Robinhood Chain

2 recent updates

Critical contracts can be upgraded by an EOA which could result in the loss of all funds.

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About

Robinhood Chain is an Arbitrum Orbit Layer 2 operated by Robinhood, focused on tokenized real-world assets (such as stocks and ETFs) and onchain financial services including 24/7 trading, lending, and borrowing. Robinhood Chain is part of Robinhood's... broader mission to democratize access to global financial markets and to empower users and developers with modern blockchain tools.

Total Value SecuredTVS

$725.49 M12.5%

Past day UOPSDaily UOPS

106.935.36%

Gas token

ETH

Type

Other

Purposes

Universal, RWA

Chain ID

4663

Tokens breakdown

Value secured breakdown

22.6% with additional trust assumptions

View TVS breakdown

Last 24h cross-chain volume$89.87 M

Last 24h cross-chain transfers354.04 K

Interop protocols used

+5 more

Tokens by volume

+448 more

Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure

Explore more in Discovery UI

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About

Why is the project listed in others?

There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges

Consequence: projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds.

Learn more about the recategorisation here.

Value Secured View TVS breakdown

Exclude restricted RWA tokens

Total

Canonically BridgedCanonically Bridged ValueCanonical

Natively MintedNatively Minted TokensNative

Externally BridgedExternally Bridged ValueExternal

ETH & derivatives

Stablecoins

BTC & derivatives

Other

View TVS breakdown

Volume and flows Explore Interop

15/24Chains

+10

40/40Protocols

+35

Avg value per second ≈ $5.47 K|1 particle ≈ $50

Chain stats

Stats

Total volume

$89.42 M

Volume in

$53.55 M

Volume out

$35.86 M

Net flow

$17.68 M

Total transfers

353.03 K

Unique tokens

433

Transfers in

207.68 K

Transfers out

145.35 K

Avg. transfer value

$253.28

Avg. transfer time

5m 2s

Connected

14 chains

Avg. value per second

$1.03 K/s

Top routes

Top tokens

Top bridges

Chainlink CCIP$7.06 M

Transfer size

Under $100

$100-$1K

$1K-$10K

$10K-$100K

Over $100K

Transfer type distribution

Explore Interop

Activity

2026 Apr 30 — Jul 23

Past Day UOPS

106.935.36%

Past Day Ops count

9.23 M

Total Ops

128.48 M

since 2026 Apr 30

Max. UOPS

116.65

2026 Jul 10

Past day UOPS/TPS Ratio

1.01

Onchain costs

The section shows the operating costs that L2s pay to Ethereum.

2026 Apr 30 — Jul 23

Total cost

$14.38 K

Avg cost per L2 UOP

$0.000117

Avg cost per day

$171.29

Data posted

This section shows how much data the project publishes to its data-availability (DA) layer over time. The project currently posts data toEthereum.

2026 Apr 30 — Jul 23

Data posted

14.92 GiB

Avg size per day

179.72 MiB

Avg size per L2 UOP

129.85 B

Liveness

This section shows how "live" the project's operators are by displaying how frequently they submit transactions of the selected type. It also highlights anomalies - significant deviations from their typical schedule.

No ongoing anomalies detected

2026 Jun 23 — Jul 23

Avg. tx data subs. interval

1 minute

Avg. state updates interval

32 minutes

Past 30 days anomalies

100% normal uptime

Milestones & Incidents

Mainnet launch

2026 Jul 1st

Robinhood Chain opens to the public, removing the transaction-access whitelist.

Learn more

Public testnet launch

2026 Feb 10th

Robinhood Chain opens its public testnet.

Learn more

Risk summary

Fraud proof system is fully deployed but is not yet permissionless as it requires Validators to be whitelisted.

Critical contracts can be upgraded by an EOA which could result in the loss of all funds.

Fraud proof system is fully deployed but is not yet permissionless as it requires Validators to be whitelisted.

Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure

Sequencer failure

No mechanism

There is no guaranteed mechanism to have transactions included if the sequencer is down or censoring. Although users can enqueue messages in the L1 delayed inbox and call forceInclusion on the SequencerInbox, the chain runs ArbOS 61 transaction filtering: an authorized filterer can register any transaction hash in the ArbFilteredTransactionsManager precompile (0x00…0074), after which the state transition function forcibly fails that transaction, including force-included ones, without delay.

State validation

Fraud proofs (INT)

Fraud proofs only allow 2 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.

Data availability

Onchain

All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.

Exit window

None

There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.

Proposer failure

Self propose

Anyone can become a Proposer after 28d of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.

Stage

Robinhood Chain is not even a

Stage 0

project.

The requirement for available node software is under review

Learn more about Stages

Please keep in mind that these stages do not reflect project security, this is an opinionated assessment of project maturity based on subjective criteria, created with a goal of incentivizing projects to push toward better decentralization. Each team may have taken different paths to achieve this goal.

Data availability

All data required for proofs is published on chain

All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.

Learn more about the DA layer here:

Ethereum

State validation

Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by a set of whitelisted validators. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.

State root proposals

Validators propose state roots as children of a previous state root. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. State roots are referred to as “assertions” within the contracts. Each chain of assertions only requires one stake, and validators staked on assertions with a child are considered inactive and can either move their stake to a new node or withdraw it. The function used to propose a new assertion is the stakeOnNewAssertion function. The stake is currently set to 1.0 ETH, and it can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. The protocol allows such funds to be trustlessly pooled together if necessary. New nodes cannot be created faster than the minimum assertion period, currently set to 15m. An assertion without “rivals” can be confirmed after the challenge period has passed, currently set to 6d 8h. If a rival is present, then it is checked that the assertion is the winner in the challenge protocol.

Funds can be stolen if no whitelisted challenger disputes an invalid state root before the challenge window expires (CRITICAL).

BoLD paper

Challenges

A challenge can be started between two siblings, i.e. two different state roots that share the same parent, by calling the createLayerZeroEdge function in the ChallengeManager contract. Edges represent assertions, or bisected assertions, within the challenge protocol. Challenges are played via a bisection game, where asserters and challengers play together to find the first instruction of disagreement. Such instruction is then executed onchain in the WASM OneStepProver contract to determine the winner. An edge can only be bisected when rivaled. The bisection process requires no new stake as their validity is checked against a parent “history root” that contains all intermediate states. An edge can also be confirmed if itself or its descendants spend enough time being unrivaled. Such time is set to 6d 8h. If both actors play as slow as possible, the maximum time to confirm an edge is double such value, i.e. 12d 17h. Due to the complexities of maintaining the history root, the challenge protocol is divided into 3 levels, where the lowest level represents assertions over blocks, the highest level represents assertions over single WASM instructions, and intermediate levels represent assertions over chunks of WASM instructions. When moving between levels, a new stake is required. Level 0 (block level) requires a stake of 0.0 ETH, level 1 requires a stake of 0.000000000000000001 ETH, level 2 requires a stake of 0.000000000000000001 ETH. The ratio between such stakes can be exploited to perform resource exhaustion attacks.

Funds can be stolen if an attacker successfully performs a resource exhaustion attack.

Fraud Proof Wars: Arbitrum BoLD

Program Hashes

Name	Hash	Repository	Verification	Used in

	0xc10c...dc97	Github

Upgrades & Governance

Past upgrades

The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.

Count of upgrades

Last upgrade

22d 18h ago

Avg upgrade interval

1mo 6d

Updates

2026 July 21, 09:39 UTC

2changes

Config: add rwa access control contract to the monitoring.

	contract ArbFilteredTransactionsManager (robinhood:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000074) [N/A] {
	+++ description: ArbOS 61 transaction-filtering precompile. An authorized filterer registers tx hashes here; the state transition function then forcibly fails those transactions, including force-included ones, without delay.
	values.filteredTransactionsAdded:
-	6086
+	6087
	}

2026 July 20, 14:11 UTC

2changes

Recent transaction-filtering increase due to a single wallet being blocked — the honeypot behind the fake "Robinhood founder seed-phrase leak". Filtered transactions rose from 278 to 6,086; none have been reversed. Added the L1 timelock ProxyAdmin (OpenZeppelin v5.0.0) to the ProxyAdmin template.

Recent transaction-filtering increase due to a single wallet being blocked — the honeypot behind the fake “Robinhood founder seed-phrase leak”. Filtered transactions rose from 278 to 6,086; none have been reversed.

Added the L1 timelock ProxyAdmin (OpenZeppelin v5.0.0) to the ProxyAdmin template.

	contract ArbFilteredTransactionsManager (robinhood:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000074) [N/A] {
	+++ description: ArbOS 61 transaction-filtering precompile. An authorized filterer registers tx hashes here; the state transition function then forcibly fails those transactions, including force-included ones, without delay.
	values.filteredTransactionsAdded:
-	278
+	6086
	}

2026 July 14, 15:53 UTC

32changes

The ArbFilteredTransactionsManager now reports 278 added filtered transaction hashes, up from 2 in the previous discovery. No filtered transaction hash has been deleted. Transaction filtering is active: an authorized filterer can register a transaction hash and make the state transition fail that transaction, including one force-included from L1. Governance was restructured on both L1 and L2: - The single 2-of-3 admin multisig was replaced by a 7-of-8 multisig and a 7-day timelock. The 7-of-8 multisig remains a direct executor, so upgrades can still bypass the timelock delay. - A separate 6-of-8 multisig can propose and cancel timelock actions. - The timelock and its admin contracts are now verified on Etherscan and Blockscout.

Governance was restructured on both L1 and L2:

The single 2-of-3 admin multisig was replaced by a 7-of-8 multisig and a 7-day timelock. The 7-of-8 multisig remains a direct executor, so upgrades can still bypass the timelock delay.
A separate 6-of-8 multisig can propose and cancel timelock actions.
The timelock and its admin contracts are now verified on Etherscan and Blockscout.

	contract Safe (eth:0x1F3Bdec08A161Ca9e5480feF33A3B2278c2931C5) [GnosisSafe] {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions:
-	[{"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x23A19d23e89166adedbDcB432518AB01e4272D94","description":"Pause and unpause and set important roles and parameters in the system contracts: Can delegate Sequencer management to a BatchPosterManager address, manage data availability and DACs, set the Sequencer-only window, introduce an allowList to the bridge and whitelist Inboxes/Outboxes.","role":".owner","via":[{"address":"eth:0x552603b4bc1f5E896AF2854548D6380f45f1B4bf"}]},{"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x1A07cc4BD17E0118BdB54D70990D2158AbAD7a2D","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x1232813BDd40aa9d53066A880dE78a4Be70B90FD"},{"address":"eth:0x552603b4bc1f5E896AF2854548D6380f45f1B4bf"}]},{"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x23A19d23e89166adedbDcB432518AB01e4272D94","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x552603b4bc1f5E896AF2854548D6380f45f1B4bf"}]},{"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x552603b4bc1f5E896AF2854548D6380f45f1B4bf","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x1232813BDd40aa9d53066A880dE78a4Be70B90FD"},{"address":"eth:0x552603b4bc1f5E896AF2854548D6380f45f1B4bf"}]},{"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x6a2E3a1e16FC29f27Ce61429746D558d656975bB","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x1232813BDd40aa9d53066A880dE78a4Be70B90FD"},{"address":"eth:0x552603b4bc1f5E896AF2854548D6380f45f1B4bf"}]},{"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x6f38FC91105Fc9a43931DcA33450ab3315E3D4Fa","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x1232813BDd40aa9d53066A880dE78a4Be70B90FD"},{"address":"eth:0x552603b4bc1f5E896AF2854548D6380f45f1B4bf"}]},{"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x85001CC4867C5e1C22dA4B79BB8852B9e2a06da0","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x1232813BDd40aa9d53066A880dE78a4Be70B90FD"},{"address":"eth:0x552603b4bc1f5E896AF2854548D6380f45f1B4bf"}]},{"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xBd0D173EEb87D57A09521c24388a12789F33ba96","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x1232813BDd40aa9d53066A880dE78a4Be70B90FD"},{"address":"eth:0x552603b4bc1f5E896AF2854548D6380f45f1B4bf"}]},{"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xc34f4907822d1cDC6aE3038Be22e6f12DEa35bd4","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x1232813BDd40aa9d53066A880dE78a4Be70B90FD"},{"address":"eth:0x552603b4bc1f5E896AF2854548D6380f45f1B4bf"}]},{"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xDf8755334ce7A73cCF6b581C02eA649AE3E864b3","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x1232813BDd40aa9d53066A880dE78a4Be70B90FD"},{"address":"eth:0x552603b4bc1f5E896AF2854548D6380f45f1B4bf"}]},{"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xf0ce991ea4A0d2400A4AB49b20ae333f6Dce3DE9","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x1232813BDd40aa9d53066A880dE78a4Be70B90FD"},{"address":"eth:0x552603b4bc1f5E896AF2854548D6380f45f1B4bf"}]},{"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xF7e12b9614b509C747ab4423bC4ACF923759Cf1B","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x1232813BDd40aa9d53066A880dE78a4Be70B90FD"},{"address":"eth:0x552603b4bc1f5E896AF2854548D6380f45f1B4bf"}]}]
	directlyReceivedPermissions:
-	[{"permission":"act","from":"eth:0x552603b4bc1f5E896AF2854548D6380f45f1B4bf","role":".executors"}]
	}

	contract UpgradeExecutor (eth:0x552603b4bc1f5E896AF2854548D6380f45f1B4bf) [orbitstack/UpgradeExecutor] {
	+++ description: Central contract defining the access control permissions for upgrading the system contract implementations.
	values.accessControl.EXECUTOR_ROLE.members.0:
+	"eth:0x7Ae50886c7EA0394613aa7Dcc287a5c9650784b6"
	values.accessControl.EXECUTOR_ROLE.members.0:
-	"eth:0x1F3Bdec08A161Ca9e5480feF33A3B2278c2931C5"
+	"eth:0xE1e825D15192457d05a251715C3e2Cab0F8CF465"
	values.executors.0:
+	"eth:0x7Ae50886c7EA0394613aa7Dcc287a5c9650784b6"
	values.executors.0:
-	"eth:0x1F3Bdec08A161Ca9e5480feF33A3B2278c2931C5"
+	"eth:0xE1e825D15192457d05a251715C3e2Cab0F8CF465"
	directlyReceivedPermissions.2:
+	{"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0xE1e825D15192457d05a251715C3e2Cab0F8CF465","description":"manage all access control roles.","role":".defaultAdminAC"}
	}

	contract ArbFilteredTransactionsManager (robinhood:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000074) [N/A] {
	+++ description: ArbOS 61 transaction-filtering precompile. An authorized filterer registers tx hashes here; the state transition function then forcibly fails those transactions, including force-included ones, without delay.
	values.filteredTransactionsAdded:
-	2
+	278
	}

-	Status: DELETED
	contract SafeL2 (robinhood:0x1F3Bdec08A161Ca9e5480feF33A3B2278c2931C5) [GnosisSafe]
	+++ description: None

	contract L2UpgradeExecutor (robinhood:0x2A153c6A1B66DBc930a8d7017230ab0253005C09) [orbitstack/UpgradeExecutor] {
	+++ description: ArbOS chain owner (UpgradeExecutor). Manages the ArbOwner chain-owner set and the transaction-filterer set, and can upgrade ArbOS configuration without delay.
	values.accessControl.EXECUTOR_ROLE.members.1:
+	"robinhood:0x6b9F63817F1442e40Bb9c3C2207758934C323FdC"
	values.accessControl.EXECUTOR_ROLE.members.1:
-	"robinhood:0x1F3Bdec08A161Ca9e5480feF33A3B2278c2931C5"
+	"robinhood:0x560C81fe78FcC276e460524428f1a62057Ca8173"
	values.executors.1:
+	"robinhood:0x6b9F63817F1442e40Bb9c3C2207758934C323FdC"
	values.executors.1:
-	"robinhood:0x1F3Bdec08A161Ca9e5480feF33A3B2278c2931C5"
+	"robinhood:0x560C81fe78FcC276e460524428f1a62057Ca8173"
	directlyReceivedPermissions.0:
+	{"permission":"act","from":"robinhood:0x672Da8B43058D1bC78956d71d9A208E168E2a3EF","role":".owner"}
	directlyReceivedPermissions.3:
+	{"permission":"interact","from":"robinhood:0x560C81fe78FcC276e460524428f1a62057Ca8173","description":"manage all access control roles.","role":".defaultAdminAC"}
	}

	EOA (robinhood:0x663703B4bC1F5e896Af2854548d6380F45F1C5D0) {
	+++ description: None
	receivedPermissions.1:
+	{"permission":"interact","from":"robinhood:0x560C81fe78FcC276e460524428f1a62057Ca8173","description":"manage all access control roles.","role":".defaultAdminAC","via":[{"address":"robinhood:0x2A153c6A1B66DBc930a8d7017230ab0253005C09"}]}
	receivedPermissions.3:
+	{"permission":"upgrade","from":"robinhood:0x560C81fe78FcC276e460524428f1a62057Ca8173","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"robinhood:0x672Da8B43058D1bC78956d71d9A208E168E2a3EF"},{"address":"robinhood:0x2A153c6A1B66DBc930a8d7017230ab0253005C09"}]}
	}

+	Status: CREATED
	contract Safe (eth:0x0fc5c64074641e677Fb86bCE80303a2eE64344Ac) [GnosisSafe]
	+++ description: None

+	Status: CREATED
	contract ProxyAdmin (eth:0x4e393071053C5d95771b1B716857d65cdf5B1839) [N/A]
	+++ description: None

+	Status: CREATED
	contract Safe (eth:0x7Ae50886c7EA0394613aa7Dcc287a5c9650784b6) [GnosisSafe]
	+++ description: None

+	Status: CREATED
	contract Safe (eth:0xbFc2b53552513174A0B006D4799B39871fe0CA1d) [GnosisSafe]
	+++ description: None

+	Status: CREATED
	contract TimelockController (eth:0xE1e825D15192457d05a251715C3e2Cab0F8CF465) [global/TimelockController]
	+++ description: A timelock with access control. The current minimum delay is 7d.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract SafeL2 (robinhood:0x3A0C507Cc7F8785C877359ad49d0476966d17a1C) [GnosisSafe]
	+++ description: None

+	Status: CREATED
	contract SafeL2 (robinhood:0x4C0360aFedD31e53718e4343F95E40b692402462) [GnosisSafe]
	+++ description: None

+	Status: CREATED
	contract TimelockController (robinhood:0x560C81fe78FcC276e460524428f1a62057Ca8173) [global/TimelockController]
	+++ description: A timelock with access control. The current minimum delay is 7d.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract ProxyAdmin (robinhood:0x672Da8B43058D1bC78956d71d9A208E168E2a3EF) [global/ProxyAdmin]
	+++ description: None

+	Status: CREATED
	contract SafeL2 (robinhood:0x6b9F63817F1442e40Bb9c3C2207758934C323FdC) [GnosisSafe]
	+++ description: None

2026 July 02, 10:37 UTC

19changes

Initial discovery. The chain uses ArbOS 61 core contracts, newer builds of standard Orbit contracts. - SequencerInbox — diff Adds an owner-only setFeeTokenPricer (inert here: isUsingFeeToken=false , feeTokenPricer=0x0 ), a custom-DA header flag ( 0x01 , unused — chain posts blobs), and delay-proof paths. No new actors beyond the existing owner/batchPoster. - RollupProxy (RollupAdminLogic) — diff ArbOS 61 admin logic; all setters (allowlist, fee-token, batch-poster mgr, AFK-whitelist) stay owner-gated — covered by the template owner permission. - RollupProxy (RollupUserLogic) — diff ArbOS 61 user logic; BoLD assertion/force-inclusion flow and getValidators proposer set unchanged. - RollupEventInbox — diff BoLD event inbox; only initialize is rollup-gated, no standing permissions. - OneStepProofEntry — diff Proof dispatcher (ArbOS 61 opcode set); immutable constructor-set prover addresses, no mutable state, no permissions. - OneStepProver0 — diff Stateless one-step WASM verifier; ArbOS 61 opcode updates only, no state/permissions. - OneStepProverMath — diff Stateless math-opcode verifier; ArbOS 61 opcode updates only, no state/permissions. - OneStepProverMemory — diff Stateless memory-opcode verifier; ArbOS 61 opcode updates only, no state/permissions. - OneStepProverHostIo — diff Host-io verifier (ArbOS 61 host-io/opcode updates); immutable customDAValidator ( 0x0 here, so custom-DA proof paths revert), no mutable state, no permissions.

Initial discovery.

The chain uses ArbOS 61 core contracts, newer builds of standard Orbit contracts.

SequencerInbox — diff Adds an owner-only setFeeTokenPricer (inert here: isUsingFeeToken=false, feeTokenPricer=0x0), a custom-DA header flag (0x01, unused — chain posts blobs), and delay-proof paths. No new actors beyond the existing owner/batchPoster.
RollupProxy (RollupAdminLogic) — diff ArbOS 61 admin logic; all setters (allowlist, fee-token, batch-poster mgr, AFK-whitelist) stay owner-gated — covered by the template owner permission.
RollupProxy (RollupUserLogic) — diff ArbOS 61 user logic; BoLD assertion/force-inclusion flow and getValidators proposer set unchanged.
RollupEventInbox — diff BoLD event inbox; only initialize is rollup-gated, no standing permissions.
OneStepProofEntry — diff Proof dispatcher (ArbOS 61 opcode set); immutable constructor-set prover addresses, no mutable state, no permissions.
OneStepProver0 — diff Stateless one-step WASM verifier; ArbOS 61 opcode updates only, no state/permissions.
OneStepProverMath — diff Stateless math-opcode verifier; ArbOS 61 opcode updates only, no state/permissions.
OneStepProverMemory — diff Stateless memory-opcode verifier; ArbOS 61 opcode updates only, no state/permissions.
OneStepProverHostIo — diff Host-io verifier (ArbOS 61 host-io/opcode updates); immutable customDAValidator (0x0 here, so custom-DA proof paths revert), no mutable state, no permissions.

Initial discovery

+	Status: CREATED
	contract ProxyAdmin (eth:0x1232813BDd40aa9d53066A880dE78a4Be70B90FD) [N/A]
	+++ description: None

+	Status: CREATED
	contract Inbox (eth:0x1A07cc4BD17E0118BdB54D70990D2158AbAD7a2D) [orbitstack/Inbox]
	+++ description: Facilitates sending L1 to L2 messages like depositing ETH, but does not escrow funds.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract Safe (eth:0x1F3Bdec08A161Ca9e5480feF33A3B2278c2931C5) [GnosisSafe]
	+++ description: None

+	Status: CREATED
	contract RollupProxy (eth:0x23A19d23e89166adedbDcB432518AB01e4272D94) [orbitstack/RollupProxyBoLD]
	+++ description: Central contract for the project's configuration like its execution logic hash (`wasmModuleRoot`) and addresses of the other system contracts. Entry point for Proposers creating new assertions (state commitments) and Challengers submitting fraud proofs (In the Orbit stack, these two roles are both called Validators).

+	Status: CREATED
	contract OneStepProverMath (eth:0x4B15E064d5d55705E89080bDEA4BFe4cF20D6114) [orbitstack/OneStepProverMath]
	+++ description: One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract OneStepProofEntry (eth:0x5087a6fD526eFD5c6770d94D0c325de0e2A2c44D) [orbitstack/OneStepProofEntry]
	+++ description: One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract UpgradeExecutor (eth:0x552603b4bc1f5E896AF2854548D6380f45f1B4bf) [orbitstack/UpgradeExecutor]
	+++ description: Central contract defining the access control permissions for upgrading the system contract implementations.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract OneStepProverMemory (eth:0x665CEA1cA6C36aB701f4C6AE895b156f79C51c35) [orbitstack/OneStepProverMemory]
	+++ description: One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract L1GatewayRouter (eth:0x6a2E3a1e16FC29f27Ce61429746D558d656975bB) [orbitstack/GatewayRouter]
	+++ description: This routing contract maps tokens to the correct escrow (gateway) to be then bridged with canonical messaging.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract EdgeChallengeManager (eth:0x6f38FC91105Fc9a43931DcA33450ab3315E3D4Fa) [orbitstack/EdgeChallengeManager]
	+++ description: Contract that implements the main challenge protocol logic of the fraud proof system.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract OneStepProver0 (eth:0x6fE84aC811EBEcd888Eca93757fEa378Bb03b00c) [orbitstack/OneStepProver0]
	+++ description: One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract L1ERC20Gateway (eth:0x85001CC4867C5e1C22dA4B79BB8852B9e2a06da0) [orbitstack/ERC20Gateway]
	+++ description: Escrows deposited ERC-20 assets for the canonical Bridge. Upon depositing, a generic token representation will be minted at the destination. Withdrawals are initiated by the Outbox contract.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract SequencerInbox (eth:0xBd0D173EEb87D57A09521c24388a12789F33ba96) [orbitstack/SequencerInbox]
	+++ description: A sequencer (registered in this contract) can submit transaction batches or commitments here.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract Wrapped Ether Token (eth:0xC02aaA39b223FE8D0A0e5C4F27eAD9083C756Cc2) [N/A]
	+++ description: None

+	Status: CREATED
	contract RollupEventInbox (eth:0xc34f4907822d1cDC6aE3038Be22e6f12DEa35bd4) [orbitstack/RollupEventInbox]
	+++ description: Helper contract sending configuration data over the bridge during the systems initialization.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract Bridge (eth:0xDf8755334ce7A73cCF6b581C02eA649AE3E864b3) [orbitstack/Bridge]
	+++ description: Escrow contract for the project's gas token (can be different from ETH). Keeps a list of allowed Inboxes and Outboxes for canonical bridge messaging.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract OneStepProverHostIo (eth:0xe1aAfAfBde42f043495B39d1a15a58E91c894Fbf) [orbitstack/OneStepProverHostIo]
	+++ description: One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract Outbox (eth:0xf0ce991ea4A0d2400A4AB49b20ae333f6Dce3DE9) [orbitstack/Outbox]
	+++ description: Facilitates L2 to L1 contract calls: Messages initiated from L2 (for example withdrawal messages) eventually resolve in execution on L1.

+	Status: CREATED
	contract L1WethGateway (eth:0xF7e12b9614b509C747ab4423bC4ACF923759Cf1B) [N/A]
	+++ description: None

Operator

The system has a centralized sequencer

While forcing transaction is open to anyone the system employs a privileged sequencer that has priority for submitting transaction batches and ordering transactions.

MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

Sequencer - Arbitrum documentation

Force inclusion can be nullified by transaction filtering

Users can enqueue messages in the L1 delayed inbox and, after the sequencing delay, call forceInclusion on the SequencerInbox to include them. However, the chain runs ArbOS 61 transaction filtering: an authorized filterer can register any transaction hash in the ArbFilteredTransactionsManager precompile (0x00…0074), after which the state transition function forcibly fails that transaction, including one force-included via L1, without delay. Force inclusion is therefore not a reliable censorship escape hatch.

Users can be censored if the operator registers their transaction hash in the ArbFilteredTransactionsManager precompile, causing the state transition function to fail it even when it is force-included via the L1 delayed inbox.

Sequencing

Buffered forced transactions

To force transactions from the host chain, users must first enqueue “delayed” messages in the “delayed” inbox of the Bridge contract. Only authorized Inboxes are allowed to enqueue delayed messages, and the so-called Inbox contract is the one used as the entry point by calling the sendMessage or sendMessageFromOrigin functions. If the centralized sequencer doesn’t process the request within some time bound, users can call the forceInclusion function on the SequencerInbox contract to include the message in the canonical chain. The time bound is defined to be the minimum between 4d and the time left in the delay buffer. The delay buffer gets replenished over time and gets consumed every time the sequencer doesn’t timely process a message. Only messages processed with a delay greater than 1634y 3mo consume the buffer. The buffer is capped at 1634y 3mo. The replenish rate is currently set at 1m every 20m. Even if the buffer is fully consumed, messages are still allowed to be delayed up to 1634y 3mo.

Sequencer and censorship resistance - Arbitrum documentation

Withdrawals

Regular messaging

The user initiates L2->L1 messages by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is settled, the message becomes available for processing on L1. The process of block finalization usually takes several days to complete.

Autonomous exit

Users can (eventually) exit the system by pushing the transaction on L1 and providing the corresponding state root. The only way to prevent such withdrawal is via an upgrade.

Other considerations

EVM compatible smart contracts are supported

Arbitrum One uses Nitro technology that allows running fraud proofs by executing EVM code on top of WASM.

Inside Arbitrum Nitro

Permissions

A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions

Go to Disco

Explore in Disco

Ethereum

Actors:

Safe0x7Ae5…84b6

A Multisig with 7/8 threshold.

Can upgrade with no delay
- Inbox UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- RollupProxy UpgradeExecutor
- UpgradeExecutor UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- L1GatewayRouter UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- EdgeChallengeManager UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- L1ERC20Gateway UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- SequencerInbox UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- RollupEventInbox UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- Bridge UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- TimelockController UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- Outbox UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- L1WethGateway UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
Can interact with RollupProxy
- Pause and unpause and set important roles and parameters in the system contracts: Can delegate Sequencer management to a BatchPosterManager address, manage data availability and DACs, set the Sequencer-only window, introduce an allowList to the bridge and whitelist Inboxes/Outboxes UpgradeExecutor
Can interact with TimelockController
- manage all access control roles UpgradeExecutor

Participants (8):

0x640B…7393 0x7957…21DD Safe 0x54Fa…E477 0xb89C…f31c 0x2963…Fa17 0x2584…8b2c 0xe94a…8d6A

TimelockController0xE1e8…F465

A timelock with access control. The current minimum delay is 7d.

Can upgrade with no delay
- Inbox UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- RollupProxy UpgradeExecutor
- UpgradeExecutor UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- L1GatewayRouter UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- EdgeChallengeManager UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- L1ERC20Gateway UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- SequencerInbox UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- RollupEventInbox UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- Bridge UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- TimelockController UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- Outbox UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- L1WethGateway UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
Can interact with RollupProxy
- Pause and unpause and set important roles and parameters in the system contracts: Can delegate Sequencer management to a BatchPosterManager address, manage data availability and DACs, set the Sequencer-only window, introduce an allowList to the bridge and whitelist Inboxes/Outboxes UpgradeExecutor
Can interact with TimelockController
- manage all access control roles UpgradeExecutor - or - acting directly

Safe0xbFc2…CA1d

A Multisig with 6/8 threshold.

Can interact with TimelockController
- cancel queued transactions
- propose transactions

Participants (8):

0x640B…7393 0x7957…21DD Safe 0x54Fa…E477 0xb89C…f31c 0xd857…7bB1 0xC951…9353 0xe94a…8d6A

Safe0x0fc5…44Ac

A Multisig with 3/7 threshold. Member of Safe, Safe.

Participants (7):

0xBa86…9ecA 0x582B…050F 0xFA67…4562 0x499b…41B4 0x90a0…7029 0x026F…e526 0x9b64…740C

Safe0x1F3B…31C5

A Multisig with 2/3 threshold.

Participants (3):

0x2963…Fa17 0x2584…8b2c 0xb89C…f31c

2 EOAs

EOA 3 EOA 4

Can interact with RollupProxy
- Can propose new state roots (called nodes) and challenge state roots on the host chain

EOA 50xDaa5…87F4

Can interact with SequencerInbox
- Can submit transaction batches or commitments to the SequencerInbox contract on the host chain

Robinhood Chain

Actors:

SafeL20x6b9F…3FdC

A Multisig with 7/8 threshold.

Can upgrade with no delay
- L2UpgradeExecutor L2UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- TimelockController L2UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
Can interact with L2UpgradeExecutor
- Can add or remove transaction filterers and change ArbOS configuration on the L2, without delay L2UpgradeExecutor
Can interact with TimelockController
- manage all access control roles L2UpgradeExecutor

Participants (8):

0x640B…7393 0x7957…21DD SafeL2 0x686c…F6eA 0xb89C…f31c 0x2963…Fa17 0x2584…8b2c 0xe94a…8d6A

SafeL20x4C03…2462

A Multisig with 6/8 threshold.

Can interact with TimelockController
- cancel queued transactions
- propose transactions

Participants (8):

0x640B…7393 0x7957…21DD SafeL2 0x686c…F6eA 0xb89C…f31c 0xd857…7bB1 0xC951…9353 0xe94a…8d6A

SafeL20x3A0C…7a1C

A Multisig with 3/7 threshold. Member of SafeL2, SafeL2.

Participants (7):

0x582B…050F 0xBa86…9ecA 0xFA67…4562 0x499b…41B4 0x90a0…7029 0x026F…e526 0x9b64…740C

EOA 10x0000…0000

Can upgrade with no delay
- NVIDIA • Robinhood Token
Can upgrade with 7d delay
- L2UpgradeExecutor TimelockController with 7d delay → L2UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- TimelockController TimelockController with 7d delay → L2UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
Can interact with L2UpgradeExecutor
- Can add or remove transaction filterers and change ArbOS configuration on the L2, without delay with 7d delay TimelockController with 7d delay → L2UpgradeExecutor
Can interact with TimelockController
- execute transactions that are ready
- manage all access control roles with 7d delay or with 7d delay TimelockController with 7d delay → L2UpgradeExecutor - or TimelockController with 7d delay

EOA 20x6637…C5D0

Can upgrade with no delay
- L2UpgradeExecutor L2UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- TimelockController L2UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
Can interact with L2UpgradeExecutor
- Can add or remove transaction filterers and change ArbOS configuration on the L2, without delay L2UpgradeExecutor
Can interact with TimelockController
- manage all access control roles L2UpgradeExecutor

EOA 60x2b94…3A87

Can interact with AccessControlsRegistry
- mint an uncapped amount of any connected Stock Token to any non-blocked address while the token is not paused

EOA 70x5516…E000

Can interact with AccessControlsRegistry
- deploy and initialize new Stock Token beacon proxies with arbitrary product identifiers, names and symbols through the StockFactory

EOA 80x697e…e553

Can interact with AccessControlsRegistry
- upgrade the external StockFactory that deploys and initializes new Stock Tokens

EOA 90x6E40…D8C1

Can interact with AccessControlsRegistry
- burn arbitrary holders’ balances without allowance on any connected Stock Token while neither the caller nor holder is blocked and the token is not paused

EOA 100x7369…4aBC

Can interact with AccessControlsRegistry
- toggle the oraclePaused flag on any connected Stock Token; the current implementation does not enforce this flag internally

EOA 110x913c…28fD

Can interact with AccessControlsRegistry
- block and unblock arbitrary addresses across all Stock Tokens, preventing them from sending, receiving, approving, spending or submitting permits

EOA 120x9290…8143

Can interact with AccessControlsRegistry
- set or schedule any nonzero UI multiplier for any unpaused Stock Token; standard ERC-20 balances and supply are unaffected

EOA 130x957B…74D4

Can interact with AccessControlsRegistry
- confiscate arbitrary holders’ balances without allowance on any connected Stock Token, even when the token is paused or either address is blocked

EOA 140xcba1…524A

Can interact with AccessControlsRegistry
- change the name and symbol of any connected Stock Token, which also changes its EIP-712 permit domain

EOA 150xCd8C…e094

Can upgrade with no delay
- AccessControlsRegistry

EOA 160xD6f8…B66d

Can interact with AccessControlsRegistry
- grant and revoke every registry and Stock Token role, including the ability to grant these powers to themselves

EOA 170xe7BC…F22A

Can interact with AccessControlsRegistry
- pause and unpause ordinary operations across all Stock Tokens connected to this registry

TransactionFilterer0xebDc…24b7

Can interact with ArbFilteredTransactionsManager
- Can register/remove transaction hashes in the ArbFilteredTransactionsManager precompile, causing the state transition function to forcibly fail those transactions, including force-included ones, without delay

EOA 180xFCcF…Ab23

Can interact with AccessControlsRegistry
- pause and unpause any individual Stock Token connected to this registry

Smart contracts

A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions

Go to Disco

Explore in Disco

A diagram of the smart contract architecture

Ethereum

RollupProxy0x23A1…2D94 Implementation #1 (Upgradable)Implementation #2 (Upgradable)Admin

Central contract for the project’s configuration like its execution logic hash (wasmModuleRoot) and addresses of the other system contracts. Entry point for Proposers creating new assertions (state commitments) and Challengers submitting fraud proofs (In the Orbit stack, these two roles are both called Validators).

Roles:
- admin: UpgradeExecutor; ultimately Safe, TimelockController
- getValidators: EOA 3, EOA 4
- owner: UpgradeExecutor; ultimately Safe, TimelockController

Can be upgraded by:

Safe with no delay TimelockController with no delay

EdgeChallengeManager0x6f38…D4Fa Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Contract that implements the main challenge protocol logic of the fraud proof system.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Safe, TimelockController

Can be upgraded by:

Safe with no delay TimelockController with no delay

SequencerInbox0xBd0D…ba96 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

A sequencer (registered in this contract) can submit transaction batches or commitments here.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Safe, TimelockController
- batchPosters: EOA 5

Can be upgraded by:

Safe with no delay TimelockController with no delay

Bridge

Escrow

0xDf87…64b3 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Escrow contract for the project’s gas token (can be different from ETH). Keeps a list of allowed Inboxes and Outboxes for canonical bridge messaging.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Safe, TimelockController

The following tokens are included in the value secured calculation:

Can be upgraded by:

Safe with no delay TimelockController with no delay

UpgradeExecutor0x5526…B4bf Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Central contract defining the access control permissions for upgrading the system contract implementations.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Safe, TimelockController
- executors: Safe, TimelockController

Can be upgraded by:

Safe with no delay TimelockController with no delay

Inbox0x1A07…7a2D Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Facilitates sending L1 to L2 messages like depositing ETH, but does not escrow funds.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Safe, TimelockController

Can be upgraded by:

Safe with no delay TimelockController with no delay

L1ERC20Gateway

Escrow

0x8500…6da0 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Escrows deposited ERC-20 assets for the canonical Bridge. Upon depositing, a generic token representation will be minted at the destination. Withdrawals are initiated by the Outbox contract.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Safe, TimelockController

All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation.

Can be upgraded by:

Safe with no delay TimelockController with no delay

Implementation used in:

Outbox0xf0ce…3DE9 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Facilitates L2 to L1 contract calls: Messages initiated from L2 (for example withdrawal messages) eventually resolve in execution on L1.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Safe, TimelockController

Can be upgraded by:

Safe with no delay TimelockController with no delay

L1GatewayRouter0x6a2E…75bB Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

This routing contract maps tokens to the correct escrow (gateway) to be then bridged with canonical messaging.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Safe, TimelockController

Can be upgraded by:

Safe with no delay TimelockController with no delay

Implementation used in:

ProxyAdmin

2 instances

0x1232…90FD 0x4e39…1839

Roles:
- owner: UpgradeExecutor

OneStepProverMath0x4B15…6114

One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.

OneStepProofEntry0x5087…c44D

One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.

OneStepProverMemory0x665C…1c35

One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.

OneStepProver00x6fE8…b00c

One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.

Wrapped Ether Token0xC02a…6Cc2

Implementation used in:

RollupEventInbox0xc34f…5bd4 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Helper contract sending configuration data over the bridge during the systems initialization.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Safe, TimelockController

Can be upgraded by:

Safe with no delay TimelockController with no delay

OneStepProverHostIo0xe1aA…4Fbf

One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.

L1WethGateway

Escrow

0xF7e1…Cf1B Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Safe, TimelockController

All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation.

Can be upgraded by:

Safe with no delay TimelockController with no delay

Robinhood Chain

L2UpgradeExecutor0x2A15…5C09 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

ArbOS chain owner (UpgradeExecutor). Manages the ArbOwner chain-owner set and the transaction-filterer set, and can upgrade ArbOS configuration without delay.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately EOA 1, EOA 2, SafeL2
- chainOwners: L2UpgradeExecutor; ultimately EOA 1, EOA 2, SafeL2
- executors: EOA 2, SafeL2, TimelockController

Can be upgraded by:

EOA 1 with 7d delay EOA 2 with no delay SafeL2 with no delay

ArbFilteredTransactionsManager0x0000…0074

ArbOS 61 transaction-filtering precompile. An authorized filterer registers tx hashes here; the state transition function then forcibly fails those transactions, including force-included ones, without delay.

Roles:
- transactionFilterers: TransactionFilterer

Source Code

TimelockController0x560C…8173 Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

A timelock with access control. The current minimum delay is 7d.

Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately EOA 1, EOA 2, SafeL2
- canceller: SafeL2
- defaultAdmin: L2UpgradeExecutor, TimelockController; ultimately EOA 1, EOA 2, SafeL2
- executor: EOA 1
- proposer: SafeL2

Can be upgraded by:

EOA 1 with 7d delay EOA 2 with no delay SafeL2 with no delay

ProxyAdmin

2 instances

0x672D…a3EF 0xa3Ac…67dF

Roles:
- owner: L2UpgradeExecutor

NVIDIA • Robinhood Token0xd060…9EEC Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

ERC-20-compatible Robinhood Stock Token logic. Transfers, approvals and permits are permissionless for addresses that are not blocked in the shared AccessControlsRegistry; there is no onchain KYC or allowlist. The registry’s roles can mint, burn arbitrary holders’ balances, confiscate balances even while paused or blocked, pause this token or all tokens, change metadata and the UI multiplier, and upgrade the shared beacon implementation.

Roles:
- admin: EOA 1

Can be upgraded by:

EOA 1 with no delay

AccessControlsRegistry0xe10b…1b00

Shared access-control registry and upgrade beacon for Robinhood Stock Tokens. Its roles apply across every token implementation that points to this registry: they control upgrades, global and per-token pauses, the shared blocklist, issuance, arbitrary holder burns, metadata and UI multipliers.

Roles:
- adminBurners: EOA 13
- beaconUpgraders: EOA 15
- blockers: EOA 11
- burners: EOA 9
- defaultAdmins: EOA 16
- factoryUpgraders: EOA 8
- globalPausers: EOA 17
- metadataUpdaters: EOA 14
- minters: EOA 6
- multiplierUpdaters: EOA 12
- oraclePausers: EOA 10
- tokenDeployers: EOA 7
- tokenPausers: EOA 18

Can be upgraded by:

EOA 15 with no delay

The current deployment carries some associated risks:

Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).

Program Hashes

Name	Hash	Repository	Verification	Used in

	0xc10c...dc97	Github

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Robinhood Chain

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About

Links: Website, Docs, etc.

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About

Why is the project listed in others?

Funds can be stolen if

Users can be censored if

MEV can be extracted if

All data required for proofs is published on chain

Program Hashes

Past upgrades

Initial discovery

The system has a centralized sequencer

Force inclusion can be nullified by transaction filtering

Buffered forced transactions

Regular messaging

Autonomous exit

EVM compatible smart contracts are supported

Ethereum

Actors:

Robinhood Chain

Actors:

Ethereum

Robinhood Chain

Program Hashes