ee26b152"
	values.$pastUpgrades.2:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["unichain:0x547d0fba434877D7237d511cF87FABe2ee26b152"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	2
+	3
	implementationNames.unichain:0x4f1db3c6AbD250ba86E0928471A8F7DB3AFd88F1:
-	"GasPriceOracle"
	implementationNames.unichain:0x547d0fba434877D7237d511cF87FABe2ee26b152:
+	"GasPriceOracle"
	references:
-	[{"text":"Source Code","href":"https://unichain.blockscout.com/address/0x4f1db3c6AbD250ba86E0928471A8F7DB3AFd88F1"}]
	}

	contract L2StandardBridge (unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000010) [opstack/Layer2/L2StandardBridge] {
	+++ description: The L2StandardBridge contract is the main entry point to deposit or withdraw ERC20 tokens from L2 to L1. This contract can store any token.
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0xe528a1a655ef22d36419f53488f5b31752c4ecc2efea627fc6be5b0d63fa5069"
+	"0xf6ef848ca1cf88e27b5e3bb5e01b91ef79f302e5daad8ba5206c4dc60027d312"
	values.$implementation:
-	"unichain:0xC0d3c0d3c0D3c0d3C0D3c0D3C0d3C0D3C0D30010"
+	"unichain:0xAE9ed42f43a3ee45c3A9dEf8ae6B48cBb58Ed1a1"
	values.$pastUpgrades.0:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["unichain:0x2A5A3eabB9Fd571A3Af0299eebdF8EaafE29a914"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.1:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["unichain:0xAE9ed42f43a3ee45c3A9dEf8ae6B48cBb58Ed1a1"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	0
+	2
	values.version:
-	"1.11.1-beta.1"
+	"1.13.2"
	values.proxyAdmin:
+	"unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
	values.proxyAdminOwner:
+	"unichain:0x6B1BAE59D09fCcbdDB6C6cceb07B7279367C4E3b"
	implementationNames.unichain:0xC0d3c0d3c0D3c0d3C0D3c0D3C0d3C0D3C0D30010:
-	"L2StandardBridge"
	implementationNames.unichain:0xAE9ed42f43a3ee45c3A9dEf8ae6B48cBb58Ed1a1:
+	"L2StandardBridge"
	}

	contract SequencerFeeVault (unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000011) [opstack/Layer2/SequencerFeeVault] {
	+++ description: Collects the sequencer fees, which are withdrawable to the FeesCollector on L1.
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0x509425b10b7bc736a2d76eb9fe3bc5951124e88ef3e4752a0a314d33690041d2"
+	"0xb45389729a8fffa7650568cd2922e482d03d3ed57b35f4819650d11174d9237a"
	values.$implementation:
-	"unichain:0xC0D3C0d3c0d3c0d3C0D3c0d3C0D3c0d3c0D30011"
+	"unichain:0xb178cdAa8336f25624A63C049EdB5AF7ca36C2dA"
	values.$pastUpgrades.0:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["unichain:0x2A5A3eabB9Fd571A3Af0299eebdF8EaafE29a914"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.1:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["unichain:0xb178cdAa8336f25624A63C049EdB5AF7ca36C2dA"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	0
+	2
	values.version:
-	"1.5.0-beta.2"
+	"1.6.1"
	values.proxyAdmin:
+	"unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
	values.proxyAdminOwner:
+	"unichain:0x6B1BAE59D09fCcbdDB6C6cceb07B7279367C4E3b"
	implementationNames.unichain:0xC0D3C0d3c0d3c0d3C0D3c0d3C0D3c0d3c0D30011:
-	"SequencerFeeVault"
	implementationNames.unichain:0xb178cdAa8336f25624A63C049EdB5AF7ca36C2dA:
+	"SequencerFeeVault"
	}

	contract OptimismMintableERC20Factory (unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000012) [opstack/OptimismMintableERC20Factory] {
	+++ description: A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it's deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain's representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.
	template:
-	"opstack/Layer2/OptimismMintableERC20Factory"
+	"opstack/OptimismMintableERC20Factory"
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0x106f86d507a55d0f26e3683c910a71a9804d75ced3a4bb374e6a78978462274b"
+	"0x11b0ed6f15cabf613492a8d54c55304a17cf60f4fd94a655d7e720d4556906d0"
	description:
-	"Factory contract to create bridge compliant ERC20 IOU token representations of bridged L1 ERC20 tokens."
+	"A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it's deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain's representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa."
	values.$implementation:
-	"unichain:0xc0D3c0d3C0d3c0d3c0D3c0d3c0D3c0D3c0D30012"
+	"unichain:0xAF87f2Fd347aCb94656f9F715B4f2409B98e75b9"
	values.$pastUpgrades.0:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["unichain:0x2A5A3eabB9Fd571A3Af0299eebdF8EaafE29a914"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.1:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["unichain:0xAF87f2Fd347aCb94656f9F715B4f2409B98e75b9"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	0
+	2
	values.version:
-	"1.10.1-beta.2"
+	"1.11.0"
	values.proxyAdmin:
+	"unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
	values.proxyAdminOwner:
+	"unichain:0x6B1BAE59D09fCcbdDB6C6cceb07B7279367C4E3b"
	implementationNames.unichain:0xc0D3c0d3C0d3c0d3c0D3c0d3c0D3c0D3c0D30012:
-	"OptimismMintableERC20Factory"
	implementationNames.unichain:0xAF87f2Fd347aCb94656f9F715B4f2409B98e75b9:
+	"OptimismMintableERC20Factory"
	}

	contract L2ERC721Bridge (unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000014) [opstack/Layer2/L2ERC721Bridge] {
	+++ description: The L2ERC721Bridge contract is the main entry point to deposit or withdraw ERC721 tokens from L2 to L1. This contract can store any token.
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0x271f936ec1986057d9043b9961aa266e87908766814bdde8071f19a9de7484be"
+	"0x0d8059378487e33161e0b838f622400642360f1e311eba8c7b8fbdb504aeee1e"
	values.$implementation:
-	"unichain:0xC0D3c0d3c0d3c0d3c0D3C0d3C0D3C0D3c0d30014"
+	"unichain:0x716eAd0Cf3e7FF86A02D4F8cb41a6D14922fA833"
	values.$pastUpgrades.0:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["unichain:0x2A5A3eabB9Fd571A3Af0299eebdF8EaafE29a914"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.1:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["unichain:0x716eAd0Cf3e7FF86A02D4F8cb41a6D14922fA833"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	0
+	2
	values.version:
-	"1.7.1-beta.2"
+	"1.10.1"
	values.proxyAdmin:
+	"unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
	values.proxyAdminOwner:
+	"unichain:0x6B1BAE59D09fCcbdDB6C6cceb07B7279367C4E3b"
	implementationNames.unichain:0xC0D3c0d3c0d3c0d3c0D3C0d3C0D3C0D3c0d30014:
-	"L2ERC721Bridge"
	implementationNames.unichain:0x716eAd0Cf3e7FF86A02D4F8cb41a6D14922fA833:
+	"L2ERC721Bridge"
	}

	contract L1Block (unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000015) [opstack/Layer2/L1Block] {
	+++ description: Simple contract that returns information about the latest L1 block, which is derived permissionlessly from the L1 chain.
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0xd8671cf61a7da63a2d77c745e213afbd37a88260d4ff2b5121e5e3c0b4711c93"
+	"0xca6401a4032def95df36b0d432052526888ef8a396f7e4fc37cdda3690932646"
	values.$implementation:
-	"unichain:0x3Ba4007f5C922FBb33C454B41ea7a1f11E83df2C"
+	"unichain:0x6a97C5D55A21265326150Efe12FC30Fb21cbff56"
	values.$pastUpgrades.2:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["unichain:0x6a97C5D55A21265326150Efe12FC30Fb21cbff56"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	2
+	3
	values.baseFeeScalar:
+	2000
	values.batcherHash:
+	"0x0000000000000000000000002f60a5184c63ca94f82a27100643dbabe4f3f7fd"
	values.daFootprintGasScalar:
+	400
	values.DEPOSITOR_ACCOUNT:
+	"unichain:0xDeaDDEaDDeAdDeAdDEAdDEaddeAddEAdDEAd0001"
	values.gasPayingToken:
+	{"addr_":"unichain:0xEeeeeEeeeEeEeeEeEeEeeEEEeeeeEeeeeeeeEEeE","decimals_":18}
	values.gasPayingTokenName:
+	"Ether"
	values.gasPayingTokenSymbol:
+	"ETH"
	values.isCustomGasToken:
+	false
	values.l1FeeOverhead:
+	0
	values.l1FeeScalar:
+	0
	values.proxyAdmin:
+	"unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
	values.proxyAdminOwner:
+	"unichain:0x6B1BAE59D09fCcbdDB6C6cceb07B7279367C4E3b"
	values.version:
+	"1.9.0"
	implementationNames.unichain:0x3Ba4007f5C922FBb33C454B41ea7a1f11E83df2C:
-	""
	implementationNames.unichain:0x6a97C5D55A21265326150Efe12FC30Fb21cbff56:
+	"L1Block"
	references:
-	[{"text":"Source Code","href":"https://unichain.blockscout.com/address/0x3Ba4007f5C922FBb33C454B41ea7a1f11E83df2C"}]
	template:
+	"opstack/Layer2/L1Block"
	description:
+	"Simple contract that returns information about the latest L1 block, which is derived permissionlessly from the L1 chain."
	}

	contract L2ToL1MessagePasser (unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000016) [opstack/Layer2/L2ToL1MessagePasser] {
	+++ description: Contract used internally by the L2CrossDomainMessenger to send messages to L1, including withdrawals. It can also be used directly as a low-level interface.
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0x1e27889ae9ce2358b6248afde8e8b6f7c4ccf0b308a9d9ecb629369ce110ea23"
+	"0xb5be3cf9878e914d0b7feef281dbcc2b72d7c7e9106e44a7dfd516d48de8a62a"
	values.$implementation:
-	"unichain:0xC0D3C0d3C0d3c0d3C0d3C0D3c0D3c0d3c0D30016"
+	"unichain:0x27E51B2254433A3284D9ba73Ea551C397DB2a124"
	values.$pastUpgrades.0:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["unichain:0x27E51B2254433A3284D9ba73Ea551C397DB2a124"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	0
+	1
	values.version:
-	"1.1.1-beta.1"
+	"1.2.0"
	implementationNames.unichain:0xC0D3C0d3C0d3c0d3C0d3C0D3c0D3c0d3c0D30016:
-	"L2ToL1MessagePasser"
	implementationNames.unichain:0x27E51B2254433A3284D9ba73Ea551C397DB2a124:
+	"L2ToL1MessagePasser"
	}

	contract OptimismMintableERC721Factory (unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000017) [opstack/Layer2/OptimismMintableERC721Factory] {
	+++ description: Factory contract to create bridge compliant ERC721 IOU token representations of bridged L1 ERC721 tokens.
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0xec1bfae18ba5717949a6969cb01d743511c076e7bc6c78ed2c2b63232b97cc57"
+	"0xf4fd8df9e9191098f5647a3568864aee248b011c092313bf392b57a4b0f43268"
	values.$implementation:
-	"unichain:0xc0d3C0d3C0d3C0d3C0d3c0d3C0D3C0d3C0D30017"
+	"unichain:0xf43862B9d814BB4504158CecCB0b74b31265e4eE"
	values.$pastUpgrades.0:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["unichain:0x2A5A3eabB9Fd571A3Af0299eebdF8EaafE29a914"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.1:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["unichain:0xf43862B9d814BB4504158CecCB0b74b31265e4eE"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	0
+	2
	values.version:
-	"1.4.1-beta.1"
+	"1.5.1"
	values.bridge:
+	"unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000014"
	values.proxyAdmin:
+	"unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
	values.proxyAdminOwner:
+	"unichain:0x6B1BAE59D09fCcbdDB6C6cceb07B7279367C4E3b"
	values.remoteChainID:
+	1
	implementationNames.unichain:0xc0d3C0d3C0d3C0d3C0d3c0d3C0D3C0d3C0D30017:
-	"OptimismMintableERC721Factory"
	implementationNames.unichain:0xf43862B9d814BB4504158CecCB0b74b31265e4eE:
+	"OptimismMintableERC721Factory"
	}

	contract L2ProxyAdmin (unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018) [opstack/Layer2/L2ProxyAdmin_karst] {
	+++ description: Administration contract for the L2 predeploy proxies. Adds upgradePredeploys(address), which can only be called by the system depositor account and delegatecalls an L2ContractsManager to upgrade every predeploy in a single network upgrade transaction.
	template:
-	"opstack/Layer2/L2ProxyAdmin"
+	"opstack/Layer2/L2ProxyAdmin_karst"
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0x5685f6e3015a6b9a257228bb8ef3c33efb233627bc5c81b7005670a10a37bd47"
+	"0xc9307181d90f9b86ff913d1c365245cfb8622929939cbff0389acf7f428ddc4b"
	description:
-	"Administration contract for other contract proxies."
+	"Administration contract for the L2 predeploy proxies. Adds upgradePredeploys(address), which can only be called by the system depositor account and delegatecalls an L2ContractsManager to upgrade every predeploy in a single network upgrade transaction."
	values.$implementation:
-	"unichain:0xC0d3C0D3c0d3C0d3c0d3c0D3C0D3C0d3C0D30018"
+	"unichain:0x893c2CEEb71D38514daF67728d3Ff1b213FC4B5F"
	values.$pastUpgrades.0:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0x48aa8d6a9d281bf0eaa204e895acdfe0ba38640c34f6d133b2f4ecb879f5c72c",["unichain:0x893c2CEEb71D38514daF67728d3Ff1b213FC4B5F"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.1:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["unichain:0x893c2CEEb71D38514daF67728d3Ff1b213FC4B5F"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	0
+	2
	values.owner:
-	"unichain:0x7E6c183F538abb8572F5cd17109C617b994d6944"
+	"unichain:0x6B1BAE59D09fCcbdDB6C6cceb07B7279367C4E3b"
	values.version:
+	"1.0.0"
	fieldMeta.owner:
-	{"severity":"HIGH"}
	fieldMeta.addressManager:
+	{"severity":"HIGH"}
	implementationNames.unichain:0xC0d3C0D3c0d3C0d3c0d3c0D3C0D3C0d3C0D30018:
-	"ProxyAdmin"
	implementationNames.unichain:0x893c2CEEb71D38514daF67728d3Ff1b213FC4B5F:
+	"L2ProxyAdmin"
	}

	contract BaseFeeVault (unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000019) [opstack/Layer2/BaseFeeVault_karst] {
	+++ description: Collects EIP-1559 base fees, which are withdrawable to the FeesCollector on L1.
	template:
-	"opstack/Layer2/BaseFeeVault"
+	"opstack/Layer2/BaseFeeVault_karst"
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0x3d0a3be0a8f45817aa732f9e2f00e95db42726fa0335aa511b97c1a4cdecd4b7"
+	"0xf7b9f825b6af20abb355da09822d54e6e3fa7243439293826bd7271f87747775"
	values.$implementation:
-	"unichain:0xC0d3c0D3c0d3C0D3C0D3C0d3c0D3C0D3c0d30019"
+	"unichain:0xf7bed7215EEF1003fac426682Cf2edeb958569f7"
	values.$pastUpgrades.0:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["unichain:0x2A5A3eabB9Fd571A3Af0299eebdF8EaafE29a914"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.1:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["unichain:0xf7bed7215EEF1003fac426682Cf2edeb958569f7"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	0
+	2
	values.version:
-	"1.5.0-beta.2"
+	"1.6.1"
	values.proxyAdmin:
+	"unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
	values.proxyAdminOwner:
+	"unichain:0x6B1BAE59D09fCcbdDB6C6cceb07B7279367C4E3b"
	implementationNames.unichain:0xC0d3c0D3c0d3C0D3C0D3C0d3c0D3C0D3c0d30019:
-	"BaseFeeVault"
	implementationNames.unichain:0xf7bed7215EEF1003fac426682Cf2edeb958569f7:
+	"BaseFeeVault"
	}

	contract L1FeeVault (unichain:0x420000000000000000000000000000000000001A) [opstack/Layer2/L1FeeVault_karst] {
	+++ description: Collects the L1 portion of the L2 transaction fees, which are withdrawable to the FeesCollector on L1.
	template:
-	"opstack/Layer2/L1FeeVault"
+	"opstack/Layer2/L1FeeVault_karst"
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0x7c20cecc6bd09d07904ca96f0b10f1b1106bb1b0910dadd959556c970f5b527e"
+	"0xf7b9f825b6af20abb355da09822d54e6e3fa7243439293826bd7271f87747775"
	values.$implementation:
-	"unichain:0xc0D3c0D3C0d3c0d3c0d3C0d3c0d3C0d3C0D3001A"
+	"unichain:0xf7bed7215EEF1003fac426682Cf2edeb958569f7"
	values.$pastUpgrades.0:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["unichain:0x2A5A3eabB9Fd571A3Af0299eebdF8EaafE29a914"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.1:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["unichain:0xf7bed7215EEF1003fac426682Cf2edeb958569f7"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	0
+	2
	values.version:
-	"1.5.0-beta.2"
+	"1.6.1"
	values.proxyAdmin:
+	"unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
	values.proxyAdminOwner:
+	"unichain:0x6B1BAE59D09fCcbdDB6C6cceb07B7279367C4E3b"
	implementationNames.unichain:0xc0D3c0D3C0d3c0d3c0d3C0d3c0d3C0d3C0D3001A:
-	"L1FeeVault"
	implementationNames.unichain:0xf7bed7215EEF1003fac426682Cf2edeb958569f7:
+	"BaseFeeVault"
	}

	contract SchemaRegistry (unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000020) [opstack/Layer2/SchemaRegistry] {
	+++ description: Contracts to register schemas for the Ethereum Attestation Service (EAS).
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0x184ad3273d7e257c9f1b138ecff33286528599eae858abc182fdc3068060af90"
+	"0xe2a60db541c987ffa9a6ed73b9100c7f62f2574966a20c903a73a8f730c7dfcc"
	values.$implementation:
-	"unichain:0xc0d3c0d3c0d3C0d3c0d3C0D3C0D3c0d3C0D30020"
+	"unichain:0x70DE55BC0bfBC52C5D0CCA1DA5816c2428886A34"
	values.$pastUpgrades.0:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["unichain:0x70DE55BC0bfBC52C5D0CCA1DA5816c2428886A34"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	0
+	1
	values.version:
-	"1.3.1-beta.1"
+	"1.3.1-beta.2"
	implementationNames.unichain:0xc0d3c0d3c0d3C0d3c0d3C0D3C0D3c0d3C0D30020:
-	"SchemaRegistry"
	implementationNames.unichain:0x70DE55BC0bfBC52C5D0CCA1DA5816c2428886A34:
+	"SchemaRegistry"
	}

	contract EAS (unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000021) [opstack/Layer2/EAS] {
	+++ description: Contract containing the main logic for the Ethereum Attestation Service (EAS).
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0xa445fc3be07624967bd4cb9792e42018303744e20dc788527e19f17d83b6373d"
+	"0x3f7d9db9a6d3d5d487930fcb808a16592e61fe97c3bbd86b63464273f81a6dd9"
	values.$implementation:
-	"unichain:0xC0D3c0D3C0d3c0D3c0D3C0D3c0D3c0d3c0d30021"
+	"unichain:0xbEc660b456B84A081E90aF29BE43385BDa5bF7b6"
	values.$pastUpgrades.0:
+	["2026-07-08T16:00:01.000Z","0xd2e9eb2ba77098610e7dda134e70f741f7456f4ec49912d667860c40988dfd8e",["unichain:0xbEc660b456B84A081E90aF29BE43385BDa5bF7b6"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	0
+	1
	values.version:
-	"1.4.1-beta.1"
+	"1.4.1-beta.3"
	implementationNames.unichain:0xC0D3c0D3C0d3c0D3c0D3C0D3c0D3c0d3c0d30021:
-	"EAS"
	implementationNames.unichain:0xbEc660b456B84A081E90aF29BE43385BDa5bF7b6:
+	"EAS"
	}

+	Status: CREATED
	contract SuperFaultDisputeGame (eth:0x19AF533Cc2A2A55786DCB8672aA5717e64213208) [opstack/SuperFaultDisputeGame]
	+++ description: Logic of the permissionless dispute game introduced in Upgrade 20. It proves a super root, a state commitment addressed by an L2 timestamp rather than by a block number. The format carries per-chain roots for a future interop set; today each game commits only to its own chain. When a state root is proposed, a game contract is cloned from this implementation; anyone posting the bond can challenge it.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract PreimageOracle (eth:0x1E1d73536A081Ef2F355d29794547a9770Aeb1E0) [opstack/PreimageOracle]
	+++ description: The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract SuperPermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0x5C3eb47cB0174aea522a2a9Ae79487139A53D691) [opstack/SuperPermissionedDisputeGame]
	+++ description: Logic of the permissioned dispute game introduced in Upgrade 20. Only the proposer configured in the DisputeGameFactory can create games of this type, and each one commits to a super root anchored to an L2 timestamp. Unlike the permissioned game it replaces, it runs no VM and exposes no challenger, bond, clock or absolute prestate: validity is governed by the AnchorStateRegistry and the Guardian.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract DelayedWETH (eth:0x74ad145aC900F1DD5551F0C9E143314DC4022FCf) [opstack/DelayedWETH]
	+++ description: Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract MIPS (eth:0xaCc005DCd857B401e4732E6F7837135A22825cfA) [opstack/MIPS]
	+++ description: The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.

2026 July 06, 07:56 UTC

High severity

8changes

Shared SuperchainConfig upgraded 2.4.0 → 2.4.2 (diff). No behavioral change — ProxyAdminOwnedBase import moved, misleading pause-state warning removed, and 5 new unused constants added to the shared Constants library (forward-plumbing for OPCM tooling).

Shared SuperchainConfig upgraded 2.4.0 → 2.4.2 (diff). No behavioral change — ProxyAdminOwnedBase import moved, misleading pause-state warning removed, and 5 new unused constants added to the shared Constants library (forward-plumbing for OPCM tooling).

	contract SuperchainConfig (eth:0x95703e0982140D16f8ebA6d158FccEde42f04a4C) [opstack/SuperchainConfig_expiry] {
	+++ description: Used to manage global configuration values for multiple OP Chains within a single Superchain network. The SuperchainConfig contract manages individual pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3 months if left untouched.
	sourceHashes.1:
-	"0x5fb525d1572fb90d060d122143b915059cbff39e0298b345857fd4267d7f6b28"
+	"0x2cd597b7305a446a1df355e6909cbd75fe38aa045faf4876a8e5496eebc1734f"
	values.$implementation:
-	"eth:0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957"
+	"eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550"
	values.$pastUpgrades.6:
+	["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0x2476c911E6D4D9411E677D8Faf15a64ac1fDEEe8"]]
	values.$pastUpgrades.7:
+	["2026-06-25T23:05:47.000Z","0xbfdac60c9687a2e469159bf2458e73de2915a0a5eb53c4991a7ecde2b1fb3f15",["eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550"]]
	values.$upgradeCount:
-	6
+	8
	values.version:
-	"2.4.0"
+	"2.4.2"
	implementationNames.eth:0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957:
-	"SuperchainConfig"
	implementationNames.eth:0xE4F9779ab53070a55db24dFAeFf9AF147c6ED550:
+	"SuperchainConfig"
	}

2026 June 02, 10:54 UTC

4changes

Unichain Multisig 1 and Multisig 2 each rotated one signer. New game name (aggregateVerifier) added to portal.

Unichain Multisig 1 and Multisig 2 each rotated one signer.

New game name (aggregateVerifier) added to portal.

	contract Unichain Multisig 2 (eth:0x9245d5D10AA8a842B31530De71EA86c0760Ca1b1) [GnosisSafe] {
	+++ description: None
	values.$members.0:
+	"eth:0x5b5B0669De777AF0Eb7A73eD46AaEe9711ab01E4"
	values.$members.2:
-	"eth:0xFA361ece9724d75B7EdF08B9A238706EAe270d3f"
	}

	contract Unichain Multisig 1 (eth:0xb0c4C487C5cf6d67807Bc2008c66fa7e2cE744EC) [GnosisSafe] {
	+++ description: None
	values.$members.0:
+	"eth:0xc8C31213545f32230E0327Db76df5538c2836081"
	values.$members.2:
-	"eth:0xf89C1b6e5D65e97c69fbc792f1BcdcB56DcCde91"
	}

2026 May 15, 13:08 UTC

4changes

Scheduled signer-key rotation on shared OP Stack governance contracts (no threshold or permission changes): - DeputyPauseModule ( 0x76fC2F971FB355D0453cF9F64d3F9E4f640E1754 ): deputy rotated from 0x352f1defB49718e7Ea411687E850aA8d6299F7aC to 0x2fA150379bF32b6d79Eeb4ff9bD280E76049a87c . Executed via superchain-ops eth/052; the DeputyPauseModule spec specifies that this is a regular rotation. - OpFoundationUpgradeSafe and OpFoundationOperationsSafe: Member rotated.

Scheduled signer-key rotation on shared OP Stack governance contracts (no threshold or permission changes):

DeputyPauseModule (0x76fC2F971FB355D0453cF9F64d3F9E4f640E1754): deputy rotated from 0x352f1defB49718e7Ea411687E850aA8d6299F7aC to 0x2fA150379bF32b6d79Eeb4ff9bD280E76049a87c. Executed via superchain-ops eth/052; the DeputyPauseModule spec specifies that this is a regular rotation.
OpFoundationUpgradeSafe and OpFoundationOperationsSafe: Member rotated.

	contract DeputyPauseModule (eth:0x76fC2F971FB355D0453cF9F64d3F9E4f640E1754) [opstack/DeputyPauseModule] {
	+++ description: Allows eth:0x2fA150379bF32b6d79Eeb4ff9bD280E76049a87c, called the deputy pauser, to act on behalf of the eth:0x847B5c174615B1B7fDF770882256e2D3E95b9D92 if set as its Safe module.
	description:
-	"Allows eth:0x352f1defB49718e7Ea411687E850aA8d6299F7aC, called the deputy pauser, to act on behalf of the eth:0x847B5c174615B1B7fDF770882256e2D3E95b9D92 if set as its Safe module."
+	"Allows eth:0x2fA150379bF32b6d79Eeb4ff9bD280E76049a87c, called the deputy pauser, to act on behalf of the eth:0x847B5c174615B1B7fDF770882256e2D3E95b9D92 if set as its Safe module."
	values.deputy:
-	"eth:0x352f1defB49718e7Ea411687E850aA8d6299F7aC"
+	"eth:0x2fA150379bF32b6d79Eeb4ff9bD280E76049a87c"
	}

	contract OpFoundationUpgradeSafe (eth:0x847B5c174615B1B7fDF770882256e2D3E95b9D92) [GnosisSafe] {
	+++ description: None
	values.$members.6:
-	"eth:0xc222ab08333109243B1f4E2a80e3D0A190714AB5"
+	"eth:0xa2A58E31C03C59e34ab4d996d811DA0C035BfDea"
	}

	contract OpFoundationOperationsSafe (eth:0x9BA6e03D8B90dE867373Db8cF1A58d2F7F006b3A) [GnosisSafe] {
	+++ description: None
	values.$members.6:
-	"eth:0xc222ab08333109243B1f4E2a80e3D0A190714AB5"
+	"eth:0xa2A58E31C03C59e34ab4d996d811DA0C035BfDea"
	}

2026 May 05, 15:18 UTC

1change

Optimism Security Council ( eth:0xc2819DC7... ) — member 12 swap: 0x92827223 → 0xcbC7dCeb . Shared multisig (referenced by multiple Superchain projects).

Optimism Security Council (eth:0xc2819DC7...) — member 12 swap: 0x92827223 → 0xcbC7dCeb. Shared multisig (referenced by multiple Superchain projects).

	contract Optimism Security Council (eth:0xc2819DC788505Aac350142A7A707BF9D03E3Bd03) {
	+++ description: None
	values.$members.12:
-	"eth:0x92827223f6b397CE9F208eE352bacA710765cACb"
+	"eth:0xcbC7dCeb857F0b25523618cCa0A03c419a6d7eA6"
	}

Operator

The system has a centralized operator

The operatorAn operator is the entity charged with managing a rollup and progressing its state. A rollup operator can be a centralized sequencer, proposer, prover, challenger, pauser of admin that is able to perform upgrades. is the only entity that can propose blocksAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over.. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.

MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

Users can force any transaction

Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.

Withdrawals

Regular exits

The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlementThe mechanism with which the execution of rollup blocks and the resultant state is verified and possible disputes are resolved. In the context of rollups or other modular blockchains, it often refers to the proof system used--validity (ZK) or fraud proofs, or a combination thereof. Sometimes it will refer to this mechanism along with where the mechanism's outputs are ultimately published and verified, as in Ethereum being a settlement layer by verifying the proofs and allowing for withdrawals., but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled. of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.

Forced messaging

If the user experiences censorship from the operatorAn operator is the entity charged with managing a rollup and progressing its state. A rollup operator can be a centralized sequencer, proposer, prover, challenger, pauser of admin that is able to perform upgrades. with regular L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups.->L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.

Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain

Other considerations

EVM compatible smart contracts are supported

OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM EquivalenceA perfect degree of compatibility; where one system or concept is indistinguishable from another in the domain being compared. In the context of rollups, it generally refers to the proximity to the EVM and to Ethereum architecture. model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. can be deployed on L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups..

Introducing EVM Equivalence

Permissions

A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions

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Ethereum

Actors:

SuperchainProxyAdminOwner0x5a0A…3d2A

A Multisig with 2/2 threshold.

Can upgrade with no delay
- ETHLockbox ProxyAdmin
- OptimismPortal2 ProxyAdmin
- AnchorStateRegistry ProxyAdmin
- DisputeGameFactory ProxyAdmin
- DelayedWETH ProxyAdmin
- L1StandardBridge ProxyAdmin
- SuperchainConfig SuperchainProxyAdmin
- L1CrossDomainMessenger ProxyAdmin
- OptimismMintableERC20Factory ProxyAdmin
- SystemConfig ProxyAdmin
- L1ERC721Bridge ProxyAdmin
Can interact with DisputeGameFactory
- set the dispute game implementation and initial bond for any game type
Can interact with AddressManager
- set and change address mappings ProxyAdmin
Can interact with AddressManager
- set and change address mappings SuperchainProxyAdmin

Participants (2):

Used in:

Unichain Multisig 20x9245…a1b1

A Multisig with 3/5 threshold.

Can interact with SystemConfig
- it can update the preconfer address, the batch submitter (SequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs.) address and the gasA virtual fuel used to execute smart contracts on a rollup. The EVM (or other VM within the rollup) uses an accounting mechanism to correspond the consumption of gas to the consumption of computing resources, and to limit the consumption of computing resources. configuration of the system

Participants (5):

0x5b5B…01E4 0xc531…CEE4 0x7D74…Bc4c 0x01Bc…3c92 0x34d1…b27C

OpFoundationUpgradeSafe0x847B…9D92

A Multisig with 5/7 threshold. It uses the following modules: SaferSafes (A Gnosis Safe module combining LivenessModule and TimelockGuard. Provides livenessLiveness refers to the ability of a system to respond to requests and to process them in a timely manner. In the context of L2s, it refers to the ability of settling transactions, proofs and state roots to the base layer. checks where a fallback owner can challenge and take over if Safe owners are unresponsive, plus optional timelock delays for transaction scheduling). Member of SuperchainProxyAdminOwner.

Can interact with SuperchainConfig
- Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof systemThe infrastructure that allows projects to verify their state transitions. It is composed by onchain verifiers and offchain provers. The main two flavors are optimistic and ZK proof systems, but they can be combined in a hybrid model. In general though, if a system is able to accept state roots optimistically, even if it has a ZK component, it is considered an optimistic proof system., the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionlessAnyone willing should be able to join and leave the network at any time, without causing significant disturbance to the network or being detrimental to the party in question. No single entity should have the power to allowlist or blocklist participants.) LivenessModule if the number of Optimism Security CouncilA Security Council is a sufficiently decentralized set of members that is able to upgrade a system. A properly set up Security Council consists of at least 8 members with a threshold greater than 75%. What 'sufficiently decentralized' means is fundamentally subjective and L2BEAT evaluates each case individually. A Security Council is allowed to instantly upgrade Stage 1 rollups. members falls below 8 → Optimism Security Council → Optimism Guardian Multisig

Participants (7):

0xf1Ef…4639 0x3041…1623 0xC2Db…6dF5 0x7F1D…9f27 0x4D01…6d15 0x69ac…Fd02 0xa2A5…fDea

Used in:

SaferSafes0xA844…483a

A Gnosis Safe module combining LivenessModule and TimelockGuard. Provides livenessLiveness refers to the ability of a system to respond to requests and to process them in a timely manner. In the context of L2s, it refers to the ability of settling transactions, proofs and state roots to the base layer. checks where a fallback owner can challenge and take over if Safe owners are unresponsive, plus optional timelock delays for transaction scheduling.

Can interact with SuperchainConfig
- Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof systemThe infrastructure that allows projects to verify their state transitions. It is composed by onchain verifiers and offchain provers. The main two flavors are optimistic and ZK proof systems, but they can be combined in a hybrid model. In general though, if a system is able to accept state roots optimistically, even if it has a ZK component, it is considered an optimistic proof system., the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionlessAnyone willing should be able to join and leave the network at any time, without causing significant disturbance to the network or being detrimental to the party in question. No single entity should have the power to allowlist or blocklist participants.) OpFoundationUpgradeSafe → LivenessModule if the number of Optimism Security CouncilA Security Council is a sufficiently decentralized set of members that is able to upgrade a system. A properly set up Security Council consists of at least 8 members with a threshold greater than 75%. What 'sufficiently decentralized' means is fundamentally subjective and L2BEAT evaluates each case individually. A Security Council is allowed to instantly upgrade Stage 1 rollups. members falls below 8 → Optimism Security Council → Optimism Guardian Multisig

Used in:

Optimism Security Council0xc281…Bd03

A Multisig with 10/13 threshold. It uses the following modules: LivenessModule (used to remove members inactive for 3mo 8d while making sure that the threshold remains above 75%. If the number of members falls below 8, the OpFoundationUpgradeSafe takes ownership of the multisig). Member of Optimism Guardian Multisig, SuperchainProxyAdminOwner.

Can interact with SuperchainConfig
- Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof systemThe infrastructure that allows projects to verify their state transitions. It is composed by onchain verifiers and offchain provers. The main two flavors are optimistic and ZK proof systems, but they can be combined in a hybrid model. In general though, if a system is able to accept state roots optimistically, even if it has a ZK component, it is considered an optimistic proof system., the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionlessAnyone willing should be able to join and leave the network at any time, without causing significant disturbance to the network or being detrimental to the party in question. No single entity should have the power to allowlist or blocklist participants.) Optimism Guardian Multisig

Participants (13):

0xE61F…76aE 0x652B…cB5f 0x5c1f…7a81 0x4A73…e61E 0x3A53…aa94 0xEF9A…877c 0x6323…c865 0xd5b7…aC90 0x7ed8…9E39 0xd915…5930 0x0a87…efE6 0xbfA0…E0d9 0xcbC7…7eA6

Used in:

LivenessGuard0x2442…4a25

Modular contract to be used together with the LivenessModule. Tracks livenessLiveness refers to the ability of a system to respond to requests and to process them in a timely manner. In the context of L2s, it refers to the ability of settling transactions, proofs and state roots to the base layer. / activity of Safe owners.

Can interact with LivenessModule
- can remove members of Optimism Security CouncilA Security Council is a sufficiently decentralized set of members that is able to upgrade a system. A properly set up Security Council consists of at least 8 members with a threshold greater than 75%. What 'sufficiently decentralized' means is fundamentally subjective and L2BEAT evaluates each case individually. A Security Council is allowed to instantly upgrade Stage 1 rollups. inactive for 3mo 8d

Used in:

Optimism Guardian Multisig0x09f7…dAf2

A Multisig with 1/1 threshold. It uses the following modules: DeputyPauseModule (Allows 0x2fA150379bF32b6d79Eeb4ff9bD280E76049a87c, called the deputy pauser, to act on behalf of the OpFoundationUpgradeSafe if set as its Safe module).

Participants (1):

Optimism Security Council

Used in:

EOA 10x2F60…f7Fd

Can interact with SystemConfig
- Allowed to commit transactions from the current layer to the host chain

Optimism EOA 10x2fA1…a87c

Can interact with SuperchainConfig
- Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof systemThe infrastructure that allows projects to verify their state transitions. It is composed by onchain verifiers and offchain provers. The main two flavors are optimistic and ZK proof systems, but they can be combined in a hybrid model. In general though, if a system is able to accept state roots optimistically, even if it has a ZK component, it is considered an optimistic proof system., the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionlessAnyone willing should be able to join and leave the network at any time, without causing significant disturbance to the network or being detrimental to the party in question. No single entity should have the power to allowlist or blocklist participants.) DeputyPauseModule though restricted to the SuperchainConfig’s pause() function → Optimism Guardian Multisig

Used in:

Unichain

Actors:

SuperchainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias0x6B1B…4E3b

Can upgrade with no delay
- DeployerWhitelist L2ProxyAdmin
- L2CrossDomainMessenger L2ProxyAdmin
- GasPriceOracle L2ProxyAdmin
- L2StandardBridge L2ProxyAdmin
- SequencerFeeVault L2ProxyAdmin
- OptimismMintableERC20Factory L2ProxyAdmin
- L1BlockNumber L2ProxyAdmin
- L2ERC721Bridge L2ProxyAdmin
- L1Block L2ProxyAdmin
- L2ToL1MessagePasser L2ProxyAdmin
- OptimismMintableERC721Factory L2ProxyAdmin
- L2ProxyAdmin L2ProxyAdmin
- BaseFeeVault L2ProxyAdmin
- L1FeeVault L2ProxyAdmin
- SchemaRegistry L2ProxyAdmin
- EAS L2ProxyAdmin

Smart contracts

A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions

Go to Disco

Explore in Disco

A diagram of the smart contract architecture

Ethereum

OptimismPortal20x0bd4…A7a2 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. to L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups.. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the SuperFaultDisputeGame.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner

Can be upgraded by:

Implementation used in:

DisputeGameFactory0x2F12…dFe4 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. and eventually challenge them. This variant exposes per-type reads only; the legacy array views (gameImpls[], initBonds[]) were removed in the new implementation.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner
- owner: SuperchainProxyAdminOwner

Can be upgraded by:

Implementation used in:

SystemConfig0xc407…BDA6 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Contains configuration parameters such as the SequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. address, gas limitThe maximum amount of gas a transaction or block may consume. on this chain and the unsafe blockAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over. signer address.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner
- batcherHash: EOA 1
- owner: Unichain Multisig 2

Can be upgraded by:

Implementation used in:

SuperchainConfig0x9570…4a4C Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Used to manage global configuration values for multiple OP Chains within a single Superchain networkA constellation of nodes (peers) that communicate via a peer-to-peer protocol, for example, in propagating transactions and blocks to other nodes.. The SuperchainConfig contract manages individual pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3 months if left untouched.

Roles:
- admin: SuperchainProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner
- guardian: Optimism Guardian Multisig; ultimately OpFoundationUpgradeSafe, Optimism EOA 1, Optimism Security CouncilA Security Council is a sufficiently decentralized set of members that is able to upgrade a system. A properly set up Security Council consists of at least 8 members with a threshold greater than 75%. What 'sufficiently decentralized' means is fundamentally subjective and L2BEAT evaluates each case individually. A Security Council is allowed to instantly upgrade Stage 1 rollups., SaferSafes

Can be upgraded by:

0x8101…fEeA Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Proxy used in:

L1StandardBridge

Escrow

The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner

All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation.

Can be upgraded by:

Implementation used in:

L1CrossDomainMessenger0x9A3D…98A6 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain’s epoch gas limitThe maximum amount of gas a transaction or block may consume., it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner

Can be upgraded by:

Implementation used in:

L1ERC721Bridge0xD04D…49Cf Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Used to bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner

Can be upgraded by:

0x08bA…f5C5 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Implementation used in:

LivenessModule0x0454…a748

used to remove members inactive for 3mo 8d while making sure that the threshold remains above 75%. If the number of members falls below 8, the OpFoundationUpgradeSafe takes ownership of the multisig

Roles:
- fallbackOwner: OpFoundationUpgradeSafe if the number of Optimism Security CouncilA Security Council is a sufficiently decentralized set of members that is able to upgrade a system. A properly set up Security Council consists of at least 8 members with a threshold greater than 75%. What 'sufficiently decentralized' means is fundamentally subjective and L2BEAT evaluates each case individually. A Security Council is allowed to instantly upgrade Stage 1 rollups. members falls below 8
- livenessGuard: LivenessGuard

Implementation used in:

ETHLockbox

Escrow

A simple escrow contract storing ETH for the canonical bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge..

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner

The following tokens are included in the value secured calculation:

Can be upgraded by:

Implementation used in:

Escrow0x1196…566A

Simple escrow that accepts tokens and allows to configure permissioned addresses that can access the tokens.

SuperFaultDisputeGame0x19AF…3208

Logic of the permissionlessAnyone willing should be able to join and leave the network at any time, without causing significant disturbance to the network or being detrimental to the party in question. No single entity should have the power to allowlist or blocklist participants. dispute game introduced in Upgrade 20. It proves a super root, a state commitment addressed by an L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. timestamp rather than by a blockAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over. number. The format carries per-chain roots for a future interop set; today each game commits only to its own chain. When a state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. is proposed, a game contract is cloned from this implementation; anyone posting the bond can challenge it.

Implementation used in:

PreimageOracle0x1E1d…b1E0

The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. for a dispute game.

Implementation used in:

AnchorStateRegistry0x27Cf…AFF9 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Contains the latest confirmed state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. This variant stores respectedGameType, retirementTimestamp, and disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds locally and drops the legacy *FromGame fields, since the AggregateVerifier model does not expose vm()/weth()/absolutePrestate() on its game implementation.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner

Can be upgraded by:

Implementation used in:

ProxyAdmin0x3B73…f2A4

Roles:
- owner: SuperchainProxyAdminOwner

SuperchainProxyAdmin0x543b…fB04

Roles:
- owner: SuperchainProxyAdminOwner

Implementation used in:

SuperPermissionedDisputeGame0x5C3e…D691

Logic of the permissioned dispute game introduced in Upgrade 20. Only the proposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block. configured in the DisputeGameFactory can create games of this type, and each one commits to a super root anchored to an L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. timestamp. Unlike the permissioned game it replaces, it runs no VM and exposes no challenger, bond, clock or absolute prestate: validity is governed by the AnchorStateRegistry and the Guardian.

Implementation used in:

DelayedWETH0x74ad…2FCf Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner

Can be upgraded by:

0x7556…1877 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Implementation used in:

L1ERC20TokenBridge

Escrow

Lido custom escrow for wstETH tokens that uses the canonical bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. for messaging but is governed externally.

The following tokens are included in the value secured calculation:

DeputyPauseModule0x76fC…1754

Allows 0x2fA150379bF32b6d79Eeb4ff9bD280E76049a87c, called the deputy pauser, to act on behalf of the OpFoundationUpgradeSafe if set as its Safe module.

Roles:
- deputy: Optimism EOA 1 though restricted to the SuperchainConfig’s pause() function

Implementation used in:

OptimismMintableERC20Factory0xA2B5…edad Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the networkA constellation of nodes (peers) that communicate via a peer-to-peer protocol, for example, in propagating transactions and blocks to other nodes. it’s deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain’s representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner

Can be upgraded by:

Implementation used in:

MIPS0xaCc0…5cfA

The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.

Implementation used in:

Unichain

DeployerWhitelist0x4200…0002 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Legacy contract that was originally used to act as a whitelist of addresses allowed to the Optimism networkA constellation of nodes (peers) that communicate via a peer-to-peer protocol, for example, in propagating transactions and blocks to other nodes.. Fully unused and deprecated since the Bedrock upgrade.

Roles:
- admin: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias

Can be upgraded by:

L2CrossDomainMessenger0x4200…0007 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

The L2CrossDomainMessenger (L2xDM) contract sends messages from L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. to L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development., and relays messages from L1 onto L2 with a system tx. In the event that a message sent from L2 to L1 is rejected for exceeding the L1 gas limitThe maximum amount of gas a transaction or block may consume., it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.

Roles:
- admin: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias

Can be upgraded by:

GasPriceOracle0x4200…000F Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Provides the current gas pricePrice of one unit of gas specified in a transaction. The token used to pay for gas is usually Ether, but rollups can use other custom tokens. for L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. transactions.

Roles:
- admin: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias

Can be upgraded by:

L2StandardBridge0x4200…0010 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

The L2StandardBridge contract is the main entry point to deposit or withdraw ERC20 tokens from L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. to L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development.. This contract can store any token.

Roles:
- admin: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias

Can be upgraded by:

SequencerFeeVault0x4200…0011 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Collects the sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. fees, which are withdrawable to the FeesCollector on L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development..

Roles:
- admin: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias

Can be upgraded by:

OptimismMintableERC20Factory0x4200…0012 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Roles:
- admin: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias

Can be upgraded by:

L1BlockNumber0x4200…0013 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Simple contract that returns the latest L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. blockAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over. number.

Roles:
- admin: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias

Can be upgraded by:

L2ERC721Bridge0x4200…0014 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

The L2ERC721Bridge contract is the main entry point to deposit or withdraw ERC721 tokens from L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. to L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development.. This contract can store any token.

Roles:
- admin: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias

Can be upgraded by:

L1Block0x4200…0015 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Simple contract that returns information about the latest L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. blockAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over., which is derived permissionlessly from the L1 chain.

Roles:
- admin: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias

Can be upgraded by:

L2ToL1MessagePasser0x4200…0016 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Contract used internally by the L2CrossDomainMessenger to send messages to L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development., including withdrawals. It can also be used directly as a low-level interface.

Roles:
- admin: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias

Can be upgraded by:

OptimismMintableERC721Factory0x4200…0017 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Factory contract to create bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. compliant ERC721 IOU token representations of bridged L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. ERC721 tokens.

Roles:
- admin: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias

Can be upgraded by:

L2ProxyAdmin0x4200…0018 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Administration contract for the L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. predeploy proxies. Adds upgradePredeploys(address), which can only be called by the system depositor account and delegatecalls an L2ContractsManager to upgrade every predeploy in a single networkA constellation of nodes (peers) that communicate via a peer-to-peer protocol, for example, in propagating transactions and blocks to other nodes. upgrade transaction.

Roles:
- admin: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias
- owner: SuperchainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias

Can be upgraded by:

BaseFeeVault0x4200…0019 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Collects EIP-1559 base fees, which are withdrawable to the FeesCollector on L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development..

Roles:
- admin: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias

Can be upgraded by:

L1FeeVault0x4200…001A Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Collects the L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. portion of the L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. transaction fees, which are withdrawable to the FeesCollector on L1.

Roles:
- admin: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias

Can be upgraded by:

SchemaRegistry0x4200…0020 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Contracts to register schemas for the Ethereum Attestation Service (EAS).

Roles:
- admin: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias

Can be upgraded by:

EAS0x4200…0021 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Contract containing the main logic for the Ethereum Attestation Service (EAS).

Roles:
- admin: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias

Can be upgraded by: