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Select two chains to compare intent bridge transfer speed.
Activity metrics come from indexed transfers. Intent mechanics are curated protocol properties.
# | Name | Last 24h
Volume | Last 24h
transfers | Last 24h avg.
transfer time | Last 24h avg.
transfer value | Active
chains | Active
tokens | Top
path | User
recovery | Solver
access | Intent
model | Settlement | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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1 | Relay | $157.04 M | 4s | $514.58 | 26 | 2.11 K | There is no onchain refund option. Failed transfers depend on Relay-operated recovery. | Transfers are filled by Relay-operated infrastructure. | Users pay against a quote from the centralized Relay API and Relay solvers fill on the destination chain from their own liquidity. | Settlement depends on Relay's centralized oracle and allocator flow: escrowed deposits are released by a single allocator signature, and the escrow owner can replace the allocator without delay. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
2 | Across | $37.36 M | 6s | $1.10 K | 17 | 10 | If no relayer fast-fills a deposit, Across can complete it through the protocol slow-fill path. This is not available for chains without an Ethereum canonical bridge adapter, nor for V5 Gateway deposits, which are instead refunded on the origin chain after the fill deadline expires. | Relayers compete to fill deposits and receive repayment. | Relayers compete to fill cross-chain transfer intents across supported chains and assets. | Relayer repayment is settled through the Across system and can be escalated to token voting via UMA. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
3 | Stargate | $29.78 M | Bus:6m 41s Taxi:1m 5s | $32.94 K | 11 | 3 | Source-side checks revert before funds move; destination delivery depends on the DVN signature. There is no source-chain refund path after funds move. | Execution is permissionless via LayerZero and Stargate liquidity pools, but requires DVN liveness. | Transfers use Stargate liquidity and omnichain routing. | Stargate uses LayerZero-based cross-chain messaging. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
4 | deBridge DLN | $14.63 M | 15s | $5.33 K | 13 | 217 | Unfilled orders can be cancelled through the DLN flow. | Order fulfillment is designed around independent takers. | Users create orders that takers can fulfill. | Order state and settlement use deBridge infrastructure. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
5 | Mayan | $10.96 M | 17s | $949.28 | 10 | 422 | There is no onchain refund option. Unfulfilled Swift orders can be refunded from the source contract with a Wormhole or refund-verifier message. | Drivers compete in Mayan auctions. | Solvers compete to fill cross-chain swap intents. | Mayan uses Wormhole messages to prove destination fulfillment or refunds and unlock source-chain funds. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
6 | LI.FI | $8.79 M | 10s | $2.37 K | 13 | 14 | Escrow orders can be refunded after expiry; Compact orders expire without moving locked funds unless fills are proven in time. | Whitelisted solvers have access to an internal API and marketplace, but solving is generally permissionless in OIF. | Uses the Open Intents Framework standard. | Solvers fill destination outputs, then claim source inputs after oracle proofs of the fills. Oracles are configurable by LI.FI. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
7 | Meson | $424.48 K | 5m 7s | $1.72 K | 8 | 4 | There is no onchain refund option. The central liquidity pool implementation source code is unavailable. | Execution depends on Meson LPs locking destination-chain liquidity in the smart contract escrow. Execution is permissionless but needs offchain signatures by the centralized oracle. | Transfers are filled from a central liquidity pool on each chain. | Settled through Meson bridge contracts. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
8 | Celer cBridge | $226.74 K | 3m 16s | $1.02 K | 7 | 4 | There is no onchain refund option. Failed pool transfers can be withdrawn on the source chain using gateway data signed by the Celer SGN. | Solvers provide the signatures of the offchain Celer signer quorum with their transaction. | Transfers are filled from the liquidity pool. | Relay and refund messages must be authorized by a Celer signer quorum. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
9 | Butter Network | $149.23 K | 1m 52s | $833.69 | 5 | 3 | There is no onchain refund: once assets are locked on the source chain, no contract path returns them. Failed destination deliveries can be permissionlessly re-executed via retryMessageIn, and failed token payouts are swept to an admin-set failedReceiver address. | There are no independent solvers or auctions: destination payouts come from bridge-held pool liquidity and only after settlement on the MAP relay chain. Anyone can trigger a payout by relaying the settled message with a receipt proof. | Transfers are filled from bridge-owned liquidity on the destination chain after the message settles on the MAP relay chain. MAPO is the only token that is burned and minted instead. | Transfers settle through the MAP relay chain, an external proof-of-stake chain. Destination chains verify only BLS signatures of its validator set via onchain light clients. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
10 | 1inch Fusion+ | $63.31 K | 9s | $7.91 K | 5 | 4 | The filling resolver, or later a RES holder, must cancel the source-chain escrow to return the deposit to the user. | Orders use timed resolver whitelists, followed by access for owner-issued RES NFT holders. | A resolver fills a user order through matching source- and destination-chain escrows. | Matching escrows use one secret and separate source- and destination-chain timelocks. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
11 | Gas.zip | $3.73 K | 2m 56s | $2.41 | 17 | 5 | There is no onchain refund option. Invalid deposits are handled through Gas.zip support. | No open solver marketplace is exposed. | Focused on sending small gas balances across chains. | Settlement depends on Gas.zip internal, centralized accounting. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||