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Molten Network
Critical contracts can be upgraded by an EOA which could result in the loss of all funds.
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About
Molten is an Orbit stack L3 on Arbitrum with Celestia DA, created by the UniDex team.
Badges
About
Molten is an Orbit stack L3 on Arbitrum with Celestia DA, created by the UniDex team.
Why is the project listed in others?
Consequence: projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds.
Learn more about the recategorisation here.
2025 Apr 15 — 2026 Apr 15
This section shows how much data the project publishes to its data-availability (DA) layer over time. The project currently posts data to
Celestia.
2025 May 07 — 2026 Apr 15
Molten integrates Espresso sequencer
2025 Jan 30th
Molten adds the Espresso TEE sequencer to their Celestia DA with Blobstream.
Molten starts using Blobstream
2024 Nov 13th
Upgraded ChallengeManager contract to the version that uses Celestia with Blobstream bridge
Arbitrum OneFunds can be stolen if
MEV can be extracted if
| SEQUENCER FAILURE | STATE VALIDATION | DATA AVAILABILITY | EXIT WINDOW | PROPOSER FAILURE | |
| Arbitrum One L2 | Self sequence | Fraud proofs (INT) | Onchain | 10d | Self propose |
| Molten Network L3 • Individual | Self sequence | Fraud proofs (INT) | Onchain | None | Self propose |
| Molten Network L3 • Combined | Self sequence | Fraud proofs (INT) | Onchain | None | Self propose |
No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.
All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.
There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.
Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.
Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by a set of whitelisted validators. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.
Whitelisted validators propose state roots as children of a previous state root. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. This structure forms a graph, and therefore, in the contracts, state roots are referred to as nodes. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.1 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be moved from one node to one of its children, either by calling stakeOnExistingNode or stakeOnNewNode. New nodes cannot be created faster than the minimum assertion period by the same validator, currently set to 15m. The oldest unconfirmed node can be confirmed if the challenge period has passed and there are no siblings, and rejected if the parent is not a confirmed node or if the challenge period has passed and no one is staked on it.
Funds can be stolen if none of the whitelisted verifiers checks the published state. Fraud proofs assume at least one honest and able validator (CRITICAL).
A challenge can be started between two siblings, i.e. two different state roots that share the same parent, by calling the startChallenge function. Validators cannot be in more than one challenge at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with partial concurrency. Since each challenge lasts 6d 8h, this implies that the protocol can be subject to delay attacks, where a malicious actor can delay withdrawals as long as they are willing to pay the cost of losing their stakes. If the protocol is delayed attacked, the new stake requirement increases exponentially for each challenge period of delay. Challenges are played via a bisection game, where asserter and challenger play together to find the first instruction of disagreement. Such instruction is then executed onchain in the WASM OneStepProver contract to determine the winner, who then gets half of the stake of the loser. As said before, a state root is rejected only when no one left is staked on it. The protocol does not enforces valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claim and then provide incorrect midpoints.
Past upgrades
The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.
Arbitrum OneThe system has a centralized sequencer
While forcing transaction is open to anyone the system employs a privileged sequencer that has priority for submitting transaction batches and ordering transactions.
MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.
Users can force any transaction
Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly. After a delay of 1d in which a Sequencer has failed to include a transaction that was directly posted to the smart contract, it can be forcefully included by anyone on the host chain, which finalizes its ordering.
Espresso TEE sequencer
Integration with Espresso sequencing. In addition to providing regular pre-confirmations, the sequencer publishes blocks to the Espresso Network. The integration expects the transaction batch poster to run inside a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), and it is programmed to verify batch inclusion in a Espresso Network block before publishing it to the host chain. However, the confirmations provided by Espresso Network are additive, and the batch poster can skip Espresso inclusion checks should the Espresso Network be down or unavailable. To ensure the batch poster is running inside a TEE, the SequencerInbox contract on the host chain was updated so that the data posting function also includes a TEE attestation as input (a “quote” / signature) that is verified onchain by the EspressoTEEVerifier for each batch transaction. The verifier checks whether the signature originates from inside the TEE and reverts if unsuccessful.
Withdrawals can be delayed if the owner of EspressoTEEVerifier updates the contract verification values (enclave hash, signer) and it is no longer possible to verify the TEE quote.
Arbitrum OneAutonomous exit
Users can (eventually) exit the system by pushing the transaction on L1 and providing the corresponding state root. The only way to prevent such withdrawal is via an upgrade.
EVM compatible smart contracts are supported
Arbitrum One uses Nitro technology that allows running fraud proofs by executing EVM code on top of WASM.
Arbitrum One
Roles:
Can submit transaction batches or commitments to the SequencerInbox contract on the host chain.
Can propose new state roots (called nodes) and challenge state roots on the host chain.
Actors:
A Multisig with 3/8 threshold.
- Can upgrade with no delay
- RollupProxy UpgradeExecutor
- SequencerInbox UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- Inbox UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- ERC20Gateway UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- ChallengeManager UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- UpgradeExecutor UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- RollupEventInbox UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- GatewayRouter UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- Outbox UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- Bridge UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- Can interact with RollupProxy
- Pause and unpause and set important roles and parameters in the system contracts: Can delegate Sequencer management to a BatchPosterManager address, manage data availability, DACs and the fastConfirmer role, set the Sequencer-only window, introduce an allowList to the bridge and whitelist Inboxes/Outboxes UpgradeExecutor
Participants (8):
0xbCDb…C2320xe521…575d0x62ea…849A0x9e14…BcD00xe62a…6A6b0xEC11…93710xbf85…6d24CalderaA Multisig with 2/4 threshold.
- Can interact with EspressoTEEVerifier
- change the modular TEE verifier contracts
- Can interact with EspressoSGXTEEVerifier
- set the enclaveHash (hash of enclave’s code and initial data) and delete all registered signers
- Can interact with EspressoNitroTEEVerifier
- set the enclaveHash (hash of enclave’s code and initial data) and delete all registered signers
A Multisig with 4/6 threshold.
- Can upgrade with no delay
- ArbitrumBlobstream
- Can interact with ArbitrumBlobstream
- can freeze the bridge contract and update the list of authorized relayers
- Can upgrade with no delay
- RollupProxy UpgradeExecutor
- SequencerInbox UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- Inbox UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- ERC20Gateway UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- ChallengeManager UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- UpgradeExecutor UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- RollupEventInbox UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- GatewayRouter UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- Outbox UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- Bridge UpgradeExecutor → ProxyAdmin
- Can interact with RollupProxy
- Pause and unpause and set important roles and parameters in the system contracts: Can delegate Sequencer management to a BatchPosterManager address, manage data availability, DACs and the fastConfirmer role, set the Sequencer-only window, introduce an allowList to the bridge and whitelist Inboxes/Outboxes UpgradeExecutor
- Can interact with SequencerInbox
- Add/remove batchPosters (Sequencers)
- A Sequencer - acting directly
- A Validator - acting directly
- Can interact with ArbitrumBlobstream
- it is a ‘Relayer’ and can call commitHeaderRange() to commit block ranges. Since adding and removing Relayers emits no events, there can be more relayers than are presented here
Base Chain
Actors:
A Multisig with 4/6 threshold.
- Can upgrade with no delay
- BaseBlobstream
- Can interact with BaseBlobstream
- can freeze the bridge contract and update the list of authorized relayers
- Can interact with BaseBlobstream
- it is a ‘Relayer’ and can call commitHeaderRange() to commit block ranges. Since adding and removing Relayers emits no events, there can be more relayers than are presented here
Ethereum
Actors:
A Multisig with 4/6 threshold.
- Can upgrade with no delay
- EthereumBlobstream
- Can interact with EthereumBlobstream
- can freeze the bridge contract and update the list of authorized relayers
- Can interact with EthereumBlobstream
- it is a ‘Relayer’ and can call commitHeaderRange() to commit block ranges. Since adding and removing Relayers emits no events, there can be more relayers than are presented here
Arbitrum One
Central contract for the project’s configuration like its execution logic hash (wasmModuleRoot) and addresses of the other system contracts. Entry point for Proposers creating new Rollup Nodes (state commitments) and Challengers submitting fraud proofs (In the Orbit stack, these two roles are both held by the Validators).
- Roles:
- admin: UpgradeExecutor; ultimately Caldera Multisig 1, EOA 1
- owner: UpgradeExecutor; ultimately Caldera Multisig 1, EOA 1
- validators: EOA 3
The Espresso TEE sequencer (registered in this contract) can submit transaction batches or commitments here. This version of the SequencerInbox also supports commitments to data that is posted to Celestia.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Caldera Multisig 1, EOA 1
- batchPosterManager: EOA 2
- batchPosters: EOA 2
Contract that allows challenging state roots. Can be called through the RollupProxy by Validators or the UpgradeExecutor.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Caldera Multisig 1, EOA 1
Central contract defining the access control permissions for upgrading the system contract implementations.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Caldera Multisig 1, EOA 1
- executors: Caldera Multisig 1, EOA 1
Escrows deposited ERC-20 assets for the canonical Bridge. Upon depositing, a generic token representation will be minted at the destination. Withdrawals are initiated by the Outbox contract.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Caldera Multisig 1, EOA 1
All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation.
This routing contract maps tokens to the correct escrow (gateway) to be then bridged with canonical messaging.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Caldera Multisig 1, EOA 1
ZK-backed verifier for AWS Nitro enclave attestations. Verifies ZK proofs (RiscZero, Succinct SP1 or Pico) that attest AWS Nitro cert chain validation was executed correctly off-chain.
- Roles:
- owner: EOA 4
One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.
One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.
The QuoteVerifier contract is used by the EspressoTEEVerifier to verify the validity of the TEE quote. It references a PCCSRouter (0x0d089B3fA00CBAD0a5098025519e9e4620622acF), an access point for Intel SGX ‘collateral’, crucial references of which some modular contracts are unverified.
TEE gateway contract that can be used to 1) register signers that were generated inside a TEE and 2) verify the signatures of such signers. It supports both Intel SGX and AWS Nitro TEEs through modular contracts.
- Roles:
- owner: SafeL2
One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine. This version uses the Blobstream DA bridge (ArbitrumBlobstream) as source of truth for the DA referenced by the fault proof.
One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.
- Roles:
- owner: UpgradeExecutor
Helper contract sending configuration data over the bridge during the systems initialization.
- Roles:
- admin: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Caldera Multisig 1, EOA 1
This contract implements view only utilities for validators.
Verifier contract for SP1 proofs (v5.0.0).
One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.
Verifies attestations of an Intel SGX TEE.
- Roles:
- owner: SafeL2
Verifies attestations of an AWS Nitro TEE. Note: currently only Succinct proofs are used.
- Roles:
- owner: SafeL2
The Blobstream DA bridge. This contract is used to bridge data commitments between Celestia and the destination chain. It specifies relayers that commit block ranges, but due to the lack of emitted events, there may be more relayers than are presented here.
- Roles:
- admin: BlobstreamMultisig
- guardians: BlobstreamMultisig
- relayers: EOA 5, EOA 6
Base Chain
The Blobstream DA bridge. This contract is used to bridge data commitments between Celestia and the destination chain. It specifies relayers that commit block ranges, but due to the lack of emitted events, there may be more relayers than are presented here.
- Roles:
- admin: BlobstreamMultisig
- guardians: BlobstreamMultisig
- relayers: EOA 7, EOA 8
Ethereum
The Blobstream DA bridge. This contract is used to bridge data commitments between Celestia and the destination chain. It specifies relayers that commit block ranges, but due to the lack of emitted events, there may be more relayers than are presented here.
- Roles:
- admin: BlobstreamMultisig
- guardians: BlobstreamMultisig
- relayers: EOA 10, EOA 9
The current deployment carries some associated risks:
Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).