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ApeX
Apex Pro and the associated StarkEx instances were sunset.
Critical contracts can be upgraded by an EOA which could result in the loss of all funds.
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About
ApeX Pro is a non-custodial trading platform that delivers limitless cross-margined perpetual contracts trading.
Badges
About
ApeX Pro is a non-custodial trading platform that delivers limitless cross-margined perpetual contracts trading.
Why is the project listed in others?
Consequence: projects with a low DAC threshold rely on the honesty of few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. These entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds.
Learn more about the recategorisation here.
2022 Aug 11 — 2026 Jul 27
ApeX Pro public beta launched
2022 Nov 21st
ApeX Pro beta is launched, with incentives program for users.
ApeX Pro live on Mainnet
2022 Aug 31st
ApeX Pro, a non-custodial decentralized exchange is now live on Mainnet.
ApeX Pro is a non-custodial trading platform that delivers limitless cross-margined perpetual contracts trading.
ApeX Pro is running two independent StarkEx instances, one for USDC and one for USDT, but that technical distinction is not visible to the user.
Funds can be stolen if
Funds can be lost if
Users can be censored if
MEV can be extracted if
STARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness.
Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 3/5 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.
Users have 1d to exit funds in case of an unwanted upgrade. There is a 8d delay before a upgrade is applied, and withdrawals can take up to 7d to be processed.
Users are able to trustlessly exit by submitting a Merkle proof of funds. Positions will be closed using the average price from the last batch state update.
Set of parties responsible for signing and attesting to the availability of data.
There are no onchain assets at risk of being slashed in case of a data withholding attack, and the committee members are not publicly known.
There is no fraud detection mechanism in place. A data withholding attack can only be detected by nodes downloading the full data from the DA layer.
The committee does not meet basic security standards, either due to insufficient size, lack of member diversity, or poorly defined threshold parameters. The system lacks an effective DA bridge and it is reliant on the assumption of an honest sequencer, creating significant risks to data integrity and availability.
Anyone can relay data availability commitments to the DA bridge. In case of current relayer failure, users can collect attestations from committee members and propose new data availability commitments to the DA bridge.
Architecture
The Starkware application utilizes a data availability solution that relies on a Committee Service to ensure data persistence. This architecture comprises the following components:
- Availability Gateway: The primary interface provided by the operator for committee members to access new batch information and submit signed availability claims.
- Data Availability Committee (DAC): A group of nodes responsible for storing state data associated with each Merkle root and attesting to data availability by signing claims.
- Data Batches: Collections of transactions processed in batches that update the state of accounts, resulting in a new Merkle root representing the updated state.
Committee members run services that interact with the Availability Gateway to obtain information about new batches and submit their signed availability claims. Each batch includes a unique batch_id, a reference to a previous batch, and a list of account updates. Committee members combine this information with data from the reference batch to compute the new state and verify the Merkle root.
When the operator produces a new batch, it must be signed by a minimum number of committee members—as defined by the application’s configuration—for it to be accepted onchain. This includes all members designated as mandatory signers. If the operator attempts to submit a batch without the required signatures, it will be rejected, thereby ensuring that data remains available and consistent.
Committee members are expected to maintain a database that stores the data associated with each batch, making use of storage solutions with a replication factor of at least 2.
DA Bridge Architecture
The DA commitments are posted to the destination chain, using the Committee Verifier contract as a DA bridge. The DA commitment consists of a data hash of the transaction batch the Committee has signed off on and a concatenation of ec-signatures by signatories.
The Committee Verifier contract verifies the signatures and the data hash and if the required threshold of Committee members has signed off on the data, the hash is stored as a registeredFact in the StarkEx contract. In a separate transaction, the operator calls the updateState() function on the StarkEx contract to update the state. Before the state update is accepted, the StarkEx contract verifies the transaction public inputs by calling the isValid() function, which verifies the hash derived from state update inputs matches the hash stored by the Committee Verifier contract.
Funds can be lost if a malicious committee signs a data availability attestation for an unavailable transaction batch.
Each update to the system state must be accompanied by a ZK proof that ensures that the new state was derived by correctly applying a series of valid user transactions to the previous state. These proofs are then verified on Ethereum by a smart contract. The system state is represented using Merkle roots.
Past upgrades
The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.
2025 July 22, 16:06 UTC2changesproject is archived.
project is archived.
| contract StarkPerpetualUSDC (0xA1D5443F2FB80A5A55ac804C948B45ce4C52DCbb) { | |
| +++ description: Central Validium contract. Receives (verified) state roots from the Operator, allows users to consume L2 -> L1 messages and send L1 -> L2 messages. Critical configuration values for the L2's logic are defined here by various governance roles. | |
| values.isFrozen: | |
| - | false |
| + | true |
| } |
2025 July 09, 09:25 UTC4changesUSDT StarkEx instance frozen, project archived. Apex Pro, the app on this StarkEx Validium, is EOL: https://www.apex.exchange/blog/detail/ApeX-Pro-Sunset-Delisting-Timeline-for-Trading-Pairs.
USDT StarkEx instance frozen, project archived.
Apex Pro, the app on this StarkEx Validium, is EOL: https://www.apex.exchange/blog/detail/ApeX-Pro-Sunset-Delisting-Timeline-for-Trading-Pairs.
| contract PerpetualEscapeVerifier (0xaadFdB9CAc145c65f2284fBe24600d07fb37F7BD) { | |
| +++ description: Special verifier for the escape() function. | |
| values.hasRegisteredFact: | |
| - | false |
| + | true |
| } |
| contract StarkPerpetualUSDT (0xe53A6eD882Eb3f90cCe0390DDB04c876C5482E6b) { | |
| +++ description: Central Validium contract. Receives (verified) state roots from the Operator, allows users to consume L2 -> L1 messages and send L1 -> L2 messages. Critical configuration values for the L2's logic are defined here by various governance roles. | |
| values.isFrozen: | |
| - | false |
| + | true |
| } |
2025 February 18, 09:12 UTCHigh severity27changesMinor upgrade to the StarkExchangeUSDC contract which is an implementation of StarkEx Perpetual. Two new asset IDs are added: - NON UNIQUE MINTABLE ASSET ID FLAG (ERC-1155) - MINTABLE ERC20 ASSET ID FLAG (ERC-20)
Minor upgrade to the StarkExchangeUSDC contract which is an implementation of StarkEx Perpetual.
Two new asset IDs are added:
- NON_UNIQUE_MINTABLE_ASSET_ID_FLAG (ERC-1155)
- MINTABLE_ERC20_ASSET_ID_FLAG (ERC-20)
| contract StarkExchangeUSDC (0xA1D5443F2FB80A5A55ac804C948B45ce4C52DCbb) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| sourceHashes.5: | |
| - | "0x0c38b010717f86413abfb52412e5eb50b689b8d172e8c39ef81fc428fe5a1e52" |
| + | "0xe29824efd6d907d93d9b4b2b0737630ab974bce5e0017cb1459975c66a798280" |
| sourceHashes.4: | |
| - | "0xb8c0122f24ea2e559e908278def38aa80b6cd27b39b2d74402dbf5ba2585c7c5" |
| + | "0xdfa7b8bf4884e9f9933980cec5bcf744d2e522c291ed2a383c140cfb8c795f29" |
| sourceHashes.3: | |
| - | "0x473fc9765112e835124640cb91a4642354e09e94f92462929139d9ab5b6ddcf4" |
| + | "0xb5161e812087e15dd53a4c29ab296ade613b540445f7d1eb470de4f81a9c555c" |
| sourceHashes.2: | |
| - | "0x5ebd3f192c54b3d36f0d57e1cb14f418ae69a1694f7dc7d19d006883fc89e525" |
| + | "0xf6d00f2bc5db71a79b854049b38819f78c8fbbd98dcc2e4555f70946f6e58069" |
| sourceHashes.1: | |
| - | "0x758db67adde840068b01898c25f007a0d0549aaf9d431c2e0ae77ae4c2c56b33" |
| + | "0xc8c9c0e9c5171cb82b707e7e4b4ea80d427ba6f1dc21fc604efdce0ffa40323d" |
| values.$implementation.4: | |
| - | "0x34E7cfedF99995A47B3e3D0AB88ba67072B55035" |
| + | "0x31e2d974BaC547101413c24C23443AD488423f64" |
| values.$implementation.3: | |
| - | "0xdD5f42B087C1D2F73a2b443249b7D3DbE148a859" |
| + | "0x45de249eEa8f9CDB70943B17CceDeb42F5BA0175" |
| values.$implementation.2: | |
| - | "0x564EA75a26Dc0Bb5c5033B4752f88953A25AD058" |
| + | "0x1BC9C618B7FA6b5EfAAD31DC801eB55c608B9310" |
| values.$implementation.1: | |
| - | "0x533a7f4bE5453513049EB94A2b115F2CcE161dce" |
| + | "0x540Ad8576d2F90f28994ab001622F964945854A8" |
| values.$implementation.0: | |
| - | "0xdD813397b79f8df581eEb0c4B8aB72304c528396" |
| + | "0x8C43C9bec15d82D153C52518030e0a9590ABD35d" |
| values.$pastUpgrades.4: | |
| + | ["2025-02-17T09:39:23.000Z","0x7c6ca54630321bc1f0e2ad0b68972ec3f6efaab449f09839ef612f90d4292bdd",["0x8C43C9bec15d82D153C52518030e0a9590ABD35d","0x540Ad8576d2F90f28994ab001622F964945854A8","0x1BC9C618B7FA6b5EfAAD31DC801eB55c608B9310","0x45de249eEa8f9CDB70943B17CceDeb42F5BA0175","0x31e2d974BaC547101413c24C23443AD488423f64"]] |
| values.$upgradeCount: | |
| - | 4 |
| + | 5 |
| values.implementation: | |
| - | "0xdD813397b79f8df581eEb0c4B8aB72304c528396" |
| + | "0x8C43C9bec15d82D153C52518030e0a9590ABD35d" |
| values.VERSION: | |
| - | "3.1.0" |
| + | "3.2.0" |
| } |
2025 January 30, 10:24 UTC4changesUpdates progHash, not found online, added to the library.
Updates progHash, not found online, added to the library.
| contract StarkExchangeUSDC (0xA1D5443F2FB80A5A55ac804C948B45ce4C52DCbb) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| values.globalConfigurationHash: | |
| - | "0x01897348c8e7a04145727a7d369a76c01711a828d58afeca4c3e7d86596b85ba" |
| + | "0x0274c9dc2096cfe79c5f28f5bfb3a95b3bd0692430b4f9ba79f871068611804a" |
| } |
| contract FinalizableGpsFactAdapterUSDC (0xE741e26573782ae3C0ea9EC710FA99Fcd27fB953) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| values.programHash: | |
| - | "3114724292040200590153042023978438629733352741898912919152162079752811928849" |
| + | "2530337539466159944237001094809327283009177793361359619481044346150483328860" |
| } |
2023 November 30, 16:11 UTC4changesUpgrade delay for USDT StarkEx has been changed from 0 to 14 days.
Upgrade delay for USDT StarkEx has been changed from 0 to 14 days.
| contract StarkExchangeUSDT (0xe53A6eD882Eb3f90cCe0390DDB04c876C5482E6b) { | |
| upgradeability.upgradeDelay: | |
| - | 0 |
| + | 1209600 |
| values.getUpgradeActivationDelay: | |
| - | 0 |
| + | 1209600 |
| } |
The system has a centralized operator
MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
Users can force exit the system
Force exit allows the users to escape censorship by withdrawing their funds. The system allows users to force the withdrawal of funds by submitting a request directly to the contract onchain. The request must be served within 7d. If this does not happen, the system will halt regular operation and permit trustless withdrawal of funds. Perpetual positions can also be force closed before withdrawing, however this requires the user to find the counterparty for the trade themselves.
Users can be censored if the operator refuses to include their transactions. However, there exists a mechanism to independently exit the system.
Funds can be lost if the user is unable to find the counterparty for the force trade.
Forced exit
If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular exit they can submit their withdrawal requests directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular exit.
Emergency exit
If the enough time deadline passes and the forced exit is still ignored the user can put the system into a frozen state, disallowing further state updates. In that case everybody can withdraw by submitting a merkle proof of their funds with their L1 transaction.
Ethereum
Actors:
A Multisig with 2/2 threshold.
- Can upgrade with no delay or with 14d delay
- StarkPerpetualUSDC - or - acting directly with 14d delay
- Can interact with StarkPerpetualUSDC
A Multisig with 2/4 threshold.
- Can upgrade with 8d delay
- SHARPVerifierCallProxy - acting directly with 8d delay
- Can interact with SHARPVerifierCallProxy
- Administer the CallProxy’s
GOVERNANCE_ADMINand role-admin hierarchy. This AccessControl role is separate from the outer proxy governor that schedules implementation upgrades - Grant and revoke application roles, including the
APP_GOVERNORrole that controls caller-specific fallback routes - Route fallback calls from specific callers to a still-active registry in the default verifier’s reference chain. This principally determines which verifier and bootloader configuration processes their proof submissions; the proxy’s explicit
isValidentry point always queries the default target
- Administer the CallProxy’s
- Can upgrade with no delay or with 14d delay
- StarkPerpetualUSDT - or - acting directly with 14d delay
- Can interact with StarkPerpetualUSDT
- Can upgrade with no delay
- FinalizableGpsFactAdapterUSDT
- FinalizableGpsFactAdapterUSDC
- Can interact with StarkPerpetualUSDC
- manage supported tokens
- Permissioned to regularly update the state of the L2 on L1. Each state update must have been proven via the SHARP verifier and contains state diffs for data availability
- Can interact with StarkPerpetualUSDT
- manage supported tokens
- Permissioned to regularly update the state of the L2 on L1. Each state update must have been proven via the SHARP verifier and contains state diffs for data availability
Member of ApexAdminMultisig.
- Can upgrade with no delay or with 14d delay
- StarkPerpetualUSDC - or - acting directly with 14d delay
- Can interact with StarkPerpetualUSDC
- Can interact with StarkPerpetualUSDT
- Permissioned to regularly update the state of the L2 on L1. Each state update must have been proven via the SHARP verifier and contains state diffs for data availability
- Can interact with StarkPerpetualUSDC
- Permissioned to regularly update the state of the L2 on L1. Each state update must have been proven via the SHARP verifier and contains state diffs for data availability
Ethereum
Data Availability Committee (DAC) contract verifying and storing data availability claims from DAC Members (via a multisignature check). The threshold of valid signatures is 3.
Data Availability Committee (DAC) contract verifying and storing data availability claims from DAC Members (via a multisignature check). The threshold of valid signatures is 3.
Central Validium contract. Receives (verified) state roots from the Operator, allows users to consume L2 -> L1 messages and send L1 -> L2 messages. Critical configuration values for the L2’s logic are defined here by various governance roles.
- Roles:
- admin: ApexAdminMultisig, EOA 3
- operators: EOA 2, EOA 5
- tokenAdmins: EOA 2
Central Validium contract. Receives (verified) state roots from the Operator, allows users to consume L2 -> L1 messages and send L1 -> L2 messages. Critical configuration values for the L2’s logic are defined here by various governance roles.
- Roles:
- admin: EOA 1
- operators: EOA 2, EOA 4
- tokenAdmins: EOA 2
Permissionless commitment calculator and registry used by the Solidity STARK verifiers. Anyone may submit a public-memory page and interaction elements; the contract computes its hash and cumulative product and registers the fact key committing to them, which the CPU verifier must bind to the proof. It is part of the proof verifier, not an application-level program registry. A malicious or nonconforming implementation can break public-memory soundness; binding to a different honest registry generally causes a liveness failure instead.
Upgradeable call router through which Starknet and other applications access SHARP fact registries. It uses call, not delegatecall, so facts and immutable verifier configuration remain at each target registry. The explicit isValid entry point always queries the default target. Other calls handled by the fallback, principally proof submissions, can be routed per caller to a still-active registry in the default target’s reference chain. The default target can be replaced by SHARP Multisig after 8d.
- Roles:
- admin: SHARP Multisig
- appGovernor: SHARP Multisig
- appRoleAdmin: SHARP Multisig
- governanceAdmin: SHARP Multisig
Immutable GPS statement verifier shared by Starknet and other StarkWare systems. It verifies a STARK proof of the exact Cairo bootloader stored onchain, forces the bootloader configuration into public memory, and registers a fact for every bootloader task. A fact is also considered valid when it exists in the time-limited reference fact registry.
Immutable GPS statement verifier shared by Starknet and other StarkWare systems. It verifies a STARK proof of the exact Cairo bootloader stored onchain, forces the bootloader configuration into public memory, and registers a fact for every bootloader task. A fact is also considered valid when it exists in the time-limited reference fact registry.
Immutable GPS statement verifier shared by Starknet and other StarkWare systems. It verifies a STARK proof of the exact Cairo bootloader stored onchain, forces the bootloader configuration into public memory, and registers a fact for every bootloader task. A fact is also considered valid when it exists in the time-limited reference fact registry.
Permissionless commitment calculator and registry used by the Solidity STARK verifiers. Anyone may submit a public-memory page and interaction elements; the contract computes its hash and cumulative product and registers the fact key committing to them, which the CPU verifier must bind to the proof. It is part of the proof verifier, not an application-level program registry. A malicious or nonconforming implementation can break public-memory soundness; binding to a different honest registry generally causes a liveness failure instead.
Immutable GPS statement verifier shared by Starknet and other StarkWare systems. It verifies a STARK proof of the exact Cairo bootloader stored onchain, forces the bootloader configuration into public memory, and registers a fact for every bootloader task. A fact is also considered valid when it exists in the time-limited reference fact registry.
Adapter between the core contract and the SHARPVerifierCallProxy. Stores the Cairo programHash (770346231394331402493200980986217737662224545740427952627288191358999988146), which can be changed until the adapter is finalized.
- Roles:
- owner: EOA 2 if the adapter is not finalized
Special verifier for the escape() function.
Adapter between the core contract and the SHARPVerifierCallProxy. Stores the Cairo programHash (2530337539466159944237001094809327283009177793361359619481044346150483328860), which can be changed until the adapter is finalized.
- Roles:
- owner: EOA 2 if the adapter is not finalized
The current deployment carries some associated risks:
Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is a 8d delay on code upgrades.