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X Layer is an OP Stack Layer 2 by OKX with seamless integration with OKX products. It is connected to the Agglayer shared bridge.
X Layer is an OP Stack Layer 2 by OKX with seamless integration with OKX products. It is connected to the Agglayer shared bridge.
Consequence: projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds.
Learn more about the recategorisation here.
The section shows the operating costs that L2s pay to Ethereum.
This section shows how much data the project publishes to its data-availability (DA) layer over time. The project currently posts data to; previously it posted to
Ethereum.
This section shows how "live" the project's operators are by displaying how frequently they submit transactions of the selected type. It also highlights anomalies - significant deviations from their typical schedule.
OP Succinct Lite dispute game activated
2026 Jun 30th
X Layer activates OP Succinct Lite to resolve challenged OP Stack state proposals with ZK proofs.
Migration to Pessimistic Proofs
2025 Aug 5th
X Layer stops validating the full L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups. state and moves to bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. accounting proofs.
In the event of a sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project’s chain by sending them to L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development.. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.
Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Single round proofs (1R) only require a single transaction to resolve. ZK proofs are used to prove the correctness of the state transition. Challenges are currently restricted to 1 whitelisted challenger and proposals are restricted to 1 whitelisted proposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block..
All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development..
There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.
Only whitelisted proposers can publish state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree.. PermissionlessAnyone willing should be able to join and leave the network at any time, without causing significant disturbance to the network or being detrimental to the party in question. No single entity should have the power to allowlist or blocklist participants. proposing becomes available only after 1000y of proposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block. inactivity, which is not a practical recovery path.
Transaction data is posted to Ethereum L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. as compressed calldata or blobsThe data that a rollup publishes to its L1/data availability (DA) layer. They consist of the L2 transactions that are rolled up, along with some metadata. Blobs are introduced as a new transaction type within Ethereum with EIP-4844, and has rollup scaling specifically in mind. Blobs persist on Ethereum’s Beacon Chain ephemerally. through the OP Stack batch inbox.
State rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. are proposed by whitelisted proposers who create dispute games via the DisputeGameFactory by posting a bond of 0.00000001 ETH. Once created, the game enters a challenge periodIn optimistic rollups, the window of time wherein network participants can assert that some fraud was included in a prior block. Most optimistic rollups currently specify a challenge window of 7 days. By extending the period, there is more time for participants to guard against fraud (invalid state transitions), but also more time until withdrawals gets enabled. of 1h during which whitelisted challengers can dispute the proposal by posting a bond of 0.00000001 ETH. If challenged, anyone can submit a ZK proof to prove the correct state within the proving period of 7d. After the challenge period passes without a successful challenge, or after a valid proof is submitted, anyone can resolve the game and finalize the state root.
Funds can be stolen if the validity proof cryptography is broken or implemented incorrectly.
Funds can be stolen if no whitelisted challenger disputes an invalid state root before the challenge window expires.
Funds can be stolen if the SP1 verifier gateway owner routes proof verification through a malicious or faulty verifier.
Funds can be frozen if the permissioned proposer fails to publish state roots to L1.
Onchain verifier
Onchain verifier
Onchain verifier
Onchain verifier | ||
Onchain verifier | ||
Onchain verifier |

The regular upgrade process for shared system contracts and L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups.-specific validiumAn off-chain solution that uses validity proofs for settlement and publishes the data offchain, therefore requiring an additional trust assumption. contracts starts at the PolygonAdminMultisig. For the shared contracts, they schedule a transaction that targets the ProxyAdmin via the Timelock, wait for 3d and then execute the upgrade. An upgrade of the Layer 2 specific validium contract requires first adding a new rollupType through the Timelock and the AgglayerManager (defining the new implementation and verifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. contracts). Now that the rollupType is created, either the local admin or the PolygonAdminMultisig can immediately upgrade the local system contracts to it. Chains using pessimistic proofs often have completely sovereign upgrade paths from the ones described here, but the shared contracts still remain relevant to them because they use them as escrow.
The PolygonSecurityCouncil can expedite the upgrade process by declaring an emergency state. This state pauses both the shared bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. and the AgglayerManager and allows for instant upgrades through the timelock. Accordingly, instant upgrades for all system contracts are possible with the cooperation of the SecurityCouncil. The emergency state has been activated 1 time(s) since inception.
Furthermore, the PolygonAdminMultisig is permissioned to manage the shared trusted aggregator (proposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block. and proverAn entity that generates the cryptographic proof to convince the verifier that the statement is true. In a ZK-Rollup, the prover generates the ZK (validity) proof to submit to the verifier contract.) for all participating Layer 2s, deactivate the emergency state, obsolete rollupTypes and manage operational parameters and fees in the AgglayerManager directly. The local admin of a specific Aggchain can manage their chain by choosing the trusted sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs., manage forced batches and set the data availabilityThe property of a rollup's data being reachable by any node retrieving the data that were rolled up and executed to reach the proposed state. Data availability (DA), specifically decoupling it from the rollup nodes themselves, is one of the preeminent factors which allows a rollup to scale securely. A rollup is faced with a decision of what to use as a DA layer to guarantee that any node can retrieve this data--permissionlessly under any circumstance. For this reason, using Ethereum for DA currently provides the strongest security guarantees. If data is stored somewhere other than a permissionless L1, then the project is not a rollup, but rather a validium or an optimium. config. For sovereign chains using pessimistic proofs they can manage any proof logic that might be used on top of the minimal pessimistic one. Creating new Layer 2s (of existing rollupType) is outsourced to the PolygonCreateRollupMultisig but can also be done by the PolygonAdminMultisig. Custom non-shared bridge escrows have their custom upgrade admins listed in the permissions section.
The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.
critical contracts and severities for the ossification perimeter
critical contracts and severities for the ossification perimeter
| contract OwnerContract (eth:0xe58C365Da30c746204022e61482bBE828cAA9091) [N/A] { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| unverified: | |
| - | true |
| values.owner: | |
| + | "eth:0x6eE7BDa7AF04F61ccf93aB4b8DB2289aBe76C6aA" |
| implementationNames.eth:0xe58C365Da30c746204022e61482bBE828cAA9091: | |
| - | "" |
| + | "Transactor" |
| sourceHashes: | |
| + | ["0x30cc972c943afe1d0ae168d0ff682153ea14360e08c012a3af63352e541fed04"] |
| } | |
X Layer switched the respected OP Stack dispute game from the PermissionedDisputeGame to OP Succinct Lite (game type 42). The new setup uses an OPSuccinctFaultDisputeGame deployed on 2026-06-30, an AccessManager for proposer/challenger allowlists, and SP1 verifier gateways for zk proof verification during challenged games.
X Layer switched the respected OP Stack dispute game from the PermissionedDisputeGame to OP Succinct Lite (game type 42). The new setup uses an OPSuccinctFaultDisputeGame deployed on 2026-06-30, an AccessManager for proposer/challenger allowlists, and SP1 verifier gateways for zk proof verification during challenged games.
| contract AnchorStateRegistry (eth:0x000590BB65ab1864a7AD46d6B957cC9a4F2C149d) [opstack/AnchorStateRegistry_post13_opsuccinct] { | |
| +++ description: Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the OPSuccinctFaultDisputeGame. Variant for chains using OPSuccinct (SP1) games instead of Cannon, which omits Cannon-specific cross-contract fields (vm, oracle, weth, challengePeriod, absolutePrestate from game). | |
| description: | |
| - | "Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame. Variant for chains using OPSuccinct (SP1) games instead of Cannon, which omits Cannon-specific cross-contract fields (vm, oracle, weth, challengePeriod, absolutePrestate from game)." |
| + | "Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the OPSuccinctFaultDisputeGame. Variant for chains using OPSuccinct (SP1) games instead of Cannon, which omits Cannon-specific cross-contract fields (vm, oracle, weth, challengePeriod, absolutePrestate from game)." |
| values.RespectedGameString: | |
| - | "PermissionedDisputeGame" |
| + | "OPSuccinctFaultDisputeGame" |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.respectedGameType: | |
| - | 1 |
| + | 42 |
| } | |
| contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0x64057ad1DdAc804d0D26A7275b193D9DACa19993) [opstack/OptimismPortal2] { | |
| +++ description: Central message and gas token (dOKB) bridge of the OP stack part of this deployment. It finalizes withdrawals against the currently respected OP Succinct Lite dispute game and allows forced transactions. | |
| values.RespectedGameString: | |
| - | "PermissionedDisputeGame" |
| + | "OPSuccinctFaultDisputeGame" |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.respectedGameType: | |
| - | 1 |
| + | 42 |
| } | |
| EOA (eth:0x6eE7BDa7AF04F61ccf93aB4b8DB2289aBe76C6aA) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| receivedPermissions.1: | |
| + | {"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x98BA64d8c8Dd33bD75F2154214BFd849d0D5c17B","description":"Allowed to add or remove proposers and challengers, and transfer ownership of the AccessManager.","role":".owner"} |
| } | |
| EOA (eth:0x736E68Af2CbF2aB0E46E4310fE5Ae568b3642FF6) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| receivedPermissions.0: | |
| + | {"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x98BA64d8c8Dd33bD75F2154214BFd849d0D5c17B","description":"Allowed to challenge or delete state roots proposed by a Proposer.","role":".challengers"} |
| } | |
| contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0x9D4c8FAEadDdDeeE1Ed0c92dAbAD815c2484f675) [opstack/DisputeGameFactory] { | |
| +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. | |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.game42: | |
| - | "eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" |
| + | "eth:0x8841FA06099FEdfE7DB6962926C6A281e9E1e607" |
| values.initBondGame42: | |
| - | 0 |
| + | 10000000000 |
| } | |
| EOA (eth:0xE43944421681170648E10007f73816e04F74394F) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| receivedPermissions.0: | |
| + | {"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0x98BA64d8c8Dd33bD75F2154214BFd849d0D5c17B","description":"Allowed to post new state roots of the current layer to the host chain.","role":".proposers"} |
| } | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract SP1VerifierGateway (eth:0x397A5f7f3dBd538f23DE225B51f532c34448dA9B) [succinct/SP1VerifierGateway] | |
| +++ description: This contract is the router for zk proof verification. It stores the mapping between identifiers and the address of onchain verifier contracts, routing each identifier to the corresponding verifier contract. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract SP1Verifier (eth:0x50ACFBEdecf4cbe350E1a86fC6f03a821772f1e5) [succinct/SP1Verifier] | |
| +++ description: Verifier contract for SP1 proofs (v5.0.0). | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract OPSuccinctFaultDisputeGame (eth:0x8841FA06099FEdfE7DB6962926C6A281e9E1e607) [succinct/OPSuccinct/OPSuccinctFaultDisputeGame] | |
| +++ description: Logic of the dispute game. When a state root is proposed, a dispute game contract is deployed. Challengers can use such contracts to challenge the proposed state root. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract AccessManager (eth:0x98BA64d8c8Dd33bD75F2154214BFd849d0D5c17B) [succinct/OPSuccinct/AccessManager] | |
| +++ description: Contract managing access control for proposers and challengers in OPSuccinct. | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract SP1Verifier (eth:0x99A74A05a0FaBEB217C1A329b0dac59a1FA52508) [succinct/SP1Verifier] | |
| +++ description: Verifier contract for SP1 proofs (v6.0.0). | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract SP1Verifier (eth:0xb69f2584CBcFf99a58C4e7002E8b89Af54a6f4e2) [succinct/SP1Verifier] | |
| +++ description: Verifier contract for SP1 proofs (v6.1.0). | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract SP1VerifierGatewayMultisig (eth:0xCafEf00d348Adbd57c37d1B77e0619C6244C6878) [GnosisSafe] | |
| +++ description: None | |
Raised gas limit.
Raised gas limit.
| contract SystemConfig (eth:0x5065809Af286321a05fBF85713B5D5De7C8f0433) { | |
| +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address. | |
| +++ description: Gas limit for blocks on L2. | |
| +++ severity: LOW | |
| values.gasLimit: | |
| - | 50000000 |
| + | 210000000 |
| } | |
fee config changes.
fee config changes.
| contract SystemConfig (eth:0x5065809Af286321a05fBF85713B5D5De7C8f0433) { | |
| +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address. | |
| +++ description: volatility param: lower denominator -> quicker fee changes on L2 | |
| values.eip1559Denominator: | |
| - | 100000000 |
| + | 50 |
| values.minBaseFee: | |
| - | 0 |
| + | 20000000 |
| } | |
move to new multisig owner.
move to new multisig owner.
| contract AnchorStateRegistry (eth:0x000590BB65ab1864a7AD46d6B957cC9a4F2C149d) { | |
| +++ description: Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame. | |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| - | "eth:0xe58C365Da30c746204022e61482bBE828cAA9091" |
| + | "eth:0xC290bE56089BCC83c6993583ce2cF51a7951D45A" |
| } | |
| contract DelayedWETH (eth:0x1B8A252A71bC8997d3871aF420895B5845212fC6) { | |
| +++ description: Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds. | |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| - | "eth:0xe58C365Da30c746204022e61482bBE828cAA9091" |
| + | "eth:0xC290bE56089BCC83c6993583ce2cF51a7951D45A" |
| } | |
| contract ProxyAdmin (eth:0x313ce9Cec2070B519f13BDaFe07eabb4f215FEE6) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| values.owner: | |
| - | "eth:0xe58C365Da30c746204022e61482bBE828cAA9091" |
| + | "eth:0xC290bE56089BCC83c6993583ce2cF51a7951D45A" |
| } | |
| contract SystemConfig (eth:0x5065809Af286321a05fBF85713B5D5De7C8f0433) { | |
| +++ description: Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address. | |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| - | "eth:0xe58C365Da30c746204022e61482bBE828cAA9091" |
| + | "eth:0xC290bE56089BCC83c6993583ce2cF51a7951D45A" |
| } | |
| contract OptimismPortal2 (eth:0x64057ad1DdAc804d0D26A7275b193D9DACa19993) { | |
| +++ description: Central message and gas token (dOKB) bridge of the OP stack part of this deployment. It allows for permissioned state proposals without public challenges, and forced transactions. | |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| - | "eth:0xe58C365Da30c746204022e61482bBE828cAA9091" |
| + | "eth:0xC290bE56089BCC83c6993583ce2cF51a7951D45A" |
| } | |
| contract L1ERC721Bridge_neutered (eth:0x85d37236f063C687d056b3604CBEe4B60d124858) { | |
| +++ description: Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain. | |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| - | "eth:0xe58C365Da30c746204022e61482bBE828cAA9091" |
| + | "eth:0xC290bE56089BCC83c6993583ce2cF51a7951D45A" |
| } | |
| contract DisputeGameFactory (eth:0x9D4c8FAEadDdDeeE1Ed0c92dAbAD815c2484f675) { | |
| +++ description: The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. | |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| - | "eth:0xe58C365Da30c746204022e61482bBE828cAA9091" |
| + | "eth:0xC290bE56089BCC83c6993583ce2cF51a7951D45A" |
| } | |
| contract L1StandardBridge_neutered (eth:0xAecF995ABf9E7eDE7ae0CE65E60622C9eD84823a) { | |
| +++ description: This OP stack bridge contract has been modified to disallow ETH and ERC-20 bridging. | |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| - | "eth:0xe58C365Da30c746204022e61482bBE828cAA9091" |
| + | "eth:0xC290bE56089BCC83c6993583ce2cF51a7951D45A" |
| } | |
| contract OwnerContract (eth:0xe58C365Da30c746204022e61482bBE828cAA9091) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| receivedPermissions.0: | |
| - | {"permission":"interact","from":"eth:0xE88CfA9D4a4fae1413914baD9796A72D13d035b9","description":"set and change address mappings.","role":".owner","via":[{"address":"eth:0x313ce9Cec2070B519f13BDaFe07eabb4f215FEE6"}]} |
| receivedPermissions.1: | |
| - | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x000590BB65ab1864a7AD46d6B957cC9a4F2C149d","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x313ce9Cec2070B519f13BDaFe07eabb4f215FEE6"}]} |
| receivedPermissions.2: | |
| - | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x1B8A252A71bC8997d3871aF420895B5845212fC6","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x313ce9Cec2070B519f13BDaFe07eabb4f215FEE6"}]} |
| receivedPermissions.3: | |
| - | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x5065809Af286321a05fBF85713B5D5De7C8f0433","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x313ce9Cec2070B519f13BDaFe07eabb4f215FEE6"}]} |
| receivedPermissions.4: | |
| - | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x62e1Aaeba9A8AA4654980653dB4B21FC82C61c15","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x313ce9Cec2070B519f13BDaFe07eabb4f215FEE6"}]} |
| receivedPermissions.5: | |
| - | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x64057ad1DdAc804d0D26A7275b193D9DACa19993","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x313ce9Cec2070B519f13BDaFe07eabb4f215FEE6"}]} |
| receivedPermissions.7: | |
| - | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x85d37236f063C687d056b3604CBEe4B60d124858","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x313ce9Cec2070B519f13BDaFe07eabb4f215FEE6"}]} |
| receivedPermissions.8: | |
| - | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0x9D4c8FAEadDdDeeE1Ed0c92dAbAD815c2484f675","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x313ce9Cec2070B519f13BDaFe07eabb4f215FEE6"}]} |
| receivedPermissions.9: | |
| - | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xAecF995ABf9E7eDE7ae0CE65E60622C9eD84823a","description":"upgrading the bridge implementation can give access to all funds escrowed therein.","role":".$admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x313ce9Cec2070B519f13BDaFe07eabb4f215FEE6"}]} |
| receivedPermissions.10: | |
| - | {"permission":"upgrade","from":"eth:0xF94B553F3602a03931e5D10CaB343C0968D793e3","role":"admin","via":[{"address":"eth:0x313ce9Cec2070B519f13BDaFe07eabb4f215FEE6"}]} |
| directlyReceivedPermissions.0: | |
| - | {"permission":"act","from":"eth:0x313ce9Cec2070B519f13BDaFe07eabb4f215FEE6","role":".owner"} |
| } | |
| contract L1CrossDomainMessenger (eth:0xF94B553F3602a03931e5D10CaB343C0968D793e3) { | |
| +++ description: Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function. | |
| values.proxyAdminOwner: | |
| - | "eth:0xe58C365Da30c746204022e61482bBE828cAA9091" |
| + | "eth:0xC290bE56089BCC83c6993583ce2cF51a7951D45A" |
| } | |
| + | Status: CREATED |
| contract Xlayer Multisig (eth:0xC290bE56089BCC83c6993583ce2cF51a7951D45A) | |
| +++ description: None | |
Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.
The user initiates L2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups.->L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. messages by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the blockAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over. containing that transaction is settled, the message becomes available for processing on L1. ZK proofs are required to settle blocks.
X Layer uses OP Stack dispute games for state validation and withdrawal finalization. Separately, the Agglayer shared bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. uses pessimistic proofs to constrain cross-chain bridge accounting for assets in the shared bridge.
Funds can be lost if the Agglayer pessimistic proof system for shared bridge accounting is implemented incorrectly.
Funds can be frozen if the OP Succinct Lite proof system or verifier gateway cannot accept valid proofs during a challenge.

A Multisig with 5/9 threshold.
Participants (9):
0xEB5E…EA720xAb35…235E0xf02B…D4B20xdFEd…56Da0xffbf…32380xeD44…dB370x516e…46B70x2161…d4170x8B9F…782BA Multisig with 2/3 threshold.
The central shared managing contract for Polygon Agglayer chains. This contract coordinates chain deployments and proof validation. All connected Layer 2s can be globally paused by activating the ‘Emergency State’. This can be done by the PolygonSecurityCouncil or by anyone after 1 week of inactive verifiers.
A Multisig with 6/8 threshold.
Participants (8):
0xFe45…2e4b0xaF46…261D0xBDc2…FEFf0x4c16…88910x3ab9…D6220x49c1…0E860x9F7d…86A00x2188…1C28A Multisig with 3/5 threshold.
A Multisig with 2/3 threshold.
Member of Xlayer Multisig.


System contract defining the X Layer Aggchain logic. It only enforces bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. accounting (pessimistic) proofs to protect the shared bridge while the Aggchain state transitions are not proven. They must instead be signed by 1 aggchainSigner(s).
Contains configuration parameters such as the SequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. address, gas limitThe maximum amount of gas a transaction or block may consume. on this chain and the unsafe blockAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over. signer address.
Central message and gasA virtual fuel used to execute smart contracts on a rollup. The EVM (or other VM within the rollup) uses an accounting mechanism to correspond the consumption of gas to the consumption of computing resources, and to limit the consumption of computing resources. token (dOKB) bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. of the OP stack part of this deployment. It finalizes withdrawals against the currently respected OP Succinct Lite dispute game and allows forced transactions.
The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. and eventually challenge them.
A verifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. gateway for pessimistic proofs. Manages a map of chains and their verifier keys and is used to route proofs based on the first 4 bytes of proofBytes data in a proof submission. The SP1 verifier is used for all proofs.
The shared bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. contract, escrowing user funds sent to Agglayer chains. It is usually mirrored on each chain and can be used to transfer both ERC20 assets and arbitrary messages.
All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation.
A merkle treeA hash-based data structure in which each leaf node is a hash of a block of data, and each non-leaf node is a hash of its children. The root of the tree is a cryptographic fingerprint of the entire data structure. Merkle trees (Merkle Patricia Tries) are used in Ethereum to efficiently store key-value pairs. storage contract aggregating state rootsA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. of each participating Layer 2Layer 2 (L2) is a category of technical solutions aimed to scale the base layer in a trust minimized way. This category includes solutions like rollups as well as state channels and plasma. Other solutions are able to scale further, but with the introduction of additional trust assumptions, which are therefore not trust minimized. Sometimes the term Layer 2 is used to refer to include these solutions too, like validiums and optimiums, but to distinguish between trust minimized and non trust minimized solutions they are often referred to as "light" L2s, opposed to "strong" L2s like rollups., thus creating a single global merkle root representing the global state of the Agglayer, the ‘global exit root’. The global exit root is synchronized to all connected Layer 2s to help with their interoperabilityRefers to the capability of different blockchain networks to communicate and share data. It enables the transfer of assets and information between blockchains, facilitating functionality and collaboration between blockchain ecosystems..
A timelock with access control. In the case of an activated emergency state in the AgglayerManager, all transactions through this timelock are immediately executable. The current minimum delay is 3d.
Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain’s epoch gas limitThe maximum amount of gas a transaction or block may consume., it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.
Contains the latest confirmed state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the OPSuccinctFaultDisputeGame. Variant for chains using OPSuccinct (SP1) games instead of Cannon, which omits Cannon-specific cross-contract fields (vm, oracle, weth, challengePeriod, absolutePrestate from game).
Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.
The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1Layer 1 (L1) is a blockchain that is self-reliant on its validator set for its security and consensus properties. Ethereum is an example of a layer 1. Blockchains started receiving the moniker of layer 1 once layer 2 became a meaningful area of development. for a dispute game.
The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.
A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the networkA constellation of nodes (peers) that communicate via a peer-to-peer protocol, for example, in propagating transactions and blocks to other nodes. it’s deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain’s representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.
Used to bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.
Logic of the dispute game. When a state rootA cryptographic hash succinctly representing a state using a Merkle tree. is proposed, a dispute game contract is deployed. Challengers can use such contracts to challenge the proposed state root.
Contract managing access control for proposers and challengers in OPSuccinct.
This OP stack bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge. contract has been modified to disallow ETH and ERC-20 bridging.
Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposerIn the context of L2s, the actor that proposes a claimed state root on L1. The term is also used in the context of Ethereum to refer to the actor that proposes a new block. and challenger.
VerifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. contract for SP1 proofs (v5.0.0).
Extension contract of the AgglayerBridge for asset metadata…
VerifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. contract for SP1 proofs (v6.1.0).
This contract is the router for zk proof verification. It stores the mapping between identifiers and the address of onchain verifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. contracts, routing each identifier to the corresponding verifier contract.
VerifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. contract for SP1 proofs (v5.0.0).
VerifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. contract for SP1 proofs (v6.0.0).
VerifierAn entity in a ZK-Rollup, often a smart contract, that verifies zero-knowledge proofs submitted by a prover. contract for SP1 proofs (v6.1.0).
The current deployment carries some associated risks:
Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).