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Ronin
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About
Ronin is an Ethereum Optimium based on the OP Stack, optimized for gaming and NFT applications. It migrated from an independent sidechain to a Layer 2 in May 2026, using EigenDA for data availability and keeping RON as the custom gas token.
Badges
About
Ronin is an Ethereum Optimium based on the OP Stack, optimized for gaming and NFT applications. It migrated from an independent sidechain to a Layer 2 in May 2026, using EigenDA for data availability and keeping RON as the custom gas token.
2026 May 12 — Jul 23
The section shows the operating costs that L2s pay to Ethereum.
2026 May 12 — Jul 23
This section shows how "live" the project's operators are by displaying how frequently they submit transactions of the selected type. It also highlights anomalies - significant deviations from their typical schedule.
2026 Jun 23 — Jul 23
Last 30 day anomalies
All liveness anomalies detected for this project in the last 30 days, helping you review recent downtime and availability issues.
No Tx data submissions were performed for 1h 20m (from 2026 Jul 20, 17:34 UTC until 2026 Jul 20, 18:54 UTC). These typically occur every 8min 32s on average.
No State updates were performed for 12h 3m 12s (from 2026 Jul 01, 15:55 UTC until 2026 Jul 02, 03:58 UTC). These typically occur every 11h 53m 58s on average.
No State updates were performed for 5h 2m 12s (from 2026 Jul 01, 10:53 UTC until 2026 Jul 01, 15:55 UTC). These typically occur every 11h 53m 58s on average.
No Tx data submissions were performed for 1h 52m 48s (from 2026 Jun 25, 07:08 UTC until 2026 Jun 25, 09:01 UTC). These typically occur every 8min 32s on average.
Funds can be stolen if
- a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL),
- the validity proof cryptography is broken or implemented incorrectly,
- no challenger checks the published state,
- the proposer routes proof verification through a malicious or faulty verifier by specifying an unsafe route selector.
Funds can be lost if
Funds can be frozen if
MEV can be extracted if
Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Single round proofs (1R) prove the validity of a state proposal, only requiring a single transaction to resolve. A fault proof eliminates a state proposal by proving that any intermediate state transition in the proposal results in a different state root. For either, a ZK proof is used.
There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.
The primary whitelisted proposer has an optimistic advantage, letting them win by default if no conflicting proposals are made. This privilege is dropped after 1mo of inactivity, and anyone can leverage the source available zk prover to prove a fault or a conflicting valid proposal to win against the privileged proposer and/or supply a bond and make a counter proposal at any time.
Data is posted to EigenDA
Funds can be lost if the sequencer posts an unavailable transaction root (CRITICAL).
Funds can be lost if the data is not available on the external provider (CRITICAL).
- EigenDA Docs - Overview
- Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs
- BatchInbox - address
- OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function
EigenDA
Proposers submit state roots as children of any (possibly unresolved) previous state root proposal, by calling the propose() function in the KailuaTreasury. A parent state root can have multiple conflicting children, composing a tournament. Each proposer requires to lock a bond, currently set to 0.5 ETH, that can be slashed if any proposal made by them is proven incorrect via a fault proof or a conflicting validity proof. The bond can be withdrawn once the proposer has no more pending proposals that need to be resolved and was not eliminated.
Proposals consist of a state root and a reference to their parent and implicitly challenge any sibling proposals who have the same parent. A proposal asserts that the proposed state root constitutes a valid state transition from the parent’s state root. To offer efficient zk fault proofs, each proposal must include 3600 intermediate state commitments, each spanning 6 L2 blocks.
Proposals target sequential tournament epochs of currently 3600 * 6 L2 blocks. A tournament with a resolved parent tournament, a single child- and no conflicting sibling proposals can be resolved after 3d.
The Vanguard is a privileged actor who can always make the first child proposal on a parent state root. They can, in the worst case, delay each tournament for up to 1mo by not making this first proposal. Sibling proposals made after the Vanguard’s initial one or after the 1mo vanguardAdvantage in each tournament are permissionless.
Funds can be frozen if the vanguard exploits their vanguard advantage (1mo), halting the chain until they propose.
Any conflicting sibling proposals within a tournament that are made within the 3d challenge period of a proposal they are challenging, delay resolving the tournament until sufficient ZK proofs are published to leave one single tournament survivor.
In the tree of proposed state roots, each parent node can have multiple children. These children are indirectly challenging each other in a tournament, which can only be resolved if but a single child survives. A state root can be resolved if it is the only remaining proposal due to any combination of the following elimination methods:
- the proposal’s challenge period of 3d has ended before a conflicting proposal was made
- the proposal is proven correct with a full validity proof (invalidates all conflicting proposals)
- a conflicting sibling proposal is proven faulty
Proving any of the 3600 intermediate state commitments in a proposal faulty invalidates the entire proposal. Proving a proposal valid invalidates all conflicting siblings. Pruning of a tournament’s children happens strictly chronologically, which guarantees that the first faulty proposal of a given proposer is always pruned first. When pruned, an invalid proposal leads to the elimination of its proposer, which invalidates all their subsequent proposals, slashes their bond, and disallows future proposals by the same address. A slashed bond is transferred to an address chosen by the prover who caused the slashing.
A single remaining child in a tournament can be ‘resolved’ and will be finalized and usable for withdrawals after an execution delay of 3d 12h (time for the Guardian to manually blacklist malicious state roots).
Validity proofs and fault proofs both must be accompanied by a ZK proof that ensures that the new state was derived by correctly applying a series of valid user transactions to the previous state. These proofs are then verified on Ethereum by a smart contract.
The Kailua state validation system is primarily optimistically resolved, so no validity proofs are required in the happy case. But two different zk proofs on unresolved state roots are possible and permissionless: The proveValidity() function proves a state root proposal’s full validity, automatically invalidating all conflicting sibling proposals. proveOutputFault() allows any actor to eliminate a state root proposal for which they can prove that any of the 3600 intermediate state transitions in the proposal are not correct. Both are zk proofs of validity, although one is used as an efficient fault proof to invalidate a single conflicting state transition.
Funds can be stolen if the validity proof cryptography is broken or implemented incorrectly.
Funds can be stolen if no challenger checks the published state.
Funds can be stolen if the proposer routes proof verification through a malicious or faulty verifier by specifying an unsafe route selector.
Funds can be frozen if a verifier needed for a given proof is paused by its permissioned owner.
Past upgrades
The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.
2026 July 06, 08:52 UTCHigh severity37changesKailua cutover: respectedGameType on OptimismPortal2 and AnchorStateRegistry moved from 1 (PermissionedDisputeGame) to 1337 (KailuaGame). Withdrawals now clear through the ZK fault-proof game. DisputeGameFactory game1337 slot repointed from KailuaTreasury ( eth:0xc7EaCDd1… ) to the KailuaGame implementation ( eth:0x296e7aD6… ); the treasury continues to hold bonds and mint game clones. KailuaVerifier proxy upgraded (impl eth:0x7fC721AC… → eth:0xDd26da83… , 2026-07-01), with new FPVM IMAGE ID ( 0xd3c097df… ) and ROLLUP CONFIG HASH ( 0x96ff8605… ). KailuaTreasury economic parameters now live: participationBond = 0.5 ETH, vanguard = eth:0xD379de94… , vanguardAdvantage = 1 month.
Kailua cutover: respectedGameType on OptimismPortal2 and AnchorStateRegistry moved from 1 (PermissionedDisputeGame) to 1337 (KailuaGame). Withdrawals now clear through the ZK fault-proof game.
DisputeGameFactory game1337 slot repointed from KailuaTreasury (eth:0xc7EaCDd1…) to the KailuaGame implementation (eth:0x296e7aD6…); the treasury continues to hold bonds and mint game clones.
KailuaVerifier proxy upgraded (impl eth:0x7fC721AC… → eth:0xDd26da83…, 2026-07-01), with new FPVM_IMAGE_ID (0xd3c097df…) and ROLLUP_CONFIG_HASH (0x96ff8605…).
KailuaTreasury economic parameters now live: participationBond = 0.5 ETH, vanguard = eth:0xD379de94…, vanguardAdvantage = 1 month.
| contract AnchorStateRegistry (eth:0x0B95fF1d1B113bac3E29Ac0BBF2089126C9aE81A) [opstack/AnchorStateRegistry_post13] { | |
| +++ description: Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the KailuaGame. | |
| description: | |
| - | "Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame." |
| + | "Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the KailuaGame." |
| values.RespectedGameString: | |
| - | "PermissionedDisputeGame" |
| + | "KailuaGame" |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.respectedGameType: | |
| - | 1 |
| + | 1337 |
| } |
| contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0x45dA2CD511DA5FEAa535eBF166E628314a65843a) [opstack/DisputeGameFactory] { | |
| +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. | |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.game1337: | |
| - | "eth:0xc7EaCDd1E755d2823463Abc4434CA445F752b336" |
| + | "eth:0x296e7aD6D441b0627768bC0650179a4206479444" |
| } |
| contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0x652CD53eCf9466E5Fb00D0E11d6CBf6469a56D77) [opstack/OptimismPortal2] { | |
| +++ description: The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the KailuaGame. | |
| description: | |
| - | "The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame." |
| + | "The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the KailuaGame." |
| values.RespectedGameString: | |
| - | "PermissionedDisputeGame" |
| + | "KailuaGame" |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.respectedGameType: | |
| - | 1 |
| + | 1337 |
| } |
| contract KailuaVerifier (eth:0x6b49976a7340D0A3C00d1bEBE0E36E2367D89c7C) [N/A] { | |
| +++ description: Proxy in front of the Kailua proof verifier; routes verification requests to the canonical RiscZeroVerifierRouter and asserts the chain-specific rollup config and FPVM image ID. | |
| values.$implementation: | |
| - | "eth:0x7fC721ACC2183c292737C5a28Ea1B30d19f1cF29" |
| + | "eth:0xDd26da83B27987A7040caE31f2E35d9Bd6f5DE59" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.1: | |
| + | ["2026-07-01T10:19:35.000Z","0x07bf7a192a2ea3b5324ef5cef339715fc6b972b261463e751f39a3f7bb2ae72d",["eth:0xDd26da83B27987A7040caE31f2E35d9Bd6f5DE59"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 1 |
| + | 2 |
| values.FPVM_IMAGE_ID: | |
| - | "0xc2e7bc71ae10caf806a1a073e4170daf3f4ac31099f1f854f7062dd70ed12fe3" |
| + | "0xd3c097dfec583bb305eefcb5dcddc313b072e372cee66e13492c37fb50e6a90b" |
| values.ROLLUP_CONFIG_HASH: | |
| - | "0xc1f5bee1ef35d2b73a7cd351e650b2b123cb3bec91b0de3941af90539d5fc829" |
| + | "0x96ff86054c51b6b832108a14d93ced530c42e0ee5a113b47671c912fc19f5b1a" |
| implementationNames.eth:0x7fC721ACC2183c292737C5a28Ea1B30d19f1cF29: | |
| - | "KailuaVerifier" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xDd26da83B27987A7040caE31f2E35d9Bd6f5DE59: | |
| + | "KailuaVerifier" |
| } |
| contract KailuaTreasury (eth:0xc7EaCDd1E755d2823463Abc4434CA445F752b336) [risc0/KailuaTreasury] { | |
| +++ description: Kailua (RISC Zero ZK fault-proof) treasury: holds participation bonds, mints KailuaGame clones, and defines the vanguard proposer economics. Bonds confiscated from eliminated proposers are split 1/3 to the prover, 1/3 to the tournament winner, 1/3 burned. | |
| values.participationBond: | |
| - | 0 |
| + | "500000000000000000" |
| values.participationBondFmt: | |
| - | "0" |
| + | "0.5" |
| values.vanguard: | |
| - | "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" |
| + | "eth:0xD379de941E78Ab394d4D4917FcCE1CC45b6cd620" |
| values.vanguardAdvantage: | |
| - | 0 |
| + | 2592000 |
| values.vanguardAdvantageFmt: | |
| - | "0s" |
| + | "1mo" |
| } |
| EOA (eth:0xD379de941E78Ab394d4D4917FcCE1CC45b6cd620) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| receivedPermissions.1: | |
| + | {"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0xc7EaCDd1E755d2823463Abc4434CA445F752b336","description":"propose new state roots before anyone else, giving a first-mover advantage on the optimistic clock.","role":".vanguard"} |
| } |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract KailuaGame (eth:0x296e7aD6D441b0627768bC0650179a4206479444) [risc0/KailuaGame] | |
| +++ description: Implementation of the KailuaGame with type 1337. Based on this implementation, new KailuaGames are created with every new state root proposal. |
2026 June 15, 13:56 UTC16changesGuardian role on OptimismPortal2, SystemConfig and SuperchainConfig moved from Conduit Multisig 1 to the joint Ronin/Conduit Safe (RoninConduitOwner): SuperchainConfig was re-initialized via the standard StorageSetter→same-impl pattern, bumping initVersion 1 → 2 and setting the new guardian address. Conduit Multisig 1 remains challenger in DGF.
Guardian role on OptimismPortal2, SystemConfig and SuperchainConfig moved from Conduit Multisig 1 to the joint Ronin/Conduit Safe (RoninConduitOwner): SuperchainConfig was re-initialized via the standard StorageSetter→same-impl pattern, bumping initVersion 1 → 2 and setting the new guardian address. Conduit Multisig 1 remains challenger in DGF.
| contract Conduit Multisig 1 (eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746) [GnosisSafe] { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| values.$members.4: | |
| - | "eth:0x65D1d44B8B2fE15d45A03708E0835C7E98a56007" |
| values.$members.8: | |
| - | "eth:0xa4000bDD2bB92ce6750b31F1eeda47Bd1cB8e6e4" |
| values.multisigThreshold: | |
| - | "4 of 12 (33%)" |
| + | "4 of 10 (40%)" |
| receivedPermissions.1: | |
| - | {"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0xEE552e802A50d855bD08E93dfcc69228FC7B9E2c","description":"Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless).","role":".guardian"} |
| } |
| contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0x652CD53eCf9466E5Fb00D0E11d6CBf6469a56D77) [opstack/OptimismPortal2] { | |
| +++ description: The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame. | |
| values.guardian: | |
| - | "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746" |
| + | "eth:0xE9Ad9723C24d946958f9FD3Bc861BbF983525607" |
| } |
| contract SystemConfig (eth:0xc4f4F908C36C8119f1FBd52CebbDB30C6f2a23C1) [opstack/SystemConfig] { | |
| +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address. | |
| values.guardian: | |
| - | "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746" |
| + | "eth:0xE9Ad9723C24d946958f9FD3Bc861BbF983525607" |
| } |
| contract RoninConduitOwner (eth:0xE9Ad9723C24d946958f9FD3Bc861BbF983525607) [GnosisSafe] { | |
| +++ description: 5-of-6 joint Ronin/Conduit Safe. | |
| receivedPermissions.2: | |
| + | {"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0xEE552e802A50d855bD08E93dfcc69228FC7B9E2c","description":"Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless).","role":".guardian"} |
| } |
| contract SuperchainConfig (eth:0xEE552e802A50d855bD08E93dfcc69228FC7B9E2c) [opstack/SuperchainConfigFake_expiry] { | |
| +++ description: This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3mo 1d if left untouched. | |
| values.$pastUpgrades.1: | |
| + | ["2026-06-09T07:02:35.000Z","0x7e9202c4d6cb60aa8f0d86f9524f58cc3b5edb505495f61503d9374e3859cdb6",["eth:0x6322C2f2D6a4305Fc033754d486A5A067Ee5F9b1"]] |
| values.$pastUpgrades.2: | |
| + | ["2026-06-09T07:02:35.000Z","0x7e9202c4d6cb60aa8f0d86f9524f58cc3b5edb505495f61503d9374e3859cdb6",["eth:0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 1 |
| + | 3 |
| values.guardian: | |
| - | "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746" |
| + | "eth:0xE9Ad9723C24d946958f9FD3Bc861BbF983525607" |
| } |
2026 June 04, 07:25 UTCHigh severity22changesKailua (RISC Zero ZK fault-proof) deployed but not yet active. DisputeGameFactory registered game type 1337 → KailuaTreasury ( eth:0xc7EaCDd1… ). OptimismPortal2 and AnchorStateRegistry still have respectedGameType = 1 (PermissionedDisputeGame); cutover requires a separate change. Ronin KailuaTreasury (v1.2.0, eth:0xc7EaCDd1… ): verifier extracted to a separate KAILUA VERIFIER proxy, bond accounting reworked. Diff vs BOB v0.1.0 baseline: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xc7EaCDd1E755d2823463Abc4434CA445F752b336/eth:0x9B3E1661bccAF907893B71e4016c01513ae9263C. RoninConduitOwner got admin over the KailuaVerifier proxy ( eth:0x6b49976a… ), so the verifier proxy is upgradable along the same path as the other OP Stack contracts. RiscZeroVerifierRouter ( eth:0x8EaB2D97… ) is the shared RISC Zero verifier-selector router. Owner is a TimelockController ( eth:0x0b144E07… , 3d delay) governed by Safe eth:0x2E5bcc… . Both are shared RISC Zero infrastructure, not Ronin-specific.
Kailua (RISC Zero ZK fault-proof) deployed but not yet active.
DisputeGameFactory registered game type 1337 → KailuaTreasury (eth:0xc7EaCDd1…).
OptimismPortal2 and AnchorStateRegistry still have respectedGameType = 1 (PermissionedDisputeGame); cutover requires a separate change.
Ronin KailuaTreasury (v1.2.0, eth:0xc7EaCDd1…): verifier extracted to a separate KAILUA_VERIFIER proxy, bond accounting reworked. Diff vs BOB v0.1.0 baseline: https://disco.l2beat.com/diff/eth:0xc7EaCDd1E755d2823463Abc4434CA445F752b336/eth:0x9B3E1661bccAF907893B71e4016c01513ae9263C.
RoninConduitOwner got admin over the KailuaVerifier proxy (eth:0x6b49976a…), so the verifier proxy is upgradable along the same path as the other OP Stack contracts.
RiscZeroVerifierRouter (eth:0x8EaB2D97…) is the shared RISC Zero verifier-selector router. Owner is a TimelockController (eth:0x0b144E07…, 3d delay) governed by Safe eth:0x2E5bcc…. Both are shared RISC Zero infrastructure, not Ronin-specific.
| contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0x45dA2CD511DA5FEAa535eBF166E628314a65843a) [opstack/DisputeGameFactory] { | |
| +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. | |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.game1337: | |
| - | "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" |
| + | "eth:0xc7EaCDd1E755d2823463Abc4434CA445F752b336" |
| } |
| contract Conduit Multisig 1 (eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746) [GnosisSafe] { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| values.$members.0: | |
| + | "eth:0xcdC931935768c0562AfE989A366a3Dc4d52F4853" |
| values.$members.8: | |
| - | "eth:0x3840f487A17A41100DD1Bf0946c34f132a57Fd5f" |
| } |
| contract RoninConduitOwner (eth:0xE9Ad9723C24d946958f9FD3Bc861BbF983525607) [GnosisSafe] { | |
| +++ description: 5-of-6 joint Ronin/Conduit Safe. | |
| receivedPermissions.8: | |
| + | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x6b49976a7340D0A3C00d1bEBE0E36E2367D89c7C","role":"admin"} |
| } |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract TimelockController (eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711) [global/TimelockController] | |
| +++ description: A timelock with access control. The current minimum delay is 3d. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop (eth:0x1efDd13f831ceeEa14940806705A53D3211CD698) [risc0/RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop] | |
| +++ description: A verifier wrapper for the eth:0xafB31f5b70623CDF4b20Ada3f7230916A5A79df9 that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract RiscZeroGroth16Verifier (eth:0x20ff7C2Cf391a5F096A2Cc181cb41916680f8E97) [taiko/RiscZeroGroth16Verifier] | |
| +++ description: Verifier contract for RISC Zero Groth16 proofs (version 2.0.0-rc.3). |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract RiscZeroGroth16Verifier (eth:0x2a098988600d87650Fb061FfAff08B97149Fa84D) [taiko/RiscZeroGroth16Verifier] | |
| +++ description: Verifier contract for RISC Zero Groth16 proofs (version 3.0.0). |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract Safe (eth:0x2E5bcc9959dB5F5016F830E47943b07242CB2609) [GnosisSafe] | |
| +++ description: None |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop (eth:0x44c220f0598345195cE99AD6A57aDfFcb9Ea33e7) [risc0/RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop] | |
| +++ description: A verifier wrapper for the eth:0xf70aBAb028Eb6F4100A24B203E113D94E87DE93C that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract RiscZeroSetVerifier (eth:0x5005aBa3DFf7C940fcc1e48DccCAD611a80eEB85) [risc0/RiscZeroSetVerifier] | |
| +++ description: Set verifier contract for RISC Zero proofs (version 0.9.0). It allows verifying a whole set of proofs identified with a Merkle root at once, afterwards each individual proof could be efficiently verified just by checking Merkle inclusion against the verified root. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract RiscZeroGroth16Verifier (eth:0x54aCE3ED46529B4d4F3770C8Bad5dDC48717B9bF) [N/A] | |
| +++ description: None |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop (eth:0x68dC2cB4e61774873971c499D9b239ec5Ac540E3) [risc0/RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop] | |
| +++ description: A verifier wrapper for the eth:0x20ff7C2Cf391a5F096A2Cc181cb41916680f8E97 that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract KailuaVerifier (eth:0x6b49976a7340D0A3C00d1bEBE0E36E2367D89c7C) [N/A] | |
| +++ description: Proxy in front of the Kailua proof verifier; routes verification requests to the canonical RiscZeroVerifierRouter and asserts the chain-specific rollup config and FPVM image ID. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop (eth:0x844D5f01161E3559d36f23d0Aa9E9620949aF782) [risc0/RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop] | |
| +++ description: A verifier wrapper for the eth:0x5005aBa3DFf7C940fcc1e48DccCAD611a80eEB85 that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract RiscZeroVerifierRouter (eth:0x8EaB2D97Dfce405A1692a21b3ff3A172d593D319) [risc0/RiscZeroVerifierRouter] | |
| +++ description: A router proxy that routes to verifiers based on selectors. The mapping can be changed by a permissioned owner (eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711). |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop (eth:0x9F9994Eb4Cb5200198FEfb470f8b50301662e696) [risc0/RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop] | |
| +++ description: A verifier wrapper for the eth:0x2a098988600d87650Fb061FfAff08B97149Fa84D that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract RiscZeroGroth16Verifier (eth:0xafB31f5b70623CDF4b20Ada3f7230916A5A79df9) [taiko/RiscZeroGroth16Verifier] | |
| +++ description: Verifier contract for RISC Zero Groth16 proofs (version 2.2.0). |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract KailuaTreasury (eth:0xc7EaCDd1E755d2823463Abc4434CA445F752b336) [risc0/KailuaTreasury] | |
| +++ description: Kailua (RISC Zero ZK fault-proof) game implementation registered as game type 1337 in the DisputeGameFactory. Deployed but NOT yet active. Bonds confiscated from eliminated proposers are split 1/3 to the prover, 1/3 to the tournament winner, 1/3 burned. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop (eth:0xDa8f3de6fBBdb261Ac771B813a578A7aBdA6B2b1) [risc0/RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop] | |
| +++ description: A verifier wrapper for the eth:0x54aCE3ED46529B4d4F3770C8Bad5dDC48717B9bF that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract RiscZeroGroth16Verifier (eth:0xf70aBAb028Eb6F4100A24B203E113D94E87DE93C) [N/A] | |
| +++ description: None |
2026 May 21, 21:42 UTC42changesProxyAdminOwner / owner rotated from Conduit Multisig 1 to a new 5-of-6 Safe ( eth:0xE9Ad9723… ) that is a joint Ronin/Conduit multisig (per Ronin team: 4 Ronin signers + 2 Conduit signers retained from Conduit Multisig 1). Affects AnchorStateRegistry, L1ERC721Bridge, DisputeGameFactory (owner + proxyAdminOwner), and the other Ronin contracts under that ProxyAdmin.
ProxyAdminOwner / owner rotated from Conduit Multisig 1 to a new 5-of-6 Safe (eth:0xE9Ad9723…) that is a joint Ronin/Conduit multisig (per Ronin team: 4 Ronin signers + 2 Conduit signers retained from Conduit Multisig 1). Affects AnchorStateRegistry, L1ERC721Bridge, DisputeGameFactory (owner + proxyAdminOwner), and the other Ronin contracts under that ProxyAdmin.
| contract AnchorStateRegistry (eth:0x0B95fF1d1B113bac3E29Ac0BBF2089126C9aE81A) [opstack/AnchorStateRegistry_post13] { | |
| +++ description: Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame. | |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| - | "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746" |
| + | "eth:0xE9Ad9723C24d946958f9FD3Bc861BbF983525607" |
| } |
| contract L1ERC721Bridge (eth:0x3a63087B36Ad5a2fD89C7C8517832dE067Fe4959) [opstack/L1ERC721Bridge] { | |
| +++ description: Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain. | |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| - | "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746" |
| + | "eth:0xE9Ad9723C24d946958f9FD3Bc861BbF983525607" |
| } |
| contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0x45dA2CD511DA5FEAa535eBF166E628314a65843a) [opstack/DisputeGameFactory] { | |
| +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. | |
| values.owner: | |
| - | "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746" |
| + | "eth:0xE9Ad9723C24d946958f9FD3Bc861BbF983525607" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| - | "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746" |
| + | "eth:0xE9Ad9723C24d946958f9FD3Bc861BbF983525607" |
| } |
| contract Conduit Multisig 1 (eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746) [GnosisSafe] { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| receivedPermissions.2: | |
| - | {"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x6FFbcf498CcF81111f397fa6065dEA13A47E573C","description":"set and change address mappings.","role":".owner","via":[{"address":"eth:0x757077Ddf12B652430DCE8fF3e4c749F5Ca861fC"}]} |
| receivedPermissions.3: | |
| - | {"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0xc4f4F908C36C8119f1FBd52CebbDB30C6f2a23C1","description":"it can update the preconfer address, the batch submitter (Sequencer) address and the gas configuration of the system.","role":".owner"} |
| receivedPermissions.4: | |
| - | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x0B95fF1d1B113bac3E29Ac0BBF2089126C9aE81A","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x757077Ddf12B652430DCE8fF3e4c749F5Ca861fC"}]} |
| receivedPermissions.5: | |
| - | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x3a63087B36Ad5a2fD89C7C8517832dE067Fe4959","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x757077Ddf12B652430DCE8fF3e4c749F5Ca861fC"}]} |
| receivedPermissions.6: | |
| - | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x45dA2CD511DA5FEAa535eBF166E628314a65843a","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x757077Ddf12B652430DCE8fF3e4c749F5Ca861fC"}]} |
| receivedPermissions.7: | |
| - | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x51639D151456d0384285C6974e441A5D2B784B7D","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x757077Ddf12B652430DCE8fF3e4c749F5Ca861fC"}]} |
| receivedPermissions.8: | |
| - | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x652CD53eCf9466E5Fb00D0E11d6CBf6469a56D77","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x757077Ddf12B652430DCE8fF3e4c749F5Ca861fC"}]} |
| receivedPermissions.9: | |
| - | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x69Fcd2E75af364295EaF48Dc058338F80CFfb434","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x757077Ddf12B652430DCE8fF3e4c749F5Ca861fC"}]} |
| receivedPermissions.10: | |
| - | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x85Ce2Ccef125aa8d018c298d5eA0f2FB5E5063c1","description":"upgrading the bridge implementation can give access to all funds escrowed therein.","role":".$admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x757077Ddf12B652430DCE8fF3e4c749F5Ca861fC"}]} |
| receivedPermissions.11: | |
| - | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xc4f4F908C36C8119f1FBd52CebbDB30C6f2a23C1","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x757077Ddf12B652430DCE8fF3e4c749F5Ca861fC"}]} |
| receivedPermissions.12: | |
| - | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xEE552e802A50d855bD08E93dfcc69228FC7B9E2c","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x502e993a5aFC9fE59b00B07ee500729D71092E34"}]} |
| receivedPermissions.13: | |
| - | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xF9aD628d9F907ad5d46Ab80100dacDf09EAc9A8e","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x757077Ddf12B652430DCE8fF3e4c749F5Ca861fC"}]} |
| directlyReceivedPermissions: | |
| - | [{"permission":"act","from":"eth:0x502e993a5aFC9fE59b00B07ee500729D71092E34","role":".owner"},{"permission":"act","from":"eth:0x757077Ddf12B652430DCE8fF3e4c749F5Ca861fC","role":".owner"}] |
| } |
| contract ProxyAdmin (eth:0x502e993a5aFC9fE59b00B07ee500729D71092E34) [global/ProxyAdmin] { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| values.owner: | |
| - | "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746" |
| + | "eth:0xE9Ad9723C24d946958f9FD3Bc861BbF983525607" |
| } |
| contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0x652CD53eCf9466E5Fb00D0E11d6CBf6469a56D77) [opstack/OptimismPortal2] { | |
| +++ description: The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame. | |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| - | "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746" |
| + | "eth:0xE9Ad9723C24d946958f9FD3Bc861BbF983525607" |
| } |
| contract DelayedWETH (eth:0x69Fcd2E75af364295EaF48Dc058338F80CFfb434) [opstack/DelayedWETH] { | |
| +++ description: Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds. | |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| - | "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746" |
| + | "eth:0xE9Ad9723C24d946958f9FD3Bc861BbF983525607" |
| } |
| contract ProxyAdmin (eth:0x757077Ddf12B652430DCE8fF3e4c749F5Ca861fC) [global/ProxyAdmin] { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| values.owner: | |
| - | "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746" |
| + | "eth:0xE9Ad9723C24d946958f9FD3Bc861BbF983525607" |
| } |
| contract L1StandardBridge (eth:0x85Ce2Ccef125aa8d018c298d5eA0f2FB5E5063c1) [opstack/L1StandardBridge] { | |
| +++ description: The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain. | |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| - | "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746" |
| + | "eth:0xE9Ad9723C24d946958f9FD3Bc861BbF983525607" |
| } |
| contract SystemConfig (eth:0xc4f4F908C36C8119f1FBd52CebbDB30C6f2a23C1) [opstack/SystemConfig] { | |
| +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address. | |
| values.owner: | |
| - | "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746" |
| + | "eth:0xE9Ad9723C24d946958f9FD3Bc861BbF983525607" |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| - | "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746" |
| + | "eth:0xE9Ad9723C24d946958f9FD3Bc861BbF983525607" |
| } |
| contract SuperchainConfig (eth:0xEE552e802A50d855bD08E93dfcc69228FC7B9E2c) [opstack/SuperchainConfigFake_expiry] { | |
| +++ description: This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3mo 1d if left untouched. | |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| - | "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746" |
| + | "eth:0xE9Ad9723C24d946958f9FD3Bc861BbF983525607" |
| } |
| contract L1CrossDomainMessenger (eth:0xF9aD628d9F907ad5d46Ab80100dacDf09EAc9A8e) [opstack/L1CrossDomainMessenger] { | |
| +++ description: Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function. | |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| - | "eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746" |
| + | "eth:0xE9Ad9723C24d946958f9FD3Bc861BbF983525607" |
| } |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract PreimageOracle (eth:0x1fb8cdFc6831fc866Ed9C51aF8817Da5c287aDD3) [opstack/PreimageOracle] | |
| +++ description: The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract MIPS (eth:0x6463dEE3828677F6270d83d45408044fc5eDB908) [opstack/MIPS] | |
| +++ description: The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract Safe (eth:0xE9Ad9723C24d946958f9FD3Bc861BbF983525607) [GnosisSafe] | |
| +++ description: None |
2026 May 18, 09:18 UTC20changesInitial discovery.
Initial discovery.
Initial discovery
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract AnchorStateRegistry (eth:0x0B95fF1d1B113bac3E29Ac0BBF2089126C9aE81A) [opstack/AnchorStateRegistry_post13] | |
| +++ description: Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract MainchainBridgeManager (eth:0x2Cf3CFb17774Ce0CFa34bB3f3761904e7fc3FaDB) [N/A] | |
| +++ description: Governance and proxy-admin contract for the legacy MainchainGateway bridge. Holds the operator/governor set, tallies stake-weighted votes for bridge proposals (operator rotations, threshold changes, withdrawals). |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract L1ERC721Bridge (eth:0x3a63087B36Ad5a2fD89C7C8517832dE067Fe4959) [opstack/L1ERC721Bridge] | |
| +++ description: Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0x45dA2CD511DA5FEAa535eBF166E628314a65843a) [opstack/DisputeGameFactory] | |
| +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract Conduit Multisig 1 (eth:0x4a4962275DF8C60a80d3a25faEc5AA7De116A746) [GnosisSafe] | |
| +++ description: None |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract ProxyAdmin (eth:0x502e993a5aFC9fE59b00B07ee500729D71092E34) [global/ProxyAdmin] | |
| +++ description: None |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract OptimismMintableERC20Factory (eth:0x51639D151456d0384285C6974e441A5D2B784B7D) [opstack/OptimismMintableERC20Factory] | |
| +++ description: A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it's deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain's representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract LegacyBridgeOwner (eth:0x51F6696Ae42C6C40CA9F5955EcA2aaaB1Cefb26e) [GnosisSafe] | |
| +++ description: None |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract PermissionedDisputeGame (eth:0x58bf355C5d4EdFc723eF89d99582ECCfd143266A) [opstack/PermissionedDisputeGame] | |
| +++ description: Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract MainchainGateway (eth:0x64192819Ac13Ef72bF6b5AE239AC672B43a9AF08) [N/A] | |
| +++ description: Legacy multi-sig-secured Ronin bridge contract holding the L1 side of deposits made before the April 2025 Chainlink CCIP migration. Still custodies residual user balances (ETH backing legacy WETH on Ronin, the deprecated WBTC contract, and dust). Withdrawals authorised by the Ronin BridgeOperator stake-weighted threshold via MainchainBridgeManager. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0x652CD53eCf9466E5Fb00D0E11d6CBf6469a56D77) [opstack/OptimismPortal2] | |
| +++ description: The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract DelayedWETH (eth:0x69Fcd2E75af364295EaF48Dc058338F80CFfb434) [opstack/DelayedWETH] | |
| +++ description: Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract AddressManager (eth:0x6FFbcf498CcF81111f397fa6065dEA13A47E573C) [opstack/AddressManager] | |
| +++ description: Legacy contract used to manage a mapping of string names to addresses. Modern OP stack uses a different standard proxy system instead, but this contract is still necessary for backwards compatibility with several older contracts. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract ProxyAdmin (eth:0x757077Ddf12B652430DCE8fF3e4c749F5Ca861fC) [global/ProxyAdmin] | |
| +++ description: None |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract L1StandardBridge (eth:0x85Ce2Ccef125aa8d018c298d5eA0f2FB5E5063c1) [opstack/L1StandardBridge] | |
| +++ description: The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract Wrapped Ether Token (eth:0xC02aaA39b223FE8D0A0e5C4F27eAD9083C756Cc2) [N/A] | |
| +++ description: None |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract SystemConfig (eth:0xc4f4F908C36C8119f1FBd52CebbDB30C6f2a23C1) [opstack/SystemConfig] | |
| +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract SuperchainConfig (eth:0xEE552e802A50d855bD08E93dfcc69228FC7B9E2c) [opstack/SuperchainConfigFake_expiry] | |
| +++ description: This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3mo 1d if left untouched. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract PauseEnforcer (eth:0xF184a6Cd470Cac2CF5cD4fBa34e20D482D6A6062) [N/A] | |
| +++ description: Immutable emergency-pause contract for the legacy MainchainGateway. Holders of the SENTRY_ROLE can flip MainchainGateway into a paused state to halt deposits and withdrawals in an emergency. |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract L1CrossDomainMessenger (eth:0xF9aD628d9F907ad5d46Ab80100dacDf09EAc9A8e) [opstack/L1CrossDomainMessenger] | |
| +++ description: Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function. |
The system has a centralized operator
MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
Users can force any transaction
Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.
Regular exits
The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.
Forced messaging
If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.
EVM compatible smart contracts are supported
OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.
External bridge architecture
The May 2026 L2 migration deployed the OP Stack canonical bridge (OptimismPortal2 and L1StandardBridge) but did not migrate user funds into it; it is currently empty. User assets are custodied on two separate L1 paths, neither of which is the canonical bridge analyzed on this page: (1) Chainlink CCIP TokenPools, the active bridge since April 2025, securing 12 tokens including AXS, USDC, WETH, WBTC (new contract), YGG, PIXEL and SLP via Chainlink DON attestations and the Risk Management Network; (2) the legacy MainchainGateway, deprecated in April 2025 but still holding residual balances (legacy WBTC, ETH backing of legacy WETH, dust), withdrawable through the Ronin BridgeOperator stake-weighted multisig. Sky Mavis has not announced a plan to migrate liquidity into the OP Stack bridge.
Ethereum
Actors:
A Multisig with 5/6 threshold. 5-of-6 joint Ronin/Conduit Safe.
- Can upgrade with no delay
- AnchorStateRegistry ProxyAdmin
- L1ERC721Bridge ProxyAdmin
- DisputeGameFactory ProxyAdmin
- OptimismMintableERC20Factory ProxyAdmin
- OptimismPortal2 ProxyAdmin
- DelayedWETH ProxyAdmin
- KailuaVerifier
- L1StandardBridge ProxyAdmin
- SystemConfig ProxyAdmin
- SuperchainConfig ProxyAdmin
- L1CrossDomainMessenger ProxyAdmin
- Can interact with AddressManager
- set and change address mappings ProxyAdmin
- Can interact with SystemConfig
- Can interact with SuperchainConfig
- Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless)
A Multisig with 3/5 threshold.
- Can interact with TimelockController
- cancel queued transactions
- execute transactions that are ready
- manage all access control roles with 3d delay TimelockController with 3d delay
- propose transactions
- Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop
- pause the verifier
- Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop
- pause the verifier
- Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop
- pause the verifier
- Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierRouter
- add/remove verifiers and the selectors they are mapped to with 3d delay TimelockController with 3d delay
- Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop
- pause the verifier
- Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop
- pause the verifier
A Multisig with 3/5 threshold.
- Can upgrade with no delay
- MainchainBridgeManager
A Multisig with 4/10 threshold.
Participants (10):
0xcdC9…48530xA9FC…8d090x6BB4…83A60x2103…911c0x8117…E7Ac0xA073…bda20xF331…647D0xa0C6…90380xefCf…dD5C0x4D80…5BAe- Can interact with SystemConfig
- Allowed to commit transactions from the current layer to the host chain
- Can interact with KailuaTreasury
- propose new state roots before anyone else, giving a first-mover advantage on the optimistic clock
Ethereum
The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately RoninConduitOwner
This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3mo 1d if left untouched.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately RoninConduitOwner
- guardian: RoninConduitOwner
Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately RoninConduitOwner
The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately RoninConduitOwner
All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation.
Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain’s epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately RoninConduitOwner
A timelock with access control. The current minimum delay is 3d.
- Roles:
- canceller: Safe
- defaultAdmin: TimelockController; ultimately Safe
- executor: Safe
- proposer: Safe
Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the KailuaGame.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately RoninConduitOwner
The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game.
Implementation of the KailuaGame with type 1337. Based on this implementation, new KailuaGames are created with every new state root proposal.
Set verifier contract for RISC Zero proofs (version 0.9.0). It allows verifying a whole set of proofs identified with a Merkle root at once, afterwards each individual proof could be efficiently verified just by checking Merkle inclusion against the verified root.
- Roles:
- owner: RoninConduitOwner
A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it’s deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain’s representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately RoninConduitOwner
Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger.
Legacy multi-sig-secured Ronin bridge contract holding the L1 side of deposits made before the April 2025 Chainlink CCIP migration. Still custodies residual user balances (ETH backing legacy WETH on Ronin, the deprecated WBTC contract, and dust). Withdrawals authorised by the Ronin BridgeOperator stake-weighted threshold via MainchainBridgeManager.
- Roles:
- admin: MainchainBridgeManager
All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation.
The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.
Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately RoninConduitOwner
A router proxy that routes to verifiers based on selectors. The mapping can be changed by a permissioned owner (TimelockController).
- Roles:
- owner: TimelockController; ultimately Safe
Immutable emergency-pause contract for the legacy MainchainGateway. Holders of the SENTRY_ROLE can flip MainchainGateway into a paused state to halt deposits and withdrawals in an emergency.
The current deployment carries some associated risks:
Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).