Base
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Base is an Optimistic Rollup that has been developed on the Ethereum network, utilizing OP Stack technology.
$7.22 B
1.19%
- The proof system is still under development.
- Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators.
- Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.
| Website | base.org |
|---|---|
| App | bridge.base.org |
| Docs | docs.base.orgstack.optimism.io |
| Explorer | basescan.orgbase.superscan.networkbase.blockscout.combase.l2scan.co |
| Repository | github.com/base-org |
| Social | @BuildOnBaseDiscordbase.mirror.xyz |
| rollup.codes | rollup.codes/base |
Badges
About
Base is an Optimistic Rollup that has been developed on the Ethereum network, utilizing OP Stack technology.
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Funds can be stolen if
Funds can be frozen if
MEV can be extracted if
State validation
In developmentCurrently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.
Exit window
NoneThere is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.
Sequencer failure
Self sequenceProposer failure
Cannot withdrawOnly the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.
Base is a - The project calls itself a rollup.
- L2 state roots are posted to Ethereum L1.
- Inputs for the state transition function are posted to L1.
- A source-available node exists that can recreate the state from L1 data. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code. View code
- The proof system is still under development.
- Users’ withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators.
- Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.
- Upgrades unrelated to on-chain provable bugs provide less than 30d to exit.
Fraud proofs are in development
Ultimately, OP stack chains will use interactive fraud proofs to enforce state correctness. This feature is currently in development and the system permits invalid state roots.
Funds can be stolen if an invalid state root is submitted to the system (CRITICAL).
All data required for proofs is published on chain
All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.
The system has a centralized operator
The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.
MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
Users can force any transaction
Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on-chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract directly.
Regular exit
The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is finalized the funds become available for withdrawal on L1. The process of block finalization takes a challenge period of 7d to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.
Funds can be frozen if the centralized validator goes down. Users cannot produce blocks themselves and exiting the system requires new block production (CRITICAL).
Forced exit
If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular exit they can submit their withdrawal requests directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all withdrawals, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular withdrawals initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular exit.
EVM compatible smart contracts are supported
OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.
The system uses the following set of permissioned addresses:
Owner of AddressManager. Admin of OptimismPortal, SystemConfig, L2OutputOracle, L1ERC721Bridge, OptimismMintableERC20Factory, L1StandardBridge.
Central actor allowed to post new L2 state roots to L1.
Central actor allowed to delete L2 state roots proposed by a Proposer.
Central actor allowed to pause deposits and withdrawals.
Used in:
This address is the owner of the ProxyAdmin. It can upgrade the bridge implementation potentially gaining access to all funds. This is a Gnosis Safe with 2 / 2 threshold.
Those are the participants of the AdminMultisig.
Core multisig of the Base team, it’s a member of the AdminMultisig, meaning it can upgrade the bridge implementation potentially gaining access to all funds. Note that the signature of Optimism Foundation multisig is also required. This is a Gnosis Safe with 3 / 6 threshold.
Those are the participants of the BaseMultisig.
Base Multisig being a member of a Challenger1of2 contract. It can challenge state roots without going through the fault proof process. This is a Gnosis Safe with 3 / 9 threshold.
Those are the participants of the BaseMultisig2.
Admin of the shared SuperchainConfig contract.
Used in:
Owner of the SuperchainProxyAdmin. This is a Gnosis Safe with 2 / 2 threshold.
Used in:
Those are the participants of the SuperchainProxyAdminOwner.
Address allowed to pause withdrawals in case of an emergency. It is controlled by the Security Council multisig, but a deputy module allows the Foundation to act through it. The Security Council can disable the module if the Foundation acts maliciously. This is a Gnosis Safe with 1 / 1 threshold. It uses the following modules: DeputyGuardianModule.
Used in:
Those are the participants of the GuardianMultisig.
Member of the SuperChainProxyAdminOwner. This is a Gnosis Safe with 5 / 7 threshold.
Used in:
Those are the participants of the FoundationMultisig_1.
Member of the ProxyAdminOwner. It implements a LivenessModule used to remove inactive (0s) members while making sure that the threshold remains above 75%. If the number of members falls below 8, the Foundation takes ownership of the Security Council. This is a Gnosis Safe with 10 / 13 threshold. It uses the following modules: LivenessModule.
Used in:
Those are the participants of the SecurityCouncilMultisig.
Deputy to the GuardianMultisig. It can also challenge state roots without going through the fault proof process. Its signature is also required to upgrade the system. This is a Gnosis Safe with 5 / 7 threshold.
Used in:
Those are the participants of the FoundationMultisig_2.
The system consists of the following smart contracts on the host chain (Ethereum):
The L2OutputOracle contract contains a list of proposed state roots which Proposers assert to be a result of block execution. Currently only the PROPOSER address can submit new state roots.
Upgrade delay: No delay
Implementation used in:
The L1CrossDomainMessenger (L1xDM) contract sends messages from L1 to L2, and relays messages from L2 onto L1. In the event that a message sent from L1 to L2 is rejected for exceeding the L2 epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.
Upgrade delay: No delay
Implementation used in:
Upgrade delay: No delay
Implementation used in:
This contract is the permissioned challenger of the system. It can delete non finalized roots without going through the fault proof process. It is functionally equivalent to a 1/2 multisig where neither party can remove the other’s permission to execute a Challenger call. It is controlled by the GuardianMultisig and the OptimismMultisig.
The SuperchainConfig contract is used to manage global configuration values for multiple OP Chains within a single Superchain network. The SuperchainConfig contract manages the PAUSED_SLOT, a boolean value indicating whether the Superchain is paused, and GUARDIAN_SLOT, the address of the guardian which can pause and unpause the system.
Upgrade delay: No delay
Proxy used in:
Value Locked is calculated based on these smart contracts and tokens:
Main entry point for users depositing ERC20 token that do not require custom gateway.
Upgrade delay: No delay
Implementation used in:
Main entry point for users depositing ETH.
Upgrade delay: No delay
Implementation used in:
wstETH Vault for custom wstETH Gateway. Fully controlled by Lido governance.
The current deployment carries some associated risks:
Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).
