$622 M
6.20%
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Base is an Optimistic Rollup that has been developed on the Ethereum network, utilizing OP Stack technology.
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Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.
All of the data needed for proof construction is published on chain.
The code that secures the system can be changed arbitrarily and without notice.
In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project’s chain by sending them to L1. There is a 12h delay on this operation.
Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.
Ultimately, OP stack chains will use interactive fraud proofs to enforce state correctness. This feature is currently in development and the system permits invalid state roots.
Funds can be stolen if an invalid state root is submitted to the system (CRITICAL).
All executed transactions are submitted to an on chain smart contract. The execution of the rollup is based entirely on the submitted transactions, so anyone monitoring the contract can know the correct state of the rollup chain.
The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.
MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on-chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract directly.
The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is finalized the funds become available for withdrawal on L1. The process of block finalization usually takes several days to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.
Funds can be frozen if the centralized validator goes down. Users cannot produce blocks themselves and exiting the system requires new block production (CRITICAL).
If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular exit they can submit their withdrawal requests directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all withdrawals, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular withdrawals initated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular exit.
OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.
This address is the owner of the ProxyAdmin. It can upgrade the bridge implementation potentially gaining access to all funds. This is a Gnosis Safe with 2 / 2 threshold.
Those are the participants of the AdminMultisig.
Address designated as a Guardian of the OptimismPortal, meaning it can halt withdrawals. It’s the owner of SystemConfig, which allows to update the sequencer address. Moreover, it can challenge state roots without going through the fault proof process. This is a Gnosis Safe with 3 / 6 threshold.
Those are the participants of the GuardianMultisig.
Core multisig of the Base team, it’s a member of the AdminMultisig, meaning it can upgrade the bridge implementation potentially gaining access to all funds. This is a Gnosis Safe with 3 / 6 threshold.
Those are the participants of the BaseMultisig.
Core multisig of the Optimism team, it can challenge state roots without going through the fault proof process. It’s also a member of the AdminMultisig, meaning it can upgrade the bridge implementation potentially gaining access to all funds. This is a Gnosis Safe with 5 / 7 threshold.
Those are the participants of the OptimismMultisig.
Owner of AddressManager. Admin of OptimismPortal, SystemConfig, L2OutputOracle, L1ERC721Bridge, OptimismMintableERC20Factory, L1StandardBridge.
Central actor allowed to commit L2 transactions to L1.
Central actor allowed to post new L2 state roots to L1.
Central actor allowed to delete L2 state roots proposed by a Proposer.
Central actor allowed to pause deposits and withdrawals.
The L2OutputOracle contract contains a list of proposed state roots which Proposers assert to be a result of block execution. Currently only the PROPOSER address can submit new state roots.
Can be upgraded by: ProxyAdmin
Upgrade delay: No delay
The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. This contract stores the following tokens: ETH.
Can be upgraded by: ProxyAdmin
Upgrade delay: No delay
It contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, the L2 gas limit and the unsafe block signer address.
Can be upgraded by: ProxyAdmin
Upgrade delay: No delay
The L1CrossDomainMessenger (L1xDM) contract sends messages from L1 to L2, and relays messages from L2 onto L1. In the event that a message sent from L1 to L2 is rejected for exceeding the L2 epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.
Can be upgraded by: ProxyAdmin
Upgrade delay: No delay
The L1ERC721Bridge contract is the main entry point to deposit ERC721 tokens from L1 to L2.
Can be upgraded by: ProxyAdmin
Upgrade delay: No delay
This contract is the permissioned challenger of the system. It can delete non finalized roots without going through the fault proof process. It is functionally equivalent to a 1/2 multisig where neither party can remove the other’s permission to execute a Challenger call. It is controlled by the GuardianMultisig and the OptimismMultisig.
Main entry point for users depositing ERC20 token that do not require custom gateway.
Can be upgraded by: ProxyAdmin
Upgrade delay: No delay
Main entry point for users depositing ETH.
Can be upgraded by: ProxyAdmin
Upgrade delay: No delay
wstETH Vault for custom wstETH Gateway. Fully controlled by Lido governance.
The current deployment carries some associated risks:
Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).