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About

ApeX Pro is a non-custodial trading platform that delivers limitless cross-margined perpetual contracts trading.


Value secured
$40.89 M0.04%
Canonically Bridged
$40.89 M
Externally Bridged
$0.00
Natively Minted
$0.00

  • Tokens
  • Past day UOPS
    1.3040.4%
  • 30D ops count
    2.33 M

  • Type
    Validium
  • Purpose
    Exchange
  • Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure

    Badges

    About

    ApeX Pro is a non-custodial trading platform that delivers limitless cross-margined perpetual contracts trading.

    Recategorisation

    133d
    17h
    15m
    48s

    The project will be classified as "Other" due to its specific risks that set it apart from the standard classifications.

    The project will move to Others because:

    The data availability committee threshold is too low

    Consequence: projects with a low DAC threshold rely on the honesty of few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. These entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds.

    Learn more about the recategorisation here.

    Value Secured
    Canonical
    External
    Native
    Activity
    ApeX
    Ethereum
    Milestones & Incidents

    ApeX Pro public beta launched

    2022 Nov 21st

    ApeX Pro beta is launched, with incentives program for users.

    Learn more

    ApeX Pro live on Mainnet

    2022 Aug 31st

    ApeX Pro, a non-custodial decentralized exchange is now live on Mainnet.

    Learn more
    Detailed description

    ApeX Pro is a non-custodial trading platform that delivers limitless cross-margined perpetual contracts trading.

    ApeX Pro is running two independent StarkEx instances, one for USDC and one for USDT, but that technical distinction is not visible to the user.

    Risk summary
    Risk analysis
    Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure

    Sequencer failure

    Force via L1

    Users can force the sequencer to include a trade or a withdrawal transaction by submitting a request through L1. If the sequencer censors or is down for 7d, users can use the exit hatch to withdraw their funds. Users are required to find a counterparty for the trade by out of system means.

    State validation

    ZK proofs (ST)

    STARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness.

    Data availability

    External (DAC)

    Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 3/5 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.

    Exit window

    None

    There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.

    Proposer failure

    Use escape hatch

    Users are able to trustlessly exit by submitting a Merkle proof of funds. Positions will be closed using the average price from the last batch state update.

    Technology

    Validity proofs ensure state correctness

    Each update to the system state must be accompanied by a ZK proof that ensures that the new state was derived by correctly applying a series of valid user transactions to the previous state. These proofs are then verified on Ethereum by a smart contract. The system state is represented using Merkle roots.

    1. Enforcing Consistency on the On-Chain State - StarkEx documentation

    Zero knowledge STARK cryptography is used

    Despite their production use zkSTARKs proof systems are still relatively new, complex and they rely on the proper implementation of the polynomial constraints used to check validity of the Execution Trace.

    • Funds can be lost if the proof system is implemented incorrectly.

    1. STARK Core Engine Deep Dive

    Data is not stored on chain

    The balances of the users are not published onchain, but rather sent to external trusted parties, also known as committee members. A state update is valid and accepted onchain only if at least a quorum of the committee members sign a state update.

    • Funds can be lost if the external data becomes unavailable (CRITICAL).

    • Users can be censored if the committee restricts their access to the external data.

    1. Data Availability Modes - StarkEx documentation
    2. Validium - StarkEx documentation
    3. Availability Verifiers - StarkEx documentation
    Data availability

    Set of parties responsible for signing and attesting to the availability of data.

    Risk analysis
    DA Layer Risks
    Economic security
    None

    There are no onchain assets at risk of being slashed in case of a data withholding attack, and the committee members are not publicly known.

    Fraud detection
    None

    There is no fraud detection mechanism in place. A data withholding attack can only be detected by nodes downloading the full data from the DA layer.

    DA Bridge Risks
    Committee security
    3/5

    The committee does not meet basic security standards, either due to insufficient size, lack of member diversity, or poorly defined threshold parameters. The system lacks an effective DA bridge and it is reliant on the assumption of an honest sequencer, creating significant risks to data integrity and availability.

    Upgradeability
    Immutable

    The bridge smart contract is immutable and cannot be updated. The bridge committee security is low and cannot be improved.

    Relayer failure
    Self propose

    Anyone can relay data availability commitments to the DA bridge. In case of current relayer failure, users can collect attestations from committee members and propose new data availability commitments to the DA bridge.

    Technology

    Architecture

    starkex architecture

    The Starkware application utilizes a data availability solution that relies on a Committee Service to ensure data persistence. This architecture comprises the following components:

    • Availability Gateway: The primary interface provided by the operator for committee members to access new batch information and submit signed availability claims.
    • Data Availability Committee (DAC): A group of nodes responsible for storing state data associated with each Merkle root and attesting to data availability by signing claims.
    • Data Batches: Collections of transactions processed in batches that update the state of accounts, resulting in a new Merkle root representing the updated state.

    Committee members run services that interact with the Availability Gateway to obtain information about new batches and submit their signed availability claims. Each batch includes a unique batch_id, a reference to a previous batch, and a list of account updates. Committee members combine this information with data from the reference batch to compute the new state and verify the Merkle root.

    When the operator produces a new batch, it must be signed by a minimum number of committee members—as defined by the application’s configuration—for it to be accepted onchain. This includes all members designated as mandatory signers. If the operator attempts to submit a batch without the required signatures, it will be rejected, thereby ensuring that data remains available and consistent.

    Committee members are expected to maintain a database that stores the data associated with each batch, making use of storage solutions with a replication factor of at least 2.

    DA Bridge Architecture

    starkex bridge architecture

    The DA commitments are posted to the destination chain, using the Committee Verifier contract as a DA bridge. The DA commitment consists of a data hash of the transaction batch the Committee has signed off on and a concatenation of ec-signatures by signatories.

    The Committee Verifier contract verifies the signatures and the data hash and if the required threshold of Committee members has signed off on the data, the hash is stored as a registeredFact in the StarkEx contract. In a separate transaction, the operator calls the updateState() function on the StarkEx contract to update the state. Before the state update is accepted, the StarkEx contract verifies the transaction public inputs by calling the isValid() function, which verifies the hash derived from state update inputs matches the hash stored by the Committee Verifier contract.

    • Funds can be lost if a malicious committee signs a data availability attestation for an unavailable transaction batch.

    1. StarkEx Committee Service - Source Code
    Operator

    The system has a centralized operator

    The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system. Typically, the Operator is the hot wallet of the StarkEx service submitting state updates for which proofs have been already submitted and verified.

    • MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

    1. Operator - StarkEx documentation

    Users can force exit the system

    Force exit allows the users to escape censorship by withdrawing their funds. The system allows users to force the withdrawal of funds by submitting a request directly to the contract onchain. The request must be served within 7d. If this does not happen, the system will halt regular operation and permit trustless withdrawal of funds. Perpetual positions can also be force closed before withdrawing, however this requires the user to find the counterparty for the trade themselves.

    • Users can be censored if the operator refuses to include their transactions. However, there exists a mechanism to independently exit the system.

    • Funds can be lost if the user is unable to find the counterparty for the force trade.

    1. Censorship Prevention - StarkEx documentation
    2. Forced Trade - StarkEx documentation
    Withdrawals

    Regular exit

    The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is settled the funds become available for withdrawal on L1.ZK proofs are required to settle blocks. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds.

    1. Withdrawal - StarkEx documentation

    Forced exit

    If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular exit they can submit their withdrawal requests directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular exit.

    1. Forced Operations - StarkEx documentation
    2. Forced Withdrawal - StarkEx documentation
    3. Forced Trade - StarkEx documentation

    Emergency exit

    If the enough time deadline passes and the forced exit is still ignored the user can put the system into a frozen state, disallowing further state updates. In that case everybody can withdraw by submitting a merkle proof of their funds with their L1 transaction.

    1. Forced Operations - StarkEx documentation
    2. Forced Withdrawal - StarkEx documentation
    3. Forced Trade - StarkEx documentation
    Permissions

    Ethereum

    Actors:

    Governors for USDC StarkEx (2) 0xef75…1D550xC532…a7B6

    Allowed to upgrade the implementation of the StarkExchange (USDC) contract, potentially maliciously gaining control over the system or stealing funds.Currently there is 14d delay before the upgrade.

    Governors for USDT StarkEx 0x53c6…Ac8b

    Allowed to upgrade the implementation of the StarkExchange (USDT) contract, potentially maliciously gaining control over the system or stealing funds.Currently there is 14d delay before the upgrade.

    Operators for USDC StarkEx (2) Operators for USDT StarkEx0x78e8…d4Fb

    Allowed to update state of the system and verify DA proofs for USDC StarkEx instance. When Operator is down the state cannot be updated.

    Operators for USDT StarkEx (2) Operators for USDC StarkEx0x552a…8169

    Allowed to update state of the system and verify DA proofs for USDT StarkEx instance. When Operator is down the state cannot be updated.

    Validity proof must be signed by at least 3 of these addresses to approve state update.

    Validity proof must be signed by at least 3 of these addresses to approve state update.

    SHARP Verifier Governors SHARPVerifierAdminMultisig

    Can upgrade implementation of SHARP Verifier, potentially with code approving fraudulent state. Currently there is 0s delay before the upgrade.

    Used in:

    SHARPVerifierAdminMultisig SHARP Verifier Governors

    A Multisig with 2 / 4 threshold. SHARP Verifier Governor.

    Used in:

    Smart contracts
    A diagram of the smart contract architecture
    A diagram of the smart contract architecture

    Ethereum

    Main contract of ApeX exchange for USDC collateral. Updates state and verifies its integrity using STARK Verifier. Allows users to deposit and withdraw tokens via normal and emergency modes. This contract stores the following tokens: USDC.

    Main contract of ApeX exchange for USDT collateral. Updates state and verifies its integrity using STARK Verifier. Allows users to deposit and withdraw tokens via normal and emergency modes. This contract stores the following tokens: USDT.

    CommitteeUSDC 0x23Ca…94E4

    Data Availability Committee (DAC) contract for USDC StarkEx instance, verifying data availability claim from DAC Members (via multisig check).

    CommitteeUSDT 0x7249…f800

    Data Availability Committee (DAC) contract for USDT StarkEx instance, verifying data availability claim from DAC Members (via multisig check).

    MultiSigPoolUSDC 0xe95b…e9DE

    Allows deposits in different tokens and swaps them to USDC. Allows fast withdrawals after the agreement of at least 2 designated signers.

    MultiSigPoolUSDT 0x379c…46b8

    Allows deposits in different tokens and swaps them to USDT. Allows fast withdrawals after the agreement of at least 2 designated signers.

    PerpetualEscapeVerifier 0xaadF…F7BD

    Contract responsible for validating force withdrawal requests. Used by both USDC and USDT StarkEx instances.

    CallProxy for GpsStatementVerifier.

    Proxy used in:

    SHARPVerifier 0x9fb7…1942

    Starkware SHARP verifier used collectively by Starknet, Sorare, ImmutableX, Apex, Myria, rhino.fi and Canvas Connect. It receives STARK proofs from the Prover attesting to the integrity of the Execution Trace of these Programs including correctly computed state root which is part of the Program Output.

    Implementation used in:

    FriStatementContract 0x30Ef…d400

    Part of STARK Verifier.

    Implementation used in:

    MerkleStatementContract 0x32a9…FdAd

    Part of STARK Verifier.

    Implementation used in:

    CairoBootloaderProgram 0x5860…c515

    Part of STARK Verifier.

    Implementation used in:

    MemoryPageFactRegistry 0xe583…C460

    MemoryPageFactRegistry is one of the many contracts used by SHARP verifier. This one is important as it registers all necessary onchain data.

    Implementation used in:

    OldMemoryPageFactRegistry 0xFD14…D1b4

    Same as MemoryPageFactRegistry but stores facts proved by the old SHARP Verifier, used as a fallback.

    Implementation used in:

    Value Secured is calculated based on these smart contracts and tokens:

    The current deployment carries some associated risks:

    • Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).

    Knowledge nuggets