Search

Search for projects by name or address

SummaryValue SecuredActivityMilestones & IncidentsRisk summaryRisk analysisData availabilityState validationOperatorWithdrawalsPermissionsSmart contracts

Immutable X logo
Immutable X

This project is archived and no longer maintained.

Badges

About

Immutable X is a NFT-focused Validium providing zero gas fees, instant trades and scalability for applications.

  • Total Value SecuredTVS
    $2.56 M81.1%
  • Past day UOPSDaily UOPS
    0.000.00%
  • Type
    Other
  • Purposes
    NFT, Exchange

    • Tokens breakdown

    Value secured breakdown

    View TVS breakdown
    Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure
    Explore more in Discovery UI

    Badges

    About

    Immutable X is a NFT-focused Validium providing zero gas fees, instant trades and scalability for applications.

    Why is the project listed in others?

    The data availability committee threshold is too low

    Consequence: projects with a low DAC threshold rely on the honesty of few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. These entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds.

    Learn more about the recategorisation here.

    Value SecuredView TVS breakdown
    Total
    Canonically BridgedCanonically Bridged ValueCanonical
    Natively MintedNatively Minted TokensNative
    Externally BridgedExternally Bridged ValueExternal
    ETH & derivatives
    Stablecoins
    BTC & derivatives
    Other
    View TVS breakdown
    Activity
    Data source: StarkEx Aggregations API

    2021 Mar 26 — 2026 Mar 09

    Past Day UOPS
    No data
    Past Day Ops count
    No data
    Max. UOPS
    42.52
    2024 Sep 04
    Past day UOPS/TPS Ratio
    No data
    Milestones & Incidents

    Immutable X migrated to Immutable zkEVM

    2026 Mar 5th

    Immutable X deployed contracts for migration to Immutable zkEVM. Operation of Immutable X halts.

    Learn more

    IMX Token introduced

    2022 Jun 29th

    Immutable announce IMX, the native ERC-20 utility token of Immutable X.

    Learn more
    Risk summary

    Funds can be stolen if

    1. a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is a 14d delay on code upgrades.

    Funds can be lost if

    1. the external data becomes unavailable (CRITICAL).

    Users can be censored if

    1. the committee restricts their access to the external data,
    2. the operator refuses to include their transactions. However, there exists a mechanism to independently exit the system.

    MEV can be extracted if

    1. the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
    Risk analysis
    Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure
    Sequencer failure
    No mechanism

    There is no mechanism to have transactions be included if the sequencer is down or censoring.

    State validation
    Validity proofs (ST)

    STARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness.

    Data availability
    External (DAC)

    Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 5/7 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.

    Exit window
    14d

    Users have 14d to exit funds in case of an unwanted regular upgrade. There is a 14d delay before a regular upgrade is applied, and withdrawals can take up to 0s to be processed.

    Proposer failure
    Use escape hatch

    Users are able to trustlessly exit by submitting a Merkle proof of funds. NFTs will be minted on L1 to exit.

    Data availability

    Data is not stored on chain

    The balances of the users are not published onchain, but rather sent to external trusted parties, also known as committee members. A state update is valid and accepted onchain only if at least a quorum of the committee members sign a state update.

    • Funds can be lost if the external data becomes unavailable (CRITICAL).

    • Users can be censored if the committee restricts their access to the external data.

    1. Data Availability Modes - StarkEx documentation
    2. Validium - StarkEx documentation
    3. Availability Verifiers - StarkEx documentation
    State validation
    Validity proofs

    Each update to the system state must be accompanied by a ZK proof that ensures that the new state was derived by correctly applying a series of valid user transactions to the previous state. These proofs are then verified on Ethereum by a smart contract. The system state is represented using Merkle roots.

    1. Enforcing Consistency on the On-Chain State - StarkEx documentation
    Operator

    The system has a centralized operator

    The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system. Typically, the Operator is the hot wallet of the StarkEx service submitting state updates for which proofs have been already submitted and verified.

    • MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

    1. Operator - StarkEx documentation

    Users can force exit the system

    Force exit allows the users to escape censorship by withdrawing their funds. The system allows users to force the withdrawal of funds by submitting a request directly to the contract onchain. The request must be served within a defined time period. If this does not happen, the system will halt regular operation and permit trustless withdrawal of funds.

    • Users can be censored if the operator refuses to include their transactions. However, there exists a mechanism to independently exit the system.

    1. Censorship Prevention - StarkEx documentation
    Withdrawals

    Regular exit

    The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is settled the funds become available for withdrawal on L1. ZK proofs are required to settle blocks. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. When withdrawing NFTs they are minted on L1.

    1. Withdrawal - StarkEx documentation

    Forced exit

    If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular exit they can submit their withdrawal requests directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular exit.

    1. Forced Operations - StarkEx documentation
    2. Full Withdrawal - StarkEx documentation

    Emergency exit

    If the enough time deadline passes and the forced exit is still ignored the user can put the system into a frozen state, disallowing further state updates. In that case everybody can withdraw by submitting a merkle proof of their funds with their L1 transaction.

    1. Forced Operations - StarkEx documentation
    2. Full Withdrawal - StarkEx documentation
    Permissions
    A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions
    Go to Disco
    Disco UI Banner
    Disco UI BannerExplore in Disco

    Ethereum

    Actors:

    IMXAdminMultisig0xD2C3…D192

    A Multisig with 4/6 threshold.

    • Can upgrade with no delay
      • RootAxelarBridgeAdaptor
      • StarkExchange
      • RootERC20BridgeFlowRate

    Participants (6):

    0x37AC…7b260x3d39…06e00xdb6c…65Ba0xA28A…7f7b0x296A…bB300x94e9…7a5e
    Used in:
    EOA 10x6f24…3F05
    • Can upgrade with no delay
      • AxelarGasService
    Smart contracts
    A dashboard to explore contracts and permissions
    Go to Disco
    Disco UI Banner
    Disco UI BannerExplore in Disco
    A diagram of the smart contract architecture
    A diagram of the smart contract architecture

    Ethereum

    AxelarGasService0x2d5d…2712Implementation (Upgradable)Admin
    • Roles:
      • admin: EOA 1
    Can be upgraded by:
    EOA 1 with no delay
    AxelarGatewayProxyMultisig0x4F44…56A5
    RootAxelarBridgeAdaptor0x4f49…8932Implementation (Upgradable)Admin
    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately IMXAdminMultisig
    Can be upgraded by:
    IMXAdminMultisig with no delay
    Proxy used in:
    StarkExchangeMigration0x58b5…e806
    StarkExchange
    Escrow
    0x5FDC…27e9Implementation (Upgradable)Admin
    • Roles:
      • admin: IMXAdminMultisig
    The following tokens are included in the value secured calculation:
    ETH token logoIMX token logoUSDC token logoOMI token logo
    Can be upgraded by:
    IMXAdminMultisig with no delay
    Operators0x7DdB…efbC
    ChildERC200x8804…FaD1
    VaultRootSenderAdapter0x9Fab…cd32
    RootERC20BridgeFlowRate0xBa5E…3eB6Implementation (Upgradable)Admin
    • Roles:
      • admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately IMXAdminMultisig
    Can be upgraded by:
    IMXAdminMultisig with no delay
    Proxy used in:
    ProxyAdmin0xdE2B…1Ec8
    • Roles:
      • owner: IMXAdminMultisig
    Used in:

    The current deployment carries some associated risks:

    • Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is a 14d delay on code upgrades.