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Ronin

There are impactful changes and part of the information might be outdated.

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About

Ronin is an Ethereum Optimium based on the OP Stack, optimized for gaming and NFT applications. It migrated from an independent sidechain to a Layer 2 in May 2026, using EigenDA for data availability and keeping RON as the custom gas token.

  • Total Value SecuredTVS
    $206.18 M11.1%
  • Past day UOPSDaily UOPS
    2.1129.9%
  • Gas token
    RON
  • Type
    Other
  • Purpose
    Universal
  • Chain ID
    2020

    • Tokens breakdown

    Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure
    Explore more in Discovery UI

    Badges

    About

    Ronin is an Ethereum Optimium based on the OP Stack, optimized for gaming and NFT applications. It migrated from an independent sidechain to a Layer 2 in May 2026, using EigenDA for data availability and keeping RON as the custom gas token.

    Why is the project listed in others?

    The proof system isn't fully functional

    Consequence: projects without a proper proof system fully rely on single entities to safely update the state. A malicious proposer can finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds.

    There is no data availability bridge

    Consequence: projects without a data availability bridge fully rely on single entities (the sequencer) to honestly rely available data roots on Ethereum. A malicious sequencer can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds.

    Learn more about the recategorisation here.

    Value SecuredView TVS breakdown
    Total
    Canonically BridgedCanonically Bridged ValueCanonical
    Natively MintedNatively Minted TokensNative
    Externally BridgedExternally Bridged ValueExternal
    ETH & derivatives
    Stablecoins
    BTC & derivatives
    Other
    View TVS breakdown
    Activity

    2026 May 12 — Jun 11

    Past Day UOPS
    2.1129.9%
    Past Day Ops count
    182.81 K
    Max. UOPS
    3.91
    2026 May 28
    Past day UOPS/TPS Ratio
    1.15
    Onchain costs

    The section shows the operating costs that L2s pay to Ethereum.

    2026 May 12 — Jun 11

    Total cost
    $1.47 K
    Avg cost per L2 UOP
    $0.000285
    Avg cost per day
    $50.90
    Liveness

    This section shows how "live" the project's operators are by displaying how frequently they submit transactions of the selected type. It also highlights anomalies - significant deviations from their typical schedule.

    No ongoing anomalies detected

    2026 May 12 — Jun 11

    Avg. tx data subs. interval
    7 minutes
    Avg. state updates interval
    12 hours
    Past 30 days anomalies
    100% normal uptime
    Milestones & Incidents

    Ronin migrates to an Ethereum L2

    2026 May 12th

    Ronin hard-forks at block 55,577,490 to become an OP Stack Optimium using EigenDA.

    Learn more
    Risk summary

    Funds can be stolen if

    1. a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).

    Funds can be lost if

    1. the sequencer posts an unavailable transaction root (CRITICAL),
    2. the data is not available on the external provider (CRITICAL).

    MEV can be extracted if

    1. the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
    Risk analysis
    Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure
    Sequencer failure
    Self sequence

    In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project’s chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.

    State validation
    Fraud proofs (INT)

    Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. Only one entity is currently allowed to propose and submit challenges, as only permissioned games are currently allowed.

    Data availability
    External

    Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on EigenDA. The sequencer is publishing data to EigenDA v2. Sequencer transaction data roots are not checked against the DACert Verifier onchain.

    Exit window
    None

    There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.

    Proposer failure
    Cannot withdraw

    Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.

    Stage
    Ronin
    Ronin is not even a
    Stage 0
    project.
    Learn more about Stages
    Please keep in mind that these stages do not reflect project security, this is an opinionated assessment of project maturity based on subjective criteria, created with a goal of incentivizing projects to push toward better decentralization. Each team may have taken different paths to achieve this goal.
    Data availability

    Data is posted to EigenDA

    Transactions roots are posted onchain and the full data is posted on EigenDA. The sequencer is publishing data to EigenDA v2. Since the DACert Verifier is not used, availability of the data is not verified against EigenDA operators, meaning that the Sequencer can single-handedly publish unavailable commitments.

    • Funds can be lost if the sequencer posts an unavailable transaction root (CRITICAL).

    • Funds can be lost if the data is not available on the external provider (CRITICAL).

    1. EigenDA Docs - Overview
    2. Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs
    3. BatchInbox - address
    4. OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function
    Learn more about the DA layer here: EigenDA logoEigenDA
    State validation
    A diagram of the state validation
    A diagram of the state validation

    Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by permissioned operators only. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.

    State root proposals

    Proposers submit state roots as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the create function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.0 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge period has passed and it is not countered.

    1. OP stack specification: Fault Dispute Game
    Challenges

    Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state roots using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 0.00 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the defend or attack functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with full concurrency. Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 3d 12h. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see freeloader claims), if a clock gets inherited with less than 3h, it generally gets extended by 3h with the exception of 6h right before depth 30, and 1d right before the last depth. The maximum clock extension that a top level claim can get is therefore 10d. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers’ stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step prover contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks (Spearbit 5.1.3).

    1. Fraud Proof Wars: OPFP

    Program Hashes

    Name
    Hash
    Repository
    Verification
    Used in
    0x0385...d54c
    Github
    Ronin logoHashKey Chain logoSilent Data logo
    Upgrades & Governance

    Past upgrades

    The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.

    Count of upgrades
    7
    Last upgrade
    13d 6h ago
    Avg upgrade interval
    6mo 1d
    Updates
    2026 June 04, 07:25 UTC
    High severity
    22changes

    Kailua (RISC Zero ZK fault-proof) deployed but not yet active. DisputeGameFactory registered game type 1337 → KailuaTreasury ( eth:0xc7EaCDd1… ). OptimismPortal2 and AnchorStateRegistry still have respectedGameType = 1 (PermissionedDisputeGame); cutover requires a separate change. Ronin KailuaTreasury (v1.2.0, eth:0xc7EaCDd1… ): verifier extracted to a separate KAILUA VERIFIER proxy, bond accounting reworked. Diff vs BOB v0.1.0 baseline: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xc7EaCDd1E755d2823463Abc4434CA445F752b336/eth:0x9B3E1661bccAF907893B71e4016c01513ae9263C. RoninConduitOwner got admin over the KailuaVerifier proxy ( eth:0x6b49976a… ), so the verifier proxy is upgradable along the same path as the other OP Stack contracts. RiscZeroVerifierRouter ( eth:0x8EaB2D97… ) is the shared RISC Zero verifier-selector router. Owner is a TimelockController ( eth:0x0b144E07… , 3d delay) governed by Safe eth:0x2E5bcc… . Both are shared RISC Zero infrastructure, not Ronin-specific.

    Kailua (RISC Zero ZK fault-proof) deployed but not yet active. DisputeGameFactory registered game type 1337 → KailuaTreasury (eth:0xc7EaCDd1…). OptimismPortal2 and AnchorStateRegistry still have respectedGameType = 1 (PermissionedDisputeGame); cutover requires a separate change.

    Ronin KailuaTreasury (v1.2.0, eth:0xc7EaCDd1…): verifier extracted to a separate KAILUA_VERIFIER proxy, bond accounting reworked. Diff vs BOB v0.1.0 baseline: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xc7EaCDd1E755d2823463Abc4434CA445F752b336/eth:0x9B3E1661bccAF907893B71e4016c01513ae9263C.

    RoninConduitOwner got admin over the KailuaVerifier proxy (eth:0x6b49976a…), so the verifier proxy is upgradable along the same path as the other OP Stack contracts.

    RiscZeroVerifierRouter (eth:0x8EaB2D97…) is the shared RISC Zero verifier-selector router. Owner is a TimelockController (eth:0x0b144E07…, 3d delay) governed by Safe eth:0x2E5bcc…. Both are shared RISC Zero infrastructure, not Ronin-specific.

    contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0x45dA2CD511DA5FEAa535eBF166E628314a65843a) [opstack/DisputeGameFactory] {
    +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them.
    +++ severity: HIGH
    values.game1337:
    - "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
    + "eth:0xc7EaCDd1E755d2823463Abc4434CA445F752b336"
    }
    contract Conduit Multisig 1 (eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746) [GnosisSafe] {
    +++ description: None
    values.$members.0:
    + "eth:0xcdC931935768c0562AfE989A366a3Dc4d52F4853"
    values.$members.8:
    - "eth:0x3840f487A17A41100DD1Bf0946c34f132a57Fd5f"
    }
    contract RoninConduitOwner (eth:0xE9Ad9723C24d946958f9FD3Bc861BbF983525607) [GnosisSafe] {
    +++ description: 5-of-6 joint Ronin/Conduit Safe.
    receivedPermissions.8:
    + {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x6b49976a7340D0A3C00d1bEBE0E36E2367D89c7C","role":"admin"}
    }
    + Status: CREATED
    contract TimelockController (eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711) [global/TimelockController]
    +++ description: A timelock with access control. The current minimum delay is 3d.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop (eth:0x1efDd13f831ceeEa14940806705A53D3211CD698) [risc0/RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop]
    +++ description: A verifier wrapper for the eth:0xafB31f5b70623CDF4b20Ada3f7230916A5A79df9 that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract RiscZeroGroth16Verifier (eth:0x20ff7C2Cf391a5F096A2Cc181cb41916680f8E97) [taiko/RiscZeroGroth16Verifier]
    +++ description: Verifier contract for RISC Zero Groth16 proofs (version 2.0.0-rc.3).
    + Status: CREATED
    contract RiscZeroGroth16Verifier (eth:0x2a098988600d87650Fb061FfAff08B97149Fa84D) [taiko/RiscZeroGroth16Verifier]
    +++ description: Verifier contract for RISC Zero Groth16 proofs (version 3.0.0).
    + Status: CREATED
    contract Safe (eth:0x2E5bcc9959dB5F5016F830E47943b07242CB2609) [GnosisSafe]
    +++ description: None
    + Status: CREATED
    contract RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop (eth:0x44c220f0598345195cE99AD6A57aDfFcb9Ea33e7) [risc0/RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop]
    +++ description: A verifier wrapper for the eth:0xf70aBAb028Eb6F4100A24B203E113D94E87DE93C that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract RiscZeroSetVerifier (eth:0x5005aBa3DFf7C940fcc1e48DccCAD611a80eEB85) [risc0/RiscZeroSetVerifier]
    +++ description: Set verifier contract for RISC Zero proofs (version 0.9.0). It allows verifying a whole set of proofs identified with a Merkle root at once, afterwards each individual proof could be efficiently verified just by checking Merkle inclusion against the verified root.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract RiscZeroGroth16Verifier (eth:0x54aCE3ED46529B4d4F3770C8Bad5dDC48717B9bF) [N/A]
    +++ description: None
    + Status: CREATED
    contract RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop (eth:0x68dC2cB4e61774873971c499D9b239ec5Ac540E3) [risc0/RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop]
    +++ description: A verifier wrapper for the eth:0x20ff7C2Cf391a5F096A2Cc181cb41916680f8E97 that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract KailuaVerifier (eth:0x6b49976a7340D0A3C00d1bEBE0E36E2367D89c7C) [N/A]
    +++ description: Proxy in front of the Kailua proof verifier; routes verification requests to the canonical RiscZeroVerifierRouter and asserts the chain-specific rollup config and FPVM image ID.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop (eth:0x844D5f01161E3559d36f23d0Aa9E9620949aF782) [risc0/RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop]
    +++ description: A verifier wrapper for the eth:0x5005aBa3DFf7C940fcc1e48DccCAD611a80eEB85 that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract RiscZeroVerifierRouter (eth:0x8EaB2D97Dfce405A1692a21b3ff3A172d593D319) [risc0/RiscZeroVerifierRouter]
    +++ description: A router proxy that routes to verifiers based on selectors. The mapping can be changed by a permissioned owner (eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711).
    + Status: CREATED
    contract RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop (eth:0x9F9994Eb4Cb5200198FEfb470f8b50301662e696) [risc0/RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop]
    +++ description: A verifier wrapper for the eth:0x2a098988600d87650Fb061FfAff08B97149Fa84D that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract RiscZeroGroth16Verifier (eth:0xafB31f5b70623CDF4b20Ada3f7230916A5A79df9) [taiko/RiscZeroGroth16Verifier]
    +++ description: Verifier contract for RISC Zero Groth16 proofs (version 2.2.0).
    + Status: CREATED
    contract KailuaTreasury (eth:0xc7EaCDd1E755d2823463Abc4434CA445F752b336) [risc0/KailuaTreasury]
    +++ description: Kailua (RISC Zero ZK fault-proof) game implementation registered as game type 1337 in the DisputeGameFactory. Deployed but NOT yet active. Bonds confiscated from eliminated proposers are split 1/3 to the prover, 1/3 to the tournament winner, 1/3 burned.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop (eth:0xDa8f3de6fBBdb261Ac771B813a578A7aBdA6B2b1) [risc0/RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop]
    +++ description: A verifier wrapper for the eth:0x54aCE3ED46529B4d4F3770C8Bad5dDC48717B9bF that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract RiscZeroGroth16Verifier (eth:0xf70aBAb028Eb6F4100A24B203E113D94E87DE93C) [N/A]
    +++ description: None
    2026 May 21, 21:42 UTC
    42changes

    ProxyAdminOwner / owner rotated from Conduit Multisig 1 to a new 5-of-6 Safe ( eth:0xE9Ad9723… ) that is a joint Ronin/Conduit multisig (per Ronin team: 4 Ronin signers + 2 Conduit signers retained from Conduit Multisig 1). Affects AnchorStateRegistry, L1ERC721Bridge, DisputeGameFactory (owner + proxyAdminOwner), and the other Ronin contracts under that ProxyAdmin.

    ProxyAdminOwner / owner rotated from Conduit Multisig 1 to a new 5-of-6 Safe (eth:0xE9Ad9723…) that is a joint Ronin/Conduit multisig (per Ronin team: 4 Ronin signers + 2 Conduit signers retained from Conduit Multisig 1). Affects AnchorStateRegistry, L1ERC721Bridge, DisputeGameFactory (owner + proxyAdminOwner), and the other Ronin contracts under that ProxyAdmin.

    contract AnchorStateRegistry (eth:0x0B95fF1d1B113bac3E29Ac0BBF2089126C9aE81A) [opstack/AnchorStateRegistry_post13] {
    +++ description: Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame.
    values.proxyAdminOwner:
    - "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746"
    + "eth:0xE9Ad9723C24d946958f9FD3Bc861BbF983525607"
    }
    contract L1ERC721Bridge (eth:0x3a63087B36Ad5a2fD89C7C8517832dE067Fe4959) [opstack/L1ERC721Bridge] {
    +++ description: Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.
    values.proxyAdminOwner:
    - "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746"
    + "eth:0xE9Ad9723C24d946958f9FD3Bc861BbF983525607"
    }
    contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0x45dA2CD511DA5FEAa535eBF166E628314a65843a) [opstack/DisputeGameFactory] {
    +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them.
    values.owner:
    - "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746"
    + "eth:0xE9Ad9723C24d946958f9FD3Bc861BbF983525607"
    values.proxyAdminOwner:
    - "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746"
    + "eth:0xE9Ad9723C24d946958f9FD3Bc861BbF983525607"
    }
    contract Conduit Multisig 1 (eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746) [GnosisSafe] {
    +++ description: None
    receivedPermissions.2:
    - {"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x6FFbcf498CcF81111f397fa6065dEA13A47E573C","description":"set and change address mappings.","role":".owner","via":[{"address":"eth:0x757077Ddf12B652430DCE8fF3e4c749F5Ca861fC"}]}
    receivedPermissions.3:
    - {"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0xc4f4F908C36C8119f1FBd52CebbDB30C6f2a23C1","description":"it can update the preconfer address, the batch submitter (Sequencer) address and the gas configuration of the system.","role":".owner"}
    receivedPermissions.4:
    - {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x0B95fF1d1B113bac3E29Ac0BBF2089126C9aE81A","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x757077Ddf12B652430DCE8fF3e4c749F5Ca861fC"}]}
    receivedPermissions.5:
    - {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x3a63087B36Ad5a2fD89C7C8517832dE067Fe4959","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x757077Ddf12B652430DCE8fF3e4c749F5Ca861fC"}]}
    receivedPermissions.6:
    - {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x45dA2CD511DA5FEAa535eBF166E628314a65843a","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x757077Ddf12B652430DCE8fF3e4c749F5Ca861fC"}]}
    receivedPermissions.7:
    - {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x51639D151456d0384285C6974e441A5D2B784B7D","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x757077Ddf12B652430DCE8fF3e4c749F5Ca861fC"}]}
    receivedPermissions.8:
    - {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x652CD53eCf9466E5Fb00D0E11d6CBf6469a56D77","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x757077Ddf12B652430DCE8fF3e4c749F5Ca861fC"}]}
    receivedPermissions.9:
    - {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x69Fcd2E75af364295EaF48Dc058338F80CFfb434","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x757077Ddf12B652430DCE8fF3e4c749F5Ca861fC"}]}
    receivedPermissions.10:
    - {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x85Ce2Ccef125aa8d018c298d5eA0f2FB5E5063c1","description":"upgrading the bridge implementation can give access to all funds escrowed therein.","role":".$admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x757077Ddf12B652430DCE8fF3e4c749F5Ca861fC"}]}
    receivedPermissions.11:
    - {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xc4f4F908C36C8119f1FBd52CebbDB30C6f2a23C1","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x757077Ddf12B652430DCE8fF3e4c749F5Ca861fC"}]}
    receivedPermissions.12:
    - {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xEE552e802A50d855bD08E93dfcc69228FC7B9E2c","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x502e993a5aFC9fE59b00B07ee500729D71092E34"}]}
    receivedPermissions.13:
    - {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xF9aD628d9F907ad5d46Ab80100dacDf09EAc9A8e","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x757077Ddf12B652430DCE8fF3e4c749F5Ca861fC"}]}
    directlyReceivedPermissions:
    - [{"permission":"act","from":"eth:0x502e993a5aFC9fE59b00B07ee500729D71092E34","role":".owner"},{"permission":"act","from":"eth:0x757077Ddf12B652430DCE8fF3e4c749F5Ca861fC","role":".owner"}]
    }
    contract ProxyAdmin (eth:0x502e993a5aFC9fE59b00B07ee500729D71092E34) [global/ProxyAdmin] {
    +++ description: None
    values.owner:
    - "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746"
    + "eth:0xE9Ad9723C24d946958f9FD3Bc861BbF983525607"
    }
    contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0x652CD53eCf9466E5Fb00D0E11d6CBf6469a56D77) [opstack/OptimismPortal2] {
    +++ description: The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame.
    values.proxyAdminOwner:
    - "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746"
    + "eth:0xE9Ad9723C24d946958f9FD3Bc861BbF983525607"
    }
    contract DelayedWETH (eth:0x69Fcd2E75af364295EaF48Dc058338F80CFfb434) [opstack/DelayedWETH] {
    +++ description: Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.
    values.proxyAdminOwner:
    - "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746"
    + "eth:0xE9Ad9723C24d946958f9FD3Bc861BbF983525607"
    }
    contract ProxyAdmin (eth:0x757077Ddf12B652430DCE8fF3e4c749F5Ca861fC) [global/ProxyAdmin] {
    +++ description: None
    values.owner:
    - "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746"
    + "eth:0xE9Ad9723C24d946958f9FD3Bc861BbF983525607"
    }
    contract L1StandardBridge (eth:0x85Ce2Ccef125aa8d018c298d5eA0f2FB5E5063c1) [opstack/L1StandardBridge] {
    +++ description: The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.
    values.proxyAdminOwner:
    - "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746"
    + "eth:0xE9Ad9723C24d946958f9FD3Bc861BbF983525607"
    }
    contract SystemConfig (eth:0xc4f4F908C36C8119f1FBd52CebbDB30C6f2a23C1) [opstack/SystemConfig] {
    +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address.
    values.owner:
    - "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746"
    + "eth:0xE9Ad9723C24d946958f9FD3Bc861BbF983525607"
    values.proxyAdminOwner:
    - "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746"
    + "eth:0xE9Ad9723C24d946958f9FD3Bc861BbF983525607"
    }
    contract SuperchainConfig (eth:0xEE552e802A50d855bD08E93dfcc69228FC7B9E2c) [opstack/SuperchainConfigFake_expiry] {
    +++ description: This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3mo 1d if left untouched.
    values.proxyAdminOwner:
    - "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746"
    + "eth:0xE9Ad9723C24d946958f9FD3Bc861BbF983525607"
    }
    contract L1CrossDomainMessenger (eth:0xF9aD628d9F907ad5d46Ab80100dacDf09EAc9A8e) [opstack/L1CrossDomainMessenger] {
    +++ description: Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function.
    values.proxyAdminOwner:
    - "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746"
    + "eth:0xE9Ad9723C24d946958f9FD3Bc861BbF983525607"
    }
    + Status: CREATED
    contract PreimageOracle (eth:0x1fb8cdFc6831fc866Ed9C51aF8817Da5c287aDD3) [opstack/PreimageOracle]
    +++ description: The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract MIPS (eth:0x6463dEE3828677F6270d83d45408044fc5eDB908) [opstack/MIPS]
    +++ description: The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract Safe (eth:0xE9Ad9723C24d946958f9FD3Bc861BbF983525607) [GnosisSafe]
    +++ description: None
    2026 May 18, 09:18 UTC
    20changes

    Initial discovery.

    Initial discovery.

    Initial discovery

    + Status: CREATED
    contract AnchorStateRegistry (eth:0x0B95fF1d1B113bac3E29Ac0BBF2089126C9aE81A) [opstack/AnchorStateRegistry_post13]
    +++ description: Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract MainchainBridgeManager (eth:0x2Cf3CFb17774Ce0CFa34bB3f3761904e7fc3FaDB) [N/A]
    +++ description: Governance and proxy-admin contract for the legacy MainchainGateway bridge. Holds the operator/governor set, tallies stake-weighted votes for bridge proposals (operator rotations, threshold changes, withdrawals).
    + Status: CREATED
    contract L1ERC721Bridge (eth:0x3a63087B36Ad5a2fD89C7C8517832dE067Fe4959) [opstack/L1ERC721Bridge]
    +++ description: Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0x45dA2CD511DA5FEAa535eBF166E628314a65843a) [opstack/DisputeGameFactory]
    +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract Conduit Multisig 1 (eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746) [GnosisSafe]
    +++ description: None
    + Status: CREATED
    contract ProxyAdmin (eth:0x502e993a5aFC9fE59b00B07ee500729D71092E34) [global/ProxyAdmin]
    +++ description: None
    + Status: CREATED
    contract OptimismMintableERC20Factory (eth:0x51639D151456d0384285C6974e441A5D2B784B7D) [opstack/OptimismMintableERC20Factory]
    +++ description: A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it's deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain's representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract LegacyBridgeOwner (eth:0x51F6696Ae42C6C40CA9F5955EcA2aaaB1Cefb26e) [GnosisSafe]
    +++ description: None
    + Status: CREATED
    contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0x58bf355C5d4EdFc723eF89d99582ECCfd143266A) [opstack/PermissionedDisputeGame]
    +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract MainchainGateway (eth:0x64192819Ac13Ef72bF6b5AE239AC672B43a9AF08) [N/A]
    +++ description: Legacy multi-sig-secured Ronin bridge contract holding the L1 side of deposits made before the April 2025 Chainlink CCIP migration. Still custodies residual user balances (ETH backing legacy WETH on Ronin, the deprecated WBTC contract, and dust). Withdrawals authorised by the Ronin BridgeOperator stake-weighted threshold via MainchainBridgeManager.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0x652CD53eCf9466E5Fb00D0E11d6CBf6469a56D77) [opstack/OptimismPortal2]
    +++ description: The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract DelayedWETH (eth:0x69Fcd2E75af364295EaF48Dc058338F80CFfb434) [opstack/DelayedWETH]
    +++ description: Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract AddressManager (eth:0x6FFbcf498CcF81111f397fa6065dEA13A47E573C) [opstack/AddressManager]
    +++ description: Legacy contract used to manage a mapping of string names to addresses. Modern OP stack uses a different standard proxy system instead, but this contract is still necessary for backwards compatibility with several older contracts.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract ProxyAdmin (eth:0x757077Ddf12B652430DCE8fF3e4c749F5Ca861fC) [global/ProxyAdmin]
    +++ description: None
    + Status: CREATED
    contract L1StandardBridge (eth:0x85Ce2Ccef125aa8d018c298d5eA0f2FB5E5063c1) [opstack/L1StandardBridge]
    +++ description: The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract Wrapped Ether Token (eth:0xC02aaA39b223FE8D0A0e5C4F27eAD9083C756Cc2) [N/A]
    +++ description: None
    + Status: CREATED
    contract SystemConfig (eth:0xc4f4F908C36C8119f1FBd52CebbDB30C6f2a23C1) [opstack/SystemConfig]
    +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract SuperchainConfig (eth:0xEE552e802A50d855bD08E93dfcc69228FC7B9E2c) [opstack/SuperchainConfigFake_expiry]
    +++ description: This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3mo 1d if left untouched.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract PauseEnforcer (eth:0xF184a6Cd470Cac2CF5cD4fBa34e20D482D6A6062) [N/A]
    +++ description: Immutable emergency-pause contract for the legacy MainchainGateway. Holders of the SENTRY_ROLE can flip MainchainGateway into a paused state to halt deposits and withdrawals in an emergency.
    + Status: CREATED
    contract L1CrossDomainMessenger (eth:0xF9aD628d9F907ad5d46Ab80100dacDf09EAc9A8e) [opstack/L1CrossDomainMessenger]
    +++ description: Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function.
    Operator

    The system has a centralized operator

    The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.

    • MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

    Users can force any transaction

    Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.

    1. Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs
    2. OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function
    Withdrawals

    Regular exits

    The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.

    1. OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function
    2. OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function

    Forced messaging

    If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.

    1. Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain
    Other considerations

    EVM compatible smart contracts are supported

    OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.

    1. Introducing EVM Equivalence

    External bridge architecture

    The May 2026 L2 migration deployed the OP Stack canonical bridge (OptimismPortal2 and L1StandardBridge) but did not migrate user funds into it; it is currently empty. User assets are custodied on two separate L1 paths, neither of which is the canonical bridge analyzed on this page: (1) Chainlink CCIP TokenPools, the active bridge since April 2025, securing 12 tokens including AXS, USDC, WETH, WBTC (new contract), YGG, PIXEL and SLP via Chainlink DON attestations and the Risk Management Network; (2) the legacy MainchainGateway, deprecated in April 2025 but still holding residual balances (legacy WBTC, ETH backing of legacy WETH, dust), withdrawable through the Ronin BridgeOperator stake-weighted multisig. Sky Mavis has not announced a plan to migrate liquidity into the OP Stack bridge.

    1. MainchainGateway - Etherscan
    2. Ronin Bridge to Chainlink CCIP migration - Ronin Blog

    Proof system cannot execute for this chain

    The dispute games on this chain commit to the op-program v1.3.1 prestate (0x038512e0…6764d54c). That binary embeds the superchain-registry snapshot at commit 42bd03ba8313 (2024-08-21), which lists 17 chain IDs and does not include Ronin (chainId 2020). If a dispute game were stepped through to the VM, op-program’s RollupConfigByChainID(2020) would not find a rollup config and would panic, producing an invalid output state — any claim (honest or fraudulent) could then be “disproven” against the panic. Users are not exposed today because the respected game type is PermissionedDisputeGame: only the proposer can create state proposals and only proposer/challenger can move or step. The proof system therefore reduces to an operator-attested delay timer rather than an adversarial fraud-proof. Fix would require redeploying games with either an updated registry snapshot or a chain-specific prestate.

    1. absolutePrestate hash registered in superchain-registry as op-program v1.3.1
    2. op-program v1.3.1 release (commit e3c2f04, 2024-08-23)
    3. superchain-registry snapshot pinned at op-program v1.3.1 build (42bd03ba8313)
    Permissions
    A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions
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    Ethereum

    Actors:

    RoninConduitOwner0xE9Ad…5607

    A Multisig with 5/6 threshold. 5-of-6 joint Ronin/Conduit Safe.

    • Can upgrade with no delay
      • AnchorStateRegistry
      • L1ERC721Bridge
      • DisputeGameFactory
      • OptimismMintableERC20Factory
      • OptimismPortal2
      • DelayedWETH
      • KailuaVerifier
      • L1StandardBridge
      • SystemConfig
      • SuperchainConfig
      • L1CrossDomainMessenger
    • Can interact with AddressManager
      • set and change address mappings
    • Can interact with SystemConfig
      • it can update the preconfer address, the batch submitter (Sequencer) address and the gas configuration of the system

    Participants (6):

    0xea42…3B280xaa6a…85c20x8e07…20700x8f9C…35520x8117…E7Ac0x6BB4…83A6
    Conduit Multisig 10x4a49…A746

    A Multisig with 4/12 threshold.

    • Can interact with DisputeGameFactory
    • Can interact with SuperchainConfig
      • Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless)

    Participants (12):

    0xcdC9…48530xA9FC…8d090x6BB4…83A60x2103…911c0x65D1…60070x8117…E7Ac0xA073…bda20xF331…647D0xa400…e6e40xa0C6…90380xefCf…dD5C0x4D80…5BAe
    Used in:
    MainchainBridgeManager0x2Cf3…FaDB

    Governance and proxy-admin contract for the legacy MainchainGateway bridge. Holds the operator/governor set, tallies stake-weighted votes for bridge proposals (operator rotations, threshold changes, withdrawals).

    • Can upgrade with no delay
      • MainchainGateway
    Safe0x2E5b…2609

    A Multisig with 3/5 threshold.

    • Can interact with TimelockController
      • cancel queued transactions
      • execute transactions that are ready
      • manage all access control roles with 3d delay
      • propose transactions
    • Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop
    • Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop
    • Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop
    • Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierRouter
      • add/remove verifiers and the selectors they are mapped to with 3d delay
    • Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop
    • Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop

    Participants (5):

    0x10B0…6A0E0x7517…BdC70xbF58…73a40xd5D4…99260xDA8e…0A01
    Used in:
    LegacyBridgeOwner0x51F6…b26e

    A Multisig with 3/5 threshold.

    • Can upgrade with no delay
      • MainchainBridgeManager

    Participants (5):

    0x4BFE…19ff0x0182…64850xC93f…1Bf90xFE1a…60310xCfD1…7f86
    EOA 10x9aA8…24F1
    • Can interact with SystemConfig
      • Allowed to commit transactions from the current layer to the host chain
    EOA 20xD379…d620
    • Can interact with DisputeGameFactory
      • Allowed to post new state roots of the current layer to the host chain
    EOA 30xF616…d412
    • Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop
    Used in:
    Smart contracts
    A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions
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    Note: Contracts presented in this section had their implementations updated since the last time our team looked at this project. The information presented may be inaccurate.

    Ethereum

    DisputeGameFactory0x45dA…843aImplementation (Upgradable)Admin

    The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately RoninConduitOwner
      • challengerFromDGF: Conduit Multisig 1
      • proposerFromDGF: EOA 2
    Can be upgraded by:
    RoninConduitOwner with no delay
    Implementation used in:
    OptimismPortal2
    Escrow
    0x652C…6D77Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately RoninConduitOwner
    The following tokens are included in the value secured calculation:
    ETH token logo
    Can be upgraded by:
    RoninConduitOwner with no delay
    Implementation used in:
    SystemConfig0xc4f4…23C1Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately RoninConduitOwner
      • batcherHash: EOA 1
      • owner: RoninConduitOwner
    Can be upgraded by:
    RoninConduitOwner with no delay
    Implementation used in:
    L1ERC721Bridge0x3a63…4959Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately RoninConduitOwner
    Can be upgraded by:
    RoninConduitOwner with no delay
    Implementation used in:
    L1StandardBridge
    Escrow
    0x85Ce…63c1Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately RoninConduitOwner

    All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation.

    Can be upgraded by:
    RoninConduitOwner with no delay
    Implementation used in:
    L1CrossDomainMessenger0xF9aD…9A8eImplementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain’s epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately RoninConduitOwner
    Can be upgraded by:
    RoninConduitOwner with no delay
    Implementation used in:
    TimelockController0x0b14…b711

    A timelock with access control. The current minimum delay is 3d.

    • Roles:
      • canceller: Safe
      • defaultAdmin: TimelockController; ultimately Safe
      • executor: Safe
      • proposer: Safe
    Implementation used in:
    AnchorStateRegistry0x0B95…E81AImplementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately RoninConduitOwner
    Can be upgraded by:
    RoninConduitOwner with no delay
    Implementation used in:
    RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop0x1efD…D698

    A verifier wrapper for the RiscZeroGroth16Verifier that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.

    • Roles:
      • owner: Safe
    Implementation used in:
    PreimageOracle0x1fb8…aDD3

    The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game.

    Implementation used in:
    RiscZeroGroth16Verifier0x20ff…8E97

    Verifier contract for RISC Zero Groth16 proofs (version 2.0.0-rc.3).

    Implementation used in:
    RiscZeroGroth16Verifier0x2a09…a84D

    Verifier contract for RISC Zero Groth16 proofs (version 3.0.0).

    Implementation used in:
    RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop0x44c2…33e7

    A verifier wrapper for the RiscZeroGroth16Verifier that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.

    • Roles:
      • owner: EOA 3
    Implementation used in:
    RiscZeroSetVerifier0x5005…EB85

    Set verifier contract for RISC Zero proofs (version 0.9.0). It allows verifying a whole set of proofs identified with a Merkle root at once, afterwards each individual proof could be efficiently verified just by checking Merkle inclusion against the verified root.

    Implementation used in:
    ProxyAdmin0x502e…2E34
    • Roles:
      • owner: RoninConduitOwner
    OptimismMintableERC20Factory0x5163…4B7DImplementation (Upgradable)Admin

    A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it’s deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain’s representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately RoninConduitOwner
    Can be upgraded by:
    RoninConduitOwner with no delay
    Implementation used in:
    RiscZeroGroth16Verifier0x54aC…B9bF
    Implementation used in:
    PermissionedDisputeGame0x58bf…266A

    Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger.

    Implementation used in:
    MainchainGateway
    Escrow
    0x6419…AF08Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Legacy multi-sig-secured Ronin bridge contract holding the L1 side of deposits made before the April 2025 Chainlink CCIP migration. Still custodies residual user balances (ETH backing legacy WETH on Ronin, the deprecated WBTC contract, and dust). Withdrawals authorised by the Ronin BridgeOperator stake-weighted threshold via MainchainBridgeManager.

    • Roles:
      • admin: MainchainBridgeManager

    All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation.

    Can be upgraded by:
    MainchainBridgeManager with no delay
    MIPS0x6463…B908

    The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.

    Implementation used in:
    RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop0x68dC…40E3

    A verifier wrapper for the RiscZeroGroth16Verifier that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.

    • Roles:
      • owner: Safe
    Implementation used in:
    DelayedWETH0x69Fc…b434Implementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately RoninConduitOwner
    Can be upgraded by:
    RoninConduitOwner with no delay
    Implementation used in:
    KailuaVerifier0x6b49…9c7CImplementation (Upgradable)Admin

    Proxy in front of the Kailua proof verifier; routes verification requests to the canonical RiscZeroVerifierRouter and asserts the chain-specific rollup config and FPVM image ID.

    • Roles:
      • admin: RoninConduitOwner
    Can be upgraded by:
    RoninConduitOwner with no delay
    ProxyAdmin0x7570…61fC
    • Roles:
      • owner: RoninConduitOwner
    RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop0x844D…F782

    A verifier wrapper for the RiscZeroSetVerifier that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.

    • Roles:
      • owner: Safe
    Implementation used in:
    RiscZeroVerifierRouter0x8EaB…D319

    A router proxy that routes to verifiers based on selectors. The mapping can be changed by a permissioned owner (TimelockController).

    • Roles:
      • owner: TimelockController; ultimately Safe
    Implementation used in:
    RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop0x9F99…e696

    A verifier wrapper for the RiscZeroGroth16Verifier that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.

    • Roles:
      • owner: Safe
    Implementation used in:
    RiscZeroGroth16Verifier0xafB3…9df9

    Verifier contract for RISC Zero Groth16 proofs (version 2.2.0).

    Implementation used in:
    Wrapped Ether Token0xC02a…6Cc2
    KailuaTreasury0xc7Ea…b336

    Kailua (RISC Zero ZK fault-proof) game implementation registered as game type 1337 in the DisputeGameFactory. Deployed but NOT yet active. Bonds confiscated from eliminated proposers are split 1/3 to the prover, 1/3 to the tournament winner, 1/3 burned.

    RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop0xDa8f…B2b1

    A verifier wrapper for the RiscZeroGroth16Verifier that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.

    • Roles:
      • owner: Safe
    Implementation used in:
    PauseEnforcer0xF184…6062

    Immutable emergency-pause contract for the legacy MainchainGateway. Holders of the SENTRY_ROLE can flip MainchainGateway into a paused state to halt deposits and withdrawals in an emergency.

    RiscZeroGroth16Verifier0xf70a…E93C
    Implementation used in:
    There are impactful changes to the following contracts, and part of the information might be outdated.
    SuperchainConfig0xEE55…9E2cImplementation (Upgradable)Admin

    This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3mo 1d if left untouched.

    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately RoninConduitOwner
      • guardian: Conduit Multisig 1
    Can be upgraded by:
    RoninConduitOwner with no delay
    Implementation used in:

    The current deployment carries some associated risks:

    • Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).

    Program Hashes

    Name
    Hash
    Repository
    Verification
    Used in
    0x0385...d54c
    Github
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