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rhino.fi
The RhinoFi StarkEx Validium is being deprecated. The RhinofiAdminMultisig upgraded the implementation of the core contract and subsequently withdrew all funds. The Validium is no longer operational and funds are currently held in a multisig on Ethereum (2025/03/10).
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About
rhino.fi is a Validium based on the StarkEx technology.
Tokens breakdown
Badges
About
rhino.fi is a Validium based on the StarkEx technology.
Why is the project listed in others?
Consequence: projects with a low DAC threshold rely on the honesty of few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. These entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds.
Learn more about the recategorisation here.
2020 May 26 — 2026 Jul 28
Rebranding
2022 Jul 13th
DeversiFi becomes rhino.fi: multi-chain platform gathering DeFi in one place.
DeversiFi Relaunched using Starkware
2020 Jun 3rd
DeversiFi is live, bringing first STARKex Validium for spot trading.
Funds can be stolen if
Funds can be lost if
Users can be censored if
MEV can be extracted if
STARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness.
Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 4/7 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.
There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade. Users can be explicitly censored from withdrawing (Blocklist on L1).
Users are able to trustlessly exit by submitting a Merkle proof of funds.
Set of parties responsible for signing and attesting to the availability of data.
There are no onchain assets at risk of being slashed in case of a data withholding attack, and the committee members are not publicly known.
There is no fraud detection mechanism in place. A data withholding attack can only be detected by nodes downloading the full data from the DA layer.
The committee does not meet basic security standards, either due to insufficient size, lack of member diversity, or poorly defined threshold parameters. The system lacks an effective DA bridge and it is reliant on the assumption of an honest sequencer, creating significant risks to data integrity and availability.
Anyone can relay data availability commitments to the DA bridge. In case of current relayer failure, users can collect attestations from committee members and propose new data availability commitments to the DA bridge.
Architecture
The Starkware application utilizes a data availability solution that relies on a Committee Service to ensure data persistence. This architecture comprises the following components:
- Availability Gateway: The primary interface provided by the operator for committee members to access new batch information and submit signed availability claims.
- Data Availability Committee (DAC): A group of nodes responsible for storing state data associated with each Merkle root and attesting to data availability by signing claims.
- Data Batches: Collections of transactions processed in batches that update the state of accounts, resulting in a new Merkle root representing the updated state.
Committee members run services that interact with the Availability Gateway to obtain information about new batches and submit their signed availability claims. Each batch includes a unique batch_id, a reference to a previous batch, and a list of account updates. Committee members combine this information with data from the reference batch to compute the new state and verify the Merkle root.
When the operator produces a new batch, it must be signed by a minimum number of committee members—as defined by the application’s configuration—for it to be accepted onchain. This includes all members designated as mandatory signers. If the operator attempts to submit a batch without the required signatures, it will be rejected, thereby ensuring that data remains available and consistent.
Committee members are expected to maintain a database that stores the data associated with each batch, making use of storage solutions with a replication factor of at least 2.
DA Bridge Architecture
The DA commitments are posted to the destination chain, using the Committee Verifier contract as a DA bridge. The DA commitment consists of a data hash of the transaction batch the Committee has signed off on and a concatenation of ec-signatures by signatories.
The Committee Verifier contract verifies the signatures and the data hash and if the required threshold of Committee members has signed off on the data, the hash is stored as a registeredFact in the StarkEx contract. In a separate transaction, the operator calls the updateState() function on the StarkEx contract to update the state. Before the state update is accepted, the StarkEx contract verifies the transaction public inputs by calling the isValid() function, which verifies the hash derived from state update inputs matches the hash stored by the Committee Verifier contract.
Funds can be lost if a malicious committee signs a data availability attestation for an unavailable transaction batch.
Each update to the system state must be accompanied by a ZK proof that ensures that the new state was derived by correctly applying a series of valid user transactions to the previous state. These proofs are then verified on Ethereum by a smart contract. The system state is represented using Merkle roots.
Past upgrades
The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.
2024 August 30, 10:09 UTC5changesAdmin EOA removed after our ping.
Admin EOA removed after our ping.
| contract StarkExchange (0x5d22045DAcEAB03B158031eCB7D9d06Fad24609b) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| issuedPermissions.1: | |
| - | {"permission":"upgrade","target":"0xCCa5De1e10c05c50C51ac551D9182cd31aca1889","via":[]} |
| issuedPermissions.0.target: | |
| - | "0x3a74010f2b37C02A249bd539EaE6b90Ba7CcD8aA" |
| + | "0xCCa5De1e10c05c50C51ac551D9182cd31aca1889" |
| values.$admin: | |
| - | ["0x3a74010f2b37C02A249bd539EaE6b90Ba7CcD8aA","0xCCa5De1e10c05c50C51ac551D9182cd31aca1889"] |
| + | "0xCCa5De1e10c05c50C51ac551D9182cd31aca1889" |
| } |
2024 August 29, 09:22 UTCHigh severity12changesThis minor upgrade of StarkExchange.sol and TokensAndRamping.sol adds the ability to withdraw even for blocklisted owner keys after a CLEARANCE DELAY hardcoded to 2 weeks. This can only be done by the BlockAdmin (hardcoded to DeversiFiTreasuryMultisig). Furthermore two signers of the GovernanceMultisig are rotated. A redWarning is added due to EOA Admin (was missed in the past).
This minor upgrade of StarkExchange.sol and TokensAndRamping.sol adds the ability to withdraw even for blocklisted owner keys after a CLEARANCE_DELAY hardcoded to 2 weeks. This can only be done by the BlockAdmin (hardcoded to DeversiFiTreasuryMultisig).
Furthermore two signers of the GovernanceMultisig are rotated.
A redWarning is added due to EOA Admin (was missed in the past).
| contract StarkExchange (0x5d22045DAcEAB03B158031eCB7D9d06Fad24609b) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| values.$implementation.2: | |
| - | "0x654cEF88e1EDD4B5a6d10815439768c60ca109a1" |
| + | "0x5524cB52490e01CBa4EB64F230CC661780cB6298" |
| values.$implementation.0: | |
| - | "0xc392DD8edAd534266cbf2817ee01dC68193DE23d" |
| + | "0x29Db022dbc824b78A0dA699a77E3d177f08A1191" |
| values.implementation: | |
| - | "0xc392DD8edAd534266cbf2817ee01dC68193DE23d" |
| + | "0x29Db022dbc824b78A0dA699a77E3d177f08A1191" |
| values.VERSION: | |
| - | "4.5.2-bl" |
| + | "4.5.3-blc" |
| } |
| contract GovernanceMultisig (0xCCa5De1e10c05c50C51ac551D9182cd31aca1889) { | |
| +++ description: This Multisig itself is one of the two Governors, the other being an EOA, both equally permissioned to upgrade the bridge. | |
| values.$members.5: | |
| - | "0xe0fE5b38C52A83308bEC9242d768441025DBB4D8" |
| + | "0x8501cFEE1715F5BC771cC65997F2A655f234e9Ef" |
| values.$members.0: | |
| - | "0x94aa58E38ac22518Cf0E267cd062Ed7E78eA958E" |
| + | "0x6Db55792263D558d9c98B740f8cB5E8a2e02Ec05" |
| } |
2024 April 11, 15:36 UTCHigh severity12changesBlocklist added - This implementation upgrade (Starkexchange.sol^4.5.2-bl and TokensAndRamping.sol^2024 3) adds support for a Blocklist that can be managed by the BlockAdmin. The BlockAdmin can block and unblock addresses from withdraw()ing funds on L1. The BlockAdmin is hardcoded to the deversifi Treasury Multisig 0x520Cf70a2D0B3dfB7386A2Bc9F800321F62a5c3a and cannot be changed. - Imports now get pulled from a folder structure but logic stays the same. (reason for the small diffs all over the place)
Blocklist added
- This implementation upgrade (Starkexchange.sol^4.5.2-bl and TokensAndRamping.sol^2024_3) adds support for a Blocklist that can be managed by the BlockAdmin. The BlockAdmin can block and unblock addresses from withdraw()ing funds on L1. The BlockAdmin is hardcoded to the deversifi Treasury Multisig
0x520Cf70a2D0B3dfB7386A2Bc9F800321F62a5c3aand cannot be changed. - Imports now get pulled from a folder structure but logic stays the same. (reason for the small diffs all over the place)
| contract StarkExchange (0x5d22045DAcEAB03B158031eCB7D9d06Fad24609b) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| upgradeability.implementation: | |
| - | "0xdF2f24751F7e84ccDCD39e7b49904FAB0Fb0f583" |
| + | "0xc392DD8edAd534266cbf2817ee01dC68193DE23d" |
| upgradeability.facets.StarkWare_TokensAndRamping_2022_2: | |
| - | "0x2Dbc18A3ac126abE1fF90A83Bbc3947ff7912Afb" |
| upgradeability.facets.StarkWare_TokensAndRamping_2024_3: | |
| + | "0x654cEF88e1EDD4B5a6d10815439768c60ca109a1" |
| implementations.2: | |
| - | "0x2Dbc18A3ac126abE1fF90A83Bbc3947ff7912Afb" |
| + | "0x654cEF88e1EDD4B5a6d10815439768c60ca109a1" |
| implementations.0: | |
| - | "0xdF2f24751F7e84ccDCD39e7b49904FAB0Fb0f583" |
| + | "0xc392DD8edAd534266cbf2817ee01dC68193DE23d" |
| values.implementation: | |
| - | "0xdF2f24751F7e84ccDCD39e7b49904FAB0Fb0f583" |
| + | "0xc392DD8edAd534266cbf2817ee01dC68193DE23d" |
| values.VERSION: | |
| - | "4.5.1" |
| + | "4.5.2-bl" |
| } |
2024 March 25, 16:34 UTC2changesThe upgrade delay of the StarkExchange escrow is reduced from 14 to 3 days. This is the delay after which the Governors can upgrade the implementation.
The upgrade delay of the StarkExchange escrow is reduced from 14 to 3 days. This is the delay after which the Governors can upgrade the implementation.
| contract StarkExchange (0x5d22045DAcEAB03B158031eCB7D9d06Fad24609b) { | |
| +++ description: None | |
| upgradeability.upgradeDelay: | |
| - | 1209600 |
| + | 259200 |
| } |
2024 March 21, 21:03 UTCHigh severity5changesRemove three signers and raise threshold. The gov multisig is now 4/6.
Remove three signers and raise threshold. The gov multisig is now 4/6.
| contract GovernanceMultisig (0xCCa5De1e10c05c50C51ac551D9182cd31aca1889) { | |
| +++ description: This Multisig itself is one of the two Governors, the other being an EOA, both equally permissioned to upgrade the bridge. | |
| +++ description: Signers of the Multisig | |
| +++ type: PERMISSION | |
| +++ severity: LOW | |
| values.getOwners.8: | |
| - | "0x0405107a60391Eb51821be373ff978115Ee58488" |
| +++ description: Signers of the Multisig | |
| +++ type: PERMISSION | |
| +++ severity: LOW | |
| values.getOwners.7: | |
| - | "0xd38831Bcb40bdEE0577Ee064112Fa77a38cAd3F8" |
| +++ description: Signers of the Multisig | |
| +++ type: PERMISSION | |
| +++ severity: LOW | |
| values.getOwners.6: | |
| - | "0x59232aC80E6d403b6381393e52f4665ECA328558" |
| +++ description: Threshold of the Multisig | |
| +++ type: PERMISSION | |
| +++ severity: HIGH | |
| values.getThreshold: | |
| - | 2 |
| + | 4 |
| } |
The system has a centralized operator
MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
Users can force exit the system
Force exit allows the users to escape censorship by withdrawing their funds. The system allows users to force the withdrawal of funds by submitting a request directly to the contract onchain. The request must be served within a defined time period. If this does not happen, the system will halt regular operation and permit trustless withdrawal of funds.
Users can be censored if the operator refuses to include their transactions. However, there exists a mechanism to independently exit the system.
Forced exit
If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular exit they can submit their withdrawal requests directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular exit.
Emergency exit
If the enough time deadline passes and the forced exit is still ignored the user can put the system into a frozen state, disallowing further state updates. In that case everybody can withdraw by submitting a merkle proof of their funds with their L1 transaction.
Blocklist
The BlockAdmin (see Permissions section) can add addresses to a Blocklist, preventing the finalization of their withdrawal on L1. This effectively locks the blocked party’s funds in the bridge escrow on L1 if the withdrawal had already been initiated on L2. The Blocklist is also effective on forced withdrawals.
Users can be censored if their address gets added to the Blocklist by the BlockAdmin.
Ethereum
Actors:
A Multisig with 2/4 threshold.
- Can upgrade with 8d delay
- SHARPVerifierCallProxy - acting directly with 8d delay
- Can interact with SHARPVerifierCallProxy
- Administer the CallProxy’s
GOVERNANCE_ADMINand role-admin hierarchy. This AccessControl role is separate from the outer proxy governor that schedules implementation upgrades - Grant and revoke application roles, including the
APP_GOVERNORrole that controls caller-specific fallback routes - Route fallback calls from specific callers to a still-active registry in the default verifier’s reference chain. This principally determines which verifier and bootloader configuration processes their proof submissions; the proxy’s explicit
isValidentry point always queries the default target
- Administer the CallProxy’s
A Multisig with 4/6 threshold.
- Can upgrade with 3d delay
- StarkExchange - acting directly with 3d delay
- Can interact with StarkExchange
- Can interact with StarkExchange
- Permissioned to regularly update the state of the L2 on L1. Each state update must have been proven via the SHARP verifier and contains state diffs for data availability
Ethereum
Data Availability Committee (DAC) contract verifying and storing data availability claims from DAC Members (via a multisignature check). The threshold of valid signatures is 4.
Central Validium contract. Receives (verified) state roots from the Operator, allows users to consume L2 -> L1 messages and send L1 -> L2 messages. Critical configuration values for the L2’s logic are defined here by various governance roles.
- Roles:
- admin: RhinofiAdminMultisig
- operators: EOA 1
- tokenAdmins: EOA 2, EOA 3
Permissionless commitment calculator and registry used by the Solidity STARK verifiers. Anyone may submit a public-memory page and interaction elements; the contract computes its hash and cumulative product and registers the fact key committing to them, which the CPU verifier must bind to the proof. It is part of the proof verifier, not an application-level program registry. A malicious or nonconforming implementation can break public-memory soundness; binding to a different honest registry generally causes a liveness failure instead.
Upgradeable call router through which Starknet and other applications access SHARP fact registries. It uses call, not delegatecall, so facts and immutable verifier configuration remain at each target registry. The explicit isValid entry point always queries the default target. Other calls handled by the fallback, principally proof submissions, can be routed per caller to a still-active registry in the default target’s reference chain. The default target can be replaced by SHARP Multisig after 8d.
- Roles:
- admin: SHARP Multisig
- appGovernor: SHARP Multisig
- appRoleAdmin: SHARP Multisig
- governanceAdmin: SHARP Multisig
Immutable GPS statement verifier shared by Starknet and other StarkWare systems. It verifies a STARK proof of the exact Cairo bootloader stored onchain, forces the bootloader configuration into public memory, and registers a fact for every bootloader task. A fact is also considered valid when it exists in the time-limited reference fact registry.
Immutable GPS statement verifier shared by Starknet and other StarkWare systems. It verifies a STARK proof of the exact Cairo bootloader stored onchain, forces the bootloader configuration into public memory, and registers a fact for every bootloader task. A fact is also considered valid when it exists in the time-limited reference fact registry.
Immutable GPS statement verifier shared by Starknet and other StarkWare systems. It verifies a STARK proof of the exact Cairo bootloader stored onchain, forces the bootloader configuration into public memory, and registers a fact for every bootloader task. A fact is also considered valid when it exists in the time-limited reference fact registry.
Permissionless commitment calculator and registry used by the Solidity STARK verifiers. Anyone may submit a public-memory page and interaction elements; the contract computes its hash and cumulative product and registers the fact key committing to them, which the CPU verifier must bind to the proof. It is part of the proof verifier, not an application-level program registry. A malicious or nonconforming implementation can break public-memory soundness; binding to a different honest registry generally causes a liveness failure instead.
Immutable GPS statement verifier shared by Starknet and other StarkWare systems. It verifies a STARK proof of the exact Cairo bootloader stored onchain, forces the bootloader configuration into public memory, and registers a fact for every bootloader task. A fact is also considered valid when it exists in the time-limited reference fact registry.
Adapter between the core contract and the SHARPVerifierCallProxy. Stores the Cairo programHash (3174901404014912024702042974619036870715605532092680335571201877913899936957).
Helper contract for registering limit orders from L1.
The current deployment carries some associated risks:
Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is a 3d delay on code upgrades.