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ApeX Pro public beta launched
2022 Nov 21st
ApeX Pro beta is launched, with incentives program for users.
Learn moreApeX Pro live on Mainnet
2022 Aug 31st
ApeX Pro, a non-custodial decentralized exchange is now live on Mainnet.
Learn moreApeX Pro is a non-custodial trading platform that delivers limitless cross-margined perpetual contracts trading.
If you find something wrong on this page you can submit an issue or edit the information.
ZK-STARKS are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness.
Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published on chain. There exists a data availability committee (DAC) that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.
The code that secures the system can be changed arbitrarily but users have some time to react.
Users can force the sequencer to include a trade or a withdrawal transaction by submitting a request through L1. If the sequencer censors or is down for 7d, users can use the exit hatch to withdraw their funds. Users are required to find a counterparty for the trade by out of system means.
Users are able to trustlessly exit by submitting a Merkle proof of funds. Positions will be closed using the average price from the last batch state update.
Each update to the system state must be accompanied by a ZK Proof that ensures that the new state was derived by correctly applying a series of valid user transactions to the previous state. Once the proof is processed on the Ethereum blockchain the L2 block is instantly finalized. The system state is represented using Merkle roots.
Despite their production use ZK-STARKs proof systems are still relatively new, complex and they rely on the proper implementation of the polynomial constraints used to check validity of the Execution Trace.
Funds can be lost if the proof system is implemented incorrectly.
The balances of the users are not published on-chain, but rather sent to several well known and trusted parties, also known as committee members. A state update is valid and accepted on-chain only if at least a quorum of the committee members sign a state update.
Funds can be lost if the external data becomes unavailable (CRITICAL).
Users can be censored if the committee restricts their access to the external data.
The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system. Typically, the Operator is the hot wallet of the StarkEx service submitting state updates for which proofs have been already submitted and verified.
MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
Force exit allows the users to escape censorship by withdrawing their funds. The system allows users to force the withdrawal of funds by submitting a request directly to the contract on-chain. The request must be served within 7d. If this does not happen, the system will halt regular operation and permit trustless withdrawal of funds. Perpetual positions can also be force closed before withdrawing, however this requires the user to find the counterparty for the trade themselves.
Users can be censored if the operator refuses to include their transactions. They can still exit the system.
Funds can be lost if the user is unable to find the counterparty for the force trade.
The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a transaction on L2. When the block containing that transaction is proven the funds become available for withdrawal on L1. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction does not require a merkle proof.
If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular exit they can submit their withdrawal requests directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request. Once the force operation is submitted if the request is serviced the operation follows the flow of a regular exit.
If enough time passes and the forced exit is still ignored the user can put the system into a frozen state, disallowing further state updates. In that case everybody can withdraw by submitting a merkle proof of their funds with their L1 transaction.
Allowed to upgrade the implementation of the StarkExchange contract, potentially maliciously gaining control over the system or stealing funds.Currently there is 14d delay before the upgrade.
Allowed to update state of the system and verify DA proofs. When Operator is down the state cannot be updated.
Validity proof must be signed by at least 3 of these addresses to approve state update.
Can upgrade implementation of SHARP Verifier, potentially with code approving fraudulent state. Currently there is 28d delay before the upgrade.
SHARP Verifier Governor. This is a Gnosis Safe with 2 / 3 threshold.
Those are the participants of the SHARPVerifierGovernorMultisig.
Can approve fast withdrawal from the bridge. At least 2 signatures are needed in order for the withdrawal to be valid.
Main contract of ApeX exchange. Updates state and verifies its integrity using STARK Verifier. Allows users to deposit and withdraw tokens via normal and emergency modes. This contract stores the following tokens: USDC.
Data Availability Committee (DAC) contract verifying data availability claim from DAC Members (via multisig check).
Allows deposits in different tokens and swaps them to USDC. Allows fast withdrawals after the agreement of at least 2 designated signers.
CallProxy for GpsStatementVerifier.
Starkware SHARP verifier used collectively by Starknet, Sorare, ImmutableX, Apex, Myria, rhino.fi and Canvas Connect. It receives STARK proofs from the Prover attesting to the integrity of the Execution Trace of these Programs including correctly computed L2 state root which is part of the Program Output.
Part of STARK Verifier.
Part of STARK Verifier.
MemoryPageFactRegistry is one of the many contracts used by SHARP verifier. This one is important as it registers all necessary on-chain data.
Part of STARK Verifier.
The current deployment carries some associated risks:
Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is a 14d delay on code upgrades.